ORDER : Narendra Kumar Vyas, J. 1.The appellant – Insurance Company has preferred this Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act being aggrieved with the award dated 8-11-2016 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kondagaon, District Kondagaon (CG) in M.A.C.C. No. 03 of 2014 (Smt. Sukhiyarin and others vs. Ravindra Kumar Wadde and others) whereby the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has awarded compensation of Rs.8,07,400/- along with 9% interest from the date of filing of the claim petition till the final payment is made to the claimants. 2.Brief facts as reflected from the record are that the respondents No.1 to 3 are the legal heirs / representatives of deceased Lakhanram. On 5-4-2013 at about 8.00 a.m., one Mahindra Tractor bearing registration No. CG 17 G-4925 which was rashly and negligently driven by its driver/respondent No.4 dashed the deceased Lakhanram who was on his motor-cycle nearby village Bohda which is situated on the way from Kondagaon to Narayanpur main road, as a result of which Lakhanram sustained grievous injuries and he was brought to District Hospital, Narayanpur and thereafter looking to his serious condition he was referred to Government Maharani Hospital, Jagdalpur where he was admitted till 10-4-2013 and during this period his left leg was operated and amputated below knee and thereafter he succumbed to death on 5-5-2013. It is alleged that prior to accident, deceased Lakhanram was aged about 40 years old and he used to earn Rs.5000/- per month by doing agricultural work. 3.Respondents No. 1 to 3 being wife and children of the deceased Lakhanram have filed a claim case under Section 166 read with Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the driver, owner and insurer of the offending tractor and in respect of said accident offence under Sections 279, 337 & 304 (A) of IPC has also been registered in Police Station Benur against the respondent No.4 who is driving of the offending tractor and after due investigation, challan was filed. 4.The claimants/respondents No. 1 to 3 to substantiate their claim before the Claims Tribunal examined the witnesses namely Smt. Sukhiyarin Bai (PW/1), Bijju (PW/2) and exhibited documents ie., final report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C in connection with criminal case registered against respondent No.4 (Ex.P/1), FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C (Ex.P/2 & P/3), Crime details form (Ex.P/4), application for medical examination (Ex.P/5), Merg intimation (Ex.P/6), property seizure memo (Ex.P/7), Naksha Panchayatnama (Ex.P/8), application for postmortem (Ex.P/9), postmortem report (Ex.P/10) and arrest memo (Ex.P/11). 5.The Insurance Company/respondent No.3 has filed written statement denying the allegation contending that respondent No.1 was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently and also denied that the deceased was aged about 40 years and was earning Rs.5,000/- per month by doing the agricultural work. It has also been stated that the deceased was not having a valid driving licence to drive the vehicle at the time of accident, therefore, the respondent No.3/Insurance Company is not responsible to pay the compensation. It has also been contended that there is a breach of policy of the Insurance Company, therefore, the respondent No.3/Insurance Company is not responsible for payment of compensation to the claimants. It has also been contended that since respondents No. 1 and 2 had collieded , therefore, they be allowed to take all the defence available to them as per Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 6.Respondent No.1 & 2 have filed their written statement denying the fact that accident has taken place because of rash and negligent driving of the Tractor bearing registration No. CG 17 – G 4925 by the respondent No.4 a a result of which the deceased sustained injuries. It has also been denied that the claimants are legal representatives of the deceased Lakhanram and prayed for dismissal of the claim application. 7.PW/1 Sukhiyarin Bai was cross-examined by the Insurance Company wherein she has admitted that the deceased died in the house and she has also admitted that if the deceased was given proper treatment in the hospital then his life would be saved. PW /2 Bijju has also supported the case of the claimants and he was cross examined by the respondents No. 1 & 2 but nothing was brought on record to rebut the same which was stated in examination-in-chief. 8.Insurance Company to substantiate their stand has not examined any witness. PW /2 Bijju has also supported the case of the claimants and he was cross examined by the respondents No. 1 & 2 but nothing was brought on record to rebut the same which was stated in examination-in-chief. 8.Insurance Company to substantiate their stand has not examined any witness. The learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal after appreciating the evidence, material on record has decided the issue No.1, 2 and 3 in favour of the claimants and accordingly the Claims Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs.8,07,400/- towards compensation. Being aggrieved with the awarded passed by the Claims Tribunal, the Insurance Company has preferred the instant Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 9.Learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance Company would submit that as per the post mortem report, the Doctor who has done the postmortem has opined that that the death of the injured was normal which is evident from Ex.P-10 and he died in the house, as such it cannot be said that the deceased succumbed to death on account of rash and negligent driving of the Tractor by the respondent No.4. He would further submit that the learned Tribunal has failed to consider the fact that there is no nexus between injury sustained by Lakhanram and cause of his death. He would further submit that the learned Tribunal has failed to consider the fact that the claimants have not adduced any medical evidence which proves the nexus in between injuries sustained which resulted to cause of death. He would further submit that since it is a normal death, therefore, the Insurance Company is not responsible to pay the compensation and prayed for allowing the instant appeal. To substantiate his arguments, he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in Miscellaneous Appeal (C) No. 251 of 2007 in case of Smt. Devki Bai and others vs. Abhijit Rai Choudhary and others decided on 11-5-2011 and would submit that in para 7 of the judgment, Hon’ble the Division Bench has held that the no evidence was led by the claimant that injuries found on the body of the deceased were sufficient or likely to result in his death. In the present case also the situation is one and the same as claimants have not led any evidence to establish that the injuries sustained by the deceased were sufficient or likely to result in his death. He would further submit that even no conclusive medical evidence to connect the death of deceased with the injuries sustained by him in the motor accident has been placed on record and only bald statement of PW/1 Smt. Devki Bai, the widow of the deceased and PW/2 Dayadaan, is not sufficient to hold that the deceased died due to motor accident and would pray for allowing the instant miscellaneous appeal. 10.Per Contra, learned counsel for respondent No.3 opposes the aforesaid submission made by learned counsel for the Insurance Company and would submit that since the vehicle was insured with the Insurance Company and the deceased succumbed to death on account of injuries sustained by him in the motor accident due to rash and negligent driving of the Tractor by the respondent No/.4, as such the claimants are entitled to get compensation and would pray for dismissal of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company. 11.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the Claims Tribunal. 12.From the submissions made at Bar, the point to be emerged for determination of this court is; “Whether the finding recorded by the learned Claims Tribunal that the deceased succumbed to injuries because of rash and negligent driving of the Tractor by respondent No.4 and whether the injury has nexus with the death due to use of motor-vehicle is legal or justified or not” ? 13.The foundation of the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the postmortem report the Doctor has given his opinion that the normal death is “due to infection was wound. Thus, he would submit that the claimants are not entitled to get compensation. This submission is being considered by this Court. 14.The word natural death which has been defined in 18th Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary means death from causes other than accident or violence. Death from natural causes. Thus, he would submit that the claimants are not entitled to get compensation. This submission is being considered by this Court. 14.The word natural death which has been defined in 18th Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary means death from causes other than accident or violence. Death from natural causes. 15.In the present case, the deceased sustained injurries in the accident because of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by respondent No.4 as a result of which left leg of the deceased was amputated and when he was in the house, it was infected which has caused his death, therefore, it cannot be said that the death was not caused because of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle and if the accident would have not taken place, his left leg would have not been amputated and probability of infection in the body cannot be ruled out. Thus, there is nexus between cause of death and accident. Claimant witness PW/1 Sukhiyarin Bain in her deposition has categorically stated that in the operated place of the deceased body there was bad smell of thick fluid containing dead tissue, cells, and bacteria, which was neither rebutted through cross-examination nor examined any witnesses by the Insurance Company, as such probability of infection in the body of the deceased cannot be ruled out. 16.The issue with regard to nexus between cause of death and accident has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Govind Singh and others vs. A.S. Kailasram and others, decided on 1-8-1974 wherein it has been held in para 11 as under. “11. Injury sustained in one accident may be the cause of a subsequent injury. The injury sustained by accident by victims on the operation table is an example of such a situation. So too are cases of suicide resulting from a mental condition produced by an accident (Pigney v. Pointera Transport Service Ltd., (1957) 2 All ER 807). Smith v. Leech Brain and Co. Ltd., (1961) 3 All ER 1159, was a case where the plaintiff had been injured by a splash of molten metal which burnt his lip. He later contracted cancer, underwent operation and died. The defendants were found to be negligent, in causing the burn and the burn was the promoting agency which promoted cancer in the tissues which already had a pre-malignant condition. He later contracted cancer, underwent operation and died. The defendants were found to be negligent, in causing the burn and the burn was the promoting agency which promoted cancer in the tissues which already had a pre-malignant condition. Lord Parker, C. J., attributed the death to the original accident and found the defendants liable to in respect of that death. Wieland v. Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd., (1969) 3 All ER 1006 was a case where the plaintiff suffered an injury caused by the admitted negligence of the defendants. After attending the hospital, she felt shaken and the movement of her head was constricted by a collar which had been fitted to her neck. In consequence, she was unable to use her bifocal spectacles with her usual skill and she fell while descending stairs, sustaining further injuries. It was held that the injuries and damage suffered because of the second fall were attributable to the original negligence of the defendants so as to attract compensation from them. Bloor v. Liverpool Darricking & Co. Ltd., (1936) 3 All ER 399 was a case where the deceased employed as a derricker, volunteered to act temporarily as a shipper on another barge, stumbled" and fell into the hole and sustained minor injuries. He was removed to the hospital and given an anaesthetic under which he collapsed and died. The post-mortem examination revealed that he had a diseased heart. Three learned Judges of the Court of Appeal held that the administration of anaesthecia cannot be deemed to be novus-actus intervaniens such as to break the chain of causation between the accident and the death and consequently the death must be attributed to the injuries sustained in the accident. A Bench of this Court had to consider in Mrs. Three learned Judges of the Court of Appeal held that the administration of anaesthecia cannot be deemed to be novus-actus intervaniens such as to break the chain of causation between the accident and the death and consequently the death must be attributed to the injuries sustained in the accident. A Bench of this Court had to consider in Mrs. C. P. Francis v. K. S. Shivaji & Co., C. M. A. No. 96 of 1970 of this Court judgment dated 11-2-1974 (Mad.), whether an accident victim who sustained a hit on the right part of his stomach, but did not sustain any visible injury on the abdomen could be deemed to have died as a result of the injury sustained in the accident when, a few days later, his abdomen had to be opened for surgical treatment of his stomach-pain and it was then found that the greater omentum was covering up the loops of intestines going down to pelvis causing an obstruction, a membrane was covering the jejuno-ilial junction and further exploration revealed pelyicabeess and lacerated appendix. The victim was operated, but he died of peritonitis. This court held that, in the absence of independent evidence to show that the victim was suffering from appendicitis earlier, the court was justified in presuming that the death of the deceased was the result of appendicitis caused by the rash and negligent act of the driver of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident. The principle in cases of this kind can best be described in the words of Lord Denning, M. R. in Statment v. West African Terminals Ltd., (1954) 2 Lloyds Rep 371 (at page 375): "..... it is not necessary that the precise contention of circumstances should be envisaged. If the consequence was one which was within the general range, which any reasonable man might foresee (and was not of an entirely different kind which no one would anticipate) then it is within the rule that a person who had been guilty of negligence is liable for the consequences". 17.Thereafter, again in the High Court of Madras in case of the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., vs. N. Meenal and others, decided on 8-4-2009 wherein it has been held in para 19 as under. “19. At thew cost of repetition, it is stated that the injured Nachiappan has succumbed to the injuries. 17.Thereafter, again in the High Court of Madras in case of the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., vs. N. Meenal and others, decided on 8-4-2009 wherein it has been held in para 19 as under. “19. At thew cost of repetition, it is stated that the injured Nachiappan has succumbed to the injuries. The crucial evidence of the doctor cannot be ignored in a light manner since he has fortified the consequent features which had arisen out of the impact on the kidney at the time of accident. He is a qualified doctor who has put in service in medical field for a long time there is nothing to smell rate in his evidence. Unless contra evidence is forthcoming, there is no embargo for placing reliance upon is opinion. Then medical evidence on record in this proceeding would go a long way to show that Nachiappan died due to the injuries which he sustained in the accident and this Court does not find any infirmity in the award passed by the Tribunal either factual or legal, which does not call for any interference from the Court. The upshot of the Tribunal need not be upset in any way which has to be confirmed and it is accordingly confirmed”. 18.Again, it has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in the case of Future General India Insurance Company Ltd., vs. Manjula Aubrey Tomlinson Christi Natural Citation 2023 (Gujhc) 56097 reported in II(2024)ACC 447 (Guj) wherein it has been held in para 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 49, 51 and 54 as under. “41. In the above-referred judgment, a reference was made of case in Govind Singh v. A.S. Kailasam reported in 1975 ACJ 215 where there was no autopsy done of the deceased. It was held with the facts of the case as under:- "9. ...... Lastly, it was argued that no autopsy had been done on Heera Bai's dead body and therefore, it is not possible to give a definite finding that her death was due to tetanus resulting from the injury sustained in the accident. Here too, the contention must be disregarded because the definite evidence of the doctors is that Heera Bai's death was due to tetanus and the infection had been brought about by injury sustained in the accident. Here too, the contention must be disregarded because the definite evidence of the doctors is that Heera Bai's death was due to tetanus and the infection had been brought about by injury sustained in the accident. A stray answer from PW5 in cross-examination that he cannot correctly set out the cause of death without a postmortem certificate is clutched at by the first respondent's counsel to contend that there is no conclusive evidence in the case to prove that Heera Bai's death was only due to tetanus. This answer cannot be available of undefined because innumerable clinical circumstances lead to the irresistible conclusion that the death was solely due to tetanus infection." 42. Thus, in view of the referred judgments, nexus between the injuries and death can be proved by oral and documentary evidence. The evidence by way of proof of vehicular accident supported by the medical evidence as well as the oral evidence of the claimant, to the circumstances of the deceased which creates confidence, establishing the nexus, then it can be relied upon to grant compensation. 43. In the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Mariambai A. Adamji (since decd.) through his heirs and LRs Zubeda Abdulhabib & Anr., reported in 2003 (1) GLR 574 , the question raised was as to whether the deceased died on account of the accident where after the accident, deceased was in the hospital for one day only, and died five undefined months thereafter and evidence of wife of deceased was that he was confined to bed till death and was not taken to hospital due to poverty. It was held on facts that the Tribunal had rightly concluded that death was due to accident. 44. In the case of Somabhai Vajabhai & Anr. v.Babubhai Bhailalbhai & Ors., reported in 1981 Law Suit (Guj) 144, it has been held that the deceased a young man aged about 20 was knocked down by a tanker. The injury sustained during the course of the accident consisted fracture of the pelvic bone and rupture of urethra. During the course of his hospitalization which lasted for nearly three months, he was thrice operated upon. The evidence on record indicated that the after-effect of the injury persisted even after his discharge from the hospital and that he was required to be hospitalized for brief periods on several occasions thereafter. During the course of his hospitalization which lasted for nearly three months, he was thrice operated upon. The evidence on record indicated that the after-effect of the injury persisted even after his discharge from the hospital and that he was required to be hospitalized for brief periods on several occasions thereafter. The death ultimately undefined occurred nearly 17 months after the accident. In determining the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal acted on the footing that it was not established that the death was caused due to the injury sustained by the deceased in the course of the accident. It was held that it was not correct to hold that there was no direct and proximate connection between the accident injury and the untimely demise of the deceased where the death was not all at once or at a point of time proximate to the date of accident, and there was no medical evidence regarding the cause of death. However, it was held that the direct testimony of the appellant clearly establishes when appreciated in the light of the medical evidence that the death was inevitably linked with the accident injury. Tested by the yardstick of probabilities and consistency with the rest of the evidence and the circumstances of the case, the appellants evidence emerges undefined unscathed finding no reason to reject it. Having observed that the surrounding circumstances also point in the same direction, it was noted that there was no definitive break, no unexplained interval, no yawning hiatus so as to snap the link between the accident injury and its tell-tale physical consequences and the untimely death. The principal after-effect of the accident injury namely the urinary difficulty is shown to have persisted throughout the interval of time between the date of accident and the date of death and treatment to relieve the deceased of the same is also shown to have been administered all along during the said period on different occasions. The Division Bench could not overlook the fact that the deceased was a youth in the prime of his life. He was healthy and suffered from no disease prior to the accident. The Division Bench could not overlook the fact that the deceased was a youth in the prime of his life. He was healthy and suffered from no disease prior to the accident. It was observed that young men do not die suddenly; some cause has to be undefined found for their death, it would be ignoring the reality to close eyes to the same and to conjecture that the death could possibly have resulted due to some other undisclosed cause when not a scintilla of it is perceivable. It was also noted that the fact that no medical evidence was led to precisely establish the cause of death is a matter of no consequences on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and on the state of evidence on record. It was noted that it might not be possible in all cases, to lead the evidence of experts, and when the direct and circumstantial evidence tending to establish the link between the accident injury and death goes unchallenged, it would be idle to insist upon the fulfillment of such a requirement. 45. In the case of Ramathal & Ors. v. Managing Director, Cheran Transport Corporation, Coimbatore, reported in (2003) 10 SCC 53 , it has been observed as under:- Unfortunately, the High Court did not discuss the materials on record in detail. It is not in dispute that the deceased was an indoor patient from 14-1-1991 to 21- 1-1991. He thereafter was being treated in the Government Hospital, Palladam. He died there. The medical certificate shows that the cause of the death was due to primary disease hypoxic encephalopathy and the immediate cause of death was due to cardio-respiratory arrest. The doctor examined on behalf of the claimants categorically stated that the accident might have been the cause of death of the deceased. The respondent did not bring any material on record to show that there was no link between the accident and the death. The finding of the High Court that there was no proper medical treatment and therefore, cause of death is not attributable to the accident does not appear to be based on any material on record. In any event, it cannot be said to be the correct approach adopted by the High Court particularly when the Tribunal on the basis of the materials brought on record by the parties came to a contrary finding. In any event, it cannot be said to be the correct approach adopted by the High Court particularly when the Tribunal on the basis of the materials brought on record by the parties came to a contrary finding. No strong and cogent reason has been assigned by the High Court in support of its judgment reversing the findings of the Tribunal. It accepted the submission made on behalf of the respondent herein without analysing the materials and without arriving at a clear finding of fact." 49. In Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Indian Reprint, 4th Edition, Volume 1 A-K by LexisNexis on page 596 under the heading of "resulting from injury", the concept of chain of causation has been explained as under:- "If death in fact resulted from the injury, it is not relevant to say that death was not the natural or probable consequence thereof. The question whether death resulted from the injury resolves itself into an inquiry into the chain of causation. If the chain of causation is broken by a novus actus interveniens, so that the old cause goes and a new one is substituted for it, that is a new act which gives a fresh origin to the after-consequence.' Dunham v Clare [1902] 2 KB 292 at 296, CA, per Collins MR The claimant under the Workmen's Compensation Act must prove an accident arising out of and in the undefined course of his employment and that injury or death resulted from it. The result need not be a direct or a natural or even a probable consequence of the accident if in fact it is a result of the accident. It is enough that the accident caused or contributed to or accelerated death and it appears from the authorities that an accident may contribute to the death if the accident has caused such a state of things in the man's body that he has become physically more susceptible to the cause which ultimately kills him.' Comery v New Hucknall Coliery Co Ltd (1919) 88 LJKB 462 at 465, CA, per Scrutton LJ" 50. In The Law of Torts by Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, 23rd Edition 1997 in Chapter IX, "Causation" is explained as under:- "If the damage alleged was not caused by the defendant's wrongful act the question of its remoteness will not arise. In The Law of Torts by Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, 23rd Edition 1997 in Chapter IX, "Causation" is explained as under:- "If the damage alleged was not caused by the defendant's wrongful act the question of its remoteness will not arise. In deciding the question whether the damage was caused by the wrongful act, the generally accepted test is known as 'but for' test. This means that if the damage would not have resulted but for the defendant's wrongful act, it would be taken to have been caused by the wrongful act." 51. In The Essentials of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology by Dr. K.S. Narayan Reddy, Sixteenth Edition 1997, "cause of death" is explained as under:- "The cause of death is the disease or injury responsible for starting the sequence of events, which are brief or prolonged and which produce death. It may be divided into: (1) Immediate cause, i.e. at the time of terminal event, e.g., bronchopneumonia, peritonitis, trauma, etc. (2) Basic cause, i.e. pathological processes responsible for the death at the time of the terminal event or prior to or leading to the event, e.g., gunshot wound of abdomen complicated by generalised peritonitis. (3) Contributory cause, i.e. the pathological process involved in or complicating, but not causing the terminal event. In some cases, the basic and the immediate cause may be identical. The manner of death is the way in which the cause of death was produced. If death occurs exclusively from disease, the manner of death is natural. If death occurs exclusively by injury or is hastened due to injury in a person suffering from natural disease, the manner of death is unnatural or violent." 54. In Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, "proximate cause" has been explained as 1. A cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on the actor. [Cases: Negligence 375.] 2. A cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occurred” 19.From the above legal position and also considering the evidence brought on record and the opinion given by the Doctor that there was infection in the body of the deceased and his left leg was amputated, which is not in dispute and Infection of the body is consequent to the amputation. Thus, it is quite vivid that the death was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the tractor by respondent No. 4, as such there is nexus regarding cause of death. Also considering the fact that insurance company has not adduced any evidence to rebut the statement of Smt. Sukhiyarin Bai (PW-01), who in clear terms has stated that the left leg of her husband was amputated because of rash and negligent driving of tractor by respondent No. 4 and thereafter he died. Thus, it is clearly established that death was taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle causing amputation of the left leg of the deceased. Thus, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant, that it was natural death and the claimants have not examined any Doctor to prove that death was caused due to amputation deserves to be rejected. 20. From perusal of Ex.P-1 to P-11 ie. record of the criminal case, it is also proved that on account of rash and negligent driving of the tractor by respondent No. 4, the incident has taken place, therefore, the finding recorded by the Claims Tribunal regarding issue No. 2 whether because of injuries sustained by the deceased he died on 05.05.2013, cannot said to be perverse or contrary to the record. 21.The case law cited by learned counsel for the appellant is distinguishable from the facts of the present case as in that case no postmortem report as reflected from para- 9 of the judgment was produced before the Tribunal to establish that Shankar died on account of injuries sustained in the Motor Accident and the deceased in that case after discharging from hospital was in the village about 05 months before his death on 21.07.2005, whereas in the present case the claimants have submitted the postmortem report and the records of the Criminal case wherein it has been mentioned that normal death was due to infection and the insurance company has also not brought on record to show that the deceased was having infection prior to the accident, therefore, the insurance company has miserably failed to prove their contention before the learned Claims Tribunal, as such, the learned Claims Tribunal has not committed any illegality or infirmity in passing the impugned order warranting any interference by this Court. 22.Accordingly, the instant appeal filed by the Insurance Company being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. The amount of compensation be disbursed to the claimants as per the direction contained in the award dated 8-11-2016 passed by the learned Claims Tribunal, particularly in paragraph 18 while deciding the issue. The interim order passed by this court on 06-2-2017 is vacated. 23.Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of.