ORDER 1. The present appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is preferred by the appellants/defendants against the judgment and decree dated 18.5.2018 passed by the II Additional District Judge, Dabra District Gwalior in Civil Suit No.2-A/2013 whereby the suit has been decreed in favour of respondent No.1/plaintiff. 2. Precisely stated facts of the case for adjudication are that plaintiff (respondent No.1 herein), namely Pawan Kumar (minor through his mother Smt. Rajkumari) filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of agriculture land vide survey No.28/2 min area 0.677 hectare. Reliefs claimed in the suit are as under: ^^¼v½ ?kksf"kr fd;k tkos] fd oknxzLr Hkwfe losZ Øekad 28@2 feu&1 jdck 1]222 gsDVs;j esa ls oknh ds LoRo LokfeRo ,oa vkf/kiR; dh Hkwfe 0-677 gsDVs;j fLFkr iVokjh gYdk uEcj 34 iapk;r jkexढ+ rglhy Mcjk ftyk Xokfy;j eŒÁŒ oknh ds LoRo LokfeRo ,oa vkf/kiR; dh gSA ¼c½ ?kksf"kr fd;k tkos] fd oknxzLr Hkwfe ds jftLVMZ foØ; i= fnukad 7-3-2011 tks oknh ds ukckyxh esa Áfroknh Øekad ds gd esa laikfnr gqvk gS] og oknh fo:) uy ,.M okbM gksdj voS/k gS rFkk oknh ij ca/kudkjh ugha gSA ¼l½ Áfroknh Øekad 1 o 2 ds fo:) bl vk'k; dh dksbZ fu"ks/kkKk ?kksf"kr dh tkos] fd os oknxzLr Hkwfe ls oknh dks vkf/kiR;P;qr uk djs] vkSj uk gh vius fgr Áfrfuf/k;ksa ls djkos vkSj uk gh mDr Hkwfe fdlh Ádkj varfjr djsa vkSj uk gh djkosA uk gh fdlh Ádkj dk O;o/kku mRiUu djsaA ¼n½ okn O;; ,oa vfHkHkk"kd 'kqYd oknh dks Áfroknh Øekad 1 o 2 ls fnykbZ tkosA ¼l½ vU; U;k;ksfpr lgk;rk tks Jheku U;k;ky; mfpr le>s] oknh dks Áfroknh Øekad 1 o 2 ls fnykbZ tkosA** 3. It was the pleadings of the plaintiff that he is having right, title, ownership, interest and possession over the suit land. Plaintiff was part of Hindu United Family (HUF) in which his grandfather late Ramswaroop Kushwah was the Karta and out of the HUF property, his grandfather purchased the suit property vide registered sale deed dated 16.3.2000 in the name of present plaintiff who was minor at the relevant point of time. After purchasing the suit property, name of plaintiff was recorded in the revenue records (Khasra, Khatauni, Bhoo-Adhikar Rin Pustika etc.) and his mother on behalf of plaintiff namely Rajkumari undertook agriculture work. After purchasing the suit property, name of plaintiff was recorded in the revenue records (Khasra, Khatauni, Bhoo-Adhikar Rin Pustika etc.) and his mother on behalf of plaintiff namely Rajkumari undertook agriculture work. Land was always cultivated by his mother because his father Rajveer Singh was in the habit of consumption of liquor. 4. Defendants No.1 and 2 are aunt and uncle of plaintiff respectively. Since the land under the ownership of plaintiff falls abutting National Highway 75, therefore, had high premium value and this fact prompted defendants No.1 and 2 to cause mischief. Therefore, taking advantage of old age of Ramswaroop (grandfather of plaintiff) and his deteriorating health condition, allegedly got executed a sale deed dated 7.3.2011 in favour of defendant No.1 – Geeta Devi which according to plaintiff is a transaction void-abinitio. 5. The said transaction according to plaintiff was sham transaction because Ramswaroop used to make signatures over documents whereas over the sale deed dated 7.3.2011 thumb impression was marked and without giving any consideration (money), sale deed has been allegedly executed. Therefore, according to plaintiff when the sale deed was allegedly executed and revenue records were interpolated then defendants tried to evict the plaintiff and his mother from the suit property which prompted him to file the instant civil suit. 6. According to plaintiff (Pawan Kumar) the suit property was part of HUF and it was purchased through HUF funds. Since father of plaintiff namely Rajveer Singh was in bad habit, therefore, his grandfather Ramswaroop purchased the land in the name of his grandson Pawan Kumar. Other properties were also purchased for other defendants and/or brothers of Rajveer Singh. However, those properties were purchased in the name of those sons of Ramswaroop, but because of bad habit of Rajveer Singh, this property was purchased in the name of grandson in place of son so that family of Rajveer Singh can sustain themselves. Therefore, HUF property by guardian could not have been disposed of. 7. Plaintiff refers different grounds in the plaint including the ground that the sale deed dated 07-03-2011 nowhere denotes that what legal necessity prompted Ramswaroop to sale the land. HUF property cannot be sold unless legal necessity for care and maintenance of minor arises. In absence of such legal necessity HUF property cannot be sold. 7. Plaintiff refers different grounds in the plaint including the ground that the sale deed dated 07-03-2011 nowhere denotes that what legal necessity prompted Ramswaroop to sale the land. HUF property cannot be sold unless legal necessity for care and maintenance of minor arises. In absence of such legal necessity HUF property cannot be sold. Another ground in the plaint was that no prior permission has been taken from the District Judge, Gwalior under the Hindu Minority and and Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1956”). Therefore, transaction is illegal. 8. According to plaintiff, the Ramswaroop used to make signatures over the documents but surprisingly in the sale deed dated 7.3.2011 thumb impression has been marked. Ramswaroop died on 25.3.2012 and in last some years he was physically and mentally unfit to execute any sale deed. Plaintiff challenged the sale deed and sought declaration on fixed Court fees. 9. Contesting defendants No.1 and 2 filed written statement and contested the claim. Defendants contested the claim regarding existence of any HUF. According to them there is no HUF exists nor it contains any agriculture land. No evidence has been given by the plaintiff regarding HUF. Therefore, the very existence of HUF was denied in written statement. 10. According to defendants No.1 and 2, no order has been filed by the plaintiff under the Act of 1956 to demonstrate that the order has been passed by which Rajveer Singh has been debarred to be plaintiff's natural guardian. According to defendants, they are not required to reply about the inclusion of name of plaintiff in the registered sale deed dated 16.3.2000, however they admit the inclusion of name of Ramswaroop in the revenue records. However, they denied the fact about cultivation of the land at the instance of mother of plaintiff namely Rajkumari. Defendants also denied the fact about premium nature of the land and acquisition proceedings earlier undertaken of some part of the land belonging to the plaintiff. They also denied the fact regarding health condition and age of Ramswaroop and submits that he received consideration in the transaction. In absence of any document placed by the plaintiff to demonstrate that Ramswaroop used to make signature over the documents in Bank, it cannot be assumed that Ramswaroop never marked thumb impression. Defendants wanted to show that Ramswaroop was in habit of making thumb impression. 11. In absence of any document placed by the plaintiff to demonstrate that Ramswaroop used to make signature over the documents in Bank, it cannot be assumed that Ramswaroop never marked thumb impression. Defendants wanted to show that Ramswaroop was in habit of making thumb impression. 11. In rebuttal to the grounds raised by the plaintiff, defendant No.1 opposed the pleadings. They submit that no document has been filed regarding bad habit of father of plaintiff and in absence of any police record, it cannot be assumed that he was in bad habit. Therefore, according to defendants, no ground mentioned for putting Ramswaroop as guardian of the plaintiff. 12. In the written statement it has further been pleaded that whenever parents of plaintiff were in need of money, it was defendants No.1 and 2 who paid money and therefore, they were always helpful to the plaintiff. Suit property was always under the possession of defendants and not in the possession of plaintiff. According to them, there was no permission required from the District Judge, Gwalior before acquisition of sale deed. 13. In special objections, defendants raised the objection that Ramswaroop was under the need of money, therefore, property was sold for consideration of Rs.7,52,500/-. It is not necessary that said amount should be paid in front of registering authority. Name of the present plaintiff was only figurative. He was not the owner of the suit property. In special objections all the contents of plaint were rejected. Dispute regarding age of the plaintiff was raised and as per the defendants, his age was incorrectly mentioned. 14. Other facts which find place in the special objection is that Ramswaroop, Khalak Singh, Hotam Singh and Pahalwan Singh were four sons of Nakaturam and all movable and immovable properties were partitioned on 16.1.1980 and the partition deed was prepared in which Ramswaroop got certain properties including tractor etc. and along with property certain liabilities were also came in the account of Ramswaroop. However, partition deed dated 28.1.1982 was executed between the family members in which present agriculture land of village Amroul has not been referred. Ramswaroop used to maintain the account of all transactions in which money transaction held between father and sons were noted down. Since HUF dissolved after 1982 because of partition of 1982, therefore, properties which were purchased by Ramswaroop were not of HUF but was self earned property. 15. Ramswaroop used to maintain the account of all transactions in which money transaction held between father and sons were noted down. Since HUF dissolved after 1982 because of partition of 1982, therefore, properties which were purchased by Ramswaroop were not of HUF but was self earned property. 15. Defendants No.1 and 2 also cast aspersions over defendants No. 3 and 4. According to these defendants, the defendants No.3 and 4 namely Pahad Singh and Thakurdas are at loggerheads with defendants No.1 and 2, therefore, at their instance, suit has been filed. 16. Defendants No.1 and 2 also mentioned the fact regarding one bank account held by Ramswaroop with co-account holder Pushpendra Singh who happens to be the son of defendants No.1 and 2. Since he is holder of the land, therefore, he executed the sale deed in favour of defendants No.1 and 2. Property which was purchased on 16.3.2000 in the name of plaintiff was a Benami property and since it was Benami property, therefore, no requirement under section 8 of the Act of 1956 existed seeking permission from the District Judge. According to them, in acquisition proceedings compensation amount has been received by Ramswaroop and Pahad Singh in equal proportion vide cheques dated 13.8.2007 of Oriental Bank of Commerce. They also raised the doubt about the age of Ramswaroop as according to them, it was 70 years. Thus, defendants No.1&2 sought rejection of plaint. According to defendants No.3 and 4 namely Pahad Singh and Thakurdas, property was of HUF and contents of plaint/pleadings are admitted. 17. They also raised the doubt about the age of Ramswaroop as according to them, it was 70 years. Thus, defendants No.1&2 sought rejection of plaint. According to defendants No.3 and 4 namely Pahad Singh and Thakurdas, property was of HUF and contents of plaint/pleadings are admitted. 17. After pleadings, Issues were framed by the trial Court which are as under: Øekad Okkn Á'u fu"d"kZ ¼1½ D;k oknh fookfnr Hkwfe dk Lokeh ,oa vkf/kiR;/kkjh gS\ gka ¼2½ D;k fookfnr Hkwfe ds laca/k esa Áfroknh Øekad&01 ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr foØ;i= fnukad 7-3-2011 oknhx.k ds fgr ds fo:) voS/k ,oa 'kwU; gS\ gka ¼3½ D;k oknhx.k fookfnr Hkwfe ds laca/k esa Áfroknhx.k ds fo:) 'kk'or fu"ks/kkKk dh fMØh ikus ds vf/kdkjh gS\ gka ¼4½ D;k fnukad 7-3-2011 dks fu"ikfnr foØ;i= dwVjfpr gS ,oa ÁfrQy jfgr gS\ gka ¼5½ D;k oknh us nkos dk mfpr :i ls ewY;kadu dj Ik;kZIr U;k; 'kqYd iVk;k gS\ gka ¼6½ D;k oknh dk nkok bl U;k;ky; ds vkfFkZd {ks=kf/kdkj ds varxZr gS\ gka ¼7½ D;k fookfnr Hkwfe la;qDr fgUnq ifjokj dh vk; ls oknh  ds uke Ø; dj dCtk ÁkIr fd;k x;k Fkk\ gka ¼8½ vuqrks"k ,oa O;;\ nkok lO;; fMØh fd;k x;kA 18. Thereafter evidence was led by the parties. In support of plaintiff, mother of plaintiff Rajkumari (PW-1), Khalak Singh (PW-2) who was the brother of Ramswaroop, Jitendra Khare (PW-3) who was Branch Manager at the relevant point of time in UCO Bank, Dabra, Notary D.K. Paliwal (PW-4) were examined. On behalf of defendants, Geeta Devi (DW-1), Aatmprakash (DW-2) who was the Branch Manager of Punjab and Sindh Bank, Dabra at the relevant point of time, Pushpendra Singh (DW-3) who was the son of defendants No.1 and 2, Dharmendra Shivpuri (PW-4) who was the witness of sale deed dated 7-3-2011 and Hakim Singh (DW-5) who was defendant No.2 in the case were examined. 19. 19. After evidence being led by the parties and after considering the arguments, submission and pleadings, trial Court allowed the suit and decreed it in the following manner: ^^¼1½ ;g fd] oknxzLr Hkwfe iVokjh gYdk uacj 34 iapk;r jkexढ+ rglhy Mcjk] ftyk Xokfy;j fLFkr losZ Øekad&28@2 feu jdck 1 222 gSŒ esa ls 0-677 gSŒ Hkwfe dk oknh LoRo] LokfeRo vkSj vkf/kiR;/kkjh gSA ¼2½ ;g fd] oknh dh ukckyxh esa fnukad 7-3-2011 dks tks jftLVMZ foØ;i= Áfroknh Øekad&01 ds ge esa lEikfnr gqvk gS og oknh ds LoRoksa ds eqdkcys 'kwU; ,oa fu"ÁHkkoh gksdj oknh ij ca/kudkjh ugha gSA ¼3½ ;g fd] Áfroknh Øekad&01 vkSj 02 oknxzLr Hkwfe ls oknh dks csn[ky ugha djsa vkSj uk djkosa rFkk mls fdlh Ádkj ls varfjr ugha djsa vkSj uk djkosa rFkk fdlh Hkh Ádkj dk O;o/kku mRiUu ugha djsaA ¼4½ ;g fd] bl nkos dk oknh dk ,oa viuk okn O;; Áfroknh Øekad&01 o 02 }kjk vnk fd;k tkosxkA vf/koDrk 'kqYd Áekf.kr gksus ij 'kSM;wy ds vuqlkj t;i= esa vafdr fd;k tkosA rnuqlkj t;i= rS;kj fd;k tkosA^^ 20. The Judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is challenged by defendants No.1 and 2 as appellants before this Court by filing the present appeal under section 96 of the CPC. 21. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellants/defendants No.1 and 2 that the issue of court fee has not been decided properly by the trial Court and caused illegality. The suit ought to have been taken into consideration under section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1870”) because relief No.2 is consequential to relief No.1. If valuation would have been done as per ad valorem court fee then jurisdiction of Civil Judge Class -I would had been available. Said Court could have tried the suit. In absence of such decision, suit has been tried before the Additional District Judge. 22. Another ground raised by counsel for the appellants is regarding non-joinder of necessary party. According to him, Rajveer Singh father of plaintiff and sister of Rajveer Singh have not been impleaded as party, therefore, case suffers from non-joinder of necessary party. 23. Another ground raised by counsel for the appellants is regarding section 12 of the Act of 1956. 22. Another ground raised by counsel for the appellants is regarding non-joinder of necessary party. According to him, Rajveer Singh father of plaintiff and sister of Rajveer Singh have not been impleaded as party, therefore, case suffers from non-joinder of necessary party. 23. Another ground raised by counsel for the appellants is regarding section 12 of the Act of 1956. According to him, when plaintiff had undivided interest in Joint Family Property and property was under the management of his grandfather then no guardian was required to be appointed in respect of such undivided interest. Even otherwise his grandfather is his natural guardian, therefore, he can purchase and sale the property under HUF. For that no permission of Court is required. He relied upon 1969 JLJ 227 Suggabai v. Smt. Hiralal and 1982 MPWN 68 Gullu v. Bhagchand. 24. As submitted, issue regarding legal necessity was not framed, therefore, it vitiates the trial because legal necessity ought to be specifically narrated. He relied upon 1998 (II) MPJR 60 , Hazarilal v. Jugal Kishore and others. 25. It is the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that after sale, mutation took place and Bhoo Adhikar Rin Pustika has been prepared. Appellants (defendants) are in possession, however plaintiff did not challenge the consequential proceedings and did not seek relief of possession. Therefore, trial Court ought to have dismissed the suit. He also raised the point regarding partition proceedings at the instance of one brother Thakurdas after filing of appeal. According to him appeal deserves to be allowed, judgment and decree passed by the trial Court be set aside and suit be dismissed. 26. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1/plaintiff vehemently opposed the prayer and according to him, at the time of sale deed dated 16.3.2000 (Ex-P/2) plaintiff was minor, therefore, sale deed was executed through grandfather for the suit property 28/2min 1 admeasuring 1.222 hectare. Part of this land went into acquisition proceedings because of construction of road, therefore, compensation was received by the plaintiff. This fact figures in the deposition of witnesses. Now land admeasuring 0.661 hectare which is the subject matter of suit and the suit land was allegedly sold by Ramswaroop to Geeta Devi. Therefore, declaration regarding ownership and declaring the sale deed as void are the relief sought by the plaintiff. This fact figures in the deposition of witnesses. Now land admeasuring 0.661 hectare which is the subject matter of suit and the suit land was allegedly sold by Ramswaroop to Geeta Devi. Therefore, declaration regarding ownership and declaring the sale deed as void are the relief sought by the plaintiff. He was never part of the sale deed and therefore, he did not require to pay ad valorem court fee. 27. Learned counsel refers deposition of Geeta Devi (DW-1) and para 16 where ownership of plaintiff is admitted by the said witness. She admits that information of execution of sale deed dated 7.3.2011 was not given to the parents of plaintiff Pawan Kumar who were his natural guardian. He refers testimony of the said witness as figured in paras 14 to 17 to bring home the factual position that owner of the suit property was Pawan Kumar and Ramswaroop has purchased the property in the name of Pawan Kumar because of bad habit of Rajveer Singh. DW-1 also admits that his father-in-law Ramswaroop used to sign and at the time of execution of sale deed, availability of amount has not been demonstrated through statement. 28. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 also refers testimony of Pushpendra Singh (DW-3) in which he refers the fact where he admits that his grandfather Ramswaroop opened the account by thumb impression, however admits in para 6 that over the photograph affixed in the Bank, does not appear any thumb impression as well as signature. Therefore, according to counsel for respondent No.1, account was not opened with the consent of Ramswaroop. He admits in para 6 about poor health condition of his grandfather and refers his age as 90-95 years at the time of death whereas Geeta Devi refers the age of Ramswaroop around 70 years and witness of sale deed Dharmendra Shivpuri (DW-4) refers the age of Ramswaroop about 60-65 years. These contradictions indicate about the false claim of defendants. 29. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 also refers testimony of Hakim Singh (PW-5) and para 13 of statement where he admits that Rajveer Singh was in habit of gambling and liquor consumption. According to him, identification of Ramswaroop while opening bank account became doubtful when Aatmprakash (PW-2) as Branch Manager of Punjab and Sinddh Bank, Dabra admits the fact in para 2 that there is overwriting in the account opening form (Ex-D/3). According to him, identification of Ramswaroop while opening bank account became doubtful when Aatmprakash (PW-2) as Branch Manager of Punjab and Sinddh Bank, Dabra admits the fact in para 2 that there is overwriting in the account opening form (Ex-D/3). Therefore, it appears that account was never opened by Ramswaroop and it was interpolated by defendants No.1 and 2. 30. While referring sections 6, 8 and 11 of the Act of 1956, counsel for respondent No.1 pressed over the fact that Ramswaroop being grandfather was never natural guardian and if he was de facto guardian even then he cannot dispose of the property of minor. In support of his submission, reliance has been placed over the judgment of apex Court in the case of Madhegowda v. Ankegowda and others, (2002) 1 SCC 178 and this Court in the case of Vinay Kant Pandey v. Bhagwandas Kurmi and others, 2005(3) of JLJ 214. 31. Any transaction contrary to the interest of minor if done by the Natural Guardian then it is Voidable and if it is done by De facto Guardian, then it is Void-ab-initio. 32. Learned counsel also refers section 101 of the Evidence Act and submits that burden of proof of execution of sale deed dated 7.3. 2011 was over defendants No.1 and 2 because Ramswaroop was infirm and could not have executed the sale deed. Defendants had to discharge the burden about execution of sale deed dated 7.3.2011. On these grounds, counsel for respondent No.1 prayed for dismissal of appeal and confirmation of judgment and decree. 33. Counsel for the parties also refers certain applications filed under Order I rule 10 of CPC as well as under Order XLI rule 27 of CPC. 34. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 35. This is the case where defendants are in appeal because they suffered judgment in trial Court. Issues raised for consideration are discussed one by one. Regarding Court fee: 36. The first and foremost submission of appellants/defendants was that the suit ought to have been attracted ad valorem court fee under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act of 1870 because relief No.2 is consequential to relief No.1. The present case pertains to the land situate at District Gwalior and therefore is driven by Mitakshara Law under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Succession Act”). The present case pertains to the land situate at District Gwalior and therefore is driven by Mitakshara Law under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the Succession Act”). Normally power to alienate HUF is subject to three exceptional conditions: (i) Legal necessity (for the sake of family members). (ii) Benefit of Estate (for the sake of family property). (iii) Act of indispensable duties (for the sake of Religious and Charitable act). 37. In the present case from the plaint allegations, it appears that minor through his mother filed the suit against their uncle, aunt and cousin to whom their grandfather alienated the property through sale deed dated 7.3.2011. Perusal of the sale deed indicates that grandfather alienated the suit property representing himself as the sole owner of the property and ignoring the fact that property was in the name of minor. In the case of Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh and Others v. Randhir Singh and Others, AIR 2010 SC 2807 guidance regarding ad valorem court fees vis-a-vis fixed court fees has been given by the apex Court and clarified the position. Relevant para is reproduced as under for ready reference: “6. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a noexecutant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B'-- two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C'. Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if 'B', who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by 'A' is invalid/void and nonest/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and Court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay advalorem Court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and Court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay advalorem Court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If “B', who is a non-excutant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed Court fee of Rs.19.50 under Article 17(iii) of second Schedule of the Act. But if 'B', a nonexecutatnt, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suit for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the Court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by Clause (V) of section 7.” 38. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Murlidhar v. Banshidhar and others, AIR 1963 Allahabad 86 explained the expression “Consequential Relief” as used in section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act of 1870. It is as under: “In our opinion, the expression consequential relief ” in section 7 (iv) (c) means some relief which would follow directly from the declaration given, the valuation of which is not capable of being definitely ascertained and which is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act and cannot be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantive relief. A consideration of all the Cls. (1) to (f), subsec. (4) Court-Fees Act leads to the same conclusion”. A consideration of all the Cls. (1) to (f), subsec. (4) Court-Fees Act leads to the same conclusion”. This definition of the expression “consequential relief ” was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sri Krishna Chandraji v. Shyam Behari Lal, (s) AIR 1955 All 177 where an analysis of the definition the learned Judges found four essential ingredients to be necessary in order to constitute a consequential relief. Those ingredients were: (I) That the relief should follow directly from the declaration given; (II) that the valuation of the relief be not capable of being definitely ascertained; (III) that the relief is not specifically provided for anywhere in the Act; and (IV) that the relief cannot be claimed independently of a declaration as a substantial relief.” 39. Similarly in the case of Sabina @ Farida v. Mohd. Abdul Wasit, 1997 (1) JLJ 105 = 1997 (1) MPLJ 554 this Court held as under: “4. The true test for ascertaining whether the consequential relief in fact flows from the declaratory relief is as to whether the said consequential relief can be claimed independently of the declaration as a substantial relief or not. Every injunction in a suit for declaration would not follow from the declaration. In a case where plaintiff is in possession of the property in his own rights, comes before the Court and seeks declaration that the property belongs to him and the other party cannot interfere with his possession then it cannot be said that plaintiff is required" to pay the ad valorem Court-fees because the relief of injunction is a consequential relief. As observed above the relief of injunction if can independently he claimed then every case it would not be a consequential relief. It is settled law that if a person is in settled possession he cannot be evicted except in accordance with law. Such a person if claims a declaration of his title and injunction that the defendants be restrained from interfering with his possession then the relief of injunction is not a consequence of the declaration because even if the Court is of the opinion that the declaration cannot be made in avour of the plaintiff then too the Court will grant an injunction in favour of the person who is in settled possession. Such a person would be called upon to value both the reliefs separately and each of the reliefs would be independent of the other. In a suit of this nature the plaintiff is not seeking the relief of injunction as consequential relief but is entitled to claim the same because of his settled possession. In such a case section 7(iv)(d) of the Court-fees Act would be applicable for valuing the relief of injunction and Article 17 of Schedule II of the Act would provide the Court-fees for the said declaration. In the matter of Sanik Nagar Durga G.N. Samiti v. Indore City Improvement Trust, 1983 MPWN Note No. 66, in almost similar situation where the plaintiff sought for the relief of declaration and injunction to restrain the defendant from starting the construction over the suit land, this Court observed that in fact the plaintiff was claiming two distinct reliefs, one for declaration of title and the other for preventive injunction. The relief of injunction in fact was not consequential to the relief of declaration because even without claiming the declaration relief, plaintiff could have brought the suit on the same pleadings seeking the relief for injunction only. These were two distinct and separate reliefs. The High Court further observed that the relief of injunction though related to question of plaintiffs title, was not consequential to the declaration. In the instant case also the plaintiff has sought-declaration of her title and has prayed for injunction. Each of the relief can be claimed separately. If it is found that the reliefs can be claimed separately then the relief of injunction would not be consequential relief to the relief of declaration. In the case in hands the plaintiff has rightly valued the suit for the purposes of the declaration and was liable to pay Court-fee in accordance with Article 17 of Schedule II. The Court below has not found any fault with the valuation of the relief and payment of Court-fees on the relief of injunction, therefore, it does not need any discussion.” 40. In the present case, appellants have specifically pleaded in the plaint that they are in possession of the suit property, therefore, they are not claiming the relief of possession. They only sought declaration and permanent injunction. Therefore, the relief of permanent injunction can be independently sought by the plaintiff and is not consequential to the relief of declaration. In the present case, appellants have specifically pleaded in the plaint that they are in possession of the suit property, therefore, they are not claiming the relief of possession. They only sought declaration and permanent injunction. Therefore, the relief of permanent injunction can be independently sought by the plaintiff and is not consequential to the relief of declaration. Relief of permanent injunction can be treated as Substantial Relief and not as Consequential Relief, therefore, from the fact situation of the case, it is clear that plaintiff has not sought any consequential relief so as to attract effect of section 7(iv)(c) of the Act of 1870, therefore, the court fee was rightly levied as fixed Court fee. Regarding non joinder of necessary party: 41. Another ground raised by counsel for the appellants is that father Rajveer Singh and sisters of Rajveer Singh were not impleaded as party defendants, therefore, plaint suffers from non joinder of necessary party. It appears that no issue was framed in respect of non joinder of necessary party, therefore, no finding was recorded by the trial Court. It appears that the appellants/defendants never challenged the said framing of issues and did not pray for addition of this issue. Nonetheless, even if father of plaintiff Rajveer Singh and aunts of plaintiff (sisters of Rajveer Singh) are not impleaded then proceedings do not vitiate from the vice of non joinder of necessary party because no relief is sought by the plaintiff against any other family members except the defendants who got the sale deed executed in their favour and apparently subsequent purchasers. It was not the suit for partition so as to implead all family members in the lis. Therefore, this contention also deserves to be rejected. Regarding De facto Guardian: 42. Appellants have raised the point regarding section 12 of the Act of 1956. According to counsel for the appellants, when plaintiffs have undivided interest in the joint family property and property was under the management of his grandfather, then no guardian was required to be appointed in respect of such undivided interest. However, said contention does not hold ground for the reason that it was not a case where appointment of guardianship was under challenge. However, said contention does not hold ground for the reason that it was not a case where appointment of guardianship was under challenge. If any guardian is required to be appointed for minor in respect of undivided interest then it does not mean that defacto guardian can dispose of the property purchased earlier in the name of minor. Sections 6, 8 and 11 of the Act of 1956 are worth consideration in this regard. Section 6 of the Act of 1956 deals regarding natural guardian of Hindu minor and according to this provision, father and mother can only be natural guardian of Hindu minor and in the case of married girl, her husband. Powers of natural guardian are discussed in section 8 of the Act of 1956 and that includes protection and benefit of minor Estate. Said section is worth reproduction: “8. Powers of natural guardian.—(1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor's estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court,— (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor; or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority. (3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. (4) No Court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in subsection (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. (4) No Court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in subsection (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. (5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining the permission of the court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the court under section 29 of that Act, and in particular (a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A thereof; (b) the court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act; and (c) an appeal shall lie from an order of the Court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that Court. (6) In this section, “Court” means the city civil Court or a district Court or a Court empowered under section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (8 of 1890), within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such court, means the court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate.” 43. Section 8 of the Act of 1956 restricts natural guardian also not to alienate/dispose of the property in any manner and he has to protect the interest of minor's estate and when natural guardian is bestowed with such responsibility, then how can an alleged defacto guardian, go contrary to the interest of the minor and dispose of the suit property as in the present case. Section 11 of the Act of 1956 deals defacto guardian in following manner: “11. De facto guardian not to deal with minor’s property. —After the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor.” 44. De facto guardian not to deal with minor’s property. —After the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor.” 44. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that as per sections 6, 8 and 11 of the Act of 1956, natural guardians are also duty bound to protect the interest of estate of minor and defacto guardian cannot go against the interest of minor in any manner. In the case of Madhegowda (Dead) By LRS. v. Ankegowda (Dead) By LRS. And others, (2002) 1 SCC 178 , the Court has given guidance in following manner: 16. Section 11 of the Act reads as follows : De facto guardian not to deal with minors property After the commencement of this Act, no person shall be entitled to dispose of, or deal with, the property of a Hindu minor merely on the ground of his or her being the de facto guardian of the minor. This Section brings about a material change in the law relating to de facto guardians or de facto managers of a Hindu minors estate by enacting in express terms that after the commencement of the Act, no person has the right or authority to do any act as a de facto guardian of such minor. Although the expression de facto guardian is often used in judgments, there is in law nothing like a de facto guardian. The statute recognises a natural guardian or a testamentary guardian or a guardian appointed by the Court. In law a person who is not a guardian as aforementioned who takes interest upon himself, the general management of the estate of a minor can be more appropriately described as de fecto manager. Before enforcement of the Act some confusion prevailed over the powers of de facto guardian or manager for alienating the property of his/her ward. It was held by the Privy Council in Hunoomanpersuad Pandey case, that a de facto guardian had the same power of alienating the property of his ward as a natural guardian. Section 11has done away with the authority of any person to deal with or dispose of any property of a Hindu minor on the ground of his being the de facto guardian of such minor. Section 11has done away with the authority of any person to deal with or dispose of any property of a Hindu minor on the ground of his being the de facto guardian of such minor. Any alienation by a de facto guardian will be governed by the provisions in section 11of the Act. The alienation, being against the statutory prohibition, would be void ab initio and the alienee would not acquire any title to the property. 17. Section 12 of the Act reads as follows : 12. Guardian not to be appointed for minor's undivided interest in joint family property:- Where a minor has an undivided interest in joint family property and the property is under the management of an adult member of the family, no guardian shall be appointed for the minor in respect of such undivided interest : Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of a High Court to appoint a guardian in respect of such interest. 18. From the statutory provisions noted above, it is clear that with the avowed object of saving the minors estate being misappropriated or squandered by any person, by a relation or a family friend claiming to be a well-wisher of the minor, section 11 was enacted to prohibit any such person from alienating the property of the minor. Even a natural guardian is required to seek permission of the Court before lienating any part of the estate of the minor and the Court is not to grant such permission to the natural guardian except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. So far as de facto guardian or de facto manager is concerned, the statute has in no uncertain terms prohibited any transfer of any part of minors estate by such a person. In view of the clear statutory mandate, there is little scope for doubt that any transfer in violation of the prohibition incorporated in section 11 of the Act is ab initio void. 25. We have carefully considered the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions so far as relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the issue arising in the present case. It is to be kept in mind that this is not a case of alienation of minors interest in a joint family property. 25. We have carefully considered the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions so far as relevant for the purpose of adjudication of the issue arising in the present case. It is to be kept in mind that this is not a case of alienation of minors interest in a joint family property. As noted earlier, Ninge Gowda died leaving his two daughters, namely Smt. Sakamma and Smt. Madamma. It is not the case of any of the parties that the suit property was a joint family property in the hands of Ninge Gowda or that the alienation by Smt.Madamma, who is the sister of the minor, was a transfer of the minors interest in the joint family property. Therefore, the question whether the provision in section 11 is applicable in the case of transfer of minors interest in a joint family does not arise for consideration here. Section 11 includes all types of properties of a minor. No exception is provided in the section. Undoubtedly Smt. Madamma, sister of the minor, is not a guardian as defined in section 4(b) of the Act. Therefore, she can only be taken to be a de facto guardian or more appropriately de facto manager. To a transfer in such a case section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minors interest by a de facto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the de facto guardian/manager. 45. Therefore, in the conspectus of facts and circumstances of the case, trial Court rightly came to the conclusion while deciding issue No.2 that the sale deed dated 07-03-2011 was against the interest of plaintiff as minor. 45. Therefore, in the conspectus of facts and circumstances of the case, trial Court rightly came to the conclusion while deciding issue No.2 that the sale deed dated 07-03-2011 was against the interest of plaintiff as minor. Those findings are just and proper in the wake of provision as contained into the Act of 1956. 46. As discussed in earlier paras, where this Court has discussed three exigencies which are those exceptional circumstances in which property of minor can be sold that too by natural guardian. Therefore, if the natural guardian wanted to dispose of the property then they had ground of legal necessity for the sake of family members, benefit of Estate for the sake of family property and act of indispensable duties for the sake of Religious and Charitable act. All the three exigencies do not find place in the present factual gamut. Therefore, there was no legal necessity existed for the grandfather of plaintiff to dispose of the property. 47. The judgments relied upon by counsel for the appellants in the case of Suggabai (supra) and Gullu (supra) are not of any help to the cause of the appellants. The facts as delineated in Suggabai (supra) were different. Here, no such legal necessity as discussed above or benefit of Estate existed which could have persuaded the grandfather to sale the property of his own grandson who was a minor yet owner of the property. In the case of Gullu (supra), the facts differ vis-a-vis present case. In the said case, father of plaintiff sold joint family property on the pretext of legal necessity and in that factual backdrop, it has been held that in the case of joint interest of minor in family property previous sanction of Court is not necessary. Here, no such question exists. Here, the question was that the Estate of minor has been disposed of clandestinely without establishing legal necessity or other exceptions carved out to sale the said property. Finding of facts given by the trial Court are in detail discussed while deciding issue No.1, 2, 4 & 7. Para 9 to 40 of the trial Court's judgment discussed in detail about these aspects. 48. Although appellants raised the point regarding non framing of the issue of legal necessity, but once issues No.1, 2 and 7 have been framed then they cover the subject regarding legal necessity. Para 9 to 40 of the trial Court's judgment discussed in detail about these aspects. 48. Although appellants raised the point regarding non framing of the issue of legal necessity, but once issues No.1, 2 and 7 have been framed then they cover the subject regarding legal necessity. Trial Court even otherwise discussed all these aspects in detail and then given findings. Therefore, it is correctly held that the grandfather of plaintiff could not have disposed of the suit property by way of sale deed and it was the sale deed void-ab-initio. Regarding execution of sale deed and burden of proof: 49. Issue No.4 was framed by the trial Court and discussed in detail with the help of evidence led by the parties. Mother of plaintiff namely, Rajkumari (PW-1) in her affidavit of chief-examination reiterated the statement of plaint. She admits the fact in her crossexamination about the sale deed executed earlier in 1999 in favour of her son namely Pawan Kumar. At that time, Pawan Kumar was 3 years old. Khalak Singh (PW-2) who was one of the brothers of Ramswaroop refers partition deed dated 21.4.1997 in which Ramswaroop endorsed his signature. He categorically submits that Ramswaroop was an educated person and always used to sign over the documents rather than marking thumb impression. He also refers the fact regarding Joint Hindu Family property. Similarly Jitendra Khare (PW-3) who was Branch Manager of UCO Bank of Branch Dabra at the relevant point of time admits in examination-inchief that Ramswaroop used to sign the documents in bank and referred documents where Ramswaroop made his signature. Similarly, D.K. Paliwal - Notary (PW-4) also made statement that Ramswaroop signed one agreement dated 21-08-1991 in which he endorsed his signature. 50. Interestingly, Geeta Devi (DW-1) in para 16 admits ownership of Pawan Kumar. She further admits that information regarding execution of sale deed in favour of herself was never given to mother and father of Pawan Kumar who were natural guardians of minor Pawan Kumar. She admits that without informing them, secretly she caused execution of sale deed in her favour. She further admits that earlier when State Government acquired the land then Pawan Kumar got compensation of the said land. She admits that without informing them, secretly she caused execution of sale deed in her favour. She further admits that earlier when State Government acquired the land then Pawan Kumar got compensation of the said land. In paras 14, 15, 16 and 17 she admits that the land was under the ownership of Pawan Kumar and at the time of execution of sale deed, his fatherin-law Ramswaroop was suffering different ailments including poor eye sight and poor mental understanding. Not only this, Pushpendra Singh who happens to be son of Geeta Devi (DW-3) admits in para 5 that his grandfather was around 90-95 years at the time of execution of sale deed. He further admits that his grandfather (Ramswaroop) was suffering from different ailments, his vision was poor to the extent that he could see very little and after 2010 he suffered complete blindness. Till his death, Ramswaroop was not a physically fit person. All these admissions and evidence render the execution of sale deed doubtful. It was not at all a valid transaction. 51. Interestingly, Dharmendra Shivhare (DW-4) refers the fact that at the time of registry, Ramswaroop was 60 years old. Such variations between DW-3 and DW-4 is drastic. He further admits in para 7 that before him Geeta Devi did not pay any amount to Ramswaroop. Therefore, Ramswaroop did not get any consideration in lieu of sale deed and it was not the sale deed with free will and consent of the parties but taking advantage of poor health of Ramswaroop this transaction has been carried out. Therefore, that transaction is sham transaction. DW-2 himself admits in cross-examination about overwriting in the account opening form (Ex.D-13). Burden of proof lies over the person who asserted the fact that the sale deed has been executed. That burden of proof in case of family and personal law is discussed in the case of Rangammal v. Kuppuswami and another, (2011) 12 SCC 220 . Relevant discussion is reproduced as under: “21. Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines “burden of proof” which clearly lays down that: “101. Burden of proof - whosoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or law dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Relevant discussion is reproduced as under: “21. Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 defines “burden of proof” which clearly lays down that: “101. Burden of proof - whosoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or law dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.” Thus, the Evidence Act has clearly laid down that the burden of proving fact always lies upon the person who asserts. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The Court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of the other party. 22. In view of this legal position of the Evidence Act, it is clear that in the instant matter, when the plaintiff/respondent No.1 pleaded that the disputed property fell into the share of the plaintiff by virtue of the sale deed dated 24.2.1951, then it was clearly for the plaintiff/respondent No.1 to prove that it was executed for legal necessity of the appellant-while she was a minor. But, the High Court clearly took an erroneous view while holding that it is the defendant/appellant who should have challenged the sale deed after attaining majority as she had no reason to do so since the plaintiff /respondent No.1 failed to first of all discharge the burden that the sale deed in fact had been executed for legal necessity of the minor's predecessor mother was without permission of the Court. It was not the defendant/respondent who first of all claimed benefit of the sale deed or asserted its genuineness, hence the burden of challenging the sale deed specifically when she had not even been dispossessed from the disputed share, did not arise at all. 31. Application of section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thus came up for discussion in this matter and while discussing the law on the burden of proof in the context of dealing with the allegation of sham and bogus transaction, it was held that party which makes allegation must prove it. 31. Application of section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 thus came up for discussion in this matter and while discussing the law on the burden of proof in the context of dealing with the allegation of sham and bogus transaction, it was held that party which makes allegation must prove it. But the Court was further pleased to hold wherein the question before the court was "whether the transaction in question was a bona fide and genuine one" so that the party/plaintiff relying on the transaction had to first of all prove its genuineness and only thereafter would the defendant be required to discharge the burden in order to dislodge such proof and establish that the transaction was sham and fictitious. This ratio can aptly be relied upon in this matter as in this particular case, it is the plaintiff/respondent No.1- Kuppuswami who relied upon the alleged sale deed dated 24.2.1951 and included the subject-matter of the property which formed part of the sale deed and claimed partition. This sale deed was denied by the defendant/appellant on the ground that it was bogus and a sham transaction which was executed admittedly in 1951 when she was a minor. 32. Thus, it was the plaintiff/respondent No.1 who should have first of all discharged the burden that the sale deed executed during the minority of the appellant was genuine and was fit to be relied upon. If the courts below including the High Court had felt satisfied on this aspect, only then the burden could be shifted on the defendant/appellant to dislodge the case of the plaintiff that the sale deed was not genuine. But when the plaintiff merely pleaded in the plaint but failed to lead any evidence - much less proof, that the sale deed was genuine and was executed in order to discharge the burden of legal necessity in the interest of minor, then the High Court clearly misdirected itself by recording in the impugned order that it is the defendant/appellant herein who should have challenged the genuineness of the sale deed after attaining majority within the period of limitation. 33. Since the High Court has misplaced burden of proof, it clearly vitiated its own judgments as also of the Courts below since it is well established dictum of the Evidence Act that misplacing burden of proof would vitiate judgment. 33. Since the High Court has misplaced burden of proof, it clearly vitiated its own judgments as also of the Courts below since it is well established dictum of the Evidence Act that misplacing burden of proof would vitiate judgment. It is also equally and undoubtedly true that the burden of proof may not be of much consequence after both the parties lay evidence, but while appreciating the question of burden of proof, misplacing of burden of proof on a particular party and recording findings in a particular way definitely vitiates the judgment as it has happened in the instant matter. This position stands reinforced by several authorities including the one delivered in the case of Koppula Koteshwara Rao v. Koppula Hemant Rao. 34. It has been further held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of J & K v. Hindustan Forest Company, 2006 (12) SCC 198 , wherein it was held that the onus is on the plaintiff to positively establish its case on the basis of material available and it cannot rely on the weakness or absence of defence to discharge onus.” 52. When defendants admit in their testimony about the failing health condition of Ramswaroop and about the fact that he used to endorse signature over the documents and further admits that they never informed about execution of sale deed to the present plaintiff and many more admissions as referred above, establishes that the sale deed was never executed by vendor in favour of vendee in proper physical and mental condition. Their admission is to be taken into account and in fact trial Court took into its account while deciding the dispute. 53. The apex Court in the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and others, AIR 1960 SC 100 discussed as under: “In the present case, the burden of proof need not detain us for another reason. It has been proved that the appellant and, his predecessors in the title which he claims, had admitted on numerous occasions that the public had a right to worship the deity, and that the properties were held as Devasthan inams. To the same effect are the records of the revenue authorities, where these grants have been described as Devasthan, except in a few cases, to which reference will be made subsequently. To the same effect are the records of the revenue authorities, where these grants have been described as Devasthan, except in a few cases, to which reference will be made subsequently. In view of all these admissions and the revenue records, it was necessary for the appellant to prove that the admissions were erroneous, and did not bind him. An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive 'of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. We shall now examine these admissions in brief and the extent to which they went and the number of times they were repeated.” 54. In the case of Avadh Kishore Dass v. Ram Gopal and others, AIR 1979 SC 861 , the apex Court held as under: “23. Further, what is more important, in cross-examination, the defendant was confronted with this declaration in the will. He unreservedly admitted that what was stated in the will, was correct. It is true that evidentiary admissions are not conclusive proof of the facts admitted and may be explained or shown to be wrong, but they do raise an estoppel and shift the burden of proof on to the person making them or his representative-in-interest. Unless shown or explained to be wrong, they are an efficacious proof of the facts admitted. Here, the defendant, far from explaining the admission or declaration made by the deceased Mahant, under whom he (defendant) claims, has affirmed it, that the entire property in suit is the absolute property of the God, Thakurji as a juristic person. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the defendant to wriggle out of the same. It cannot be said that the defendant had inadvertently affirmed the correctness of the admission/declaration made in the aforesaid will by the deceased Mahant. It was a conscious admission. The defendant himself repeatedly admitted this position with regard to the ownership of the land being exclusively of the idol, Thakurji Maharaj, in the applications filed for receiving annuity under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari, Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1952, which was granted to the idol, in respect of the Trust property.” 55. The apex Court in the case of S. R. Srinivasa and others v. S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274 , held as under: 45. The apex Court in the case of S. R. Srinivasa and others v. S. Padmavathamma, (2010) 5 SCC 274 , held as under: 45. In the case of Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi it was observed as follows (AIR p.105 para 11): "11.......An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous." 46. In the case of Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam, it has been observed (SCC p.252, para 27): "27......Admissions, if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." 47. The aforesaid two judgments along with some other earlier judgments of this Court were considered by this Court in the case of Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly wherein it was observed as follows (SCC pp.90 & 94, paras 16 & 28): "16.A thing admitted in view of section 58 of the Evidence Act need not be proved. Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that even a vague or evasive denial may be treated to be an admission in which event the court may pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Relying on or on the basis thereof a suit, having regard to the provisions of Order 12 rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure may also be decreed on admission. It is one thing to say that without resiling from an admission, it would be permissible to explain under what circumstances the same had been made or it was made under a mistaken belief or to clarify one's stand inter alia in regard to the extent or effect of such admission, but it is another thing to say that a person can be permitted to totally resile therefrom." "28. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other." Regarding applications under Order I Rule 10 CPC 56. Two applications (I.A.No.366 of 2022 and 640 of 2022) were filed by the appellants seeking impleadment as party respondents. Since plaintiff has filed the suit seeking the relief against Geeta Devi, her husband and son, therefore, they were impleaded as party defendants. The persons who were tried to be impleaded later on, were not proper and necessary party and no relief was sought against them. Appellants intended to implead some subsequent purchasers through these applications but on the principle of lis pendens their interest are being addressed and canvased by the appellants if the very execution of sale deed dated 7.3.2011 executed in favour of appellants is under doubt and found to be a sham transaction then all other subsequent transactions go. Lis pendens is embodied in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. All these transactions render subservient to the rights of the parties under the judgment or order which may be made in appeal. Here the judgment and decree was passed on 18-05-2018 and transactions were made in 2020, therefore, on this ground transactions were subservient to the decree passed by this Court. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in favour of plaintiff/respondent No.1 is affirmed by this Court by dismissing the appeal of defendants/appellants, therefore, the subsequent sale of the suit property made by the plaintiff in favour of different persons does not at all suffer adversely. It was not the case of partition where all co-owners or stakeholders could have been impleaded. Since no relief was sought against father of plaintiff, therefore, his father Rajveer Singh was not required to be impleaded as party. His non inclusion in the lis does not vitiate the trial. Therefore, all these applications stand rejected. Regarding applications under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. 57. Since no relief was sought against father of plaintiff, therefore, his father Rajveer Singh was not required to be impleaded as party. His non inclusion in the lis does not vitiate the trial. Therefore, all these applications stand rejected. Regarding applications under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. 57. Four applications (I.A.No.453 of 2022, 639 of 2022, 119 of 2023 and 7055 of 2023) were filed by the appellants seeking the prayer of taking the documents on record. Appellants wanted to bring the sale deed executed by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 in favour of different persons. Since the judgment decree passed by the trial Court has been affirmed and appeal of the appellants/defendants is dismissed, therefore, the transaction would be governed by the principle of lis pendens. Since suit is filed in the year 2013 and already 11 years have passed, therefore, on technical pretext if the matter would have been remanded back to the trial Court then it would not have served the cause of justice. Those documents are duly considered by this Court and found that these documents are not of such nature which require to be taken on record and in consequence thereof matter could have been remanded back. This would have started another lease of litigation for no reason. Moreso, documents are not of such nature which can change the tenor and texture of the litigation. Therefore, all these applications stand rejected. 58. In view of the discussion made above, after going through the pleadings, issues framed and evidence led, it appears that the trial Court did not err in passing the impugned judgment and giving its findings in specific term about the issues framed affirmatively in favour of plaintiff. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the appellants stands dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is hereby affirmed. 59. Appeal stands dismissed.