JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. 1.Challenge in this petition is to Sections 4, 5, 6, 8(1), 8(3) and 9 of the Chhattisgarh Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Durg (Acquisition) Act, 2021 (henceforth ‘the Act, 2021’); the petitioners further sought a direction towards the State authorities to include a mechanism or scheme to protect the interest of the petitioner, who is a creditor of the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Durg (henceforth ‘the College’); and the petitioners also sought a relief that the provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 9 of the Act, 2021 be declared as unconstitutional, void ab initio and ultra vires to the provisions of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (henceforth ‘the TP Act’). 2.(i)The background case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a charitable educational institution and the society runs various institutions. The respondent No.3 is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act and is running a Medical, Dental and Pharmacy College and also a hospital of 750 beded hospital. They were running the medical college in the name of ‘Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital, Motilal Nehru Nagar, Bhilai’. The letter of intent dated 30-12-2017 (Annexure-P/2) was addressed by the respondent No.3 whereby the entire assets of the Medical College and Hospital was issued in favour of the petitioners by the Board of Directors. The total consideration of the property was fixed at Rs.165 crores and token acknowledgment initially an amount of Rs.2.5 crores was paid by the petitioner to the respondent No.3, who have been shown as party No.2 & 1, respectively. (ii) Subsequently, the Asset Purchase Agreement (Annexure – P/3) was executed in between the petitioner and the respondent No.3 wherein the following assets (as mentioned in para 8.3 of petition) were agreed to be purchased by the petitioner No.1 : a) Medical College under the name and style of "Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College located at Kurud Road, Durg District, Kachundar, Chhattisgarh – 490024; b) Medical Hospital under the same campus at Kurud Road, Durg District, Kachandur, Chhattisgarh – 490024; and c) 25 acres of land at Durg District, Kachandur - Property, more particularly described in the asset purchase Agreement, along with all movable and immovable assets, rights, title, entitlements, intellectual property, equipment, governmental authorizations etc. in relation to the aforesaid properties. (iii) Thereafter, advance amount of Rs.4,04,43,000/- was paid, as per Article-3 in part. in relation to the aforesaid properties. (iii) Thereafter, advance amount of Rs.4,04,43,000/- was paid, as per Article-3 in part. It was further agreed that for whatsoever reasons buyer fails and wants to delay the process of registry, it shall do so after making balance payment of Rs.133.50 crores to seller on or before 25-2-2018, after receipt of which seller will give power of attorney to buyer for registry. Further it was agreed that if the purchaser failed to pay the balance amount by 25-2-2018 the seller shall be at liberty to continue/not with this asset purchase agreement. (iv) Some dispute arose between the parties, therefore, the notice for termination of contract was served to the petitioner on 30-6-2018 (Annexure-P/4) and thereafter some negotiations were going on in between the parties. In the meanwhile, the Act, 2021 came to into force. Thus, this petition. 3.(A)Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that Sections 4, 5, 6, 8(1), 8(3) and 9 of the Act, 2021 were beyond the legislative competence of the State, therefore, they are required to be declared unconstitutional. He would further submit that Section 4 starts with non obstante clause, which includes that any order or judgment or decree of any Court on in any contract the properties of the College together with its associated hospital shall vest in Government and any right, possession and interest of any person including a juristic or other organisation shall be ceased. He would submit that Section 4 is in two parts that any order of decree is nullified by this Act and would not permissible to be executed including the contract and the contract, which is saved under the TP Act, which is a central legislation the right accrued cannot be ceased, therefore, the said part is beyond the legislative competence of the State. (B)Learned counsel would submit that the said order, judgment, decree of the Court are saved either under Entry 77 of List-I or Entry 65 of List-II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. He would submit that by such State legislation it infringes upon the jurisdiction and power of all Courts. He would submit that the legislature made by the State cannot overrule the Court’s orders/decisions by enacting the law and judicial pronouncements cannot be nullified. He would submit that by such State legislation it infringes upon the jurisdiction and power of all Courts. He would submit that the legislature made by the State cannot overrule the Court’s orders/decisions by enacting the law and judicial pronouncements cannot be nullified. Learned counsel would next submit that what has been done by the impugned Act by the State Government is clearly entrenching upon the judicial field to nullify the judgments and orders, which is violative of judicial powers. To buttress his contention, learned counsel would place reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Janapada Sabha Chhindwara v The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. and Anr. (1970) 1 SCC 509 (C)Learned counsel would submit that albeit it is open to change the law in general by changing the basis but it is not open to set aside an individual decision inter parties. He would submit that since there is a demarcation between legislative and judicial functions predicated on the theory of separation of powers, but the encroachment not permissible. He would also submit that no legislature has the power to abrogate the orders/judgments/decisions or judicial adjudications of the Courts by merely declaring under the law made by it. He would submit that there is no effect by making the provision under Sections 4 and 5, therefore, the same are liable to be declared ultra vires. (D)Learned counsel would submit that Section 9 of the Act, 2021 purport that the property shall free from all encumbrances and Government shall not be liable to pay any person living or juristic anything for any liabilities of its owners before the vesting would also overriding the provisions of Section 100 and 55(6)(b) of the TP Act. He would submit that since the TP Act gives a right over property and is a central legislation though the State can pass the legislation for acquisition and requisitioning of property under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List III, the effect of Sections 100 and 55(6)(b) of the TP Act cannot be nullified. He would submit that since the TP Act gives a right over property and is a central legislation though the State can pass the legislation for acquisition and requisitioning of property under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List III, the effect of Sections 100 and 55(6)(b) of the TP Act cannot be nullified. In support of his contention, learned counsel would place reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (1993) Supp (1) SCC 96, Cheviti Venkanna v State of Telangana AIR 2016 SC 4982 , Forum of People’s Collective Efforts v State of WB AIR OnLine 2021 SC 231, Delhi Development Authority v Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Others AIR 2000 SC 573 . 4.(a)Learned counsel appearing for the State, ex adverso, would submit that the constitutionality of the legislation cannot be challenged in the vacuum and there must be a cause of action to challenge the same. He would submit that since the petitioner has not even approached the competent civil Court having jurisdiction there exist no cause of action to challenge the legislation. He would further submit that since the petitioner has not produced the Board resolution therefore the present petition is liable to be dismissed as there is no locus standi to the petitioner institution. In support of his contention, learned counsel would place reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v Union of India and Others (1950) SCC 833 : 1950 SCC OnLine SC 49. (a)Learned counsel would refer to Section 54 of the TP Act to submit that no charge will be created by merely entering into the contract. He would submit that the remedy has been provided in Section 9 of the Act, which was never invoked by the petitioner and he is dragging a purely civil matter to the writ court only to save the court fees. According to him, the time was essence of the contract and since the petitioner has not acted in the time no remedy of specific performance can otherwise be granted to the petitioner. According to him, the time was essence of the contract and since the petitioner has not acted in the time no remedy of specific performance can otherwise be granted to the petitioner. 5.Learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.3 would submit that the petitioner has already availed the alternate remedy and filed the claim as financial creditor before the National Company Law Tribunal (henceforth ‘the NCLT’), but the said claim has been rejected by the Insolvency Resolution Professional (henceforth ‘the IRP’) wherein it was held that time is essence of the contract. Thereafter, the application under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 moved before the NCLT, Cuttack. He would submit that when the petitioner is already availed a remedy before the NCLT he cannot turn back to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the legislation. In support of his contention, he would place reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in the matters of K.S. Rashid and Sons v Income Tax Investigation Commission AIR 1954 SC 207 , Tanzeem khurseed Zargar v J&K Special Tribunal & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (JKL) 2021, K. Jayaram & Ors. v Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. (2022) 12 SCC 815 , and the decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in the matter of Sunil Tandon v Union and Anr., WPC No.10645 of 2021 (decided on 22-10-2021). 6.We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents. 7.Since maintainability issue was not raised in the return of the State about the fact that the petitioner had filed the writ petition not on the basis of any Board resolution, we would like to refrain to deliberate on the said issue. 6.We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents. 7.Since maintainability issue was not raised in the return of the State about the fact that the petitioner had filed the writ petition not on the basis of any Board resolution, we would like to refrain to deliberate on the said issue. 8.For proper adjudication of the present dispute, it would be necessary to quote the provisions of Sections 4 to 9 of the Act, 2021, which are as follows : 4.Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any order or judgment or decree of any Court or in any contract or other document, on and from the date of commencement of this Act, Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College Kachandur, Durg, Chhattisgarh together with its associated Hospital and all its assets, rights and interests, shall vest in Government and any right, possession and interest of any person living or juristic, individuals, companies, shareholders or any other organization in respect of it shall be ceased. 5(1)Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any order or judgment or decree of any Court or in any contract or other document, relating to the establishment vested in the Government under Section 4, immediately before the commencement of this Act, the same shall be deemed to have been terminated on such commencement. (2)On commencement of this Act, the administration and management by any Company, Society, person living or juristic or any organization who had managed and administered these establishment vested before in the Government under Section 4 shall be deemed to ceased. 6.For the purpose of transfer and vesting of the establishments of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Durg, in the Government under section 4, the Government shall pay to Chandulal Chandrakar Memnorial Hospital, registered under Companies Act, 1956 (No. 1 of 1956), Reg. No. 10-11769 of 1997, the amount payable under sub-section (2) of section 8. 7(1)The Government shall appoint by notification, a person having adequate knowledge and experience in matters of administration, medical and finance, as Special Officer for the purpose of fixing the amount specified in Section 6. (2)For assisting the Special Officer in exercising the powers conferred on him under this Act the Government may depute such other officers as it may think fit. (2)For assisting the Special Officer in exercising the powers conferred on him under this Act the Government may depute such other officers as it may think fit. (3)The salaries and allowances of the Special Officer and other officers deputed under sub-section (2) shall be as fixed by the Government. 8(1)The Special Officer appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 7 shall do valuation of the moveable and immovable property which has vested in Government under Section 4, (2)In view of the compulsory nature of taking over, the amount payable shall be paid up to two times the amount of actual valuation determined under sub-section (1), (3)No other money shall be payable to any person living or juristic for vesting of any properties in the Government under Section 4. 9(1)The properties of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Durg, Chhattisgarh shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and Government shall not be liable to pay any person living or juristic anything for any liabilities of its owners before the vesting, (2)The liabilities of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College, Kachandur, Durg, Chhattisgarh shall remain the liabilities of its owners before the vesting in the Government and can be recovered by their creditors from them by following normal process of law. 9.The primary contention of the petitioner is that Section 4 of the Act, 2021 leading to cease of any right, interest as against the Government in vesting. The Act, 2021 was promulgated on 3-9-2021. After acquisition of Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital, the employees filed a petition before this Court in the matter of Devraj Sahu & Others v State of Chhattisgarh & Others, WPS No.1088 of 2022 (decided on 31-7-2023) wherein by order dated 31-7-2003 the statement of Objects and Reasons were reproduced. The same is quoted below for ready reference : 10. Section 4, which is one of the limb of challenge, which is reproduced hereinabove, starts with non obstante clause that Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Medical College Kachandur, Durg, Chhattisgarh together with its associated Hospital and all its assets, rights and interests, shall vest in Government. 11.The constitutional validity of such provisions was deliberated by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Devraj Sahu (supra) wherein certain findings in respect of Sections 3, 4, 5 & 9 of the Act, 2021 were recorded. 11.The constitutional validity of such provisions was deliberated by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Devraj Sahu (supra) wherein certain findings in respect of Sections 3, 4, 5 & 9 of the Act, 2021 were recorded. Since the findings have already been recorded by the co-ordinate Bench, the rule of stare decisis require that such findings must be adhered to. In Devraj Sahu (supra) the Court observed thus at para 23. 23) Section 5 of the Act of 2021 specifically provides that all relationship of any person with the Hospital establishment shall be deemed to have been terminated immediately upon vesting of the rights with the Government. As such, a conjoint reading of Sections 3, 4 & 5 of the Act of 2021 would show that the object of the Act of 2021 was only pertaining to the limited acquisition of the Hospital without interfering and touching upon any other activity which the private company was engaged in at the time of acquisition and the Hospital establishment was separated from all relationship either contractual or otherwise and the same was vested with the State Government from the date of acquisition. Thus, relationship, rights, interest, claims, etc. of any person including the petitioners concerning the private company would stand as against the private company and it shall be the responsibility of the private company – respondent No.3 herein to satisfy the said claims, etc., if any, which is evident from Section 9(2) of the Act of 2021. In view of the aforesaid fact, it is not open for this Court to record the contrary finding, which had already been recorded. Even otherwise we do not find any cogent reasons to do so. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously argued that since the amount of earnest money was paid by them the statutory charge has been created over the property and the property having been substituted in terms of money after the acquisition for the unpaid amount the petitioner would hold a statutory charge according to the provisions of Section 55(6)(b) of the TP Act. Since much reliance has been placed on the provisions of Section 55(6)(b) it would be relevant to reproduce the same : 55. Since much reliance has been placed on the provisions of Section 55(6)(b) it would be relevant to reproduce the same : 55. Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller.—In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immoveable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold:— xxxxxxxxx (6) The buyer is entitled— xxxxxxxxx (b)unless he has improperly declined to accept delivery of the property, to a charge on the property, as against the seller and all persons claiming under him, to the extent of the seller’s interest in the property, for the amount of any purchase-money properly paid by the buyer in anticipation of the delivery and for interest on such amount; and, when he properly declines to accept the delivery, also for the earnest (if any) and for the costs (if any) awarded to him of a suit to compel specific performance of the contract or to obtain a decree for its rescission. 13. ‘Sale’ is defined under Section 54 of the TP Act. The same is quoted below : 54. “Sale” defined.—"Sale” is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised. Sale how made.—Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument. In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property. Contract for sale.—A contract for the sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. 14.Perusal of the above Section would show that a contract for sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place and it will not create charge on such property. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. 14.Perusal of the above Section would show that a contract for sale of immoveable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place and it will not create charge on such property. Statutory right, which the petitioner claimed to have been created in his favour by Section 55(6)(b) of the TP Act. Reading of Section 55(6)(b) would show that it is a conditional, which speaks about buyer's entitlement. It starts with the words “unless he has improperly declined to accept delivery of the property, to a charge on the property, as against the seller and all persons claiming under him. So the ingredient to invoke such Section, the condition placed therein is required to be in existence. 15. This Section came to be interpreted by the Supreme Court in the matter of Delhi Development Authority v Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Others, (2000) 10 SCC 130 wherein the Court held that in so far as money and interest on such amount are concerned, the provisions can be pressed into motion unless the buyer has improperly declined to accept delivery. The charge is available against the seller and all persons claiming under him. This charge in favour of the buyer is the converse of the seller’s charge under Section 55(4)(b) and it would a statutory charge, which is different from the contract of charge which the buyer may entitle to claim under a separate contract and no charge is available under the agreement is genuine. 16. The said Section further was interpreted by the Supreme Court in the matter of Videocon Properties Ltd. v Dr. Bhalchandra Laboratories and Others, AIR 2004 SC 1787 : 2004 AIR SCW 1353 that the buyer's charge engrafted in clause (b) of paragraph 6 of Section 55 of the TP Act would extend and enure to the purchase money or earnest money paid before the title passes and property has been delivered by the purchaser to the seller. Bhalchandra Laboratories and Others, AIR 2004 SC 1787 : 2004 AIR SCW 1353 that the buyer's charge engrafted in clause (b) of paragraph 6 of Section 55 of the TP Act would extend and enure to the purchase money or earnest money paid before the title passes and property has been delivered by the purchaser to the seller. Para 14 of the said judgment is quoted below : 14)The buyer's charge engrafted in clause (b) of paragraph 6 of Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act would extend and enure to the purchase-money or earnest money paid before the title passes and property has been delivered by the purchaser to the seller, on the seller's interest in the property unless the purchaser has improperly declined to accept delivery of property or when he properly declines to accept delivery including for the interest on purchase money and costs awarded to the purchaser of a suit to compel specific performance of the contract or to obtain a decree for its rescission. The principle underlying the above provision is a trite principle of justice, equity and good conscience. The charge would last until the conveyance is executed by the seller and possession is also given to the purchaser and ceases only thereafter. The charge will not be lost by merely accepting delivery of possession alone. This charge is a statutory charge in favour of a buyer and is different from contractual charge to which the buyer may become entitled to under the terms of the contract, and in substance a converse to the charge created in favour of the seller under Section 55(4)(b). Consequently, the buyer is entitled to enforce the said charge against the property and for that purpose trace the property even in the hands of third parties and even when the property is converted into another form by proceeding against the substituted security, since none claiming under the seller including a third party purchaser can take advantage of any plea based even on want of notice of the charge. The said statutory charge gets attracted and attaches to the property for the benefit of the buyer the moment he pays any part of the purchase money and is only lost in case of purchaser's own default or his improper refusal to accept delivery. The said statutory charge gets attracted and attaches to the property for the benefit of the buyer the moment he pays any part of the purchase money and is only lost in case of purchaser's own default or his improper refusal to accept delivery. So far as payment of interest is concerned, the section specifically envisages payment of interest upon the purchase-money/price prepaid, though not so specifically on the earnest money deposit, apparently for the reason that an amount paid as earnest money simpliciter, as mere security for due performance does not become repayable till the contract or agreement got terminated and it is shown that the purchaser has not failed to carry out his part of the contract, and the termination was brought about not due to his fault, the claim of the purchaser for refund of earnest money deposit will not arise for being asserted. 17.Reading of said principle parallel to Section 4 of the Act, 2021, which is under challenge, the object of the Act, 2021, Section 4 speaks about extinguishment of charge with the vesting of property in Government. The said vesting is not under challenge by the petitioner. It is only the claim for charge for money was paid under the agreement is being now extended to declare Section 4 of the Act, 2021 as ultra vires to Section 55. 18.In our view the said submission of the petitioner misses the way inasmuch as while the agreement was entered on 19-2-2018. The agreement subsequently could not culminate into eventual sale, therefore, the contract was terminated on 30-6-2018 by the seller. Perusal of the agreement would show that it contained a clause that the balance price was to be paid by a particular date of 25-2-2018 and thereafter the parties to the agreement could not keep their promise, as such, the dispute arose. 19.The judgment relied on by the petitioner rendered by the Bombay High Court in the matter of Mohammad Akil Khan v Premraj Jawanmal Surana and Another AIR 1972 Bombay 217 : 1972 MAH LJ 483 would show that Section 55(6)(b) of the TP Act to adjudicate the claim would also depend on the fact that when the seller and buyer are both willing to perform their respective parts of the contract but the specific performance of the contract has become impossible by the unexpected interference by the State in acquiring the property. In such case, the buyer will be entitled to recover from the seller any purchase money properly paid together with interest and also earnest with interest and to that extent he would have under Section 55(6)(b) and it will have a charge on the land. Since vesting in this case is not under challenge, this proposition cannot be pressed into motion and Section 4 of the Act, 2021 only extinguish the charges when the property vested in the State, which was purchased from the respondent No.3 on payment of compensation. By such implementation of Section the assets vested not the liability. The liability remained with the erstwhile owner i.e. respondent No.3 namely; Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital Private Limited was made recoverable from it. 20.In order to evaluate the wordings of Section 4 of the Act, 2021, it would be apt to read it with Section 9 wherein Section 9(1) engrafted that the properties shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and Government shall not be liable to pay any person living or juristic anything for any liabilities of its owners and at the same time in Section 9(2) passage has been given to the claimant that the liabilities shall remain the liabilities of its owners before the vesting in the Government and can be recovered by their creditors from them by following normal process of law. 21.Reading of Sections 4 & 9 of the Act, 2021 together would show that the liability which was limited uptill the acquisition was that of the respondent No.3 and the liberty was given to claim for respondent No.3 as per normal process of law. The petitioner categorically contended that it is not a case of specific performance but for recovery of money, which is turned into statutory charge. In this petition they are not claiming any right touching upon the contract. Then in such case if the statutory charge is not proved in accordance with Section 55(6)(b) of the TP Act, then Section 9(2) of the Act, 2021 would come to rescue of the petitioner. 22.Subsequent challenge albeit has been pleaded in the petition, but has not been pressed upon during the course of arguments, however, no much emphasis was placed to advance the challenge. 23.Reading of Sections 4 & 5 read with Section of the 9 of the Act, 2021 would show that it is about vesting of property. 22.Subsequent challenge albeit has been pleaded in the petition, but has not been pressed upon during the course of arguments, however, no much emphasis was placed to advance the challenge. 23.Reading of Sections 4 & 5 read with Section of the 9 of the Act, 2021 would show that it is about vesting of property. Any contract if existing would be deemed to be terminated. The termination of contract is relate to fixing of liability under Section 9(2) and this Court while adjudicating the vires will not go into the question of disputed facts inasmuch as admittedly according to the contract certain time limit was fixed and the consideration having not been paid in time the contract was terminated. The record of the Court further would show that the petitioner also went before the NCLT, Cuttack against the IRP wherein the Central Bank of India was the financial creditor. 24.The Central Bank of India filed the proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before the NCLT, Cuttack, wherein the petitioner also filed its claim as financial creditor. The claim of the petitioner was rejected on the ground that the time being the essence of contract and having not remitted the consideration even after giving extension the claim was rejected. Being aggrieved by such order of the IRP, the petitioner had filed the aforesaid application under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. While the said petition was pending, other writ petition including the present petition was filed. Admittedly, the petitioner had not filed any suit before the competent jurisdictional Court for recovery of earnest money paid, instead writ petition has been filed claiming certain Sections of the Act, 2021 to be ultra vires. 25.While the case was pending before the NCLT, one time settlement was arrived at with the Bank and, as such, by order dated 28-3-2023 the NCLT closed the proceedings. The petitioner herein instead of knocking the door for recovery has tried to short circuit the issue by filing the present writ petition. The Sections, which are under challenge only purport about valuation. We are unable to understand as to how the petitioner is effected by such valuation clause as it was inter se in between the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital Private Limited and the State. Much emphasis has also not been placed before us about vires of such Section. The Sections, which are under challenge only purport about valuation. We are unable to understand as to how the petitioner is effected by such valuation clause as it was inter se in between the Chandulal Chandrakar Memorial Hospital Private Limited and the State. Much emphasis has also not been placed before us about vires of such Section. It only left with Section 9. Section 9 which is to be read with Sections 4 & 5 speaks that the property shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances, as we have averred earlier in order to get statutory charges under Section 55(6)(b) of the TP Act the certain pre condition of delivery of possession is a condition precedent without that independent charge cannot be invoked when sub-section (2) of Section 9 made it open for the petitioner to go for filing of the suit. Then in such case non filing of the suit may not lead to recovery proceedings. 26.The Supreme Court in the matter of M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v Sky Power Southeast Solar India (P) Ltd. (2023) 2 SCC 703 held thus at paras 123 & 124 : 123. We again reiterate that a monetary claim arising from a contract may be successfully urged by a writ applicant but the premise would not be a mere breach of contract. Being part of public law the case must proceed on the basis of there being arbitrariness vitiating the decision. The matter should not fall within a genuinely disputed question of facts scenario. The dispute which must be capable of being resolved on a proper understanding of documents which are not in dispute may furnish a cause of action in a writ court. Such was the case in ABL [ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 ] . 124. What is this litigation all about? This litigation is not about enforcing a monetary claim. The writ petition lays a challenge to the termination of the contract. A termination of the contract, no doubt, again may not be immune if it is found to be afflicted with the vice of arbitrariness. Interference again may be refused if the court finds that the case really belongs to the small area with unclear contours where it can be appropriated as a private law dispute. A termination of the contract, no doubt, again may not be immune if it is found to be afflicted with the vice of arbitrariness. Interference again may be refused if the court finds that the case really belongs to the small area with unclear contours where it can be appropriated as a private law dispute. The distinction between public law and private law has concededly been reduced to nearly imperceptible terms but the distinction in law remains. 27.Since the argument has also been advanced that the charge can be agitated, nothing has been brought before us to show that neither the State was eclipsed under legal competence to pass such Act nor there was violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India or other parent Act. Only the agreement exist on which the petitioner is banking upon the claim recovery of earnest money under the garb of charge under Section 55(6)(b) of the TP Act. Article 62 of the Limitation Act, 1963 naming charge over the property claiming money for recovery could have been filed but at this stage while adjudicating this issue we will not deliberate on it as to whether the statutory charge was created or not, when the rival claim has been made by the respondent No.3 the money has been forfeited for non payment of consideration within the stipulated time and the time was essence of contract. This adjudication is required after the evidence is led in proper suit not by way of writ petition before the Court to declare certain Act passed by the State to be ultra vires. When Section 9(2) of the Act, 2021 gives liberty and saves the interest of third party to recover money or any liability that right is required to be decided before the Civil Court after due evidence is adduced. 28.As an upshot, the writ petition, sans substratum, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).