JUDGMENT : A.Y. KOGJE, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is inter-alia filed inter-alia for following prayer: “(B) BE PLEASED to issue appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the order of detention dated 02/10/2023 at annexure “A” passed by the Police Commissioner, Surat City, vide PCB/PASA/DTN/827/223, passed by the Police Commissioner, Surat i.e. the Respondent No. 2 herein, and further be pleased to direct the respondents to release the petitioner from detention forthwith and set at free, in the interest of justice.” 2. The present petition is directed against order of detention dated 02.10.2023 passed by the respondent–detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under section 3(2) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) by detaining the petitioner-detenue as defined under section 2(c) of the Act. Under the order of detention dated 02.10.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Police, City Surat by which the petitioner has been detained as a ‘dangerous person’ based on two offenses registered with Singanpore Dabholi Police Station. 3. The petitioner has been detained as a dangerous person in view of his involvement in commission of theft of a mobile phone and a motorcycle. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner has challenged the order of detention on the ground that the offenses in which the petitioner has been involved is not affecting the even tempo of life and therefore, there is no breach of public order for detaining the petitioner. Learned advocate has submitted on merits that the petitioner has been arraigned as an accused of bike theft however, the fact is that the petitioner was only a purchaser of the bike, theft of which was committed by another accused. 4.1 It is further submitted that for the co-accused of the very offense, the detaining authority has not passed any order of detention against him. Learned advocate has lastly submitted that on the very next day of his being enlarged on bail, the order of detention has been passed. 5. As against this, learned Assistant Government Pleader has objected to the grant of the petition by submitting on the ground that the petitioner has been arraigned as an accused in two offenses which are under Chapter XVI and XVII of the IPC and therefore, rightly considered as a dangerous person for being habitual offender. 6. 5. As against this, learned Assistant Government Pleader has objected to the grant of the petition by submitting on the ground that the petitioner has been arraigned as an accused in two offenses which are under Chapter XVI and XVII of the IPC and therefore, rightly considered as a dangerous person for being habitual offender. 6. Heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. The petitioner has been detained as a dangerous person by detention order dated 02.10.2023. The grounds of detention would indicate that the detaining authority has relied upon two offenses registered with Singanpore Dabholi Police Station, Surat details of which in tabular form are as under: S. No. Police Stand and C.R. Number and date Sections Date of Arrest/ Date of Bail 1 Singanpor-Dabholi Police Station Part-A 11210063230372 Dated 20.06.2023 379(A) (3) and 114 of the IPC 06.07.2023 01.08.2023 2 Singanpore-Dabholi Police Station Part-A 1121006323038 Date 25.06.2023 379(A)(3) and 114 of the IPC 06.07.2023 30.09.2023 7. The Court has considered the nature of offense alleged against the petitioner. First being theft of a mobile phone and another being a motorcycle. Both the incidents being sporadic are not sufficient to be treated as having disturbed the even tempo of life so as to disturb the public order. Hence as is held by the Apex Court in case of Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 , the case of the petitioner would not fall in the definition of a ‘dangerous person’. The Court observed as follows: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 8. The Court has also taken into consideration the fact that the petitioner was enlarged on regular bail in the second offense on 30.09.2023. Thereafter, it appears from the record that the statements of secret witnesses were recorded on 01.10.2023. The same were verified on the very same day i.e. on 01.10.2023, whereas the second statement of the secret witness was recorded on 01.10.2023 and verified by the detaining authority on 02.10.2023 and immediately on 02.10.2023, the impugned order of detention has been passed. In the opinion of the Court, the chronology would suggest that the detaining authority has not applied its mind however, has passed the order of detention mechanically without referring or perusing the material on record alongwith the grounds of detention. 9. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 10. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 02.10.2023 being No. PCB/PASA/DTN/827/2023 passed by the respondent detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 11. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.