JUDGMENT : 1. The present group of First Appeals challenges the common judgment passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.) at Kalol, Dist. Gandhinagar on 21.02.2019 in fourteen group of matters being Motor Accident Claim Petition Nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of 2014, 24, 30 to 34 of 2016, 46 and 47 of 2015, which were having original old M.A.C.P. numbers registered in the year 2011. 2. The Insurance Company inter alia has raised the ground that the driver of the insured vehicle was not holding valid and effective license, and as per the evidence on record confirmed by the concerned R.T.O., produced at Exh.54 to 60, the license so produced on record is fake. 3. Advocate Mr. Maulik Shelat for the Insurance Company submits that it is the bounden duty of the owner of the vehicle to prove on record that he had verified the license of his driver, and thereby had permitted him to ply the vehicle. In absence of any such evidence on record, an adverse inference is required to be drawn that no such exercise was undertaken by the owner of the vehicle. 3.1 Advocate Mr. Shelat submitted that necessary evidence was brought on record by way of reply under R.T.I. from the R.T.O., from which it transpired that the license relied upon was fake. 4. Countering the argument, Advocate Mr. Paresh M.Darji for the claimants relying on the judgment of IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Geeta Devi and Ors., passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No.19992 of 2023 on October 30, 2023, submitted that now it is settled that if in case the owner was not aware of the license being fake per se the fact that the driving license was found to be fake does not absolve the insurer. Further, Advocate Mr. Dargi submitted that the insurance company has not examined the truck driver, nor has examined the R.T.O. Officer to prove the fact on record that license produced was fake. 5. Advocate Mr. Nishit A.Bhalodi has adopted the argument of Advocate Mr. Paresh M.Darji. 6. The facts of vehicular accident, as was noted by the Tribunal had taken place between Dalu (Camper) bearing Registration No.GJ-2-Y-5734 and the Truck bearing Registration No.RJ-27-G4142, on 07.07.2011. 5. Advocate Mr. Nishit A.Bhalodi has adopted the argument of Advocate Mr. Paresh M.Darji. 6. The facts of vehicular accident, as was noted by the Tribunal had taken place between Dalu (Camper) bearing Registration No.GJ-2-Y-5734 and the Truck bearing Registration No.RJ-27-G4142, on 07.07.2011. The Motor Accident Claim Petitions were filed, where few of them were the heirs of the deceased, while certain applications were by the injured claimants. M.A.C.P. Nos.5 and 9 of 2014 are the fatal matters by the heirs of the deceased, while rest are by the injured claimants. 7. The only issue, now as per the grounds in the appeals and the submissions raised by the learned advocates, require to be dealt, is about the license of the driver of truck, which was urged by the insurance company as being fake. The learned Tribunal after having considered the evidence on record had held driver of the truck sole negligent for the accident. The Truck was insured with the present appellant. 7.1 The Tribunal has referred to Exh.52, 53, 55 and 56 as the copy of the R.T.I. Application to Fatehapur R.T.O. with the speed post slip, a copy of reply of R.T.O. at Exh.54 and Exh.57, copy of appeal under R.T.I. at Exh.58 and 59, and reply of the R.T.O. at Exh.60. The learned Tribunal has not discussed the evidence produced by the insurance company in connection with reply of the R.T.O.; however, the only observation which could be seen in context of the license in paragraph-22 of the judgment is to the effect that the knowledge of the owner regarding the driver holding the valid and effective license, is not proved on record; hence, argument of the learned Advocate of the insurance company was not found tenable. 8. In Geeta Devi and Ors. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of the matter, where the Tribunal had found the driver of the tempo holding a fake driving license, thus, opined that the insurance company would not be liable to pay the compensation; hence, directed the insurance company to deposit the awarded amount with the liberty to recover from the owner of the tempo. Aggrieved by the finding, the matter had travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Aggrieved by the finding, the matter had travelled to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. After considering the record, the Apex Court has noted that the driver of the vehicle had produced a driving license at the time of his employment, and it was only after the accident it came to light that the said license was not a genuine one. The record clerk from the R.T.O., Mathura was justified, who deposed that the license produced was fake, as that license number was related to some other person. 8.1 The Tribunal has held that petitioner insurance company would not be liable owing to the breach of terms of insurance police by the vehicle policy owner. The High Court in the appeal opined that the insurance company had neither pleaded nor proved that the deceased vehicle owner did not take adequate steps to verify the genuineness of the driving license, and in absence of such a plea on his part, the Tribunal could not have concluded that there was a breach of terms and conditions of the insurance policy. Therefore, the High Court held that the insurance company shall not have the right to recover the compensation from the vehicle owner. 8.2 The Hon’ble Supreme Court had referred to section 149 of the M.V. Act, 1988, and has also made a relevant reference to the ‘Driver Clause’, as was read from the insurance policy, which has been noted in the following terms: “Any person including insured: provided that the person driving holds an effective driving licence at the time of the accident and is not disqualified from holding or obtaining such a licence.” 8.3 The Hon’ble Supreme Court after having considered the same has observed that statutory provision or the ‘Driver Clause’ does not mandate, that driving skill test should be undertaken without fail before employing a driver, and, thus, it was not open for the insurance company to cite the same as a breach of terms and conditions of the policy, while the Apex Court has observed that, in fact there was no such terms or conditions in the policy. 8.4 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further having observed the contention of the insurance company that the driver of the vehicle was not duly licensed, as he possessed a fake license, has noted that neither Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Act of 1988, nor the ‘Driver Clause’ in the insurance policy provide that the owner of the insured vehicle must, as a rule, get the driving licence, of the person employed as a driver for the said vehicle, verified and checked with the concerned transport authorities; with the further clarification to observe that generally as a matter of course, no person employing a driver would undertake such a verification exercise and would be satisfied with production of a licence issued by a seemingly competent authority, the validity of which has not expired; even considering the impracticability of every person employing a driver to expect the transport authority concerned to verify and confirm, whether driving licence produced by that driver is a valid and genuine one. Subject to just exception, to conclude that no such mandatory conditions is provided in any insurance policy, and it would not be opened to the insurance company, which also does not prescribe such a stringent condition, to cite the failure of the vehicle owner to get the driving licence checked with the RTO as a reason to disclaim liability under the insurance policy. 8.5 The Apex Court has made a reference to the case of Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and Orthers, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 654 , observing as under: “Useful reference in this regard may be made to Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kokilaben Chandravadan and others , wherein this Court, in the context of Section 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which is in pari materia with Section 149(2) (a)(ii) of the Act of 1988, observed as under: - ‘14. Section 96(2)(b)(ii) extends immunity to the insurance company if a breach is committed of the condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification. The expression ‘breach’ is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of ‘breach’ is ‘infringement or violation of a promise or obligation’ (see Collins English Dictionary). The expression ‘breach’ is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of ‘breach’ is ‘infringement or violation of a promise or obligation’ (see Collins English Dictionary). It is therefore abundantly clear that the insurer will have to establish that the insured is guilty of an infringement or violation of a promise that a person who is duly licensed will have to be in charge of the vehicle. The very concept of infringement or violation of the promise that the expression ‘breach’ carries within itself induces an inference that the violation or infringement on the part of the promisor must be a wilful infringement or violation. If the insured is not at all at fault and has not done anything he should not have done or is not amiss in any respect how can it be conscientiously posited that he has committed a breach? It is only when the insured himself places the vehicle in charge of a person who does not hold a driving licence, that it can be said that he is ‘guilty’ of the breach of the promise that the vehicle will be driven by a licensed Driver. It must be established by the insurance company that the breach was on the part of the insured and that it was the insured who was guilty of violating the promise or infringement of the contract. Unless the insured is at fault and is guilty of a breach the insurer cannot escape from the obligation to indemnify the insured and successfully contend that he is exonerated having regard to the fact that the promisor (the insured) committed a breach of his promise. Not when some mishap occurs by some mischance. When the insured has done everything within his power inasmuch as he has engaged a licensed Driver and has placed the vehicle in charge of a licensed Driver, with the express or implied mandate to drive himself, it cannot be said that the insured is guilty of any breach.’ 8.6 The correctness of the decision was considered by three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sohan Lal Passi Vs. P.Sesh Reddy and Ors., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 21 , wherein proposition of law was duly approved. In case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. P.Sesh Reddy and Ors., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 21 , wherein proposition of law was duly approved. In case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh and Others, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297 , where three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the interpretation of section 149 of the Act of 1988. the cases before the Bench involved, amongst others, instances where the driving licence produced by the driver or owner of the vehicle was a fake one. The consideration of the bench, as was given to the said issue, has been noted in the judgment of Geeta Devi & Ors. (supra), by observing that, Section 149(2)(a) opened with the words ‘that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy’, would imply that the insurer’s defence of the action would depend upon the terms of the policy. Further to note that the insurance company wished to avoid its liability is not only required to show that the conditions laid down in Section 149 (2)(a) or (b) are satisfied but is further required to establish that there has been a breach on the part of the insured, and considering that the proposition of law is no longer res integra, that the person who alleges breach must prove the same, it was observed by the Bench in Swaran Singh (supra) that an insurance company would be required to establish the said breach by cogent evidence and in the event an insurance company fails to prove that there has been breach of conditions of the policy on the part of the insured, such an insurance company cannot be absolved of its liability. 8.9 In context with the case, as was submitted of driver’s licence being fake, the Bench in Swaran Singh (supra), has observed that the question would be, whether the insurer could prove that the owner was guilty of wilful breach of condition of insurance policy. It was pointed out that the defence to the effect that the licence held by the person driving the vehicle was a fake one, would be available to the insurance company, but, whether despite the same, the plea of default on the part of the owner has been established or not would be a question which would have to be determined in each case. 8.10 Having observed the case of United India Insurance Co. 8.10 Having observed the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Lehru and Ors., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 338 , the Bench observed that the ratio laid down must not be read to mean that the owner of a vehicle can, under no circumstances, have any duty to make an inquiry with regard to the genuineness of the driving licence and the same would again be a question which would arise for consideration in each individual case. The finding, thus, sum up by the Bench was noted in the case of Geeta Devi and Ors. (supra), which reads as under: “(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish “breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case.” 8.11 The Apex Court, thereafter referring to the judgment of Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Rajaram And Ors., reported in (2018) 8 SCC 799 , had considered the liability of the insurance company raising a question as to whether an insurance company could be absolved of liability on the ground that the insured vehicle was being driven by a person who did not have a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. The Apex Court found that no attempt was made to ascertain whether the owner was aware of the fake driving licence possessed by the driver and, it was therefore held in Ram Chandra Singh case (supra) that it is only if the owner was aware of the fact that the licence was fake, but still permitted such driver to drive, the insurance company would stand absolved. It was unequivocally held that the mere fact that the driving licence was fake per se would not absolve the insurer. 9. In context of the proposition of law referred in Geeta Devi & Ors. (supra) with the observation made by the learned Tribunal in the present matter the fact of owner having the knowledge of the driving license being not valid and effective on the date of accident, was not proved on record by the insurance company. The appellant insurance company had tried to place on record the information sought under R.T.I. from the R.T.O., but no fact could be proved to bring on record that the owner was having the knowledge of the license, as sought to be proved through R.T.I. information as being fake. 9.1 It is required to be noted that the policy holder, Mr. Shokat Khan Pathan was not joined as party in the claim petition, while the owner on record of the truck bearing Registration No.RJ-27-G-4142 is respondent no.2, Gyansingh Danaram. The sale transaction was not informed to the insurance company. 9.1 It is required to be noted that the policy holder, Mr. Shokat Khan Pathan was not joined as party in the claim petition, while the owner on record of the truck bearing Registration No.RJ-27-G-4142 is respondent no.2, Gyansingh Danaram. The sale transaction was not informed to the insurance company. The driver, Imranuddin Nihaludin Shaikh, opponent no.1, at the relevant time of accident was driving the vehicle, while the fact of ownership of the truck could be proved, and Gyansingh Danaram was made party respondent. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court, to the facts, as was brought to the notice in the case of Geeta Devi & Ors. (supra), had observed that once a seemingly valid driving licence is produced by a person employed to drive a vehicle, unless such licence is demonstrably fake on the face of it, warranting any sensible employer to make inquiries as to its genuineness, or when the period of the licence has already expired, or there is some other reason to entertain a genuine doubt as to its validity, the burden is upon the insurance company to prove that there was a failure on the part of the vehicle owner in carrying out due diligence apropos such driving licence before employing that person to drive the vehicle. 11. Admittedly, in the present matters also, no evidence has been produced on record to infer that the owner of the truck was having the knowledge that the driving license, as was in the name of the driver whom he is employing, was fake. The insurance company has failed to prove the wilful breach on the part of the said vehicle owner. It would be very hard to except from owner to enquire from various R.T.Os., or the specific R.T.O. with regard to the genuineness of the license as could have been produced by the driver, who would be employed by the owner. 12. In view of the legal proposition, which has been now well settled, the grounds raised by the insurance company as regarding the wilful breach on the part of the owner with regard to the driving license stated to be fake, would not be tenable. Hence, there is no ground to entertain the appeals, the same stand dismissed.