JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. I.A. No.965 of 2024 1. This interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 37 days in preferring this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Heard the parties. 3. Having regard to the averments made in the application and submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we are of the view that the appellant was prevented from sufficient cause in filing the appeal within the period of limitation. As such, the delay of 37 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned. 4. I.A. No. 965 of 2024 stands allowed. I.A. No.2471 of 2024 5. The instant interlocutory application has been filed by the applicants, namely Sulochana Choudhary and Suman Kumar Lall seeking leave of this Court to permit them to intervene in the instant Letters Patent Appeal by adding them as party respondents. 6. Mr. Amritansh Vats, learned counsel appearing for the proposed interveners, has submitted that by this interlocutory application the proposed interveners seek indulgence of this Court to allow them to intervene the present Letters Patent Appeal, as the applicants are the residents of the same mohalla, i.e., Hurhuru, and the road in question is the only access road for the applicants for ingress and outgress. 7. It has further been submitted that the order that may be passed in the present appeal, if any, in favour of the appellant, can affect the rights of the present applicants. 8. Learned counsel for the applicants, on the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the applicants may be allowed to intervene the present Letters Patent Appeal by adding them as party respondents. 9. Heard the parties. 10. There is no objection on the part of either the appellants or the respondents if the present interlocutory application will be allowed. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and submission made on behalf of the applicants, we are of the view that the present interlocutory application needs to be allowed. 12. Accordingly, I.A. No.2471 of 2024 is allowed. 13. Office is directed to make necessary correction in the cause title of the case. L.P.A. No.610 of 2023 14. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and submission made on behalf of the applicants, we are of the view that the present interlocutory application needs to be allowed. 12. Accordingly, I.A. No.2471 of 2024 is allowed. 13. Office is directed to make necessary correction in the cause title of the case. L.P.A. No.610 of 2023 14. The instant appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the judgment/order dated 14.08.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.2522 of 2019 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has declined to pass positive direction with respect to the claim of the petitioner for compensation in lieu of utilization of land for the purpose of road, however, with a liberty to take appropriate recourse in the matter before the competent court of civil jurisdiction. 15. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition is required to be enumerated which reads as under:- It is the case of the petitioner that the land situated at village- Cantonment, Mohalla Hurhuru, P.S. No 157, District-Hazaribagh under Khata No. 90, Plot No.904 and 905 measuring an area of 54 decimals was purchased in the name of Mrs. Helen Bala wife of Mr. G.G. Soren, the mother of appellant by virtue of Registered Sale Deed No.5522 dated 24.8.1954. 16. After purchase of the land, the mother of the appellant came in possession over the same and her name had been mutated in the Revenue Office and Rent Receipt issued in her name against the payment of rent to the Government. 17. During her life time, the mother of the petitioner has sold an area of 12 decimals out of 54 decimals (in Plot No. 904, 3 decimals out of 0.18 decimal and plot no. 905, 9 decimals out of 36 decimals) to one Pritha Jemes Herenj after due permission of Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh under the provision of C.N.T. Act, since she belonged to Scheduled Tribe Community and an area of 0.42 decimals left under her possession. 18. The mother of the petitioner passed away sometimes in the year 2003. 905, 9 decimals out of 36 decimals) to one Pritha Jemes Herenj after due permission of Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh under the provision of C.N.T. Act, since she belonged to Scheduled Tribe Community and an area of 0.42 decimals left under her possession. 18. The mother of the petitioner passed away sometimes in the year 2003. Thereafter the petitioner got his name mutated by succession vide Mutation Case No. 698 of 2002-2003 in respect of land measuring an area of 42 decimals in the Revenue Office and got Rent Receipt in token on payment of rent to the Government. 19. The land-in-question is under exclusive and conclusive possession of petitioner without any hindrance since the date of purchase. 20. On 13.10.2017, the petitioner went to the land-in- question and saw that sand, bricks and stone chips were lying there and some labourers were doing soling work after outing soil. Then the petitioner informed Ward Commissioner upon which the Ward Commissioner told him that P.C.C. Road is being constructed after sanction from Municipal Corporation. 21. It is the further case of the petitioner that the process of acquiring the land of petitioner by the Municipal Corporation, Hazaribagh for construction of P.C.C. Road is against the Land Acquisition Proceeding. The Municipal Corporation, Hazaribagh has acquired the land of petitioner without initiating Land Acquisition Proceeding and without issuing notice to the petitioner which is against the law. 22. The Executive Officer, Municipal Corporation, Hazaribagh has issued a letter no. 747 dated 06.02.2018 to Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar, Hazaribagh regarding construction of P.C.C. Road in Khata No. 90, Plot Nos. 904 and 905. From the aforesaid letter of Executive Officer, Municipal Corporation, Hazaribagh, it is evident that the petitioner's land was acquired by Municipal Corporation for construction of P.C.C. Road. 23. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a representation before the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh for payment of compensation of 22 decimal land which has been acquired by Municipal Corporation for construction of P.C.C. Road but the respondents refused to give the same till 2018 and so the cause of action arose in 2019. 24. 23. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a representation before the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh for payment of compensation of 22 decimal land which has been acquired by Municipal Corporation for construction of P.C.C. Road but the respondents refused to give the same till 2018 and so the cause of action arose in 2019. 24. When the request of the petitioner for payment of compensation was not allowed, the petitioner moved this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(C) No.2522 of 2019 seeking a direction upon the respondents to give adequate compensation of the land illegally occupied by Municipal Corporation, Hazaribagh for construction of P.C.C.Road which are petitioner’s raiyati land measuring an area of 22 decimals. 25. The respondents have appeared and filed counter affidavit. 26. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, has dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 14.08.2023 by declining to pass positive direction with respect to the claim of the petitioner for compensation in lieu of utilization of land for the purpose of road, however, with a liberty to take appropriate recourse in the matter before the competent court of civil jurisdiction, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 27. It is admitted fact that the road just adjacent to the house of the petitioner which was in existence as a kutcha road since 1988. The local body-Respondent No.5, has constructed P.C.C. road over the same. 28. The learned Single Judge has called upon Respondent No.5. A counter affidavit has been filed wherein the stand inter alia has been taken that the said part of the land is being used as a road since 1988 and subsequently, the P.C.C. road has been constructed and hence, for last 35 years no claim has been made by the petitioner or predecessor in interest of the petitioner. 29. The learned Single Judge, on the aforesaid premise, has dismissed the writ petition, however, liberty has been granted to take appropriate recourse in the matter before the competent court of civil jurisdiction which is under challenged in this intra-court appeal. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellant 30. Mr. J.J.Sanga, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, has not appreciated the factual aspect in right perspective that without any acquisition mechanism the land is being utilized by the people in general over which P.C.C. road has been constructed. 31. Argument advanced on behalf of the appellant 30. Mr. J.J.Sanga, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition, has not appreciated the factual aspect in right perspective that without any acquisition mechanism the land is being utilized by the people in general over which P.C.C. road has been constructed. 31. The argument has been advanced that there is no dispute of title with respect to the land said to be in favour of the predecessor in interest of the petitioner/writ petitioner, hence, denial of the claim to compensate is absolutely improper but that aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration. Therefore, the order impugned suffers from error and hence not sustainable in the eyes of law. Argument advanced on behalf of Respondent No.5 32. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.5, has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to take the ground that there is no consideration of the factual aspect by the learned Single Judge, rather, the learned Single Judge has considered each and every aspect of the matter and particularly, has gone through the recital of the registered sale deed wherein the reference of the boundary of the land has been referred. It has been mentioned that in the western side there is kuccha road. Hence, after lapse of 35 years it cannot be disputed now by the petitioner that there no road, since, that is admitted by him that in the western side of the boundary of the land there is a road. 33. Further, in addition to the aforesaid, it has been argued that the claim even if said to be fit, it is a belated claim since the claim has been agitated after lapse of 35 years. Argument advanced on behalf of respondent State and the interveners/newly added respondents. 34. Mrs. Rukmini Kumari, learned A.C. to S.C.(Mines)-III, appearing for the respondent State and Mr. Amritansh Vats, learned counsel appearing for the interveners/newly added respondents, have adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent No.5. Analysis 35. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order as also the pleading made in the writ petition. 36. Amritansh Vats, learned counsel appearing for the interveners/newly added respondents, have adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent No.5. Analysis 35. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order as also the pleading made in the writ petition. 36. The consideration which has been sought to be made by the writ petitioner by filing writ petition is that the land which is being now used for the purpose of public road, is being used without compensating the writ petitioner. 37. The claim of the petitioner, if admitted, that the said road is being used since the year 1988 and the writ petition has been filed in 2019 which is after lapse of about 31 years almost. 38. This Court, therefore, is of the view that such claim is hopelessly barred by principle of delay and laches. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. Reference in this regard may be taken from New Delhi Municipal Council Vs. Pan Singh & Ors reported in (2007) 9 SCC 278 in particular paragraph 17, which is quoted hereunder as: “17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India).” 39. In State of M.P. & Ors Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the writ petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay 9 and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. Emphasis was laid down on the principle of delay 9 and laches stating that the High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and inconvenience in bringing the justice. In this context, further reference is made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] wherein the land losers had approached the Court of law after inordinate delay seeking compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, in para7, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which reads hereunder as:- “7. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” 40. Thus from the aforesaid settled connotation of law, it is evident that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional Court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. 41. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but, in most circumstances, inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 42. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 42. Adverting to the facts of the case, so far as the claim of the writ petitioner that the said road is owned by the petitioner but the same is also contrary to the documentary evidence as would be evident from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent No.5-the local body, wherein the registered sale deed has been appended wherein the reference of this road has been made having in the western side of the plot of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner or the predecessor in interest of the petitioner themselves have admitted about the existence of the road and hence, after such a long delay, making prayer to compensate for utilization of the land cannot be said to be proper. Conclusion 43. This Court, having discussed the aforesaid factual aspect and coming back to the order passed by the learned Single Judge wherein the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition, however, the learned Single Judge is lenient enough to grant liberty to take appropriate recourse in the matter before the competent court of civil jurisdiction. 44. This Court, therefore, is of the view that there is no need to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 45. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.