JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is an accused in a charge-sheet arising out of FIR bearing No. 111/2023 for commission of offence under section 306 IPC registered with Police Station, Pacca Danga, Jammu, pending before the court of 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the trial court’). The petitioner had already approached the learned trial court for the grant of bail but the learned trial court vide order dated 08.12.2023 dismissed the application and as such after remaining un-successful before the learned trial court for grant of bail, the petitioner has now approached this Court for grant of bail on the ground that his wife had left his company with her own free will on 25.12.2022 and while leaving her matrimonial home took away the minor daughter and also all of her belongings including clothes, jewellery. The petitioner had filed a petition for grant of divorce against his wife (now deceased) before the court of learned Principal Judge (Family Courts), Jammu on 23.03.2023. 2. It is urged by the petitioner that the deceased had been residing with her mother w.e.f. December 2022 till 25.06.2023 when the deceased committed suicide in her parental home. It is further stated that the evidence produced by the prosecution in support of charge-sheet is merely an afterthought and based upon the statements of the related witnesses and further that there are no specific allegations of abetment levelled against the petitioner and the charge-sheet has been filed on the basis of general and bald allegations. 3. During the pendency of this bail application, on the oral prayer made by the mother of the deceased, not opposed by the petitioner, she was also arrayed as respondent No. 3 by this Court vide order dated 29.12.2023. 4. The official respondents as well as respondent No. 3 have filed the objections separately. In the reply filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it is stated that on 27.08.2023 FIR No. 111/2023 for commission of offence under section 306 IPC was registered with Police Station, Pacca Danga Jammu after the inquiry was conducted in terms of section 174 Cr.P.C. The petitioner was arrested on 27.09.2023 and the statement of the minor daughter of the petitioner/deceased was also recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. As per her statement, her father i.e. the petitioner herein used to say that her mother should commit suicide. Her father used to harass her mother a lot. The statements of the mother and brother of the deceased have also been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. In their statements, they have mentioned different incidents spanning from 2011 till the death of the deceased. It is also stated that the deceased had filed a complaint against her husband with Police Station, Women Cell, Jammu and the deceased was living with her mother at Karan Nagar, Jammu. Both the husband and wife entered in to compromise before Women Cell but that did not yield any result and both agreed for divorce on the condition that the petitioner would pay Rs. 25 lacs to her, but the accused declined to pay even a single penny to the deceased wife. She kept on requesting the petitioner to take her to matrimonial home and the accused filed a divorce case against her. The accused husband kept offending her telephonically and demanded dowry items. The accused husband also abused the deceased for not giving birth to male child. Fed up with the treatment meted out to her, the wife committed suicide on 25.06.2023. The accused was arrested on 27.09.2023. The Investigating Officer also seized the original Answer Sheet of Family Law-II Paper wherein the deceased had mentioned in detail the activities of the petitioner. The Investigating Officer after conclusion of the investigation, filed charge-sheet against the petitioner. It is further averred that as per call detail reports received from 01.05.2023 till 05.06.2023, the deceased was in touch with the petitioner on his mobile numbers with effect from 01.05.2023 till 05.06.2023 and further that Aditya Khajuria had blacklisted the mobile number of his wife (deceased) after 06.06.2023. 5. Respondent No. 3 has also filed the response stating therein that the petitioner got married by stating that he was Forest Ranger but in fact was a Forest Guard. It is also stated that the petitioner had entered into the business of crypto currency in the year 2022 as he wanted to make a lot of money through said business and was planning to leave his job and shift to Dubai permanently. It is further stated that the petitioner was a greedy person and used to demand money and gifts from his wife, respondent No. 3 and her husband and they fulfilled his demands to the best of their ability. It is further stated that the petitioner was a greedy person and used to demand money and gifts from his wife, respondent No. 3 and her husband and they fulfilled his demands to the best of their ability. Respondent No. 3 has also stated that the petitioner is a womanizer, having illicit relations with many women. In May, 2022, the petitioner forced his wife to bring ten lacs from her father and also forced her to get share in her father’s property. In May, 2022, the situation got worsened as the petitioner entered into the business of crypto currency with three partners, namely, Suresh Kumar Basotra, Manik Seth and Vineet Khullar. It is also alleged that one night the petitioner forced his wife to consume some drug due to which she got unconscious. When the petitioner’s wife got unconscious, the petitioner made her nude and clicked her nude photographs and videos with different boys. On the basis of those photographs and videos, the petitioner used to blackmail his deceased wife. It is further stated that one day the petitioner forced his deceased wife to go to Hotel Radisson and to make physical relations with his above mentioned partner Suresh Kumar. She refused to do so. The petitioner kept on physically torturing his wife and on 24.12.2022, the petitioner administered beatings to his wife mercilessly and the petitioner’s daughter made video of said incident. On 24.12.2022, the wife of the petitioner along with her daughter went to Police Station, Women Cell Jammu and lodged a report against the petitioner and since then, she had been residing with the respondent No. 3. It is also stated that her daughter (deceased) was pursuing LLB Course and on 25.03.2023, she appeared in Family Law Paper. She was so much mentally harassed by the petitioner that she narrated the torture meted out to her in her Answer Sheet. The said Answer Sheet has been seized by the Police. The deceased was also having the habit of writing personal diary and she had also written notes about the treatment meted out to her. The personal diary and notes were also seized by the Police. The deceased had also made a video in which she had clearly stated that the petitioner was physically and mentally torturing her and was forcing her to commit suicide. The said video has also been seized by the Police. The personal diary and notes were also seized by the Police. The deceased had also made a video in which she had clearly stated that the petitioner was physically and mentally torturing her and was forcing her to commit suicide. The said video has also been seized by the Police. The petitioner also used to send different persons to the deceased parental house where she was staying and they used to threaten the deceased. 6. Mr. Sunil Sethi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the charge has already been framed against the petitioner and the petitioner has been in custody for the last nearly six months and as such, he deserves to be enlarged on bail. He further argued that the material witnesses are related witnesses as such, there is no likelihood of influencing them and further that before Women Cell Jammu, the petitioner and the deceased had entered into a settlement wherein the petitioner had agreed to pay Rs. 25 lacs and then subsequently he expressed his inability to pay the said amount as a result of which the wife of the petitioner committed suicide. 7. Per contra, Mr. P.D. Singh, learned Dy. AG appearing for official respondents has argued that there are serious allegations against the petitioner and the statement of the minor daughter of the petitioner has yet to be recorded and in the event of release of the petitioner, there is every likelihood that the petitioner would make an endeavour to influence the minor daughter. He further argued that because of the cruel treatment meted out to his wife by the petitioner, she committed suicide. 8. Mr. Vilakshan Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 has vehemently argued that the documentary evidence collected by the Investigating Officer clearly demonstrates the conduct and attitude of the petitioner which prompted the deceased to take extreme steps of ending her life. He further stated that mere fact that the deceased was residing separately from the petitioner would not absolve the petitioner of the charge for abetting the suicide by the deceased as she was being treated in such a manner that she was left with no other option but to end her life. 9. Heard and perused the record including the record of trial court. 10. 9. Heard and perused the record including the record of trial court. 10. The allegations against the petitioner are in respect of abetting the commission of suicide by the deceased who admittedly had been residing with her mother ever since 25.12.2023. The Investigating Officer during the course of investigation has seized the personal diary, answer sheet and the various notes stated to have been written/prepared by the deceased during her life time. This is also borne out from the record that the parties had settled the dispute before Police Station Women Cell Jammu and as per the alleged statement of the deceased written in her own hand, both the petitioner and the deceased had agreed for mutual divorce for an amount of Rs. 25 lacs to be paid by the petitioner. 11. The contention of the petitioner that no offence of abetment of suicide is made against the petitioner as the deceased was residing separately from him, pertains to the merits of the case and this Court while granting bail, cannot appreciate the merits of the claims of either of the parties but the fact remains that there was a marital discord between the petitioner and the deceased and the documentary evidence also demonstrates the conduct and attitude of the petitioner. This Court would not like to examine the veracity of the claims made in the documentary evidence and would leave it for the trial court to examine the same at an appropriate stage, but the fact remains that the daughter of the petitioner and deceased has been cited as a witness in the charge sheet. She is eight years old and student of 3rd standard. There is no doubt that she is of impressionable age, though at present she is in custody of respondent No. 3. The charge was framed on 08.12.2023 and the matter was posted for 08.01.2024. On 08.01.2024, no witness was present and the prosecution was directed to produce evidence on 06.02.2024. On 06.02.2024, learned counsels for the petitioner filed the power of attorney on behalf of the petitioner/accused and the matter was posted for 27.03.2024. Thus it is evident that no witness has been examined till date. The daughter of the petitioner and the deceased is a material witness and as already stated, she is of impressionable age. On 06.02.2024, learned counsels for the petitioner filed the power of attorney on behalf of the petitioner/accused and the matter was posted for 27.03.2024. Thus it is evident that no witness has been examined till date. The daughter of the petitioner and the deceased is a material witness and as already stated, she is of impressionable age. The allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature and if proved, he can be sentenced with imprisonment up to ten years. Though the petitioner has been in custody for the last nearly six months but this court is of the considered view that the petitioner does not deserve to be enlarged on bail, as the statement of the minor daughter has not been recorded as yet. 12. In terms of Section 309 Cr.P.C, the court can postpone or adjourn the proceedings for such time as it considers “reasonable”. This court finds that the learned trial court has fixed the case after 50 days from the last date fixed for the hearing, which cannot be termed as reasonable. Needless to say, that right to speedy trial is a fundamental right and fixing the date of hearing after 50 days, particularly, when the accused is in custody amounts to violation of his right to speedy trial. Not only this, the speedy trial is necessary for maintaining the public faith in criminal justice system. In “Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 ” the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : 86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are: (1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also, does not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. (2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. (3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are: (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise. (4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is — who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex parte representation. (5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] “it cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed 2d 627] in the following words: ‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.’ However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. (7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases. (8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order — including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. (10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial. (11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis. 13. In view of the above, this Court while rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for grant of bail, direct the learned trial court to pre-pone the date of hearing in the charge-sheet in the first week of March 2024. The respondent No.3 who is having the custody of the minor daughter shall produce her before the learned trial court on the date to be fixed by the learned trial court for recording her statement and after the statement of minor daughter is recorded, the petitioner shall be at liberty to apply afresh for grant of bail before the learned trial court. 14. The application is, accordingly, disposed of.