ORDER : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. Pleading 1. The issue involved in this writ petition is for cancellation of the license pertaining to the Public Distribution System. 2. In addition to the issue on merit, the issue of jurisdiction has also been raised and taking note of the aforesaid submission, the Court has passed an order directing the State to establish the jurisdiction in taking action in cancellation of the license granted under the provision of Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984. 3. The learned State Counsel has submitted by making reference of the Clause 11 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984 which confers the jurisdiction to the State authority to deal with such licensee in whose favour, the license has been granted and if it will be found that the terms and conditions of the license are being flouted, then the said power is to be exercised and accordingly in the instant case , the power as stipulated in Clause 11 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984, has been exercised. 4. The State Counsel has further submitted by making reference of Section 85 of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000, wherein, it has been provided that the law which will prevalent having been enacted by the erstwhile State of Bihar prior to 15.11.2000, will have its applicability in the successor State of Jharkhand on or after 15.11.2000. 5. The learned State Counsel has relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi & Anr. Vrs. Swarn Rekha Cokes & Coals (P) Ltd. & Ors., reported in (2004) 6 SCC 689 in order to strengthen his argument that the law which was prevalent on or before 15.11.2000 will be applicable, so long, it is not being altered. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted by going through the provision of Section 85 of the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000 having been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ranchi & Anr. (supra) that he is not raising the issue of jurisdiction, rather, he will address the issue on merit by pointing out the illegality and impropriety in passing the order of cancellation of license. Prayer 7. (supra) that he is not raising the issue of jurisdiction, rather, he will address the issue on merit by pointing out the illegality and impropriety in passing the order of cancellation of license. Prayer 7. The order dated 12.11.2008 passed by Deputy Commissioner, Dumka in RMA No. 53 of 2008-09 has been challenged by which the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka dated 22.07.2008 passed in office being order No. 122/2008 has been affirmed whereby and whereunder the PDS license being License No. 38/1986 for the village/panchayat Sukhjora, Block Raneshwar, District Dumka has been cancelled. Facts 8. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading, made in the instant petition reads as under: 9. It is the case of the writ petitioner that he was granted public distribution shop license by the Respondent No. 3 in year 1986 under Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984 bearing License No. 38/1986. 10. The writ petitioner had been running his said shop without any complain to the satisfaction of all cardholder/consumer since 1986. 11. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 has issued direction/instruction to every licensee, Raneshwar circle, to lift food grains from the FCI Godown at Raghunathpur, only on Friday. 12. Further, the Respondents no. 3 has inspected the public distribution shop of the petitioner on 06.06.2008 (Friday) and on that time the shop of the petitioner was closed because the petitioner had gone to FCI Godown Raghunathpur for lifting food grains on 06.06.2008 (Friday) which is only day (Friday) to lift food grains from the above said godown. 13. Further, the Respondent No. 3 issued explanation notice to the petitioner vide order No. 108/2008 stating therein that the shop of the petitioner was found to be closed and the petitioner was found absent on inspection dated 06.06.2008 (Friday). 14. It is the further case of the writ petitioner that he has submitted his explanation on 07.07.2008 in response to notice, as contained in Annexure 2 to the Respondent No. 3 and denied all the allegations leveled against the petitioner, and asserted that on 06.06.2008, he had gone to lift the food grains from FCI Godown, whereas the AGM himself had not reached to Godown, as such same could not be lifted. 15. 15. Further, the respondent No. 3 has cancelled the license of the petitioner bearing license No. 38/86 on the ground that the shop of the petitioner was found closed and the shopkeeper has gone to lift food grains from Godown to lifting food grains and other allegation, bearing order No. 122/2008 dated 22.07.2008. 16. Thereafter, the writ petitioner filed an appeal against the impugned order dated 22.07.2008 before the Respondent No. 2, Deputy Commissioner, Dumka, bearing Rev. Misc. (Supply) Appeal No. 53/2008 and the Respondent No. 2 vide order dated 12.11.2008 has confirmed the order of the Respondent No. 3 and dismissed the said appeal without considering the explanation of the petitioner as well as the application dated 21.07.2008 filed by the villagers. 17. It is evident from the factual aspect that a license was issued to run the public distribution system shop in 1986 being license No. 38/1986 under the provision of Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984. 18. The writ petitioner was supplying the foodgrains as per the terms and conditions of the license but as would appear from the show cause for a day since the shop was found to be closed in course of inspection as such based upon inspection report, the show cause was issued as to why license be not cancelled in view of the provision of Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984. 19. The reply in defence was filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dumka wherein it is stated the day when it was found that the shop to be closed, the writ petitioner had gone to lift the foodgrains from the godown. 20. The Sub Divisional Officer, Dumka in the capacity of the Licensing Officer has not found the said reply to be satisfactory and accordingly the license was cancelled vide order dated 22.07.2008. 21. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said order has challenged the same before the appellate authority, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner who has also declined to interfere with the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, against which the present writ petition. Argument made on behalf of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner 22. Mr. 21. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said order has challenged the same before the appellate authority, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner who has also declined to interfere with the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, against which the present writ petition. Argument made on behalf of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner 22. Mr. Kaushlendra Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the order impugned that: (i) The reply in defence has not properly been appreciated, since for a day that too when the licensee had gone to the godown for lifting the foodgrains and the shop was closed for that reason, but without taking into consideration the said valid reason, the license has been cancelled. (ii) The cancellation is also based upon the complaints said to be received with respect to the irregularity said to be committed by the petitioner but the copy of the inspection report has not been supplied to the writ petitioner along with the show cause notice, hence, the petitioner has not been provided with the adequate and sufficient opportunity to defend. (iii) The inspection report reflects that so many complaints have been received but copy of none of the complaints has ever been served to the petitioner and further there is no reference in inspection report that who are the complainants and as such merely on the basis of the clue, the license has been cancelled. (iv) Learned counsel for the petitioner by emphasizing upon the statement made on behalf of the State in counter-affidavit dated 09.04.2024 has submitted that the writ petition is of the year 2009 and the Coordinate Bench has passed ad interim order keeping the order of cancellation of the license in abeyance and since then he is carrying out business by properly running the shop without any complaint whatsoever. (v) The submission has been made that the competent authority has also been brought to the notice of the fact that since 2009 there is no irregularity. It has been contended that the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been disputed by the State in the counter-affidavit, although two counter-affidavits have been filed. 23. (v) The submission has been made that the competent authority has also been brought to the notice of the fact that since 2009 there is no irregularity. It has been contended that the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been disputed by the State in the counter-affidavit, although two counter-affidavits have been filed. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the aforesaid premise has submitted that since the very cancellation of the license itself is illegal and without following the principle of natural justice, due to the reason that the copy of the inspection report has not been served and if the imputation as made in the show cause notice will be taken into consideration the order of cancelling license is too harsh. Argument made on behalf of the learned Counsel for the State 24. Per contra, Mr. Ratnesh Kumar, Learned SC(L&C)-I appearing for the State has submitted on the issue of the non-furnishing of the inspection report to the writ petitioner along with the show cause that no such statement has been made with respect to service of the inspection report in the counter-affidavit. So far as the carrying out business from the day when the ad interim order has been passed by this Court, there is no averment in the counter-affidavit also that during the period of 15 years, any complaint has been received against the writ petitioner. Analysis 25. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, gone across the impugned orders and the pleadings made on behalf of the respective parties. 26. This Court, based upon the submission made on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties, is required to consider the argument that due to non-supply of the inspection report, will it not be said to be gross violation of the principle of natural justice, due to the reason, that the cancellation of the license, is based upon the other aspect/ground which has found no reference in the show cause. 27. The show cause, is being issued by the competent authority, for the purpose of taking any adverse decision against the licensee, who has accrued right to carry out business under the statutory provision, i.e., Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984, based upon that, the license was issued way back in 1986. 28. 27. The show cause, is being issued by the competent authority, for the purpose of taking any adverse decision against the licensee, who has accrued right to carry out business under the statutory provision, i.e., Bihar Trade Articles (Licenses Unification) Order, 1984, based upon that, the license was issued way back in 1986. 28. The show cause cannot be said to be a mere formality and further the show cause, if is being issued, all the reasons, if found to be there, based upon any report, is required to be referred therein along with the inspection report and it is only then, it would be said that the person concerned, against whom, the adverse decision is proposed to be taken, has been provided adequate and sufficient opportunity, so as to follow the cardinal principle of natural justice. 29. The decision said to have been taken by the competent authority under Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984 which provides specifically that no license can be cancelled without providing adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, for ready reference, the Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984 is being referred as under:- “(2) No order of cancellation shall be made under this clause unless the licensee has been given a reasonable opportunity stating his case against the proposed cancellation but during the pendency or in contemplation of proceedings of cancellation of licence, the licence can be suspended for a period not exceeding 90 days without giving any opportunity to the licensee of stating his case. Such suspension shall be limited only to those trade articles regarding which contravention has been made by the licensee.” 30. Further as per the sub- Clause (1) of 11 power having being conferred upon the competent authority to cancel the license but such cancellation cannot be continued beyond the period of 90 days and there is no reference in Clause 11 (1) that before passing the order of suspension in the light of the provision of Clause 11(1) of the Order, 1984, a show cause notice is to be issued. 31. It is due to the obvious reason that the suspension of license is not punishment, rather, it is contemplation of enquiry or final decision based upon the show cause containing the irregularity by providing reasonable opportunity, as per the provision of Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984. 32. 31. It is due to the obvious reason that the suspension of license is not punishment, rather, it is contemplation of enquiry or final decision based upon the show cause containing the irregularity by providing reasonable opportunity, as per the provision of Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984. 32. The reasonable opportunity has been taken care of by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi Vrs. Union of India & Anr. reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 , which was on the issue of Section 10 of the Passport Act, 1934. 33. The said provision provides about impounding of passport in view of the provision of Section 10(3) of the Passport Act, 1934, but, without any stipulation therein that such impounding can be made only after providing an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned. The vires of Section 10(3) of the Passport Act, 1934 was questioned before the Hon’ble Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court (Constitution Bench) has laid the proposition, although without declaring the provision of Section 10(3) to be invalid, but, it has been laid down that whether it has been provided in the statutory provision to provide an opportunity of hearing is not relevant, the relevant is that if the adverse decision is being taken leading to civil consequence, then the cardinal principle is to provide an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being referred as under:- “9. We may commence the discussion of this question with a few general observations to emphasise the increasing importance of natural justice in the field of administrative law. Natural justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large areas of administrative action. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his address before the Bentham Club: “We can, I think, take pride in what has been done in recent periods and particularly in the field of administrative law by invoking and by applying these principles which we broadly classify under the designation of natural justice. Many testing problems as to their application yet re-remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of administrative action is but one area in which the principles are to be deployed. Many testing problems as to their application yet re-remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of administrative action is but one area in which the principles are to be deployed. Nor are they to be invoked only when procedural failures are shown. Does natural justice qualify to be described as a ‘majestic’ conception? I believe it does. Is it just a rhetorical but vague phrase which can be employed, when needed, to give a gloss of assurance? I believe that it is very much more. If it can be summarised as being fair-play in action — who could wish that it would ever be out of action? It denotes that the law is not only to be guided by reason and by logic but that its purpose will not be fulfilled; it lacks more exalted inspiration. And then again, in his speech in the House of Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman, the learned Law Lord said in words of inspired felicity: “... that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedures are to be applied which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural justice, it has been said, is only “fair play in action”. Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches : there may we find what Byles, J., called “the justice of the common law” ”. Thus, the soul of natural justice is “fair-play in action” and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. Thus, the soul of natural justice is “fair-play in action” and that is why it has received the widest recognition throughout the democratic world. In the United States, the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in England too it has been held that “fair-play in action” demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action is taken against a person, he must be given an opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord Denning, MR in these terms in Schmidt v. Secretary of State or Home Affairs — “where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representations on his own behalf”. The same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has even gainedaccess to the United Nations (vide American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, p. 479). Magarry, J., describes natural justice “as a distillate of due process of law” (vide Fontaine v. Chastarton). It is the quintessence of the process of justice inspired and guided by “fair-play in action”. If we look at the speeches of the various Law Lords in Wiseman case14 it will be seen that each one of them asked the question “whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly so that it could be said that their procedure did not match with what justice demanded”, or, was the procedure adopted by the Tribunal “in all the circumstances unfair?” The test adopted by every Law Lord was whether the procedure followed was fair in all the circumstances and “fair-play in action” required that an opportunity should be given to the taxpayer “to see and reply to the counter-statement of the Commissioners” before reaching the conclusion that “there is a prima facie case against him”. The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” 34. The Clause11(2) provides to have the reasonable opportunity then the question is that “what is the meaning of reasonable opportunity”. The inquiry must, therefore, always be: does fairness in action demand that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person affected?” 34. The Clause11(2) provides to have the reasonable opportunity then the question is that “what is the meaning of reasonable opportunity”. Whether merely by saying that the irregularity has been committed by citing one instance, while at the time taking decision, the competent authority has considered other irregularities, which has come in the inspection report. 35. This Court, therefore, has found from the admitted fact that the cancellation as per Clause 11 (2) of the Order, 1984 is not only on the basis of the closure of the shop for a day, rather, it is totally based upon the inspection report wherein the reference of various complaints have been made. 36. The question is that what imputation has been made in the said complaints and who are the complaints that has not been disclosed by the State, so that, the petitioner could have an opportunity to defend properly with respect to such irregularities said to be committed by him. 37. The principles of natural justice cannot be said to be mere a formality, rather, before taking away the source of livelihood or leading to any civil consequence, it is mandatory requirement on the part of the competent authority to provide reasonable opportunity so as to have the person concerned adequate and reasonable opportunity. Herein specifically, it has been provided under Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984 that before cancellation, the reasonable opportunity has to be given. 38. This Court, therefore, is of the view that non-supply of the inspection report before taking final decision of cancellation in view of the provision of Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984, cannot be said to be the proper compliance of the principles of natural justice as also cannot be said in consonance with the order as contained under Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984. 39. 39. This Court has also considered the aspect that if on the ground of technicality, will it be proper for this Court to quash the order finally, in view of the position of law that on technicality nobody can be allowed to take advantage, but, herein the admitted fact is that the writ petition has been filed in the year 2009, wherein, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order of ad interim stay vide order dated 10.07.2009 and since then, the writ petitioner is carrying out the business, i.e., for last 15 years without any complaint whatsoever. The reference of no complaint whatsoever is being made after going through the two counter affidavits filed on behalf of the State. But there is no reference of the complaints having been said to be committed by the writ petitioner after grant of the ad interim stay. 40. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that it is a fit case where the Writ of Certiorari is to be issued on the ground of the error apparent on the face of the order due to non-compliance of the statutory provision, as contained under Clause 11(2) of the Order, 1984 by not providing the inspection report and accordingly, it cannot be said that the writ petitioner has been provided with the reasonable opportunity. The law is well-settled, so far as the principle for issuance of Writ of Certiorari, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” Conclusion: 42. This Court, applying the aforesaid position of law in the fact of the present case and based upon the reason referred hereinabove, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 12.11.2008 passed in R.M.A. No.53/2008-2009 and order dated 22.07.2008 passed in Office Order No.122/2008 are hereby, quashed and set aside. 43. In the result, the instant writ petition stands allowed.