JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal filed by the accused-appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.08.2018, passed in Special Criminal Case No. 42 of 2017 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Puran Vishal), by the Special Judge, constituted under the provisions of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for brevity the “POCSO Act”) Mahasamund (C.G.) whereby he has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence U/s. 06 of POCSO Act (on three counts) Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count and in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month on each count. U/s. 377 of IPC (on three counts) Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count and in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month on each count. U/s. 506 (Part-II) of IPC (on three counts) Rigorous imprisonment for 07 years with of Rs. 1,000/- on each count and in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month on each count. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2 The case of the prosecution, in short, is that between April, 2017 to September, 2017, at Government Primary School of Village Baldideehi, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Sankra, District Mahasamund (CG), the accused-appellant, being a public servant, posted as Government Teacher of the said school, committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault with minor victims No. 01, 02 & 03 (PW-13, PW-12 & PW-11 respectively) multiple time against their will and consent and also threatened them to kill and thereby, said to have committed the aforesaid offences in question. 3. The further case of the prosecution is that when father of the victim No. 02 (PW-12), namely, Anand Patel (PW-01) reported the matter to the police by submitting written complaint (Ex.P/01), FIR (Ex.P/01) was registered against the appellant and wheels of investigation started running, in which, nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P/08. After obtaining necessary consent and permission, the victims No. 01, 02 & 03 (PW-13, PW-12 & PW-11 respectively) were subjected to medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. Tara Agrawal (PW-14). After obtaining necessary consent and permission, the victims No. 01, 02 & 03 (PW-13, PW-12 & PW-11 respectively) were subjected to medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. Tara Agrawal (PW-14). As per MLC reports (Ex.P/27 to Ex.P/31) of the respective victims No. 1 to 03, it has been opined that injuries were found over the bodies of all the victims and there are signs of sexual intercourse on all of them. Further, slides of all the victims were prepared and handed over to the police alongwith their undergarments (panties) for analysis, which was seized vide Ex.P/41. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was arrested and sent for medical examination. Appellant’s MLC report is Ex.P/20 to P/21 and his undergarment was also seized vide Ex.P/40. The aforesaid seized articles were sent for chemical examination and, as per FSL report (Ex.P/47), it has been mentioned that stains of human sperm/semen were found on the slides and undergarments (panties) of victim No. 01 (PW-13) and victim No. 03 (PW-11). Further, in order to ascertain the correct age of the victims, their mark-sheet (Article-A/1C, Article-A/2C & Article-3 A-C) and copies of relevant dakhila kharij register (Article A/4 to A/06) were obtained, wherein the date of birth of victim No. 01 (PW-13) has been mentioned as 16.06.2007, date of birth of victim No. 02 (PW-12) has been mentioned as 10.05.2007 and date of birth of victim No. 03 (PW-11) has been mentioned as 27.08.2007, meaning thereby, all the victims were minor aged about 9-10 years (below 12 years) on the date of offence. Thereafter, statement of witnesses were recorded and, after due investigation, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences in the competent criminal Court having jurisdiction, which was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. 4. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 48 documents apart from Article-A/c to Article-06, whereas the appellant in support of his defence, though not examined any witness but exhibited 04 documents. 5. 4. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 48 documents apart from Article-A/c to Article-06, whereas the appellant in support of his defence, though not examined any witness but exhibited 04 documents. 5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence punishable under Sections 377 & 506 (Part-II of IPC as also under Section 06 of the POCSO Act and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 6. Mr. Sudhir Kumar Bajpai, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. In view of questions framed and answers given by the victims in their statements before the Court, the learned trial Court has erred in law while holding the appellant guilty for offences in question. Even victim No. 01 & 02 (PW-13 & PW-12) have not supported the case of the prosecution. He would also submits that even if the date when the offence in question is said to have been committed (i.e. 23.09.2017) is considered, the un-amended provision of Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 will come into play, wherein the minimum punishment prescribed for having committed offence under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 was 10 years’ RI and the same was subsequently amended w.e.f. 16.08.2019. Therefore, the present appellant be also sentenced for a period of 10 years’ RI by reducing it from life imprisonment, as awarded by the learned trial Court. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 to support his aforesaid submission. Therefore, the present appellant be also sentenced for a period of 10 years’ RI by reducing it from life imprisonment, as awarded by the learned trial Court. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sonu Kushwaha, (2023) 7 SCC 475 to support his aforesaid submission. Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant by placing reliance on a decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in the matter of Manoj v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC Online Bom 2339 would submit that though the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant for offences under Section 377 of IPC and Section 06 of POCSO Act, but in light of the provisions contained under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (for brevity the “GC Act”) as also under Section 71 of IPC (i.e. Section 09 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), the appellant cannot be punished twice for the same offence and, therefore, the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error while doing so and imposed sentence of imprisonment for life for both the offences separately. Hence, the present appeal be allowed in full or in part. 7. Per-contra, learned State counsel would submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent-State that in view of statement of the victim No. 03 (PW-11), wherein she has clearly narrated the incident and implicated appellant herein to be the author of the crime in question, coupled with other evidence available on record i.e. MLC Reports of the victims (Ex.P/27 to Ex.P/31) and FSL report (Ex.P/47), the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offences mentioned herein-above and, therefore, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. In the instant case, considering the statement of victim No. 3 (PW-11), wherein he has clearly narrated the incident and implicated the appellant herein to be the author of the crime by stating that while she was studying in Class-IV, the accused-appellant herein sexually assaulted her in the office room of the school by entering his penis in her mouth as well as in her vagina. The said statement of the victim No. 3 (PW-11) is also supported by her grand-father, namely, Babulal Patel (PW-05) and her mother, namely, Kanti Patel (PW-06). As such, the statement of the victim No. 3 (PW-11) inspire confidence and can be relied upon to hold the appellant herein guilty of the offences in question. Furthermore, the aforesaid stand of the victim No. 3 (PW-11), mush less the prosecution, is also corroborated by other evidence available on record i.e. (i) MLC reports (Ex.P/27 to Ex.P/31) of the respective victims No. 1 to 03, wherein it has clearly been opined that injuries were found over the bodies of all the victims and there are signs of sexual intercourse on all of them, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. Tara Agrawal (PW-14), who has conducted the medical examination of all the victims; (ii) FSL report (Ex.P/47), wherein it has been opined that stains of human sperm/semen were found on the slides and undergarments (panties) of victim No. 01 (PW-13) and victim No. 03 (PW-11); and (iii) mark-sheet (Article-A/1C, Article-A/2C & Article-3 A-C) and copies of relevant dakhila kharij register (Article A/4 to A/06) of the respective victims, duly been proved by the Headmaster of the School, namely Virendra Kumar Sahu (PW-07), wherein the date of birth of: victim No. 01 (PW-13) is mentioned as 16.06.2007; victim No. 02 (PW-12) as 10.05.2007 and victim No. 03 (PW-11) as 27.08.2007, meaning thereby, all the victims were minor aged about 9-10 years (below 12 years) on the date of offence. As such, on the basis of aforesaid evidence available on record, we are of the considered opinion that though victim No. 03 (PW-11) has partly supported the case of the prosecution, but in view of supporting statements of her maternal grand-father-Babulal Patel (PW-05) and mother- Kanti Patel (PW-6) coupled with other evidence, specially medical evidences i.e. MLC reports and FSL report, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the appellant is guilty of committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault only on the minor victim No. 03 (PW-11), is strictly in accordance with law, however, the prosecution has failed to establish the said offences qua victim No. 01 (PW-13) and victim No. 02 (PW-12). Consequently, in our considered opinion, the conviction of the appellant for offences under Section 377, 506 (Part-I) of IPC and under Section 06 of POCSO Act, is affirmed only on one count i.e. for victim No. 03 (PW-11) and, same is set aside on two counts i.e. for victim No. 01 (PW-13) and victim No. 02 (PW-12). We hereby hold accordingly. 10. Now, the first question would be whether the learned trial Court is justified in awarding sentence for imprisonment for life to the appellant for having committed offence under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 or same can be reduced, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant by placing reliance on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra). 11. In the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court finding the accused therein to be guilty of having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault punishable under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012, proceeded to convict him for the said offence and upon further finding that the minimum punishment prescribed for said offence at the time when offence was committed i.e. prior to 16.08.2019, was 10 years’ RI, awarded him sentence for 10 years’ RI and held in Para-11 to 15 as under: “11. Section 6, as applicable before its substitution on 16-08-2019, read thus: “6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault - Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.” On the date of the commission of the offence, rigorous imprisonment for ten years was the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. From 16th August 2019, the minimum sentence has been enhanced to twenty years. However, the amended provision will not apply to this case as the incident has taken place prior to 16th August 2019. 12. Surprisingly, the High Court has observed that Section 5 was not applicable, and the offence committed by the respondent falls under the category of a lesser offence of penetrative sexual assault, which is punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. Thus, the High Court committed an obvious error by holding that the act committed by the respondent was not an aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Thus, the High Court committed an obvious error by holding that the act committed by the respondent was not an aggravated penetrative sexual assault. In fact, the Special Court was right in punishing the respondent under Section 6 and sentencing him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs.5,000/-. 13. The POCSO Act was enacted to provide more stringent punishments for the offences of child abuse of various kinds and that is why minimum punishments have been prescribed in Sections 4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act for various categories of sexual assaults on children. Hence, Section 6, on its plain language, leaves no discretion to the Court and there is no option but to impose the minimum sentence as done by the Trial Court. When a penal provision uses the phraseology “shall not be less than” the Courts cannot do offence to the Section and impose a lesser sentence. The Courts are powerless to do that unless there is a specific statutory provision enabling the Court to impose a lesser sentence. However, we find no such provision in the POCSO Act. 14. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent may have moved ahead in life after undergoing the sentence as modified by the High Court, there is no question of showing any leniency to him. Apart from the fact that the law provides for a minimum sentence, the crime committed by the respondent is very gruesome which calls for very stringent punishment. The impact of the obnoxious act on the mind of the victim-child will be life-long. The impact is bound to adversely affect the healthy growth of the victim. There is no dispute that the age of the victim was less than twelve years at the time of the incident. Therefore, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the Trial Court. 15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 18th November 2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 5415 of 2018 is quashed and set aside and the judgment and order dated 24th August 2018 passed by the learned 8th Additional Sessions Judge, Special Judge POCSO Act, Jhansi in Special Session Trial No. 134 of 2016 is restored. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 5415 of 2018 filed before the High Court stands dismissed. The respondent shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and shall pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-.” 12. In that view of the matter and considering the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sonu Kushwaha (supra) and further considering the statement of the victim No. 03 (PW-11) coupled with other evidence available on record in the shape of MLC Reports of the victims (Ex.P/27 to Ex.P/31) and FSL report (Ex.P/47), while affirming the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012, we deem it appropriate to sentence him for a period of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment by reducing it from imprisonment for life. We hereby hold accordingly. 13. The next argument raised on behalf of the appellant, which needs consideration is that though the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant for offences under Section 377 of IPC and Section 06 of POCSO Act, but in light of Section 26 of the GC Act and under Section 71 of IPC (i.e. Section 09 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), the appellant cannot be punished twice for the same offence and, in light of the decision of Manoj (supra), the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error while doing so and imposing sentence of imprisonment for life for both the aforesaid offences separately. 14. In order to consider the plea raised at the bar, it would be first appropriate to notice Section 26 of the GC Act as under: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments:- where an act or omission constitutes an offence under to or more enactments, then the offender shall liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” 15. The object of the above-quoted Section 26 of the GC Act is that if a person is made to undergo punishment more than once for the same act, there would be harassment beyond limits. Therefore, taking into account the consideration of avoiding oppression, this section adopts a restrictive attitude and, while allowing double prosecution for the same offence, it prohibits double punishment. Therefore, taking into account the consideration of avoiding oppression, this section adopts a restrictive attitude and, while allowing double prosecution for the same offence, it prohibits double punishment. Section 26 envisages the possibility of the same act or omission not only being an offence under different enactments, but of the accused being charged under either or any of them, though he shall not be punished twice for the same offence. Section 26 protects the guilty parties against double jeopardy or double penalty. This section lays down that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments than the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence [See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker, AIR 1971 SC 815 : (1971) 1 SCC 442 ]. The opening words of Section 26 are very specific “an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments.” The test would be whether two offence are the same is not identity of the allegations, but the identity of the ingredients of offence. This principle is based upon well known maxim “nemo debet bis vexari si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa” which means that no one ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the same cause. 16. It is also well settled in criminal jurisprudence that where an act constitutes an offence under two or more enactments then the offender remains liable to be prosecuted and punished under any one of these enactments. Section 26 of the GC Act came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, 1968 SCC Online SC 68 wherein while dealing with identical situation whether the appellant therein can be prosecuted both under Section 177 of IPC and under Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 at the same time, have held that Section 26 of the GC Act provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence and observed in Para-6 as under: “6. We proceed to consider the next question arising in this case viz. whether the appellant can be prosecuted both under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 52 of the 1922 Act at the same time. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that in view of the provisions of Section 26 of the General clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) the appellant can be prosecuted either under Section 52 of the 1922 Act or under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and not under both the sections at the same time. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Section 26 of the General clauses Act states: “26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments - Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.” A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this aspect of the case.” 17. Similarly, in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Sayyed Hassan Sayyed Subhan, (2019) 18 SCC 145 their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with the same issue, relying upon the decision of T.S. Baliah (supra), have held that there is no bar in prosecuting person under both the law, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence and observed in Para-07 as under: “7. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. There is no bar to a trial or conviction of an offender under two different enactments, but the bar is only to the punishment of the offender twice for the offence. Where an act or an omission constitutes an offence under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. [T.S. Baliah v. T.S. Rangachari, (1969) 3 SCR 65 : AIR 1969 SC 701 ] The same set of facts, in conceivable cases, can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time, an offence under any other law. [State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 27].” 18. Thereafter, in the matter of Kanwar Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 14 SCC 331 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that Section 26 of the GC Act permits prosecution for “different offences” but bars prosecution and punishment twice for the “same offence” under two or more enactments. 19. At this stage, it would also be appropriate to notice Section 71 of IPC (i.e. Section 09 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), which provides for limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences and reads as under: “Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences, unless it be so expressly provided. Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.” 20. Section 71 of IPC deals with the limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. Section 71 of IPC deals with the limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. It has been provided therein that where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute, when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences. As such, Section 71 of IPC lays down the limits of the punishment to which offender can be sentenced. 21. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Another, AIR 2012 SC 2844 has held that in order to attract the provisions of Section 71 of IPC, ingredients of the offences in earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not identity of allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offences. 22. The Bombay High Court in the matter of Manoj (supra) taking into consideration the above-quoted Section 71 of IPC has clearly held that the offender tried for an offence punishable under Section 377 with Sections 376 of IPC and Section 06 of POCSO Act, cannot be separately punished, as such an act is an offence falling in two definitions i.e. the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 06 of POCSO Act, 2012 and observed in Para-38 as under: “38........In view of the definition of “rape” under Section 375 of the Penal Code, 1860, the accused may be punished for carnal sexual assault under Section 376 of the Penal Code, 1860 as well as under Section 06 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, the court is of the view that the offender tried for an offence punishable under Section 377 with Section 376 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 06 of the POCSO Act cannot be separately punished as such an act is an offence falling in two definitions i.e. in the Penal Code, 1860 and POCSO Act. Therefore, the court is of the view that the offender tried for an offence punishable under Section 377 with Section 376 of the Penal Code, 1860 and Section 06 of the POCSO Act cannot be separately punished as such an act is an offence falling in two definitions i.e. in the Penal Code, 1860 and POCSO Act. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge has correctly not imposed a separate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 377 of the Penal Code, 1860.” 23. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the above legal position and in light of Section 26 of the GC Act and Section 71 of IPC it is necessary to consider where a common act is made penal by two or more statutory provisions/enactments, which constitutes offence in those provisions/enactments, in that situation, though the legal labels are different but their ingredients are identical, the punishment should be one. Essentially, there is only one culpable act and different legal labels may lead to two different “offences.” It is by the reason of two different legislation, an act happens to fall under two different enactments, but the ingredients of such act/offence, in both the enactments, are one and same and, therefore, the offender should not receive punishment for more than one of them. As such, in the present case, the learned trial Court has committed error of law while sentencing the appellant separately to undergo imprisonment for life for having committed offence punishable under Section 377 of IPC as also under Section 06 of POCSO Act for the reason that the ingredients of said offence/act, which made it penal under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and further under Section 377 of IPC are same, for which, in light of Section 26 of GC Act and Section 71 of IPC, the appellant cannot be punished twice. Since the appellant has been sentenced for offence punishable under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, no separate sentence is required to be awarded to him for having committed offence punishable under Section 377 of IPC, though he has been held guilty for both the offences. Consequently, while affirming the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Section 377 of IPC and under Section 06 of POCSO Act, the singular punishment/sentence is being awarded to him i.e. only for offence punishable under Section 06 of the POCSO Act. Consequently, while affirming the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Section 377 of IPC and under Section 06 of POCSO Act, the singular punishment/sentence is being awarded to him i.e. only for offence punishable under Section 06 of the POCSO Act. We hereby hold accordingly. 24. Resultantly, in view of foregoing analysis, we order as under: (i) the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, 2012 [only on 01 count i.e. for victim No. 03 (PW-11)] is hereby affirmed, however, in light of Sonu Kushwaha (supra), he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years instead of life imprisonment, but the fine amount and default sentence shall remain intact. (ii) the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 377 of IPC [only on 01 count i.e. for victim No. 03 (PW-11)] is also hereby affirmed, but in view of finding arrived at herein above, considering the fact that the appellant has also been punished for offence under Section 06 of POCSO Act, as above, no separate sentence is awarded to him for having committed offence under Section 377 of IPC and, as such, the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to him by the learned trial Court for offence under Section 377 of IPC is hereby set aside. (iii) the conviction and sentences of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 506 (Part-II) of IPC [only on 01 count i.e. for victim No. 03 (PW-11)], as awarded by the learned trial Court, is hereby affirmed/upheld and same shall remain as it being well-merited. (iv) since the prosecution has failed to establish its case qua victim No. 01 (PW-13) and victim No. 02 (PW-12), therefore, the conviction and sentences of the appellant for offences under Section 377 & 506 (Part-II) of IPC and under Section 06 of the POCSO Act, on these two counts, as awarded by the learned trial Court, are hereby set aside. (v) the direction of the learned trial Court that all the sentences of the appellant shall run concurrently shall also remain intact. 25. Consequently, this criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 26. While parting with the record, we must place on record the appreciation for assistance rendered by Mr. (v) the direction of the learned trial Court that all the sentences of the appellant shall run concurrently shall also remain intact. 25. Consequently, this criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 26. While parting with the record, we must place on record the appreciation for assistance rendered by Mr. Manoj Paranjape, learned amicus curiae, who not only argued the case at length on short notice but has also brought relevant facts and legal position to our notice and further submitted written submission. 27. Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action.