ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Vicky B. Mehta on behalf of the petitioner and learned AGP Mr. Sahil Trivedi on behalf of the respondent – State. 2. By way of this petition, the petitioners have sought for the following prayers:- “(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, by holding that the petitioners are eligible and entitled to be appointed on the post of Vidhya Sahayak pursuant to the advertisement of Vidhya Sahayak “backlog” appointment published by the District Primary Education Officer, Panchmahal at Godhra and further be pleased to direct the respondents to give an appointment on the post of Vidhya Sahayak with arrears and all consequential benefits including continuity of service; (b) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, by holding that the petitioners being more meritorious as the petitioner no.1 stood at Sr. no.416 and the petitioner no.2 stood at Sr. no.422 ahead of Kamol Gitaben Bhursinghbhai who stood at Sr. no.430, are entitled for appointment on the post of Vidhya Sahayak and further be pleased to direct the respondents to give appointment to the petitioners, with arrears and all consequential benefits including continuity of service; (c) Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, by directing the respondents to consider and decide the representation of the petitioners dated 3.10.2023 as expeditiously as possible within a time bound schedule and to communicate the outcome of the said representation to the petitioners; As Annexure-J (d) Grant such other and further reliefs as may be deemed fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 3. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No.3 had published an advertisement on 25.01.2007 for appointing Vidyasahayak on backlog vacancies and whereas it is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners had appeared in the selection process and on 12.03.2007, the petitioners were called for the purpose of document verification and whereas after the document verification, a list had been prepared, which shows the merit-wise standing of the candidates. It is the case of the petitioners that while petitioner No.1 was at serial No.416 of the said list, the petitioner No.2 was at serial No.422 in the said list and whereas a candidate named Kamol Gitaben Bhursingbhai who was at serial No.430 of the said list had been appointed and whereas since the said candidate has lesser marks than the petitioners and was much below the petitioners in the select list, therefore, the petitioners being aggrieved, have approached this Court challenging the said action. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Mehta on behalf of the petitioners would submit that a perusal of the list makes it apparent that the petitioners had a better claim than the candidate who according to the petitioners had been appointed and whereas since the petitioners were not made aware about the reason for the candidature of the petitioners not being considered, the petitioner No.1 had preferred an application under the RTI on 01.07.2016, seeking relevant information, more particularly, information as to why the petitioners had not been appointed and the circumstances in which the candidate who was appointed had been given appointment. Learned advocate would submit that the requested information not been provided, the petitioner No.1 had preferred an appeal before the appellate authority on 16.01.2017 and whereas inspite of the appellate authority directing the respondents to provide the requisite information, the same had not been provided. Learned advocate would submit that it is under such circumstances that the petitioners have approached this Court. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Mehta would submit that the present issue would not be barred by delay and latches since according to learned advocate, the non appointment of the petitioners, has resulted in a continuing grievance of the petitioners and since in number of decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court has explained that in case of a continuing wrong, than the same would be an exception to the law of limitation. Learned advocate in support of his submissions would rely upon decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation reported in 2022 (5) JT 470 . Learned advocate would submit that since the non appointment of the petitioners reflect a continuous wrong, more particularly, since the petitioners had a better claim than the candidate who have been appointed, therefore, this Court may consider this petition, without any reference to the interregnum period. 6. Learned advocate would submit that since the non appointment of the petitioners reflect a continuous wrong, more particularly, since the petitioners had a better claim than the candidate who have been appointed, therefore, this Court may consider this petition, without any reference to the interregnum period. 6. Per contra, this petition is vehemently objected to by learned AGP Mr. Sahil Trivedi for the respondent – State. Learned AGP would submit that the petitioners were aware as far as back in the year 2007 that probably, a person having less merit than the petitioners had been appointed. Learned AGP would submit that having not questioned the said decision at the relevant point of time, now it is too late in the day after 16 years to agitate the said grievance. Learned AGP would submit that the issue in question, neither reflects a continuous wrong nor according to learned AGP would it be appropriate to disturb the probable appointment given to the candidate named by the petitioners, more particularly, since neither the said person has been joined, and more particularly, since multiple equities would have been created in the interregnum. Thus, requesting learned AGP would submit that this Court may not entertain this petition. 7. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties who have not submitted anything further. Considering the submissions made by learned advocates, more particularly, having regard to the list annexed with the petition, i.e. with regard to the selection of the year 2007 it would appear that at the stage of document verification, the petitioners were aware about their standing qua the candidate against whom they have a grievance as noted hereinabove the petitioner No.1 is at serial No.416 having secured 75.507 marks and petitioner No.2 is at serial No.422 having secured 75.387 marks. As against the same, the person against whom the petitioners have raised a grievance i.e. Kamol Gitaben Bhursingbhai, the said candidate is at serial No.430 having secured 71.320 marks. As against the same, the person against whom the petitioners have raised a grievance i.e. Kamol Gitaben Bhursingbhai, the said candidate is at serial No.430 having secured 71.320 marks. In the considered opinion of this Court, while the petitioners may have a reasonable grievance, yet, it is too late in the day to agitate and consequently adjudicate on the same since it clearly appears that the fact of a candidate who is having lesser merit than the petitioners, was known to the petitioners from the year 2007 itself and whereas applications under the Right to Information Act which have been preferred intermittently in the year 2016 and 2017, would not dilute the fact as regards the petition being grossly delayed by around 16 years. The petitioners ought to have agitated their grievance at the relevant point of time and having not done so, it would clearly appear that the petitioners had acquised to the said situation and whereas it would not be open for the petitioners to now reopen such a stale claim. 8. In so far as the submission of learned advocate for the petitioner that the grievance of the petitioner constitutes a continuous wrong, the same also does not merit any consideration. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak relied upon by learned advocate for the petitioners, has explained, more particularly, referring to decision in case of Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh reported in 2008 (8) SCC 648 as regards the concept of continuous wrong. Paragraph-11 of the decision, being relevant for the present purpose is reproduced hereinbelow for benefit:- “11. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio, this Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Tarsem Singh, while referring to the decision in Shiv Dass v. Union of India and Others, quoted the following passages from the latter decision: “8...The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. xx xx xx 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. … If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.” In Tarsem Singh (supra), reference was also made to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the following passage from Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare and Others v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Others, AIR 1959 SC 798 which had explained the concept of continuing wrong in the context of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908, corresponding to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, observing that: “31...It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.” Accordingly, in Tarsem Singh (supra) it has been held that principles underlying ‘continuing wrongs’ and ‘recurring/successive wrongs’ have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. ‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. A ‘continuing wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. ‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. Having held so, this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) had further elucidated some exceptions to the aforesaid rule in the following words: “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 9. Quoted paragraph-31 of Tarsem Singh as above, would reflect that a continuous wrong, according to the Hon’ble Apex Court is a continuous source of injury which renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for continuance of the said injury. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court if the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete then there is a no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court if the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete then there is a no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. On the other hand, it has been explained that if the wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by the said act continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In the considered opinion this court, the grievance of the petitioners would not constitute a continuing wrong since the alleged wrongful act of not appointing the petitioners, while appointing a person less meritorious than petitioners, had become complete upon the non appointment of the petitioners. While the damage on account of the non appointment would continue but there is no continuing wrong which takes place. As explained the damage caused on account of the alleged wrongful act would continue but at the same time the alleged wrongful act has not resulted in a continuous cause of action in favour of the petitioners, for the petitioners to claim that the present petition should be decided on merits without any reference to the delay which has occurred in the interregnum. 10. As such it also requires to be mentioned here that quoted paragraph No.8 of Tarsem Singh as above, also reflects the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the High Court would not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy of writ, more particularly, if the delay is unreasonable and there is an effect of not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed that in writ-jurisdiction, unexplained delay coupled with creation of third party rights in the time is an important factor which would weigh with the High Court. 10.1 In the instant case, as rightly submitted by learned AGP, any decision to interfere may cause hardship, inconvenience and even injustice upon the candidate who had been according to the petitioners appointed though she was less meritorious. In the considered opinion of this Court, after 16 years of appointment, it would be highly unreasonable to disturb appointment given to a candidate on the ground that she was less meritorious, more particularly, since the proposed disturbing would be at the instance of the petitioners who have sought redressal of main grievance, belatedly. In the considered opinion of this Court, after 16 years of appointment, it would be highly unreasonable to disturb appointment given to a candidate on the ground that she was less meritorious, more particularly, since the proposed disturbing would be at the instance of the petitioners who have sought redressal of main grievance, belatedly. In the considered opinion of this Court, in the interregnum, having worked for 16 years, rights have accrued in favour of the said person and whereas disturbing the said person at this stage, to the extent of even joining her as a party to the present litigation and examining her appointment, would also resulting injury to the said person. The said issue ought not to be overlooked by this Court. 11. It would also appear that the person in question, having worked for 16 years, is entitled to claim that she has a settled right to continue on the post in question as against any rights which the petitioners may have had at the time of appointment of the said person, which are to be treated as waived by the petitioners, on account of the petitioners not having agitated any grievance in the interregnum. Thus on this count also the petition does not warrant any interference. 12. As far as the application/appeal under the RTI Act is concerned, in the considered opinion of this Court, the same was also preferred too late in the day, more particularly, the application having been preferred in the year 2016 and the appeal having been preferred in the year 2017 i.e. 9 years and 10 years respectively after the merit list had been published at the time of document verification, after which the candidate less meritorious to the petitioners had been appointed. 13. 13. Having regard to the above discussion, more particularly, as this Court deems it appropriate not to countenance the submission of continuing wrong and further since this Court is of the opinion that the petition is barred by extraordinary and inordinate delay and whereas since it would appear that taking cognizance of this petition itself would cause grave injustice to the person against whom the petitioners are making out a case, more particularly, since the said person having worked for 16 years, has rights settled in her favour, and furthermore since there is no explanation whatsoever for the delay, more particularly, since the only explanation being application under the RTI Act, appear to be too few and intermittent, therefore, the petition is hereby rejected.