JUDGMENT : The petitioners are asserted to be the members of the 'Kerala Chamber of Commerce and Industry' ('KCCI' for short) which is stated to be a Company originally registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956. 2. The petitioners impugns Ext.P6 order issued by the 'National Company Law Tribunal' ('NCLT' for short), issued by it invoking power under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ('IBC' for short) quathe 'KCCI'; and impute that the said order is the product of a fraud committed by it, in conjunction with the Financial Institution, which approached the said Tribunal. 3. Sri.D.Anil Kumar – learned counsel for the petitioners, explained that the controversy has its genesis in the fact that the 'KCCI' obtained certain financial facilities from the South Indian Bank Ltd, which was then declared by the latter as a Non-Performing Asset. He submitted that the Bank, thereupon, initiated action under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 before the jurisdictional Debt Recovery Tribunal ('DRT' for short); and also initiated proceedings under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act ('SARFAESI Act' for short). He pointed out that, in the meanwhile, and somewhere along the time, the secured debt appears to have been assigned by the Bank in favour of the 4th respondent -which is a statutorily established 'Asset Reconstruction Company' (ARC); and that they, suppressing the afore actions taken by the Bank, approached the 'NCLT', to obtain Ext.P16 order. He vehemently argued that Ext.P16 is thus an order issued by the 'NCLT' without being aware of the foundational facts; and hence, that it can only be construed to be the product of fraud and misrepresentation. 4. Sri.D.Anil Kumar then went on to explain that this is causing his clients individual prejudice because, they are already litigating against the 'KCCI' before the same forum, alleging suppression and mismanagement; but that, on account of Ext.P16, in one sweep, even those proceedings are now incapacitated from being taken forward due to the rigour of the consequent statutory moratorium. Sri.D.Anil Kumar then added that there are also proceedings initiated against the 'KCCI' by the Enforcement Directorate, under the 'Prevention of Money Laundering Act' ('PMLA Act' for short); and that even this has not been taken into account by the 'NCLT', while Ext.P16 has been issued. He thus prayed that Ext.P16 be set aside. 5. Sri.D.Anil Kumar then added that there are also proceedings initiated against the 'KCCI' by the Enforcement Directorate, under the 'Prevention of Money Laundering Act' ('PMLA Act' for short); and that even this has not been taken into account by the 'NCLT', while Ext.P16 has been issued. He thus prayed that Ext.P16 be set aside. 5. Sri.Akhil Suresh – learned counsel appearing for the Resolution Professional, countered the afore submissions of Sri.D.Anil Kumar contending that this Writ Petition is not maintainable because, the petitioners had a statutory right under Section 61 of the 'IBC', to have filed an appeal against Ext.P16; and argued that, even going by the pleadings on record, the petitioners have chosen not to invoke any such remedy, but to have incohately submitted in paragraph 13 of the writ petition, that “fraud and collusion on the part of IRP came to the notice of petitioners...only recently” (sic). He then showed me that, going by further averments in the said paragraph, the petitioners maintain that an appeal before the 'National Company Law Appellate Tribunal' (NCLAT) is not “an effective remedy in the peculiar facts of the case” (sic); and predicated that, therefore, since they have, in full violation, refused and failed to invoke the statutory remedy available to them, they could not have approached this Court through a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6. On the merits of the matter, Sri.Akhil Suresh submitted that, it is now well settled -through the various judgments of this Court and that of the Honourable Supreme Court – that mere initiation of certain other proceedings by the Bank in the past, including before the 'DRT' or under the 'SARFAESI Act', would not be an inhibiting factor for the 'NCLAT' in exercising their discretion under Section 7 of the 'IBC', to entertain an application under its ambit, or in passing orders thereon. He, however, conceded that, in Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd v. Axis Bank Ltd (Civil Appeal No.4633/2021), the Honourable Supreme Court has clarified that, in case of a Financial Creditor the 'NCLT' requires to exercise discretions, while deciding whether an application under Section 7 is to be admitted and ordered; but argued that, in the case at hand, this would be of no consequence because, there were no impeding factors in the way of the Tribunal from issuing Ext.P16. He concluded, pointing out that the allegation of the petitioners is not that there has been any collusion between the 'KCCI' and 'ARC' -while the latter approached the 'NCLT'; but that the Insolvency/Resolution Professional was guilty of such. He predicated that such a sweeping allegation against his client is uncharitable; and that, in any event, it is limpid from the materials on record, that no such imputation could have ever been impelled against the said individual, who is only acting as per the orders of the Tribunal; and that too, after Ext.P16 had been issued. 7. Sri.Kevin Thomas – learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent, adopted most of the submissions of Sri. Akhil Suresh, but added to it, saying that the allegation of fraud and misrepresentation impelled by the petitioners are self serving ones, particularly when they have chosen to do so against the Resolution Professional. He then countered the submissions of the petitioners, that the 'NCLT' ought not to have raised orders under Section 7 of the 'IBC' on account of the proceedings initiated by the Enforcement Directorate against the 'KCCI', contending it to be wholly baseless because, the said proceedings were initiated much after Ext.P16 order had been passed by the Tribunal. He concluded, bringing to the notice of this Court, that the Resolution Professional has already prepared a Plan, which is now scheduled to be put to vote of the statutory 'Committee of Creditors' (COC); and that going by the same, all the claims would be fully satisfied and hence that the petitioners cannot stand in the way of such action being completed. 8. Sri.Jai Shankar V. Nair – learned Standing Counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent – Enforcement Directorate, admitted that his client initiated action against 'KCCI' only after Ext.P16 order had been issued; but argued that the provisions of the 'PMLA' Act would over ride all actions now pending before the 'NCLT'. He submitted that he does not intent to make any further comment in this case at this time, because, the petitioners do not call into question any action taken by his client. He, however, reserved his right to do so in the connected matter, namely, WP(C) No. 35869/2022, in which the Resolution Professional has assailed the steps taken by the Enforcement Directorate specifically. 9. He, however, reserved his right to do so in the connected matter, namely, WP(C) No. 35869/2022, in which the Resolution Professional has assailed the steps taken by the Enforcement Directorate specifically. 9. I must say upfront that, normally, when the petitioners had obtained an effective, alternative statutory remedy -under Section 61 of the 'IBC' -against Ext.P16, a writ petition of this nature cannot be entertained. Of course, it is also well settled, as this Court is fully aware, that the mere availability of an alternative remedy would not detract this Court from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if sufficient reasons are warranted. 10. Keeping in mind the afore forensic rigour, it is pertinent that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that his clients were not aware of Ext.P16 “until recently”, which is to mean till the writ petition was filed. However, the pleadings disclose, without any ambiguity, that the petitioners were fighting with the management of the 'KCCI' before the same 'NCLT', alleging operation and mismanagement, having invoked the provisions of Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013, in a proceeding numbered as TCP 22/2019. It is also virtually without contest that the said case was listed soon after Ext.P16 had been issued; and obviously, on account of the rigor of the said order, all proceedings therein would have also been subjected to the moratorium. 11. In fact, Sri.Kevin Thomas – learned counsel for the fourth respondent, pointed out that, TCP 22/2019 had been listed on 26.11.2022 and that the submission of the petitioners themselves, that Ext.P16 had been issued, was recorded on that day. Of course, this Court does not have direct information about this, except the afore statement of Sri.Kevin Thomas; but the argument of the petitioners, that they were not aware of Ext.P16 until such time as this writ petition had been filed, certainly cannot appeal to me, especially when they have chosen not to explain the long delay of nearly ten months. 12. 12. That apart, the arguments of Sri.D.Anil Kumar are, on one hand, that the application under Section 7 of the 'IBC' has been filed by the ARC was suppressing the factum of the Bank having filed an application before the 'DRT' and having initiated action under the SARFAESI Act; while, on the other, he asserts that there was fraud and collusion on the part of the IRP (Insolvency/Resolution Professional) -which he added, was again something which his clients knew only recently. 13. One fails to understand how these two statements can be reconciled, particularly when fraud and collusion by the Resolution Professional, in the 'NCLT' having issued Ext.P16, is virtually impossible to assert, when he could have acted only as per the said order and subsequent to it alone. 14. To paraphrase, it defeats reason in the petitioners arguing that Ext.P16 is bad on account of the fraud and collusion of the Resolution Professional; when it is then expressly admitted that the said Authority acted only thereafter, pursuant to such order. Obviously, this argument can only be repelled. 15. Coming back to the contentions of the petitioners, that the action of the 'ARC' in having approached the 'NCLT' was also on account of fraud and collusion, except for such a bald allegation, nothing else has been even pleaded, much less established in this case. 16. As I have already said above, the singular contention of the petitioners is that the 'ARC' had suppressed the pendency of the proceedings before the DRT, as also the action initiated by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act; but the declarations in Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (supra), renders it indubitable that, unless there had been an Award/decree, or a certainty of recovery, the NCLT was never incapacitated from proceeding further under the 'IBC', especially when the said judgment also declares the law that, even if such Tribunal was to defer consideration of such an application, it could only be for good reason. Prima facie, I do not find any such 'good reason', that could have persuaded the 'NCLT' from refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Section 7 of the 'IBC'. 17. Prima facie, I do not find any such 'good reason', that could have persuaded the 'NCLT' from refusing to exercise jurisdiction under Section 7 of the 'IBC'. 17. By way of reiterated clarity, one cannot fathom how the petitioners could have approached this Court nearly ten months after Ext.P16 had been issued, without even attempting to explain the delay; but merely saying that an appeal before the 'NCLT' “is not at all an effective remedy in the peculiar facts of the case” (sic). In the afore circumstances, I am left without any doubt that this writ petition is not maintainable and therefore, dismiss it; however, leaving full liberties to the petitioners to invoke any other remedy that may be available to them under law, as per their legal entitlement.