JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. The instant petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India directed against the order dated 21.08.2023 passed by learned Additional Munsif-VI, Koderma in Original Suit No.235 of 2020 (arising out of Original Suit No.109 of 2018) whereby and whereunder the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been rejected disallowing the prayer to make amendment in the plaint. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant petition, which are required to be enumerated, read hereunder as :- 3. It is the case of the petitioner that as per Survey Record of Right the lands of Khata No.8 of village Tetariadih, Police Station Koderma, P.S. No.63, present P.S. Domchanch, old District Hazaribag, present District Koderma was owned and possessed by Doman Singh and his brother Bishun Singh, both sons of Chaman Singh, who constituted a joint family governed by Mitakshra School of Hindu Law and both held joint title and possession thereon. 4. Bishun Singh had a daughter namely, Dashari Devi, who was married during the life time of Bishun Singh and settled in her Sasural permanently, where she died in due course without having any concern with her naihar. On the lands of Khata No.8 of Mouza Tetariadih Bishun Singh and Doman Singh were living together and were cultivating the land jointly. Subsequently Bishun Singh died in jointness with Doman Singh and after the death of Bishun Singh, Doman Singh became the absolute owner of lands of Khata No. 8 of Mouza Tetariadih. 5. Doman Singh died in due course, leaving behind his seven sons, namely Jitan Singh, Nunu Singh, Sohar Singh, Mangar Singh, Devi Singh, Chhotu Singh and Jhari Singh. Out of seven sons, Jitan Singh had no issue and he died heirless and remaining six sons had become the joint owners of the lands. 6. In course of time the six brothers partitioned the lands of khata no.8 of mouza Tetariadih. They also held owned and possessed lands of khata no. 178, which was entered in the name of Bishun Singh and others in the khatiyan and thus heirs of Doman Singh were jointly cultivating the lands of both khatas. Later on sons of Doman Singh partitioned the lands orally and after that with other lands and they became separate in possession, cultivation and residence. 178, which was entered in the name of Bishun Singh and others in the khatiyan and thus heirs of Doman Singh were jointly cultivating the lands of both khatas. Later on sons of Doman Singh partitioned the lands orally and after that with other lands and they became separate in possession, cultivation and residence. 7. Nunu Singh, son of Doman Singh was allotted portion of lands in khata no.8 including lands of plot no. 401,403 and 404 of village Tetariadih and was put in separate possession after family arrangement and partition and was exercising all acts of possession thereon during his life time separately. Ultimately Nunu Singh died in course leaving behind him, his only son Bulaki Singh, who stepped into the shoes of his father and came in possession of lands of aforesaid plots of khata no.8 of mouza Tetariadth and acquired exclusive right, title, interest and possession thereon. 8. Bulaki Singh remained in possession of the lands of the aforesaid plots and continued to possess the same during his life time. Bulaki Singh died leaving behind him, his one son Ashok Singh and Ashok Singh being legal representative of his deceased father Bulaki Singh, became the absolute owner of the lands of khata no.8, plot no. 401, 403 and 404 of village Tetariadth of the land of his share and possession and continued to exercise all acts of possession thereon. 9. The said Ashok Singh, felt need of money in April 1988 and so decided to sell portion of land of plot no. 403, for which he contacted with plaintiff no.1, Smt. Sumitra Devi and offered her to purchase 5 decimals of land of plot no. 403, khata no.8 of mouza Tetariadih. Aafter receiving the full consideration money, Ashok Singh executed and registered a sale deed, vide sale deed no. 3941, dated 30.04.1988, whereby he sold and transferred 5 decimals out of 17 decimal of lands of Plot no. 403, khata no.8 of mouza Tetariadih to Smt. Sumitra Devi, wife of Shree Sheo Narain Singh, daughter of Hari Ram and put her in possession on the land. After purchase Smt. Sumitra Devi applied for mutation before Anchal Adhikari, Koderma and the land was mutated in her name. Her name was entered in Register II and she has been paying rent and obtaining rent receipt in her name. 10. After purchase Smt. Sumitra Devi applied for mutation before Anchal Adhikari, Koderma and the land was mutated in her name. Her name was entered in Register II and she has been paying rent and obtaining rent receipt in her name. 10. The said Ashok Singh again sold 4 decimals land of plot no.403 and 8 decimals land of plot no. 404, total area 12 decimals to plaintiff Smt. Sumitra Devi vide sale deed no. 602 dated 01.12.2003. Mutation of the said land was also done in her favour vide Mutation case no. 1741/2003-04. 11. In the year 2004, Ashok Singh also sold and transferred 2 decimals land of plot no. 401 and 05 decimals land of plot no. 403, total 7 decimals land to Smt. Rekha Devi, wife of Shree Sudhir Singh who is daughter of Shree Sheo Narain Singh and Smt. Sumitra Devi plaintiff no.1, vide sale deed no.293, dated 19.01.2004. Rekha Devi applied for mutation of said purchased land in her name which was done. 12. One Bhatu Singh, son of Devi Singh and Tufani Singh, son of Chhotu Singh, although they were heirs of recorded tenants but they had no title or possession of any concern with the suit land after partition and family arrangement between heirs of recorded tenants but surprisingly Bhatu Singh and Tufani Singh and others, without the knowledge and consent of Ashok Singh, executed forged sale deed in favour of Malti Devi, wife of Badri Halwai, the portion of suit land along with some other land and after the death of Malti Devi, her husband Badri Halwal executed a registered sale deed no. 1373 dated 15.5.2014 in favour of land brokers, Anil Pandit and Rajendra Pandit. The purchased land was also never mutated in the name of Malti Devi. 13. Further, Badri Halwai, husband of Malti Devi had no possession even after the death of his wife so even after execution and registration of sale deed to Anil Pandit and Rajendra Pandit, the said sale deed remained on paper only and the vendees never came in possession till date. 14. The defendant no.1, Anil Pandit and no.2 Rajendra Pandit filed a petition before Anchal Adhikari, Domchanch vide Misc. case no. 07/2015 for mutation of the aforesaid land in their favour on the basis of above mentioned sale deed no. 14. The defendant no.1, Anil Pandit and no.2 Rajendra Pandit filed a petition before Anchal Adhikari, Domchanch vide Misc. case no. 07/2015 for mutation of the aforesaid land in their favour on the basis of above mentioned sale deed no. 1373, dated 15.5.2014 which was rejected by the Circle Officer, Domchanch, vide order dated 14.09.2015 with observation that the matter is related to right and title on suit land and directed them to go to civil court. 15. Against refusal of mutation vide order dt. 14.09.2015, defendant no.1 and 2 filed a Mutation Appeal bearing no. 10/2015-16 before L.R.D.C. Koderma. The plaintiffs appeared and submitted the relevant documents but the learned L.R.D.C. Koderma, without considering the legal and valid documents of plaintiffs and without considering that plaintiffs have pucca and kacha house and peaceful possession on the land in suit, illegally allowed mutation in the name of defendant no.1 and 2 by order dated 25.07.2017 and cancelled the old Jamabandi standing in the name of plaintiffs. 16. The said order passed in Mutation Appeal no.10/15-16 was challenged in Mutation Revision before learned Deputy Commissioner Koderma by plaintiffs, but the same was dismissed. 17. Thereafter, the petitioners filed suit before the civil court, Koderma being Original Suit No.109 of 2018 for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit properties. 18. In Original Suit No.109 of 2018, the plaintiffs-petitioners herein have filed a petition under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. seeking amendment in the plaint which was rejected assigning reason by the learned court that the amendment which has been sought for cannot be said to be amendment. 19. The further reason has been assigned directing the plaintiff to remain cautious of filing such petitions which seek to change the whole nature and subject matter of the suit, unsupported by proper documentation and decisions which are filed only for the purpose of misuse of the process of the court. 20. Against aforesaid order of rejection, the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed. Argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner 21. Mr. 20. Against aforesaid order of rejection, the present Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been filed. Argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner 21. Mr. Ankit Vishal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while assailing the impugned order, has submitted that the reason upon which the petition has been rejected, cannot be said to be sufficient reason to sustain the order reason being that whatever amendment has been sought for is formal in nature and in order to fill up the blank portion of the plaint which due to inadvertence remained unfilled. Therefore, it cannot be said that the nature of the suit is going to be changed. Hence, the impugned order suffers from error and, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law. Analysis 22. This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner and gone across the finding recorded by the learned court in the impugned order. 23. This Court, before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, needs to refer the order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. Consideration of the scope of Order VI Rule 17 has been taken into consideration by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of J.J. Lal Private Limited & Ors Vs. M.R. Murali & Anr. [ (2002) 3 SCC 98 ]. In the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to consider the judgment rendered in case of Majalti Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao [ (1989) 4 SCC 732 ] where was a case wherein the eviction case was filed under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. In the written statement, the tenant denied the title of landlord which was sought to be made a ground for eviction submitting that such denial made out a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court has rejected the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction, held that even a denial of a landlord's title by the tenant in the written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which the written statement containing the denial has been filed. The reasoning which was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of J.J. Lal Private Ltd. (supra) is that to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord, would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of character as a tenant in the written statement. The submission of the learned counsel for the tenant, which was made is that in any event the landlord had failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction petition was filed. The Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the aforesaid ground of denial by holding that normally this would have been so but, in the present case, the Hon’ble Apex Court find that the trial court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenant's denial of the landlord's title to the schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. 24. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. 24. For ready reference paragraph 12 of the judgment is quoted as under: “12.We may straightaway refer to a decision of this Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao [ (1989) 4 SCC 732 ] which was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. Eviction petition was filed on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord. In the written statement, the tenant denied the title of landlord which was sought to be made a ground for eviction submitting that such denial made out a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the Andhra Act. This Court, rejecting the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction, held that even a denial of a landlord's title by the tenant in the written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which the written statement containing the denial has been filed. The reasoning which appealed to this Court was that to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord, would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of character as a tenant in the written statement. The submission of the learned counsel for the tenant was that in any event the landlord had failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction petition was filed. The submission of the learned counsel for the tenant was that in any event the landlord had failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction petition was filed. This Court held: (SCC p. 738, para 6) “We agree that normally this would have been so but, in the present case, we find that the trial court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenant's denial of the landlord's title to the schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition.” 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has further considered the issue in the Om Prakash Gupta Vs. Ranbir B. Goyal [ (2002) 2 SCC 256 ], wherein it has been pleased to hold that the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. 26. For ready reference, paragraph 13 of the judgment is quoted as under: “13. Recently in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [ (2002) 2 SCC 256 ] while dealing with power of the court to take note of subsequent events and then to grant, deny or modify the relief sought for in the plaint, this Court has held: (See pp. 262-63, paras 11-12) “11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. 262-63, paras 11-12) “11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the commencement of the lis. However, the Court has power to take note of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly subject to the following conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. *** 12. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In the former case, the court may take judicial notice of the event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being introduced into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties.” 27. It is, thus, evident that the Hon’ble Apex Court has emphasized that the need for amendment and the basic parameters for allowing the such amendment is that there must complete justice to the parties and if the subsequent event will not be brought to the part of the pleading and if there is likelihood of not getting complete justice to the parties then the amendment is to be allowed. 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Raj Kumar Guramara (dead) through its LRs vs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited & Anr. 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Raj Kumar Guramara (dead) through its LRs vs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited & Anr. [ (2008) 14 SCC 364 ] wherein law has been laid down the proposition for the purpose of allowing the petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 in case certain conditions namely, (i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii) when the amendment would result in introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. 29. For ready reference, paragraph 18 of the judgment is quoted as under: “18. Further, it is relevant to point out that in the original suit, the plaintiff prayed for declaration of his exclusive right to do mining operations and to use and sell the suit schedule property and in the petition filed during the course of the arguments, he prayed for recovery of possession and damages from the second defendant. It is settled law that the grant of application for amendment be subject to certain conditions, namely, (i) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii) when the amendment would result in introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation. The plaintiff not only failed to satisfy the conditions prescribed in proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 but even on merits his claim is liable to be rejected. All these relevant aspects have been duly considered by the High Court and rightly set aside the order dated 10-3-2004 of the Additional District Judge.” 30. The similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and sons and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 84 . Relevant paragraph -63 reads as under: “63. The similar view has been reiterated by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Revajeetu Builders and Developers vs. Narayanaswamy and sons and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 84 . Relevant paragraph -63 reads as under: “63. On critically analysing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application. These are some of the important factors which may be kept in mind while dealing with application filed under Order 6 Rule 17. These are only illustrative and not exhaustive.” 31. Thus, it is evident that the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the conditions of amendment: (i) when the nature of the suit is not changed; (ii) when the amendment would not result in introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii) when defeats the law of limitation, if fresh suit of amendment plaint would be passed; (iv) when there is a general rule it would be rejected but to avoid multiplicity it can be allowed. 32. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is the admitted case of the petitioner that the plaint when was filed, the portions have remained unfilled. The same has been sought to be filled up by way of petition filed under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. 33. The same has been rejected taking into consideration the aforesaid conduct of the petitioner that the plaint since has been kept unfilled then where is the occasion to file an amendment petition to fill up the unfilled part of the plaint as also assigning the reason that if such amendment will be allowed, the nature of suit will be changed. 34. 34. In view of the aforesaid admitted fact that the petition under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. was filed to fill up the space in the plaint which has been kept unfilled at the time of filing of the suit, the question which requires consideration by this Court as to whether filling up the space in the plaint can be said to be the real purport of exercise of power under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. to be exercised by the court of law. 35. The scope of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. is not to allow the party concerned to fill up the space by filing an application under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., rather, the scope of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. is to bring on record certain facts/prayer which could not have been brought to the notice of the court and which has got bearing in the adjudication of the suit whether it is fact which is prior to filing of the suit or the subsequent events. 36. The condition for exercising such power has been considered by Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove and, as such, in the light of the aforesaid proposition, the propriety of the order passed by the learned court is to be considered. 37. Since the admitted case of the petitioner is that in the plaint the unfilled space was sought to be filled up by filing amendment petition under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. Hence, it cannot be said that the right which is to be exercised by the litigant concerned by making a petition under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. was to be filed taking into consideration the very purport and scope of Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. 38. The learned court has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter and has come out with the reason while dealing with the proposed amendment No.1 which is proposed amendment in the 4th line of para-4 that after the word ‘name of’ and before the word ‘and others’ the word ‘Bishun Singh’ be deleted and in its place, the word ‘Bulaki Singh’ be inserted. In the 7th line of para 4 of the plaint, after the word ‘khata no.’ and before the word ‘along’ the number 27 be deleted and its place the no. ‘178’ be inserted. 39. In the 7th line of para 4 of the plaint, after the word ‘khata no.’ and before the word ‘along’ the number 27 be deleted and its place the no. ‘178’ be inserted. 39. The learned court has rejected the said prayer of making amendment by assigning the reason that addition of parties, or names of the parties cannot be done through an amendment petition but only under Order I. The change in name of the plaintiffs, in effect changes the parties and the change in no. of the Khata no. of the land changes the subject matter of the suit and thus it will prejudice the defendant if the amendment is allowed. 40. The petitioner has prayed for second amendment in the 3rd line of page 10 of the plaint, after the word ‘keeping her’ and before the word ‘in one room’, in blank space, the word ‘cattle’ be inserted. 41. The learned court has come out with the finding that by allowing such amendment the nature of the suit will not be changed, rather, the said amendment has been considered to be harmless. 42. The third amendment which has been sought for is in the 3rd line of page 14 of the plaint, after the word ‘sale deed’ and before the word ‘in favour of’, the words and number ‘no.1597 dated 31.03.2004, sale deed no.7892 dated 02/05/1973 and sale deed no.5976 dated 24/04/1969’ be inserted. 43. The learned trial court, while rejecting the said prayer, has assigned the reason that insertion of the proposed amendment will add completely new sale deeds to this case and delete the previous ones, upon which the present suit was brought. 44. The learned court has also come to the conclusion that amendment sought will adversely affect the right, title and interest of the present parties as well as other parties involved. The learned court, on the basis of the aforesaid reason, has rejected the same. 45. The fourth amendment which has been sought for is that the first line of para 11 of the plaint after the word ‘so called’, the word ‘vendors’ be deleted and in the plaint the word ‘vendees’ be inserted. 46. The learned court has given the reason for rejection that two words ‘vendors’ and ‘vendees’ have completely different connotations while ‘vendors’ mean the ones who are selling, ‘vendees’ mean ‘the one who purchase’. 46. The learned court has given the reason for rejection that two words ‘vendors’ and ‘vendees’ have completely different connotations while ‘vendors’ mean the ones who are selling, ‘vendees’ mean ‘the one who purchase’. That change of terminologies change the nature of the suit. 47. The amendment which has been sought for by way of proposed amendment no.5 is insertion in 12th line of page 18 of the plaint after the word ‘revision no.’ and before the word/symbol and number ‘__________/2007’ the number ‘20’ be inserted. 48. The learned court has given the reason of rejecting the said amendment that such amendment could have been sought at much earlier stage and it cannot be rationally deciphered that the same was not in knowledge of plaintiff and the blanks were left to be filled at belated stage. 49. So far as the proposed amendment no.6 is concerned, the amendment as sought for was that the sentence made in sub-para II of para 17 of the plaint ‘sale deed no.12411 dated 11/06/1975 executed by Etwari Singh and others in favour of Khubi Devi wife of Nunman Modi, sale deed no.1064 dated 25.05.1999 executed by Nunman Modi in favour of Lalia Devi wife of Raman Sao, sale deed no.5972 dated 27.11.2003/28.11.2003 executed by Bhatu Singh and other in favour of Lalia Devi wife of Raman Sao’ be deleted. 50. The aforesaid amendment has also been held to be improper by assigning the reason that the same is prayer No.II of the suit and deletion of same and insertion of new sale deeds would result in complete change in the nature of the suit and will greatly prejudice the defendants. 51. The amendment no.8 which pertains to insertion in the 14th line of sub para II of para 17 of the plaint after the word ‘deed no.’ the number ‘1597’ be inserted. After the 17th line and before the 18th line the sentence ‘sale deed no.5967 dated 24.04.1969 executed by Etwari Singh in favour of Smt. Malti Devi and’ be inserted. 52. The said amendment has also been declined to be allowed in view of the fact that the nature of the suit will change and it will be said to be material change in the entire pleading of the plaint. 53. 52. The said amendment has also been declined to be allowed in view of the fact that the nature of the suit will change and it will be said to be material change in the entire pleading of the plaint. 53. The next amendment which has been sought for with respect to genealogical table has also been considered and rejected in view of the fact that the proper document is required from the circle office to support the amendment. 54. The learned court, based upon the aforesaid reason, has rejected the proposed amendments, save and except proposed amendment no.2 55. Since the law is very specific in the matter of allowing the amendment as has been referred hereinabove, based upon the judgment pronounced by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the insertion of the deed no. 1597 and 5967 if has been disallowed by giving a reason that it will prejudiced to defendants and its insertion will add new sale deed and the nature of the suit will change, which according to our considered view cannot be said to suffer from an error, reason being that either insertion of deed number or insertion of the name of certain persons who have executed the deed, as per proposed amendment no. VIII or the replacement of the word ‘vendee’ to that of the ‘vendor’ as proposed amendment no. IV or filling up of the vacant space in the plaint, the same, according to the considered view of this Court, if allowed to be there, then the very nature of the suit will be changed due to the reason that if the sale deed has been referred and it is now being replaced or the sale deed is not there or the name of the persons who have executed the sale deeds are being sought to be incorporated by way of amendment, the same will be said to change the nature of the suit. 56. This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got least jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order and the same can only be exercised if there is manifest error which is apparent on the face of record. 57. It needs to refer herein the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 56. This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got least jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order and the same can only be exercised if there is manifest error which is apparent on the face of record. 57. It needs to refer herein the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Dealing with the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 has been pleased to laid down therein regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limitless power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. 58. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. 59. Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 , wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. 60. 60. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent, the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. 61. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 , it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 62. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. 63. It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 64. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. 64. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 65. This Court, having discussed the aforesaid fact and the legal issues, is of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any error. 66. Accordingly, the instant Civil Miscellaneous Petition stands dismissed.