JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. I.A No. 9601 of 2023 1. This interlocutory application has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 29 days in preferring L.P.A. No. 579 of 2023. 2. In this application, the appellant has stated as under: “5. That the appellant is resident of Dehri, Bihar and as such he could not come to his counsel at Ranchi for instructing him to file the instant appeal within time, since he fail suddenly ill and had been suffering from viral fever, cough and cold for 26 days and after recovery when he contacted his lawyer by that time limitation of 30 days has already expired, hence this I.A. for the condonation of delay in filing the instant memo of appeal. 6. That the appellant was all along vigilant in pursuing its case and there is no willful latches or negligence on part of the appellant or his counsel and the circumstances under which the delay had occurred was completely beyond control and the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in not filing this appeal within time. 7. That the appellant would suffer irreparable loss and injury if delay consumed in filing of the instant application is not condoned by this Hon'ble Court and opportunity is not granted to the appellant to contest the appeal on merit. 8. That the appellant has a good prima-facie case in this appeal for consideration of this Hon'ble Court and as such, it is expedient in the interest of justice that the delay of 19 days in filing the appeal may be condoned and the case may be heard on merit.” 3. In view of the averments made in the application, I.A No. 9601 of 2023 is allowed. L.P.A. No. 579 of 2023 4. The writ petitioner after his failed attempt in W.P. (S) No. 2659 of 2014 has approached this Court by filing the present Letters Patent Appeal. 5. On a glance at the order dated 26th July 2023, we gather that the writ Court did not entertain the prayer of the appellant primarily on the ground that appointment from a panel of select list cannot be made about quarter a century after others were appointed. 6. The writ Court has held as under: “7. 5. On a glance at the order dated 26th July 2023, we gather that the writ Court did not entertain the prayer of the appellant primarily on the ground that appointment from a panel of select list cannot be made about quarter a century after others were appointed. 6. The writ Court has held as under: “7. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that no case is made out for interference for the following reasons: (i) The petitioner cannot claim parity with the petitioners of CWJC No. 2338/1998 (R) on the ground that the petitioners of said CWJC were appointed on having requisite qualification. (ii) The vacancies have already been filled up as 103 persons in Grade-IV have already been appointed as per Roster as they fulfilled the requisite qualifications. (iii) The process of appointment has already been over. Panel cannot be kept alive as now 23 years have passed. (iv) Similarly situated persons had already approached this Court in W.P. (S) No. 3726 of 2014, W.P. (S) 1749 of 2009 and W.P. (S) No. 1752 of 2009, wherein, a direction was issued by this Court to the respondents to consider their claims. Thereafter, the Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department, Govt. of Jharkhand has passed a reasoned order, rejecting the claim of that petitioners, for the reason that the respondents have already appointed 103 persons in Grade IV as per the reservation roaster for the appointment of the persons whose names were mentioned in the panel list of the Deputy Commissioner of the concerned district. (v) The petitioner has approached this Court after 16 years of long delay for claiming parity with the petitioners of CWJC No. 2338/1998 (R), who have already been appointed and as such, this writ petition cannot be entertained on the ground of gross delay itself. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metro Politan Water Supply and Swerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , at relevant paras has held thus: “Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle.” In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle.” In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 8. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, no interference is warranted in the instant writ petition and as such, is hereby dismissed.” 7. Mr. P.K. Mukhopadhyay, the learned counsel for the appellant reiterating the stand taken before the writ Court submits that similarly situated persons were appointed pursuant to a direction passed in C.W.J.C. No. 2338 of 1998(R) and the orders passed by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 3726 of 2014, W.P. (S) No. 1749 of 2009 and W.P. (S) No. 1752 of 2009 but the claim of the appellant was illegally not considered by the respondents. 8. The appellant, who claims that he was appointed by virtue of an order contained in letter no. 1232 dated 15th December 1994 and was transferred to Motihari by the order contained in memo no. 312 dated 2nd August 1995, is admittedly not in service; at least, after December 1998 when he demanded payment of salary. In the meantime, an advertisement was issued on 23rd January 1997 for appointment of Mechanical Assistant, Khalashi, Chowkidar, Lady Peon etc. but no appointment was made for some time. The case pleaded by the appellant is that 110 retrenched employees approached the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2338 of 1998 (R) and a direction was issued by the High Court for filling up the vacant posts in the Road Construction Department. 9. The writ Court having considered the orders passed in C.W.J.C No. 2338 of 1998 (R) and other writ petitions held that the appellant cannot claim parity with others who were appointed several years back in the past. The writ Court also took note of the judgment in Chennai Metro Politan Water Supply and Swerage Board and Others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 to fortify its conclusion that the prayers made in W.P. (S) No. 2659 of 2014 cannot be granted. 10. In Chennai Metro Politan Water Supply and Swerage Board the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “16. 10. In Chennai Metro Politan Water Supply and Swerage Board the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 11. This is by now well-settled a law that even a candidate who finds place in the select list cannot claim appointment as a matter of right. The appellant has failed to produce any evidence as to his illegal exclusion from the select list out of which 103 persons were appointed in Grade-IV posts. The writ Court rightly observed that sixteen long years after the selection process was over, the appellant cannot claim parity with the others. 12. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances in the case, we find no merit in this Letters Patent Appeal and, accordingly, L.P.A. No. 579 of 2023 is dismissed.