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2024 DIGILAW 602 (RAJ)

Kanchan Kanwar W/o Late Shri Sattu @ Satyanarain Singh v. Mehboob Ahmed S/o Ahmed Khan

2024-04-16

RAJENDRA PRAKASH SONI

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JUDGMENT : RAJENDRA PRAKASH SONI, J. 1. Instant appeal is directed against the Judgment and Award dated 17.10.2003 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sojat, Camp Jaitaran, District Pali in motor accident claim case number 69/2001, whereby the claim petition preferred by the appellants was dismissed. 2. According to the assertions made in the claim petition, on 01.07.2001 at about 10:50 pm, on the public road between a petrol pump located at Nimaaj bypass and Khinawadi village, driver of bus no. RJ-19-P-2979 Mehboob Ahmed was driving the bus rash and negligently as well as at a high speed. The bus collided with a tractor number RJ-19-R-3050, which was moving ahead of the bus and on the correct side of the road. As a consequence of the collision, the tractor driver Satyanarayan Singh @ Sattu fell down from the tractor and died when the tractor, along with the trolley, ran over him. Offence against respondent no. 1 Mehboob Ahmed was registered u/s 279, 337, 338 and 304A of IPC by the police and after investigation charge sheet was filed against him before the court of competent jurisdiction. 3. According to pleadings, at the time of death, deceased was aged about 22 years and stated to be employed as a driver for the same tractor owner for the past 6-7 years, earning Rs. 3000 per month as salary along with an additional amount for expenses. In addition to this, he also had experience in farming. After deducting his personal expenses, he used to earn a net income of Rs. 3000 per month. He left behind a widow and mother; both of whom were dependent on him. 4. The driver, owner and subsequent purchaser (respondent numbers 1 to 3) in their joint written statement disowned responsibility for the accident by asserting that there was no accident with the bus however, they stated that the bus was insured with the respondent no. 4 insurance company. 5. The insurance company in its separate written statement pleaded that the vehicle involved in the accident was not being driven under control and employment of the insured nor did the bus have a valid permit. According to the respondent, the deceased himself was responsible for the accident, citing his negligence as the cause. Additionally, it was alleged that both the drivers did not possess valid and effective driving licenses. According to the respondent, the deceased himself was responsible for the accident, citing his negligence as the cause. Additionally, it was alleged that both the drivers did not possess valid and effective driving licenses. Furthermore, it was pleaded in the alternative to be a case of contributory negligence. It also denied the fact that involved bus was insured with them. All other factual averments made in the claim petition were denied for want of knowledge. 6. The Tribunal vide award dated 17.10.2003 dismissed the claim petition. In reaching its verdict, the Tribunal held that “Since there was no eyewitness to the accident, the principle of “res ipsa loquitur” is applicable. However, only the F.I.R was available on record to serve as evidence and solely relying on F.I.R, it does not sufficiently prove the negligence and rashness of the respondent bus driver. Additionally, notice under Section 133 was issued to the subsequent buyer of the bus, instead of the registered owner. Therefore, even based on the reply received, the respondent no. 1 cannot be definitively proved to be the driver of the vehicle involved at the time of the accident.” Further, the Tribunal observed that “claimants failed to prove the site plan of the scene as evidence. Consequently, without the site plan, the tribunal lacks insight into the actual circumstances of the accident, making it impracticable to apply the principle of “res ipsa loquitur”. As a result, the claimants were unable to substantiate that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligence of the bus driver or that the driver was operating the bus under the employment and control of the registered owner. Nonetheless, it was established that the vehicle was insured with respondent no. 4 insurance company.” 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that Tribunal without considering the charge sheet filed against driver of the offending vehicle in criminal case, entire investigation carried out against the driver of the offending vehicle, documents produced by claimants regarding accident and that no contrary evidence adduced by respondents in this regard, wrongly dismissed the claim petition filed by the claimants on the grounds mentioned above. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the record of the Tribunal. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants and have perused the record of the Tribunal. The two questions which fall for determination are whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the bus driver-Mehboob Ahmad and whether he was driving the bus under the control and employment of the owner of the vehicle at the relevant time? 9. A perusal of the record reveals that the police after investigation have filed charge sheet against respondent no.1 Mehboob Ahmad, for the offence under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of IPC. The respondents have failed to rebut the said contention of charge sheet. 10. At the outset, it may be mentioned that some material facts which have a direct bearing on the fate of this case, have escaped notice of the Tribunal. Regarding the question whether the deceased was driving the bus under the control and employment of the vehicle owner, the Tribunal framed issue number 5. In the initial part of the judgment, issue number 5 was adjudicated against the insurance company. However, in the later part of the judgment, the Tribunal concluded that the employment of the deceased was not proved, resulting in a contradictory finding. Therefore, in view of this Court, based on the adjudication on issue no. 5, it was evident that the employment of the deceased was indeed found to be proved by the Tribunal. 11. Besides the determination of Tribunal was incorrect in determining that only the First Information Report was available on the record to assess the aspect of negligence and rashness. Except the site plan, the complete charge sheet and related documents were available on the record. The charge sheet, formulated by the police, was also based on the facts and evidence gathered from the site plan. If, according to the respondents, the contents of the site plan were indicative of negligence and rashness of the deceased himself, the respondent could have produced it to refute their liability however, no such evidence was produced by the respondents. 12. Importantly, the driver and owner of the offending vehicle though denied responsibility of the accident in their joint written statement but they chose not to enter the witness box in their defence. 13. 12. Importantly, the driver and owner of the offending vehicle though denied responsibility of the accident in their joint written statement but they chose not to enter the witness box in their defence. 13. Unfortunately, what becomes apparent that the approach of the Tribunal was not sensitive enough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot or the claimants' hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for an accident particularly in such circumstances when the deceased was alone on his tractor and the incident occurred late at night in darkness. 14. After perusing the award of the Tribunal rejecting the claim petition, it could be noticed that after the accident, the bus driver had parked the bus at the scene of crime and then fled from the spot. Upon receiving information about the accident, the owner of the tractor arrived at the scene. He initially transported the injured Satyanarayan Singh to the nearest hospital and subsequently arranged for his transfer to higher center at Jodhpur for further treatment. The first information report was also duly lodged by disclosing the identity of the offending vehicle which caused the accident. 15. It is thus obvious that the date of the accident and the identity of the vehicle was both disclosed immediately after the accident coupled with filing of charge-sheet being filed against the bus driver and there is no lack of evidence on this point. This solitary evidence alone should have been enough for the Tribunal to entertain the claim petition and conduct the proceeding for determining the compensation after taking all relevant facts into consideration, but the Tribunal appears to have rejected the claim of the appellants solely on the ground that the eye witness to the accident as well as site plan were not produced by the claimant. 16. Hon’ble the Apex Court’s observations in Bimla Devi & Ors. vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Ors. reported in 2009 (13) SCC 530 is very apt to this kind of situation where, it is said that:- 12. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal “stricto sensu” is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal “stricto sensu” is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimants predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties. 17. In Rugga Singh vs. Prem Singh reported in 2006 0 ACJ (Rajasthan) 1453 this Court has earlier ruled that:- “It is difficult to appreciate approach of the Tribunal, as the Judge of the Tribunal ought to have known that it is the factum of accident, involvement of the deceased in the accident and the identity of the vehicle which are the most relevant considerations for entertaining a claim and the eye witness, if any, to the accident are only witnesses on the point of corroboration of the accident. If the factum of the accident is proved by a single circumstance, which is indicated from the first information report wherein the identity of the vehicle and death of the deceased is clearly proved, then the fact that it was not corroborated by adducing evidence of the eye witnesses cannot be a reason to disbelieve the unimpeachable evidence that the accident was caused by the vehicle whose identity has prima facie been proved and even if there be any doubt about its identity, the same can definately be scrutinised at the stage of determination of the proceeding. But to reject the claim itself inspite of prima facie proof of involvement of the vehicle as also the fact that the accident indeed took place, is bound to result into serious miscarriage of justice. Ignoring ample evidence in regard to the factum of accident which has to be held as primary evidence on the ground that the secondary evidence of eye witnesses were not available can hardly be held to be a sound reasoning to reject the claim itself. The Tribunal therefore was clearly in error in rejecting the claim petition filed by the claimant-appellants at its initiation itself on the ground that the eye witness to the accident had not been produced. This reason relied upon by the Tribunal while rejecting the claim petition of the claimant-respondents is not fit to be upheld. Consequently, the impugned order of the Tribunal rejecting the claim petition is set aside which has resulted into grave miscarriage of justice to the interest of the dependants of the deceased-appellant.” 18. Therefore by giving effect to the said principles, this Court is of the considered opinion that while deciding claim petitions, strict rule of evidence is not to be insisted upon and it has to be decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. In the present case, there were sufficient material available on record in the form of charge sheet, including all other police papers coupled with the fact that no evidence to the contrary was adduced by the respondents. 19. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has not taken a holistic view of the matter. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 20. 19. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has not taken a holistic view of the matter. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. 20. In these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the Tribunal was not justified in dismissing the claim petition on the ground that claimants failed to prove that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the bus involved. The employment of bus driver was also proved as per reply to the notice (Ex-5) under Section 133 of the Motor Vehicle Act. The findings recorded by the Tribunal being not in consonance with the material available on record are liable to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the Tribunal for computation of amount of compensation. 21. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, the award impugned is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the concerned Tribunal to decide the claim petition afresh on its own merits, after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 6 months from the date of this order. Parties are directed to appear before the concerned Tribunal on 06.05.2024. 22. Needless to mention that the Tribunal shall determine only the quantum of compensation on the basis of evidence already available on record. Record of the Tribunal be sent back forthwith. 23. It is made clear that nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on quantum of compensation and the Tribunal shall decide the compensation on its own merits in accordance with law.