JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been preferred by the tenant, assailing an order of remand dated 12.07.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Mathura on a revision preferred by him, setting aside the decree for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent passed by the Trial Court against the tenant. 2. The tenant, though successful before the Court of revision in dislodging the decree of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent etc., says that all evidence was there on record, on the foot of which the Revisional Court ought to have finally determined the suit. Instead, he remanded the suit to the Trial Court. And, that is why the tenant has preferred the present revision. 3. Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-landlords, waived opportunity to file a counter affidavit on 28.08.2023, whereupon this petition was admitted to hearing and heard forthwith. Judgment was reserved. 4. Heard Ms. Rama Goel Bansal, learned Counsel for the petitioner-defendant and Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. 5. The plaintiff-respondents instituted SCC Suit No. 13 of 2015 against the tenant-petitioner [‘the tenant’ for short] with a case that the tenant is in occupation of premises, bearing Water Rate Nos. 1409/2-1409/2A (old) and No. 167/205 (new). The said premises are entered in the Municipal Assessment Record for the years 1987-93 with the Nagar Palika, Mathura as one situate at 2161/M, Bharatpur Gate, Mohalla Guru Nanak Nagar, Junction Road, Mathura. The former owner and landlord of the premises were Vinod Sharma, Pramod Sharma and Ashok Sharma, all sons of the late Jagannath Sharma and Smt. Anita Rishi and Komal Sharma, from whom the plaintiff-respondents purchased the demised premises, a shop, vide registered sale deed dated 02.05.2014 for their own need. The owner, prior to the plaintiffs' vendee, was Jagannath Sharma, who had purchased the demised premises from Smt. Chhakko Bai. The tenant occupied the premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 220/- exclusive of tax. The demised premises was earlier a kachcha shop with a tiled roof constructed in the year 1982. In place of the kachcha shop, the then owner got a new shop constructed in the year 1986, which was assessed to house tax for the first time by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Mathura in the year 1987. 220/- exclusive of tax. The demised premises was earlier a kachcha shop with a tiled roof constructed in the year 1982. In place of the kachcha shop, the then owner got a new shop constructed in the year 1986, which was assessed to house tax for the first time by the Nagar Palika Parishad, Mathura in the year 1987. The provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) [‘the Act of 1972’ for short] do not apply to the demised shop. The defendant is in arrears of rent since the month of January, 1991 and he owed all this rent to the plaintiff-respondents' predecessor-in-title, the former landlord and owner. The plaintiff-respondents have acquired the right to recover all rent due in terms of the sale deed executed in their favour. 6. Relying upon the averments in O.S. No. 267 of 2014, Anil Kumar and Others vs. Vinod Sharma and Others, pending before the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) Mathura, a suit brought on wrong facts, the plaintiff-respondents, mistaking those facts, pleaded by the tenant as correct, caused a notice dated 08.07.2014 to be served upon the defendant through their Counsel. In the said notice, the terms of the tenancy were incorrectly mentioned to say that a plot of land was let out to the tenant by the former landlord. Upon acquisition of complete information, the plaintiff-respondents caused a notice dated 05.11.2014 to be served upon the tenant, mentioning that the previous notice be treated revoked, and further saying that the demised shop was constructed by the previous owner in the year 1986. By the said notice, the plaintiff-respondents demanded arrears of rent and determined the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 7. The notice was served upon the tenant, but was answered taking an incorrect stand. The rent due was not remitted nor the demised shop vacated. Pending suit, Smt. Rashmi Bansal, who was a Director of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, resigned, her resignation being accepted on 20.10.2020. In her place, Vipul Garg was appointed the Director, who was impleaded as plaintiff No. 3 to the suit. The plaintiff-respondents, on the said facts, sought a decree for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent from 01.04.2012 to 28.02.2015, besides pendente lite and future mesne profits. 8. In her place, Vipul Garg was appointed the Director, who was impleaded as plaintiff No. 3 to the suit. The plaintiff-respondents, on the said facts, sought a decree for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent from 01.04.2012 to 28.02.2015, besides pendente lite and future mesne profits. 8. The suit was contested by the tenant on various grounds, including that the demised premises were constructed in the year 1981, and not the year 1986. According to the tenant, a plot of land situate at Sonkh Adda, Junction Road, District Mathura was leased out to his mother Smt. Vimla Devi by its previous owners and landlords, Ghanshyam, Brij Bihari, Baikunth Nath, Anil Kumar and Rakesh Kumar on 01.06.1980. The rent settled was a quarterly sum of Rs. 660/- that would work out to Rs. 220/- a month, inclusive of all taxes. The terms of the lease obliged the tenant's mother Smt. Vimla Devi to construct a shop on the demised land and the cost of construction would be payable by the landlords, Ghanshyam and Others to Smt. Vimla Devi. The tenant's mother, Smt. Vimla Devi got the demised shop constructed with the consent of the then owners and landlords, Ghanshyam and others, incurring a total expenditure of Rs. 8,500/-. The cost of construction was not paid to the tenant's mother by the then owners and landlords. 9. It is pleaded that an agreement was entered into between the tenant's mother, Smt. Vimla Devi and the former owners and landlords, Ghanshyam and Others on 30.01.1982, where it was covenanted that except for default in payment of two successive quarterly rent, despite service of notice, the tenant's mother would not be evicted. After demise of his parents, the tenant, along with his brothers and sisters, occupies the demised shop, where for the time being he runs a restaurant, as his means of livelihood and to provide for his siblings. 10. The demised shop and the adjoining property were purchased long ago by Jagannath. Jagannath is no more and his heirs and transferees are bound by the terms of the demise between the tenant's mother, the late Smt. Vimla Devi and the former owners and landlords. 10. The demised shop and the adjoining property were purchased long ago by Jagannath. Jagannath is no more and his heirs and transferees are bound by the terms of the demise between the tenant's mother, the late Smt. Vimla Devi and the former owners and landlords. In violation of the terms of the lease, Jagannath instituted SCC Suit No. 3 of 1990 against the tenant's mother, Smt. Vimla Devi, which is pending before the learned Additional District Judge-II, Mathura and proceedings whereof have been stayed by this Court. The tenant's mother, the late Smt. Vimla Devi had been regularly depositing rent in the said suit in accordance with law and after her death, the tenant's father regularly deposited due rent. In this manner, rent up to 31.12.2013 has been deposited in Court. Upon inquiries made by the tenant and one Munna, it transpired that Jagannath Sharma's heirs have transferred the demised shop and those held on a tenancy by Munna in the landlords' favour vide registered sale deed dated 16.04.2014. 11. For some time past, the Director/Employees/Agents have been troubling the tenant with their efforts to forcibly dispossess him from the demised shop. Therefore, the tenant brought a suit for the permanent injunction against the landlords, bearing Suit No. 267 of 2014, Anil Kumar and Others vs. Vinod Kumar and Others, which is pending before the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) Mathura. The tenant and the other co-tenants of the demised shop, transferred to the landlord by the alleged sale deed dated 02.05.2014, upon provision of a copy thereof as well as that of the authority letter, are willing to pay rent to them. The landlords, without serving a notice upon the co-tenants, have proceeded against the tenant, which is illegal. The tenant has answered the notices dated 08.07.2014 and 05.07.2014, stating correct facts vide his replies dated 05/06.08.2014 and 03.12.2014, respectively. So long as SCC Suit No. 3 of 1990 is pending, the present suit is not maintainable and liable to be stayed under section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1980. [‘Code’ for short] 12. The demised shop, shown by letter P1 in the map, annexed to the written statement, was got constructed by the tenant's mother Smt. Vimla Devi in the year 1981 and was completed in the said year. Payment of rent for the said shop commenced in that year. [‘Code’ for short] 12. The demised shop, shown by letter P1 in the map, annexed to the written statement, was got constructed by the tenant's mother Smt. Vimla Devi in the year 1981 and was completed in the said year. Payment of rent for the said shop commenced in that year. In these circumstances, the provisions of the Act of 1972 are applicable to the demised shop. Although, the tenant's mother, the late Smt. Vimla Devi and her successors never committed any default in the payment of rent, yet if, in the opinion of the Court, any default is found, the tenant is entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act of 1972. In view of the aforesaid facts, the notice is invalid and the tenancy cannot be terminated thereby. The landlords have deliberately, on false and frivolous pleas, in order to make unlawful gain, instituted the present suit, which deserves to be dismissed with special costs of Rs. 20,000/- under Section 35-A of the Code. 13. A replication and additional written statement were also filed, as also a written statement, in answer to certain amendments made to the plaint and a further replication by the landlords as well. 14. On the pleadings of parties, as many as fourteen issues were framed, which read (translated into English from Hindi): (1) Whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between parties? (2) Whether on the basis of the plaint allegations, the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs sought? (3) Whether the defendant, since the month of January, 1991, did not pay rent despite demand? (4) Whether the plaintiffs terminated the defendant's tenancy vide notice dated 05.11.2014? (5) Whether the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the suit property? (6) Whether the defendant is entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972? (7) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, if any? (8) Whether any cause of action has arisen to the plaintiffs? (9) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder? (10) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred by estoppel? (11) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure? (12) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is not maintainable? (13) Whether the suit property is situate in Mohalla Badri Nagar, Bharatpur Gate, Mathura? (9) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder? (10) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is barred by estoppel? (11) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is liable to be stayed under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure? (12) Whether the plaintiffs' suit is not maintainable? (13) Whether the suit property is situate in Mohalla Badri Nagar, Bharatpur Gate, Mathura? (14) Whether the instant suit is bad for mis-joinder? 15. Substantial documentary evidence was led on behalf of the landlords and tenant and two witnesses each were examined. There is a detailed summary of all this evidence set out in the judgment of the Trial Court. No useful purpose would be served, looking to the limited controversy here, by referring to it all over again, except to the extent relevant. That will be done during the course of this judgment. 16. Issue No. 1 was decided in the manner that the parties stood in the relationship of landlord and tenant with the rent being Rs. 220/- per month together with taxes. Issues Nos.5 and 6 were answered in the manner that the provisions of the Act of 1972 were not applicable to the demised shop and that the tenant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act last mentioned. Issues Nos. 3 and 4 were decided together by the Trial Court and both answered in the affirmative, holding that the tenant was in default of rent since 02.05.2014, which he did not pay despite demand, and that the landlords determined the tenant's demise vide notice dated 05.11.2014. Issue No. 8 was answered in the affirmative, holding that the plaintiffs had an emergent cause of action to bring the suit. Issues Nos. 9 and 14 were again decided together by the Trial Court, answering them in the negative, holding that the suit was neither bad for non-joinder of parties or mis-joinder. Issue No. 10 was also answered in the negative, holding that the suit was not barred by estoppel. Issue No. 11 was answered in the negative, holding that the defendant, who bore burden on the issue, did not say much to discharge it. Issue No. 12 was again a defendant's issue and was decided in the negative, holding that there was nothing established to show that the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable. Issue No. 11 was answered in the negative, holding that the defendant, who bore burden on the issue, did not say much to discharge it. Issue No. 12 was again a defendant's issue and was decided in the negative, holding that there was nothing established to show that the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable. Issue No. 13 was answered in the negative, because it was not pressed during trial by the defendant. Issues Nos. 2 and 7 were decided together, holding that the plaintiff-landlords were entitled to a decree for eviction against the tenant and to recover damages for use and occupation for the period 01.04.2012 to 28.02.2015 as well as pendente lite and future. 17. The suit was, accordingly, decreed for eviction with the direction to deliver possession within two months to the landlords. In addition, the tenant was ordered to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 220/- per month from 02.05.2014 to 28.02.2015. The tenant was further ordered to pay, at the same rate, damages for use and occupation until delivery of possession. This decree passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court was assailed by a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, carried to the District Judge of Mathura, where it was numbered as SCC Revision No. 92 of 2022. The revision aforesaid came up for hearing before the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Mathura on 12.07.2023. The learned Additional District Judge, by a judgment and order of the date last mentioned, allowed the revision, set aside the Trial Court's decree and remanded the suit for trial afresh with reference to Issues Nos.5 and 6. These issues, as already discussed, were to the effect if the Act of 1972 was applicable to the demised shop, and, if the tenant was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the last mentioned Act. The learned Additional District Judge held that the Trial Court in reaching its conclusion that the Act did not apply, had ignored from consideration the certified copy of the Municipal Assessment, bearing Paper No. 99-Ga/2, which proves that the demised shop was constructed much prior to 26.04.1985 and had been recorded in the Palika Assessment way back on 30.06.1981. The learned Additional District Judge held that the Trial Court in reaching its conclusion that the Act did not apply, had ignored from consideration the certified copy of the Municipal Assessment, bearing Paper No. 99-Ga/2, which proves that the demised shop was constructed much prior to 26.04.1985 and had been recorded in the Palika Assessment way back on 30.06.1981. It has also been remarked that in the tax assessment list for the year 1970 to 1987, the demised shop's construction had been reported in the quarterly report and the said shop assessed to tax by the Nagar Palika, Mathura with effect from 01.04.1981. The premises were assigned number 1409/M. It was mentioned in the records of the Nagar Palika, at that time, as a pucca shop, newly constructed. The learned Judge remarked that the aforesaid assessment, Paper No. 99-Ga has been totally ignored from consideration by the Trial Judge and findings recorded entirely on the basis of the assessment for the years 1987-93, bearing Paper No. 21-Ga/14, while rendering judgment on Issues Nos.5 and 6. It must be remarked that though the entire suit has been remanded for trial afresh, the findings recorded by the learned Judge in the Revisional Court would clearly show that what he really intends is a decision afresh by the Trial Court on Issues Nos. 5 and 6. 18. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, what this Court notices is that for one the Revisional Court has recorded remarks of a kind that do not leave much to be decided by the Trial Court on Issues Nos. 5 and 6. In addition, more than sufficient evidence was available on record before the Revisional Court to enable it to pronounce judgment in the suit, deciding it finally in exercise of powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. The order of remand, therefore, passed by the Revisional Court is not only unnecessary, but also an exercise that is wasteful of public time and money. It would serve no cause of justice. The consequence of the remand would be a repetition of the trial on at least two issues and a further revision by the aggrieved party. The order of remand, therefore, passed by the Revisional Court is not only unnecessary, but also an exercise that is wasteful of public time and money. It would serve no cause of justice. The consequence of the remand would be a repetition of the trial on at least two issues and a further revision by the aggrieved party. It is a settled principle of the law that if the Court of appeal or revision has all the evidence before it to enable it to decide the suit, an order of remand ought not to be made. Perhaps, the order of remand has been passed by the Court of revision because of a hesitation about limitations on the Revisional Court's power in recording findings of fact or interfering with such findings regarded inherent in that jurisdiction. The powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act are wide, much wider than those under Section 115 of the Code. If the view taken by the Trial Court is perverse or manifestly illegal, the Revisional Court hearing a revision under Section 25 has all the jurisdiction to pass judgment, deciding the suit in case there is sufficient evidence on record. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Anwar Uddin vs. 1st Additional District Judge, Aligarh and Others, 1999 (2) AWC 1332 where it was observed: 14. The contention that if the finding recorded by the learned Small Cause Court was erroneous, the revisional court ought to have remanded the case to the Small Cause Court for deciding the same, has also no merit, because evidence was already on record which was not correctly appreciated by the learned Small Cause Court and, therefore, in such a situation, the learned revisional court was justified in deciding the issue itself on the basis of material and evidence on record, instead of remanding back the matter to the learned Small Cause Court. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not apply in the facts of the present case. That apart, this Court while disposing of the earlier Writ Petition No. 4290 of 1980 of the petitioner, vide order dated 2.9.1982. remitted the case to the learned revisional court for disposing of the revision on merit. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not apply in the facts of the present case. That apart, this Court while disposing of the earlier Writ Petition No. 4290 of 1980 of the petitioner, vide order dated 2.9.1982. remitted the case to the learned revisional court for disposing of the revision on merit. Therefore, the learned revisional court has not committed any error or illegality in deciding the issue in terms of the direction of this Court. 19. The same issue was also up for consideration before this Court in Surya Prakash Gupta vs. Smt. Santosh Kumari and Another, 2012 (1) ADJ 109 where it was held: 13. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law that ordinarily the Revisional Court under Section 25 of the Act cannot record finding of fact on the issue of fact on which no finding has been recorded by the trial Court however in exceptional cases, the revisional can record its own finding. Since, in the present case, entire evidence was available on record, it was not necessary for the Revisional Court to have remitted the case to the trial Court for the purpose of recording a finding of fact, the Revisional Court can decide the case itself on the basis of the material available on record. There is no prohibition in law that under no circumstances, the Revisional Court can record its finding particularly when the entire evidence is available on record. Here, it is not a case of reassessment or reappraisal of evidence. It cannot be ignored that when the matter was remitted to the trial Court by the Revisional Court by its order dated 20.10.2010 for taking evidence, no objection whatsoever was raised by the petitioner, rather he complied with the order and appeared before the trial Court, and lead evidence in his support and also opposed the prayer of the Respondent No. 1 in the trial Court to record finding of fact on the evidence recorded by it. Now after more than a year, he cannot be permitted to raise an objection that the Revisional Court cannot record a finding on the evidence collected by the lower Court particularly when already there is an order of this Court in writ petition No. 48214 of 2010 directing the Revisional Court to decide the S.S.C. Revision No. 7 of 2009, Surya Prakash vs. Smt. Santosh Kumari and Another, within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 20. No doubt, in these cases, there was a direction by this Court to the Revisional Court to decide the revision on merits with the existing evidence on record etc., but that, in our opinion, would not make much difference. After all, this Court does not confer jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess. It would also be of relevance to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mundri Lal vs. Sushila Rani and Another, (2007) 8 SCC 609 where their Lordships, comparing the powers of revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 and Section 15 of the Code, observed: 22. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact that a revision is provided for by the statute, and not an appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises. 23. We, however, do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered therewith. A pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered with but if such finding has been arrived at upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors or therefor relevant fact has been ignored, the revisional court will have the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact. Applicability of the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact. 21. Applicability of the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact. 21. In the totality of circumstances, this Court is of opinion that the impugned remand order dated 12.07.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Mathura in S.C.C. Revision No. 92 of 2022 deserves to be set aside. 22. In the result, this petition stands allowed in part. The impugned judgment and order dated 12.07.2023 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Mathura is hereby set aside, with a direction to the Revisional Court to determine the revision on merits, deciding the suit, after hearing both parties, bearing in mind the guidance in this judgment. 23. Since the suit is one of the year 2015, it is directed that the Revisional Court shall proceed to hear the revision, fixing two dates of effective hearing every week and decide it within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 24. There shall be no order as to costs. 25. The Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate this order to the Additional District Judge, Court No. 6, Mathura through the learned District Judge, Mathura.