JUDGMENT : The short point to be decided in these writ petitions are about the scope of enquiry to be conducted by the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (hereinafter mentioned as CALA) under Section 3H(3) of the National Highway Act, 1956 (for short Act, 1956) and also the stage when the competent authority (CALA) shall refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction when a dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable. 2. WP(C) Nos.21231/23, 22382/23, 23489/23, and 23901/23 are treated as the leading cases and I will narrate the facts in these cases. In all other cases, the same contentions are raised and therefore, the facts of the other cases are not mentioned separately. 3. WP(C) No.21231/23 and WP(C) No.22382/23 are filed by Kaprat Family Trust and Another. However, in WP(C) No.21231/23, the Kaprat Family Trust is represented by Mr.Vijayabhanu Kaprat, and in WP(C) No.22382/23, Mr. Kaprat Krishna Kumar represents the Kaprat Family Trust. There is a dispute between Kaprat Krishna Kumar and Kaprat Vijayabhanu about the authority to represent Kaprat Family Trust. Since that is not a question to be decided in these writ petitions, I am not going to the same. But it is a fact that, Kaprat Family Trust is represented by two individuals in these cases. 4. I will narrate the facts in WP(C) No.21231/23 in brief. According to the petitioners in this writ petition, the 2nd petitioner is representing the 1st petitioner Kaprat Family Trust. It is submitted that the 1 st petitioner Family Trust was created by the Family members of Kaprat Family at Venniyur, Malappuram District during a family partition that took place in the year 1958. The said partition deed stands registered as document No.752/1959 of SRO, Thirurangadi. Ext.P1 is the partition deed. It is submitted that, by the said partition deed, 718 items of immovable properties enumerated under A schedule to Ext.P1 partition deed were endowed for the benefit of the family deities who are perpetual minors namely, Sree Kurumba, Bhuvaneswari, Dharma Sasthavu, Vettaikorumakan, Bhagavathi, Rakshass, Kalari Paradevatha, Sarpakavu, maintenance of family temples, Kalari, ponds, as well as to conduct religious rights and rituals. It is further submitted that the entire items of properties enumerated in Schedule A of the partition deed No.752/1959 of SRO, Thirurangadi, assigned in favour of the deities mentioned above are exclusively owned by the deities who are perpetual minors for all purposes. Further, it is also submitted that, as reflected in Ext.P1 partition deed, a trustee is appointed to minister and monitor the properties that originally belonged to the deities, and the said trustee is only the custodian of the said properties on behalf of the deities of the Tharavad. 5. It is submitted that certain items of the properties included in A schedule of Ext.P1 were notified under the provisions of Act, 1956 for acquisition, for the purpose of widening National Highway 66 (for short NH 66). It is further submitted that the petitioner came to know of the acquisition through the notification issued under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, which was published in the major dailies. On coming to know about the proceedings, the 2nd petitioner submitted an application before the 2nd respondent in the year 2018, requesting the 2nd respondent to consider the status/claim of the petitioners in the properties so notified, before passing awards in respect of such properties. Since the same was not considered, the 2nd petitioner approached this Court by filing WP(C) No 37893/2018, in which this Court directed the 2nd respondent CALA to consider the application of the 2nd petitioner, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing. But, it is submitted that no further actions were initiated from the office of the 2nd respondent for more than 2 years and thus the 2nd petitioner once again approached the 2nd respondent by preferring another representation seeking proper enquiry and verification of records, especially Ext P1 partition deed and further seeking to release the compensation in respect of the properties acquired for the purpose of widening of NH 66 to the actual owners of the properties, ie., the Kaprat family deities. It is submitted that, though in furtherance of the said representation, the petitioners were issued with notices of hearing, the 2nd respondent was not pleased to consider any contentions of the petitioners. Meanwhile, the younger brother of the 2nd petitioner in this case approached this Court by filing WP(C) No.21887/2020 under the pretext of Trustee of the Kaprat Family Trust. It is submitted that, though in furtherance of the said representation, the petitioners were issued with notices of hearing, the 2nd respondent was not pleased to consider any contentions of the petitioners. Meanwhile, the younger brother of the 2nd petitioner in this case approached this Court by filing WP(C) No.21887/2020 under the pretext of Trustee of the Kaprat Family Trust. The 2nd petitioner impleaded himself as additional 4th respondent in the above said writ petition. The above writ petition was disposed as per Ext.P2 judgment to conclude the enquiry contemplated under Section 3H(3) of the Act, 1956 and further directed the CALA to decide whether a reference under Section 3H(4) is necessary. Based on Ext.P2 judgment, the CALA passed Ext.P3 proceedings. Challenging Ext.P3 the petitioner and the petitioner in WP(C) 21887/2020 filed writ petitions before this Court, which was disposed of by this Court by Ext.P4 common judgment by directing to reconsider the matter and the petitioners in those cases were allowed to raise objection against each individual title holders. Thereafter, Ext.P5 proceedings were issued by the CALA. The petitioners are aggrieved by Ext.P5 and hence, this writ petition is filed with the following prayers; “i. Issue a writ of certiorari or appropriate writ, order or direction to call for records leading up to Ext P5 and quash the same; ii. Issue writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or direction directing the 2nd respondent to refer the matters in question related to the claim/dispute raised by the petitioners for the deities who own the properties as mentioned in Ext P1 that are being acquired under the National Highway Act, 1956 to the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of which land in question situates to decide the dispute. iii. May dispense with filing translation of vernacular documents. iv. Pass such other order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”(SIC) 6. WP(C) No.22382/23 is filed by the Kaprat Family Trust represented by Mr. Kaprat Krishna Kumar, who is the brother of the 2nd petitioner in WP(C) No.21231/2023. This writ petition is filed with the following prayers; “i) To issue a writ of Certiorari or other appropriate writ, direction of order quashing Exhibits P28 to P33 passed by the 2nd respondent CALA in TGI nos. Kaprat Krishna Kumar, who is the brother of the 2nd petitioner in WP(C) No.21231/2023. This writ petition is filed with the following prayers; “i) To issue a writ of Certiorari or other appropriate writ, direction of order quashing Exhibits P28 to P33 passed by the 2nd respondent CALA in TGI nos. 1199/2018, 1187/2018, 1201/2018, 1196/2018 1197/2018 and 1200/2018 respectively, for being erroneous, illegal, unsustainable, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions Sections 3H(3) & 3H(4) of the NH Act, 1956; ii) To declare that from the records made available in the case considered and discussed in Exhibits P28 to P33, contentious disputes have arisen in terms of Section 3H(4) of the NH Act, 1956, in TGI nos. 1199/2018, 1187/2018, 1201/2018, 1196/2018, 1197/2018 and 1200/2018, between the petitioners and respondents 4 to 7 herein, on account of rival claims of ownership and title over the properties and in view of rival claims for receiving compensation in lieu of acquisition; iii) To refer the rival claims raised by petitioner and respondents 4 to 7 in TGI nos. 1199/2018, 1187/2018, 1201/2018, 1196/2018, 1197/2018 and 1200/2018, to the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction viz. the Principal District Court, Manjeri for adjudication in terms of Section 3H(4); iv) To issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order commanding the 2nd respondent not to disburse the balance compensation deposited in IndusInd Bank, Malappuram branch in the name of the CALA & the Project Director, NHAI or part thereof to respondents 4 to 7 or their nominees, agents or legal representatives as the case, may be under any circumstance until the disputes raised in TGI nos. 1199/2018, 1187/2018, 1201/2018, 1196/2018, 1197/2018 and 1200/2018, are referred and adjudicated conclusively by the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction, in terms of Section 3H(4) of the NH Act, 1956; v) To issue a writ of Mandamus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing the 2nd respondent to seek appropriate and adequate security from respondents 4 to 7 in the form of sufficient bank guarantee in the name of CALA & Project Director, NHAI, Malappuram for the amount already received by them as Interim Award vide Exhibits P5 to P9 made mention of in this writ petition for securing prompt repayment/recovery of the amount already received by them in case of adverse finding by the competent court to their entitlement to receive compensation as claimed by them; vi) To dispense with the filing of English translations of vernacular documents; vii) To grant such other relief and incidental reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem proper and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case and to allow the writ petition.” (SIC) 7. WP(C) No.23489/2023 and WP(C) No.23901/2023 are also filed by the Kaprat Family Trust represented by Vijayabhanu Kaprat, who is the 2nd petitioner in WP(C) No.21231/2023. The facts in these cases can be discussed later. 8. Heard Adv. Sri. Saiby Jose Kidangoor and Adv. Sri. A.S. Dileep for the petitioners, and Sr. Adv. S. Sreekumar and Sr.Adv. T. Krishnanunni instructed by their retaining counsels for some of the respondents. I also heard Adv. P. Chandrasekhar and Adv. P Satheesan who are also appearing for some of the respondents. 9. The short point to be decided in these cases is about the scope of enquiry under Section 3H of the Act, 1956. Adv. Sri. Saiby Jose Kidangoor relying Section 3G and 3H of the Act, 1956, submitted that there is a dispute arises as to the person to whom the amount is payable and hence the CALA ought to have referred the matter to the decision of Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Adv. Saiby Jose Kidangoor takes me through the various provisions of the Act 1956 and Ext.P4 judgment of this Court. Adv. Adv. Saiby Jose Kidangoor takes me through the various provisions of the Act 1956 and Ext.P4 judgment of this Court. Adv. Saiby submitted that this Court allowed the petitioners to raise objections against each individual title holders with respect to the acquired properties and if such objections are filed, there is a direction to consider the same by the CALA in terms of Section 3H(4) of the Act, 1956. According to the counsel, the finding of CALA in the impugned order would show that CALA stepped into the shoes of a civil court and decided the matter. The learned counsel submitted that the duty of CALA is only to find out whether any dispute arises regarding any person to whom the amount of compensation is to be paid. The counsel submitted that a bare perusal of the pleadings in this case would show that there is a dispute arises and therefore, the CALA ought to have referred the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court. Adv. Saiby also takes me through the partition deed relied on by the petitioners and submits that the property acquired is part and parcel of Schedule A of the partition deed. Therefore, it is submitted that CALA erred in rejecting the claim of the petitioners that there is a dispute regarding the entitlement of compensation. Adv.Saiby also took me through the partition deed produced in his cases and submitted that a detailed discussion about the dispute is not necessary from the side of CALA and if there is a prima facie dispute of title, CALA has no jurisdiction to decide the same and the matter ought to have been referred to the civil court. Adv.Saiby submitted that even if the purchase certificate is there to the contesting respondents, in the light of A schedule of the partition deed, the contesting respondents have no right over the property. Adv.Saiby also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Vinod Kumar and others v. District Magistrate MAU and Others (Manu/SC/0748/2023) to support his contention. Adv.A.S. Dileep submitted that the purchase certificates produced by the claimants are not acceptable. Adv.Dileep takes me through the relevant portion of the Land Reforms Act and submitted that the purchase certificates are void and those purchase certificates ought to have been rejected by CALA. 10. Adv.A.S. Dileep submitted that the purchase certificates produced by the claimants are not acceptable. Adv.Dileep takes me through the relevant portion of the Land Reforms Act and submitted that the purchase certificates are void and those purchase certificates ought to have been rejected by CALA. 10. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.Krishnanunni takes me through the partition deed relied on by the petitioners. The Senior Counsel submitted that, a perusal of partition deed itself shows that, there was a lease and after coming into force of Land Reforms Act the party respondents obtained purchase certificate and therefore there is no dispute arises in this case and hence the CALA rightly rejected the contentions of the petitioners. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.Sreekumar also supported the proceedings issued by CALA and submitted that there is nothing to interfere with the same. Adv.P.Satheesan, who appeared for some of the contesting respondents, relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sreeja v. Union of India and others [ 2022 (6) KHC 698 ] submitted that only if the CALA was unable based on materials to decide the title, the matter can be referred to civil court. Adv.P.Chandrasekharan, who is appearing for the contesting respondents in W.P.(C) Nos.23489 of 2023 and 23901 of 2023 submitted that, in these cases, even the Kapratt Family Trust has no case that they have any better title than his clients and therefore, there is nothing to interfere with the impugned orders in these two writ petitions. 11. The point to be decided in these cases is about the scope of enquiry under Section 3H(3) of the Act, 1956 and the situation in which the matter is to be referred to the Principle Civil Court of original jurisdiction under Section 3H(4). As per Section 3G of the Act, 1956, where any land is acquired under the said Act, the competent authority has to determine the amount payable to the land and the same shall be paid. Before proceeding to determine the amount under section 3G or subsection (2), CALA shall give a public notice publishing through local newspapers, one of which will be in vernacular language, inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. Before proceeding to determine the amount under section 3G or subsection (2), CALA shall give a public notice publishing through local newspapers, one of which will be in vernacular language, inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. If the amount determined by the competent authority under subsection (1) of section 3G or subsection (2) of Section 3G is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the party, will determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. The criteria to be followed by CALA or the arbitrator while determining the amount under subsection (1) of subsection (5) of Section 3G is narrated in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 3G (7) of the Act, 1956. 12. Section 3H deals with the deposit and payment of the amount. It will be better to extract Section 3H of the Act, 1956. “3H. Deposit and payment of amount.— (1) The amount determined under section 3G shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority before taking possession of the land. (2) As soon as may be after the amount has been deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall on behalf of the Central Government pay the amount to the person or persons entitled thereto. (3) Where several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them. (4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the principal civil court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. (5) Where the amount determined under section 3G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the arbitrator may award interest at nine per cent, per annum on such excess amount from the date of taking possession under section 3D till the date of the actual deposit thereof. (5) Where the amount determined under section 3G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the arbitrator may award interest at nine per cent, per annum on such excess amount from the date of taking possession under section 3D till the date of the actual deposit thereof. (6) Where the amount determined by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the competent authority, the excess amount together with interest, if any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be deposited by the Central Government in such manner as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that Government, with the competent authority and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (4) shall apply to such deposit.” 13. Subsection (3) of Section 3H says that where several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under subsection (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons, who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them. Therefore, a preliminary duty is there to CALA to determine the person, who in its opinion is entitled to receive the amount payable. Section 3H (4) says that if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The Apex Court in Vinod Kumar’s case considered the scope of Section 3H(3). It will be better to extract the same here: “34. Our final conclusion is as under: If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, then, the competent authority shall refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 3H will not serve the purpose. The competent authority possesses certain powers of the Civil Court but in the event of a dispute of the above nature, the summary power, vesting in the competent authority of rendering an opinion in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 3H will not serve the purpose. The dispute being of the nature triable by the Civil Court that the law steps in to provide for that to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The dispute regarding apportionment of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, would then have to be decided by that Court.” 14. The Division Bench of this Court in Sreeja’s case (supra) also considered the scope of Section 3H (3) of the Act, 1956. It will be better to extract the relevant paragraphs here: “11. If rival claims are received, the competent authority (CALA) should look into it as provided in sub-section (3) of S.3-H and find out who is the person really entitled to get the compensation. If the question relates to the title and the competent authority is unable on the basis of the materials before it to decide the entitlement to get compensation, the only option for him is to refer the parties under sub-section (4) of S.3 - H of the Act to the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction after following the procedure for deposit as in R.4 in the National Highways (Manner of depositing the amount by the Central Government; Making requisite funds available to the competent authority for acquisition of land) Rules. 12. It is therefore the obligation of the competent authority under S.3-H of the National Highways Act to see that as soon as the amount of compensation has been deposited with the competent authority, to pay such compensation to the person or persons entitled thereto. Situations may arise where the competent authority would not be able to decide as to who is entitled to receive the compensation. Situations may arise where the competent authority would not be able to decide as to who is entitled to receive the compensation. That can be on account of (i) the failure on the part of the owner of the acquired land to stake his claim or, (ii) failure on the part of the owner to furnish necessary documents to find his entitlement or, (iii) more than one person stake claim for the compensation and such claims are conflicting, or (iv) on account of dispute between the several claimants as to the apportionment of the compensation amount or any part thereof, and so on and so forth. Often, we noticed that when such disputes crop up before the CALA, no decision as contemplated in the aforesaid provisions is taken. The amount of compensation is kept idle in the account of the CALA without taking the mandatory steps provided under S.3-H(3) and 3- H(4) of the National Highways Act. It is reminded that if the amount of compensation is kept idle as a deferred compensation, it may be possible for the claimant, who would be found entitled to receive compensation, to claim interest on the compensation and in such event, the officers concerned may be fastened with the liability to pay interest on the amount of compensation.” 15. From the above dictum and also a perusal of Section 3H of the Act 1956 would show the scope of enquiry to be conducted by CALA. As per Section 3H(3), the CALA has to determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable, which is determined under Section 3G of the Act, 1956. From the above, it is clear that the CALA has some power to determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable, which is determined under Section 3G of the Act, 1956. If any dispute arises, then only, the CALA needs to refer the dispute to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. What is the meaning of "Dispute arises" mentioned in Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956? A larger bench of this Court in Kesava Bhat V. Surbryaya Bhat( 1979 KLT 766 ), while considering the scope of Section 125 of the Land Reforms Act, considered the meaning of “arises”. What is the meaning of "Dispute arises" mentioned in Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956? A larger bench of this Court in Kesava Bhat V. Surbryaya Bhat( 1979 KLT 766 ), while considering the scope of Section 125 of the Land Reforms Act, considered the meaning of “arises”. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the above judgment here: “........Unless the question actually "arises" for consideration, there is no obligation under Section 125 (3) to make a reference to the Land Tribunal. The mere incorporation of an unnecessary or irrelevant plea of tenancy into the written statement which has no relation whatever to the material averments and the reliefs sought in plaint, cannot attract the bar of Section 125 (1), or the provisions of Section 125 (3). It follows that the statement of the principle in Sankaran v. Rajammal (1974 Ker LT 488) which was approved by the Full Bench in Lessee v. Kuttan (1976 Ker LT 571) must also be overruled. That decision stated that Section 125 (3) bars any consideration by the court of the question even for the purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case has been established. We consider this an overstatement of the principle. It is only if the question arises for consideration that the obligation to refer under Section 125 (3) also arises. We do not think it can be the intention of the Legislature to make the reference to the Land Tribunal dependent upon a plea in the written statement which has got no relation to the claim made in the plaint, and which would not, having regard to the frame of the plaint, or to other legal obstacles in raising the defence, call for any adjudication at all. .......................................................................... .......................................................................... ..................................... 13. Counsel on both sides expatiated on the meaning of the expression "arise". The decision in Weed v. Ward, ((1889) 40 Ch ' D 555) was cited. Cotton L. J. there stated that a question which "arises" for consideration is something which will necessarily have to be decided. .......................................................................... .......................................................................... ..................................... 13. Counsel on both sides expatiated on the meaning of the expression "arise". The decision in Weed v. Ward, ((1889) 40 Ch ' D 555) was cited. Cotton L. J. there stated that a question which "arises" for consideration is something which will necessarily have to be decided. Much the same thing was said by Lindley, L. J. and Lopes, L. J. Being a plain and simple suit for injunction on the averment that the defendant was only the plaintiff's agent, we do not think any question regarding the rights of a tenant "arises" so as to attract Section 125 (3) of the Act, Attention was called to the decision of a learned Judge of this Court in George v. Chakkunni, (1977 Ker LT 865). Our learned brother Bhaskaran, J. very rightly noticed that the legislature had guardedly used the expression 'arising' instead of 'raised'. It was observed that to invoke the Section it is not sufficient that a dispute regarding the right of tenancy is raised, and that the question should, on the other hand, "arise" in the proceedings. The learned Judge was of the view that if as a matter of fact, the plea is barred by the operation of the principles of res judicata, the Court trying to proceed has no jurisdiction to try that question over again, and in that view, the question does not really "arise" for decision. We give our assent to this exposition of the principle by the learned Judge.” 16. From the above, it is clear that whether the "dispute arises" is something that will necessarily have to be decided. A simple dispute raised by a party without any basis cannot be treated as a "dispute arises" as per Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956. The legislature has used the expression "arises" instead of "raised" in Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956. The same issue considered by the larger bench in the above decision. The dictionary meaning of "arises" is "come into being". Simply because a party raises a dispute, CALA need not refer the dispute to the civil court. The duty of the CALA is to find out whether a "dispute arises" in the facts and circumstances of each case. So there is no automatic reference to civil court, once a party raises a dispute. Simply because a party raises a dispute, CALA need not refer the dispute to the civil court. The duty of the CALA is to find out whether a "dispute arises" in the facts and circumstances of each case. So there is no automatic reference to civil court, once a party raises a dispute. The CALA has a duty to find out whether there is a "dispute arises" in the facts and circumstances of each case for which an enquiry is necessary. This is clear from Section 3G(3) of the Act of 1956 also where it is stated that the CALA shall determine the persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the amount payable to each of them. If there is any dispute arising in that "determination process" mentioned in Section 3G(3) of the Act 1956, then only the CALA needs to refer the matter to the civil court. 17. This Court in the judgment dated 01.04.2022 in WP(C) Nos.22382 of 2023 and 28757 of 2021, which is the earlier round of litigation in this case considered this question in detail. The above judgment leads to the impugned orders in these cases. This court in the above judgment made certain observations based on the facts available in this case. This Court observed that only when a contest is raised with respect to the entitlement of the owner of a land being disbursed the amount of compensation under the award relating to it, the CALA can refer the matter to the competent court under Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956. It also observed by this Court that simply because some objections are filed before the CALA in an omnibus manner against the entire extents acquired by the National Highway Authorities, saying that all of them are covered by a partition deed, in which said extents are reserved for the benefit of certain deities and for the performance of rituals with respect to the same is not sufficient. These observations in the judgment dated 01.04.2022 in WP(C) Nos.22382 of 2023 and 28757 of 2021 became final because the petitioners have not challenged these observations. This Court also observed in the above judgment that individual objection or dispute with respect to the entitlement of the compensation to the party respondents and other owners of the acquired properties is to be raised before CALA. 18. This Court also observed in the above judgment that individual objection or dispute with respect to the entitlement of the compensation to the party respondents and other owners of the acquired properties is to be raised before CALA. 18. It is an admitted fact that the party respondents in these batch of the writ petitions obtained purchase certificates from a competent authority. Section 72K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 deals with the issue of a Certificate of purchase. Section 72K(2) says that the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title, and interest of the land owner and intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates. The party respondents are relying on their respective purchase certificates to claim the amount. The CALA authorities considered the purchase certificates and other documents produced by the party respondents and concluded that the same is conclusive proof for assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the land owner. The counsel for the petitioners submitted that, in the light of the partition deed produced in these writ petitions. the properties claimed by the party respondents are included in A schedule of the partition deed. It is the case of the petitioners that the above items of the properties are endowed for the benefit of family deities who are perceptual minors namely Sree Kurumba, Bhuvaneswary, Dharma Sasthavu, Vettaikorumakan, Bhagavathy, Rakshas, Kalari Paradevatha, Sarpakavu, maintenance of family temples, Kalari, ponds, as well as for the purpose of conducting religious rights and rituals. The learned Senior counsel Shri.T.Krishnaunni takes me through the relevant portion of Ext.P1. First of all, I do not want to discuss the validity of Ext.P1 partition deed. But, paragraph 7 of the partition deed produced as Ext.P1 in these cases is relevant. The same is extracted hereunder:- 19. Admittedly, the partition deed was executed in the year 1959. The Kerala Land Reforms Act came into force in the year 1963. The party respondents obtained purchase certificate as per Section 72 K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. A perusal of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the partition deed itself shows that there was a lease. In such circumstances, the CALA is right in deciding that the purchase certificate produced by the party respondents is to be relied on. The party respondents obtained purchase certificate as per Section 72 K of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. A perusal of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the partition deed itself shows that there was a lease. In such circumstances, the CALA is right in deciding that the purchase certificate produced by the party respondents is to be relied on. I see no reason to take a different stand in such situations. Adv. Dileep took me through different sections of the Land Reforms Act and submitted that the purchase certificate is void ab initio and the same cannot be accepted and therefore, there is a “dispute arises”. I cannot agree with the same. Admittedly, the petitioners challenged the purchase certificate by filing appeals in accordance with law with delay condonation petitions. It is informed to this Court that those appeals with delay condonation petitions are even now pending. That itself shows that the petitioners also want to challenge the purchase certificate. The existence of the same is admitted by them. Therefore, as long as the purchase certificates are in force, it cannot be said that there is a “dispute arises” in these cases. If the petitioners are able to show that the purchase certificates were obtained by fraud or in an illegal manner in the pending legal proceedings filed by them against the same, the petitioners can sue the party respondents for returning the compensation amount. Till the validity of the purchase certificate is decided by the competent authorities, the claim of the party respondents for compensation need not be deferred indefinitely. Moreover, there is no "dispute arising" as on today in the light of the purchase certificate produced by the party respondents in these cases. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that a "dispute arises" in these cases and therefore, the matter is to be referred to the decision of the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction as per Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956 cannot be accepted. The CALA already considered these matters in detail and found that there is no dispute arising for referring to the decision of the Principal Civil Court. The CALA relied on the purchase certificate and other documents produced by the party respondents to conclude that there is no dispute arises in these cases. Indeed, several observations are there in the impugned orders regarding the title of the petitioners. The CALA relied on the purchase certificate and other documents produced by the party respondents to conclude that there is no dispute arises in these cases. Indeed, several observations are there in the impugned orders regarding the title of the petitioners. I make it clear that those observations are only to decide whether there is any "dispute arising" for referring the matter to the civil court as per Section 3H(4) of the Act 1956. This will not stand in the way of the petitioners proceeding with the challenge against the purchase certificate of the party respondents and if the petitioners ultimately succeed in proving that the purchase certificate is obtained by fraud and other means or it is set aside by competent authorities, the petitioners can sue the party respondents separately to recover the amount obtained by them as per Section 3H of the Act 1956. Therefore, the contention of the petitioners that a dispute arises for reference to Civil court under Section 3H of the Act 1956 at this stage is unsustainable. 20. As far as W.P.(c) No.23901/2023 is concerned, Adv. P. Chandrasekharan takes me through the counter affidavit filed by respondent No.16 and also the impugned order. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of Ext.P20, the impugned order in W.P.(C)No.23901/2023: “From the above discussion it is convinced beyond doubt that the present holder Sri. Muhammad kutty Elanthi is having absolute title, ownership and possession over the 0.0282 Ha of land in Survey No. 333/2 in Tirurangadi village of Tirurangadi Taluk and also that the property in this case do not belong to the 'A' schedule of the Doc No. 752/59 and that Sri. Vijayabhanu Kaprat and Kaprat Krishnakumar are having no right or title over the property. For the above reasons, the objections filed by Sri. Kaprat Vijayabhanu and Sr. Kaprat Vijayabhanu is found to be devoid of any merit and are here by rejected. The direction issued by the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in WP(C) 25088/2021 and 28757/2021 are accordingly complied with.” 21. From the above, it is clear that the property in this case does not belong to the 'A' schedule of the partition deed. If that be the case, there is no merit in the above Writ petition. Similarly in W.P.(C) No.23489/2023 also, Adv. From the above, it is clear that the property in this case does not belong to the 'A' schedule of the partition deed. If that be the case, there is no merit in the above Writ petition. Similarly in W.P.(C) No.23489/2023 also, Adv. P. Chandrasekhar takes me through the counter affidavit filed by respondents 4, 5, 6, and 9 in that case and also the impugned order. It will be better to extract the relevant portion of the impugned order, Ext.P10 in W.P.(C) No.23489/2023: “During the hearing, the claimant presented that, the objection raised by Krishnakumar is not pertaining to the land in this case. There is no specific objection against this property which is included in Sy No. 327/4A. The Claimant submitted that the objection submitted by Krishnakumar is not a valid objection as mentioned in the judgment of Hon'ble High Court. No proper objection has been submitted within the time stipulated by the Hon'ble Court. On a close verification of the documents on the file and upon hearing both parties, it is convinced that only Kaprat Krishnakumar has filed objection that too without proper signature and no specific objection in Survey no.327/4.A. Without signature, the objection is not valid in the eye of law. Since no valid objection has been submitted by any party within the time stipulated by the Hon'ble Court, further steps with regard to objections are hereby dropped in this case. The eligibility of the claimant for the compensation will be considered separately.” 22. From the above also, it is clear that there is no proper objection raised by the party. The counter affidavit filed by respondents 4, 5, 6 and 9 in this case is also relevant. Paragraph No.5 of the counter affidavit is extracted hereunder: “5. It is submitted that the property of this respondent was acquired for widening national highway. Exhibit P6 is the order as per which the objection of the petitioners were rejected by the 2nd respondent and the 5th respondent was found to be having absolute title, ownership and possession over 0.0145 Hectare in Survey No. 214/10 (New Survey No. 214/14) in Thirurangadi Village by the 2nd respondent. The said order was passed by consent since the petitioners in the course of hearing said that they had no objection on the property comprised in Survey no. 214/10. The said order was passed by consent since the petitioners in the course of hearing said that they had no objection on the property comprised in Survey no. 214/10. It can thus be seen that the petitioners have not filed any objection in respect of property in Survey No. 214/10 in Thirurangadi village. In that view of the matter this respondent was found to be having absolute ownership and possession in respect of the land acquired from him in Survey No. 214/10 (New Survey No. 214/14) in Thirurangadi Village.” 23. From the above it is clear that, even the petitioners have no case that the property obtained by the party respondents in this case is part of the partition deed. Therefore, there is no merit in W.P.(C) Nos.23901/2023 and 23489/2023 and those Writ petitions can be dismissed. In the result, these Writ petitions are disposed of in the following manner: 1. W.P.(C) No.23489/2023 and 23901/2023 are dismissed. 2. The remaining Writ petitions are disposed of confirming the order passed by the CALA. But I make it clear that the petitioners are free to pursue the challenge against the purchase certificate obtained by the party respondents and if ultimately the petitioners succeed in proving that the purchase certificates are unsustainable, the petitioners are free to sue the party respondents separately for getting the compensation amount collected by them from the CALA. 3. The CALA is directed to disburse the amount due to the party respondents forthwith without waiting for the challenge against the purchase certificate by the petitioners.