ORDER : M.Nagaprasanna, J. The petitioner/accused is before this Court calling in question proceedings in Special Case No.28 of 2024 pending before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTSC-1, Tumakuru, arising out of Crime No.154 of 2023 registered for offences punishable under Sections 376(l) of the IPC and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘the Act’ for short). 2. Heard Sri H.E. Purushothama, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: The 2nd respondent is the complainant, mother of the victim child. It is the allegation of the complainant that on 10.12.2023 while she was doing her household work at 3.15 p.m., her daughter was playing alone in front of the house. After about 30 minutes, she noticed that her daughter was missing as she was not found in the same place playing. She goes in search of her daughter and notices that her daughter was coming out of the house of the petitioner holding her shirt and pant in her hand. When she enquired with her daughter, she was informed that the petitioner on the pretext of giving her sugarcane has taken her to the bathroom of his house, removed her clothes and caused pain. She points out at her private parts where the petitioner has indulged in sexual assault on the child. 4. The mother go over the house of the petitioner to enquire and then saw the petitioner coming out of his bathroom in his minimal clothing. Thereafter, the mother did not immediately complain as she was apprehensive of her reputation or her daughter’s reputation being damaged. But, when the daughter went on repeatedly complaining of experiencing pain in the vaginal region, gathering courage, the complainant registers the crime on 21.12.2023 which is close to 11 days after the alleged incident. Based upon the said complaint, a crime in crime No.154 of 2023 comes to be registered for offences punishable as afore-quoted. The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The statements tendered by the victim or the mother of the victim had driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition contending that such incident has never happened. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the incident alleged has never taken place. The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The statements tendered by the victim or the mother of the victim had driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition contending that such incident has never happened. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the incident alleged has never taken place. It is no doubt true that the petitioner had taken the victim to his house but, he has not indulged in such acts. He would rely on the statement of the victim under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. to contend that the proceedings should be quashed relying on the said statement. 6. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor on the other hand would contend that the allegation against the petitioner is grave as he has indulged in sexual assault on a mentally retarded child. Therefore, it is an unpardonable act on the part of the petitioner who is 48 years old and the statements that he wants to rely on, should be tested in evidence. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The victim child who is 13 years old, mentally retarded is an admitted fact. The allegation is that, on 10-12-2023, the petitioner takes the child into his house and has allegedly indulged in sexual assault upon the child. The mother though became aware of the factum of sexual assault, owing to the position of the family in the society and disability of the daughter did not choose to complain immediately. But, when the daughter persistently complained of pain in the vagina, the complaint emerges after about 11 days. Though the complaint is registered after 11 days, it is not a case that it would become fatal to the prosecution owing to the fear faced by the mother to keep quiet. However, the complaint then comes to be registered on 21.12.2023. It reads as follows: The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner for the afore-quoted offences. However, the complaint then comes to be registered on 21.12.2023. It reads as follows: The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against the petitioner for the afore-quoted offences. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column No.17 reads as follows: If the complaint and summary of the charge sheet are noticed in tandem, what would unmistakably emerge is, prima facie, the petitioner indulging in sexual assault upon a 13 year old mentally retarded child and therefore, the offence under Section 376 (2)(l) of the IPC and Section 4 of the Act is alleged. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would seek to rely upon two circumstances. One, the order of the coordinate Bench which grants bail. The order of the coordinate Bench while granting bail observes that there is more than 10 days delay in lodging the FIR and on that score, grants bail inter alia. In the considered view of this Court, the order of the coordinate Bench is for the purpose of grant of bail and cannot become foundation to the case at hand for quashment of the proceedings against the petitioner. 10. The second circumstance is, placing reliance on the cross-examination of the victim in in-camera proceedings. The said examination and cross-examination read as follows: The victim clearly narrates what the petitioner did. To certain questions that the petitioner has asked, she has said it has not happened. What is discernible from the statement supra is questioning of a mentally retarded child who is 13 years old and who narrates what has happened in the examination-in-chief. In the cross-examination, it could be that there are some stray sentences in favour of the petitioner. Placing reliance on the examination or cross-examination of the 13 years old child cannot lead to quashment of the proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. It could at best be subject to further proceedings. The allegation against the petitioner in the case at hand is undoubtedly heinous and horrendous. The offences alleged inter alia is the one punishable under Section 376(2)(l). 11. Section 376 of the IPC reads as follows: “376. The allegation against the petitioner in the case at hand is undoubtedly heinous and horrendous. The offences alleged inter alia is the one punishable under Section 376(2)(l). 11. Section 376 of the IPC reads as follows: “376. Punishment for rape.—(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. 11. Section 376 of the IPC reads as follows: “376. Punishment for rape.—(1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever,— (a) being a police officer, commits rape— (i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is appointed; or (ii) in the premises of any station house; or (iii) on a woman in such police officer's custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to such police officer; or (b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public servant's custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to such public servant; or (c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the Central or a State Government commits rape in such area; or (d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a women's or children's institution, commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or (e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or (f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; or (g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or (h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or (i) * * * (j) commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or (k) being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits rape on such woman; or (l) commits rape on a woman suffering from mental or physical disability; or (m) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or disfigures or endangers the life of a woman; or (n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,— (a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces constituted under any law for the time being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces that are under the control of the Central Government or the State Government; (b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and includes the precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation; (c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as assigned to the expression “police” under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861); (d) “women's or children's institution” means an institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a widow's home or an institution called by any other name, which is established and maintained for the reception and care of women or children. (3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life, and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim: Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be paid to the victim.” (Emphasis supplied) Section 376(2)(l) of the IPC punishes a person who commits rape on a woman who is suffering from mental and physical disability. The other offence is Section 4 of the Act. Section 4 of the Act reads as follows: “4. Punishment for penetrative sexual assault.— (1) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below sixteen years of age shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person, and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below sixteen years of age shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person, and shall also be liable to fine. (3) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.” (Emphasis supplied) Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault would be punished. Section 3 of the Act defines what is penetrative sexual assault. It reads as follows: “3. Penetrative sexual assault.—A person is said to commit “penetrative sexual assault” if— (a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or (d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the victim is mentally unstable, therefore, those statements should not be given credence. The submission, is on the face of it, unacceptable. The victim identifies the petitioner, narrates though not in minute detail, about the acts of the petitioner. The cross-examination cannot be discarded simply because it is the evidence tendered by a child that is disabled. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of PATAN JAMAL VALI Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, (2021) 16 SCC 225 wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “Testimony of disabled prosecutrix 44. Another feature of the case that we would like to dwell on relates to the testimony of the prosecutrix, PW 2. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, (2021) 16 SCC 225 wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “Testimony of disabled prosecutrix 44. Another feature of the case that we would like to dwell on relates to the testimony of the prosecutrix, PW 2. In his judgment, the Sessions Judge noted as follows: “21. Identification of the accused by the victim girl : It is needless to say that identifying the accused basing on the voice is weak type of evidence. Coming to the present facts and circumstances of the case, PW 2 is blind by birth as the access of the accused to victim proved by the prosecution she can easily identify the accused by hearing his voice. Moreover, PW 1, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5 and some others caught hold of the accused when he opened the door of the house of PW 1, on the date of the incident and the evidence of the police officials also corroborates with the witnesses who caught hold of the accused and handed over him to PW 11 and on the instructions of PW 11, the accused was taken to Mahanandi Police Station. It was suggested to PW 2 that her statement that she identified the accused with his voice is false. In view of the categorical evidence of PW 1, PW 3 and PW 4, so also the admission made by the accused in Section 313CrPC examination that he used to visit the house of PW 1 to call the brothers of the victim for doing coolie work, the above suggestion has no legs to stand. The above evidence would amply prove that the victim has successfully identified the accused and her evidence cannot be doubted simply because she is a blind girl.” 45. In the High Court, the defence sought to cast doubt on the testimony of the prosecutrix by arguing that she would have been unable to identify the accused due to her disability. While the above plea was not pressed by the appellant in this Court, we would like to take this opportunity to affirm the conclusion of the Sessions Judge and to clarify the position of law on this point. 46. There have been instances where the testimony of a disabled prosecutrix has not been considered seriously and treated at an equal footing as that of their able-bodied counterparts. 46. There have been instances where the testimony of a disabled prosecutrix has not been considered seriously and treated at an equal footing as that of their able-bodied counterparts. One such instance is the judgment of this Court in Mange v. State of Haryana [Mange v. State of Haryana, (1979) 4 SCC 349 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 985] , where the testimony of a thirteen-year-old girl who was deaf and mute was not recorded and the conviction was confirmed on the account of an eyewitness and supported by medical evidence. This Court in affirming the conviction noted that the non-examination of the prosecutrix was not a major infirmity in the prosecution's case “apart from being a child witness, she was also deaf and dumb and no useful purpose would have been served by examining her”. (SCC p. 350, para 2) We are of the considered view that presumptions of such nature which construe disability as an incapacity to participate in the legal process reflect not only an inadequate understanding of how disability operates but may also result in a miscarriage of justice through a devaluation of crucial testimonies given by persons with disabilities. The legal personhood of persons with disabilities cannot be premised on societal stereotypes of their supposed “inferiority”, which is an affront to their dignity and a negation of the principle of equality. 47. A survey and analysis of the High Court judgments by Saptarshi Mandal indicates that the testimony of the disabled witnesses is devalued by not recording the testimony of the prosecutrix at all; or recording it without adherence to correct legal procedure, thereby rendering it ineffectual; dismissal of the testimony for its lack of intelligibility or for not being supported by the condition of her body. [ Saptarshi Mandal, “The Burden of Intelligibility : Disabled Women's Testimony in Rape Trials”, Indian Journal of Gender Studies, 20 No. 1 (2013) : 1-29, p. 6 (“Mandal, Disabled Women Testimony in Rape Trials”).] 48. This kind of a judicial attitude stems from and perpetuates the underlying bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities. We are of the view that the testimony of a prosecutrix with a disability, or of a disabled witness for that matter, cannot be considered weak or inferior, only because such an individual interacts with the world in a different manner, vis-à-vis their able-bodied counterparts. We are of the view that the testimony of a prosecutrix with a disability, or of a disabled witness for that matter, cannot be considered weak or inferior, only because such an individual interacts with the world in a different manner, vis-à-vis their able-bodied counterparts. As long as the testimony of such a witness otherwise meets the criteria for inspiring judicial confidence, it is entitled to full legal weight. It goes without saying that the court appreciating such testimony needs to be attentive to the fact that the witness' disability can have the consequence of the testimony being rendered in a different form, relative to that of an able-bodied witness. In the case at hand, for instance, PW 2's blindness meant that she had no visual contact with the world. Her primary mode of identifying those around her, therefore, is by the sound of their voice. And so PW 2's testimony is entitled to equal weight as that of a prosecutrix who would have been able to visually identify the appellant. (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court elucidates the law of consideration of the testimony of a disabled prosecutrix and holds that the judicial attitude that stems from underlying bias and stereotypes against persons with disabilities should be effaced and if the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, it would not be effacing the said stereotype, but refacing it. 13. In the teeth of the allegations levelled against the petitioner, this Court would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and consider quashment of the proceedings, it would become a travesty of law, as the petitioner has indulged in sexual perversion by seeking to practice eroticism beyond the bounds of maturity and sanity. The behaviour of the petitioner cannot but be described to be a paraphiliac, albeit, prima facie. It is ununderstandable as to how the petitioner seeks quashment of the proceedings basing his foundation on the score of stray answers of a mentally retarded child in her cross-examination. 14. The complaint is registered on 21.12.2023, a year has passed by. I, therefore, deem it appropriate to direct the concerned Court to conclude the proceedings within an outer limit of 3 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, if not earlier. 15. Finding no merit in the petition, the petition stands rejected.