ORDER : Parth Prateem Sahu, J. 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking following reliefs:- “10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of appropriate nature in quashing the impugned letter dated 12.03.2024 as the same is illegal and non-est in eyes of law. 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue direction to the authorities, to extend the benefit of the amendment made in the Rule 4 of Rules of 2019 to the petitioner by extending the lease period of sand mine situated at the village Kareli Chhoti Tehsil Magarlod, District – Dhamtari, having Khasra No. 409 bearing Rakba 4.90 hectares petitioner for another two years as per the mandate of the amendment made in Rule 4 of the Rules of 2019 vide notification dated 15.05.2023. 10.3 Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice. 10.4 Cost of the petition may also be granted to the petitioner.” 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this writ petition are that the petitioner was granted lease of sand mines at Village Kareli Chhoti, Tehsil – Magarlod, District – Dhamtari over the land bearing Khasra No. 409 admeasuring 4.90 hectares. The lease was executed on 02.11.2020 for a period of 02 years up till 01.11.2022 which was extended in accordance with the provisions as provided under Rule 4 of the Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Ordinary Sand (Quarrying and Trade) Rules, 2019 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the Rules, 2019) . The extended period of one year also came to an end on 01.11.2023. During subsistence of the lease period of the petitioner, the State of Chhattisgarh has brought amendment in Rules, 2019 and the duration of quarry lease as provided under Rule 4 of Rules, 2019 has been made as 05 years from the date of registration of quarry lease deed. 3. After coming into force the amended provision of Rule 4 of Rules, 2019, the petitioner submitted an application dated 15.09.2023 before the Respondent No. 4 (Annexure P/4) for extending the period of lease for a further period of 02 years from 01.11.2023, in view of the amendment brought in Rule 4 of the Rules, 2019 with respect to the duration of lease as 05 years in place of 03 years. It appears that looking to the questions posed by the respective Collectors, Respondent No. 2 has issued letter to all the Collectors of the State of Chhattisgarh clarifying the effect of the amendment brought in Rule 4 of Rules, 2019 and held that the amended provision will not apply retrospectively. The petitioner after getting knowledge of the letter issued by the Respondent No. 2 as filed this writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the issuance of letter by the Respondent No. 2 is non-est in the eyes of law. It is contended that the executive and the authorities cannot issue any clarification on the legislative amendment issued by the State Government without prior approval of the Hon’ble the Governor. Letter dated 15.05.2023 (Annexure P/3) is not in the name of Hon’ble the Governor. By issuing letter dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure P/5), the Respondent No. 2 has curtailed the rights of the petitioner to carry his business for a further period of 02 year, making it total period of lease of the petitioner as 05 years by the executive order. The action on the part of the Respondent No. 2 is also in violation of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. The Executive has no authority under the law to add the words on the wisdom of the Legislature, once the amendment as brought under any Rule or Section, original seizes to exist and therefore, the duration of the lease mentioned in the lease deed executed and registered in favour of the petitioner of 02 years, further extendable for 01 year under Rule 4 will be substituted by 05 years automatically. Therefore, the duration for lease for the petitioner will be 05 years as the amendment is brought in by Legislature during the currency of the lease of the petitioner. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Ram Sharma Vs. Union of India 1988 Supplementary SCC 30 and Zile Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. 2004 8 SCC 1 . In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhagat Ram Sharma Vs. Union of India 1988 Supplementary SCC 30 and Zile Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. 2004 8 SCC 1 . He also contended that in the amended provision, the words used as the duration of lease earlier mentioned in the provision to be substituted and therefore, by virtue of the words used ‘substitution’, it is having the effect of its application from inception of the incorporation of the Rules, 2019. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State vehemently opposes the submission of the counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the lease deed executed in favour of the petitioner was in the year 2020 and as per Rule 4 of the Rules, 2019, initially, the duration of the lease was for a period of 02 years and the benefit of extension of 01 year was also granted to the petitioner as provided under Rule 4 of the Rules, 2019. The lease deed of the petitioner came to an end on 01.11.2023. The writ petition is filed after much expiry of the lease period of the petitioner only on 16.04.2024. He also contended that the amendment brought in the Rules, 2019 has its prospective operation and it cannot be applied as retrospective. The letter dated 12.03.2024 (Annexure P/5) is only the clarificatory letter wherein, the Respondent No. 2 has clarified the legal position of the amendment brought in under Rule 4 of the Rules, 2019. The writ petition is devoid of substance and hence, it is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties. 7. The undisputed facts are that the petitioner was granted the quarry lease of the area which is mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The lease was executed and registered on 02.11.2020 vide Annexure P/1. The duration of the lease as mentioned in the registered lease deed is from 02.11.2020 to 01.11.2022 (02 years). The State of Chhattisgarh in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 154 of the Mines Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the Act, 1957) has incorporated “Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Ordinary Sand (Quarrying and Trade) Rules, 2019”. The grant of lease to the petitioner is governed under the Rules, 2019. The State of Chhattisgarh in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 154 of the Mines Minerals (Development and Regulations) Act, 1957 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the Act, 1957) has incorporated “Chhattisgarh Minor Mineral Ordinary Sand (Quarrying and Trade) Rules, 2019”. The grant of lease to the petitioner is governed under the Rules, 2019. Rule 3 of the Rules, 2019 talks of identification of ordinary sand quarries and fixation of heading price. Rule 4 deals with duration of lease which is extracted below for ready reference:- “4. Duration of Quarry Lease – The quarry lease for quarrying of ordinary sand shall be granted for a period of two years, which may be extended for a further period of one year. The period of two years shall be reckoned from the date of registration of the Quarry Lease Deed. 8. Perusal of the aforementioned Rule would show that initially, the quarry lease for quarrying ordinary sand has been granted to the petitioner for a period of 02 years which may be extended for a further period of 01 year. The total period of lease under the lease deed executed and registered under the Rules, 2019 on the date of its registration was only up to maximum 03 years. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 15 of the Act, 1957, amended the Rules, 2019. Along with other amendments brought in Rules, 2019, Rule 4 was also amended and the amended Rule 4 of the Rules, 2019 is extracted for ready reference:- “2. For Rule 4, the following rule shall be substituted, namely:- 4. Duration of Quarry Lease. -The quarry lease for mining of ordinary sand shall be given for a period of five years. The period of five years will be counted from the date of registration of teh Quarry lease deed.” The amendment has been published in the Gazette on 09.05.2023 under the notification of amendment of Rules, 2019. In para 2, it is mentioned “For Rule 4, the following rule shall be substituted namely and thereafter, the amended provision of Rule 4 is mentioned”. In para 2, it is mentioned “For Rule 4, the following rule shall be substituted namely and thereafter, the amended provision of Rule 4 is mentioned”. It is the word “shall be substituted” which is being hit-up by the petitioner and is argued as once there is substitution of the period of lease under Rule 4, then, the substitution has to be from the period of lease which is to be substituted, is to be read and understood its application from the date of inception/incorporation of Rules, 2019. 9. In the amendment notification, it is nowhere mentioned that the amendment which is brought in the Rules, 2019 is having its retrospective effect. When there is no specific mention that the amended provision will have its retrospective effect, it has to be understood that it is having its application prospectively only. It is a gardner principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless, it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. Unless, there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature otherwise, it is deemed to be prospective only. In the case of State of Kerela Vs. Mathai Verghese & Ors. 1986 4 SCC 746 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:- “The Court can merely interpret a provision so as to make explicit the intention of the Legislature. It cannot re-write, re-cast or redesign the provision since, the power to legislate has not been conferred on the Court.” 10. In the case of National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2003 5 SCC 23 , their Lordships held as under:- “15. The legislative power either to introduce enactments for the first time or to amend the enacted law with retrospective effect, is not only subject to the question of competence but is also subject to several judicially recognized limitations with some of which we are at present concerned. The first is the requirement that the words used must expressly provide or clearly imply retrospective operation.” 11. In the case of Bhagat Ram (Supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the effect of amendment under the Punjab State Public Service Commission (Conditions of Service) (First Amendment) Regulations, 1972 has observed thus:- “16. ..... The first is the requirement that the words used must expressly provide or clearly imply retrospective operation.” 11. In the case of Bhagat Ram (Supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the effect of amendment under the Punjab State Public Service Commission (Conditions of Service) (First Amendment) Regulations, 1972 has observed thus:- “16. ..... When language of statute is free from abiguity, no duty is cast upon the court to do anything more than to give effect to the word or words used. We do not mean to say that there might not be something in the context of an Act of Parliament, or to be collected from its language, which might give to words prima facie prospective a larger operation, but that ought not to receive a larger operation unless you find some reason for giving it...... 17. It is a matter of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending law, that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision substituted. Such deletion has the effect of repeal of the existing provision. Such a law may also provide for the introduction of a new provision. There is no real distinction between “repeal” and an “amendment”. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., vol. 1 at p. 477, the learned author makes the following statement of law:- “The distinction between repeal and amendment as these terms are used by the Courts, is arbitrary. Naturally the use of these terms by the Court is based largely on how the Legislatures have developed and applied these terms in labelling their enactments. When a section is being added to an Act or a provision added to a section, the Legislatures commonly entitle the Act as an amendment .... When a provision is withdrawn from a section, the Legislatures call the Act an amendment, particularly when a provision is added to replace the one withdrawn. However, when an entire Act or section is abrogated and no new section is added to replace it, Legislatures lebel the Act accomplishing this result a repeal. When a provision is withdrawn from a section, the Legislatures call the Act an amendment, particularly when a provision is added to replace the one withdrawn. However, when an entire Act or section is abrogated and no new section is added to replace it, Legislatures lebel the Act accomplishing this result a repeal. Thus as used by the Legislatures, amendment and repeal may differ in kind-addition as opposed to withdrawal or only in degree-abrogation of part of a section as opposed to abrogation of a whole section or Act; or more commonly, in both kind and degree-addition of a provision to a section to replace a provision being abrogated as opposed by abrogation of a whole section of an Act. This arbitrary distinction has been followed by the Courts, and they have developed separate rules of construction for each. However, they have recognised that frequently an Act purporting to be an amendment has the same qualitative effect as a repeal-the abrogation of an existing statutory provision-and have therefore applied the term 'implied repeal' and the rules of construction applicable to repeals to such amendments.” 18. Amendment is, in fact, a wider term and it includes abrogation or deletion of a provision in an existing statute. If the amendment of an existing law is small, the Act professes to amend; if it is extensive, it repeals a law and re-enacts it. An amendment of substantive law is not retrospective unless expressly laid down or by necessary implication inferred. 19. For the sake of completeness, we wish to add that the mere use of the word “substitution” does not imply that Regulation 8(3) must relate back to November 1, 1956, the appointed day. The problem usually arises in case of repeal by substitution. In the case of executive instructions, the bare issue of a fresh instrument on the same subject would replace a previous instrument. But in the case of a legislative enactment, there would be no repeal of an existing law unless the substituting act or provision has been validly enacted with all the required formalities. In State of Maharashtra v. The Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd., [1977] 1 SCR 1002 a three Judges Bench repelled the argument that since the word 'substituted' was used in the Amending Act of 1949. In State of Maharashtra v. The Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd., [1977] 1 SCR 1002 a three Judges Bench repelled the argument that since the word 'substituted' was used in the Amending Act of 1949. It necessarily followed that the process embraces two distinct steps, one of repeal and another of a fresh enactment, in that case, the whole legislative process termed “substitution” proved to be abortive inasmuch the Amending Act did not receive the assent of the Governor General under s. 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and was thus void and inoperative. Distinguishing the two earlier decisions is Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras, [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR 435 and Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Balica & Co. [1969]3 SCR 40 the Court observed that the mere use of the word “substituted” does not ipso facto or automatically repeal a provision until the provision which is to take its place is constitutionally permissible and legally effective. It relied upon the following principle of construction stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edn., Vol. 36. p. 474: “Where an Act passed after 1850 repeals wholly or partially any former enactment and substitutes provision for the enactment repealed, the repealed enactment remains in force until the substituted provisions come into operation.” And observed : (SCC p. 651, para 18) “We do not think that the word substitution necessarily or always connotes two severable steps, that is to say, one of repeal and another of a fresh enactment even if it implies two steps. Indeed, the natural meaning of the word "substitution" is to indicate that the process cannot be split up into two pieces like this. If the process described as substitution fails, it is totally ineffective so as to leave intact what was sought to be displaced. That seems to us to be the ordinary and natural meaning of the words 'shall be substituted’.” 12. In the aforementioned decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that:- “The underline fallacy of the argument is one that lies in the assumption that the earlier regulation was substituted. That seems to us to be the ordinary and natural meaning of the words 'shall be substituted’.” 12. In the aforementioned decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further observed that:- “The underline fallacy of the argument is one that lies in the assumption that the earlier regulation was substituted. What had been substituted is the newly added by way of amendment to remove an existing anomaly.” In the case at hand also, the earlier provision under Rule 4 of the Rules, 2019 i.e. the duration of the lease has been amended and the earlier provision has been removed and therefore, it is an amendment which shall come into effect only from the date of notification of the amended provision i.e. 09.05.2023. The petitioner has entered into the lease deed and got it registered on 02.11.2020 and therefore, the petitioner would not get any benefit of the amended provision which has been in force by way of notification dated 09.05.2023, as in the notification, there is no mention that the amendment will have its retrospective effect. 13. For the foregoing discussions, the submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the earlier Rule 4 under Rules, 2019 has been substituted by the amendment and therefore, it will have its application from the date of inception of Rules, 2019 is misplaced and not sustainable. Accordingly, it is replled. 14.The writ petition being bereft of merits is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly, dismissed.