JUDGMENT : SAMIR J. DAVE, J. 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner-detenue has challenged the order of detention dated 03.10.2023 by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City in exercise of powers conferred on him under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Antisocial Activities Act, 1985 (for short ‘the PASA Act’) and has also prayed for an order to set him free from detention. 2. This Court has taken notice of the fact that the petitioner has been detained as a ‘bootlegger’. This Court has also taken notice of the fact that in the grounds of detention order dated 03.10.2023, the detaining authority has relied upon 2 (two) cases registered with Airport Police Station and DCB Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 65(A)(A), 65(A)(E), 98(2) and 116B and 81 of the Prohibition Act. 3. Section 2(b) of the PASA Act defines the term ‘bootlegger’ which reads as under: “S.2(b) “bootlegger” means a person who distills, manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in contravention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bom. XXV of 1949) and the rules and orders made thereunder, or of any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly expends or applies any money or supplies any animals, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the doing of any of the things described above by or through any other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of any such thing.” 4. Section 3 of the PASA Act speaks about the power to make orders detaining certain persons. It reads as under: “Section 3 - Power to make orders detaining certain persons: (1) The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. It reads as under: “Section 3 - Power to make orders detaining certain persons: (1) The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section. (3) When any order is made under this section by an authorised officer, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, has a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. (4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter-alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health.” 5. The Court has observed that the last offence registered against the petitioner at DCB Police Station is on 10.06.2023, for which the petitioner was arrested on 13.07.2023 and was immediately enlarged on bail on the next day i.e. 19.07.2023. Thereafter, the order of detention is passed on 03.10.2023, which is after delay of 1.5 months. 6. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sushanta Kumar Banik vs. State of Tripura, AIR 2022 SC 4715 , where the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “11. We are persuaded to allow this appeal on the following two grounds: (i) Delay in passing the order of detention from the date of proposal thereby snapping the “live and proximate link” between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention and failure on the part of the detaining authority in explaining such delay in any manner. (ii) The detaining authority remained oblivious of the fact that in both the criminal cases relied upon by the detaining authority for the purpose of passing the order of detention, the appellant detenu was ordered to be released on bail by the special court. The detaining authority remained oblivious as this material and vital fact of the appellant detenu being released on bail in both the cases was suppressed or rather not brought to the notice of the detaining authority by the sponsoring authority at the time of forwarding the proposal to pass the appropriate order of preventive detention. DELAY IN PASSING THE ORDER OF DETENTION 12. We may recapitulate the necessary facts which have a bearing so far as the issue of delay is concerned. The proposal to take steps to preventively detain the appellant at the end of the Superintendent of Police addressed to the Superintendent of Police (C/S) West Tripura, Agartala is dated 28th of June 2021. The proposal in turn forwarded by the Assistant Inspector General of Police (Crime) on behalf of the Director General to the Secretary, Home Department is dated 14.07.2021. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. The order of detention is dated 12th of November, 2021. There is no explanation worth the name why it took almost five months for the detaining authority to pass the order of preventive detention. 13. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and the avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would suffice to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi Administration and Others, (1982) 2 SCC 403 , wherein the following observation is made: “Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing.” 14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter, there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing of the order of detention. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxx xxx xxx 20. However, the same principles would apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle in both situations would be the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention. xxx xxx xxx 20. It is manifestly clear from a conspectus of the above decisions of this Court, that the underlying principle is that if there is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and actual arrest of the detenu and in the same manner from the date of the proposal and passing of the order of detention, such delay unless satisfactorily explained throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the requisite subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in passing the detention order and consequently render the detention order bad and invalid because the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention is snapped in arresting the detenu. A question whether the delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 21. In the present case, the circumstances indicate that the detaining authority after the receipt of the proposal from the sponsoring authority was indifferent in passing the order of detention with greater promptitude. The “live and proximate link” between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stood snapped in arresting the detenu. More importantly the delay has not been explained in any manner and though this point of delay was specifically raised & argued before the High Court as evident from Para 14 of the impugned judgment yet the High Court has not recorded any finding on the same.” The Court finds that the delay of 1.5 months is fatal to the present detention order as well. 7. In this connection, it is required to be referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 852 , where the distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ has been clearly laid down. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the grounds of detention, in the opinion of this Court, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner-detenue adversely affect or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Just because two cases have been registered against the petitioner-detenue under the Prohibition Act, by itself, do not have any bearing on the maintenance of public order. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community much less public health. The petitioner may be punished for the alleged offences committed by him but, surely, the acts constituting the offences cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community much less public health. It may be that the petitioner-detenue is a ‘bootlegger’ within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the PASA Act, but merely because he is a ‘bootlegger’ he cannot be preventively detained under the provisions of the PASA Act unless, as laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the PASA Act, his activities as a ‘bootlegger’ affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 9. In the result, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The order of detention dated 03.10.2023 passed by the respondent authority is hereby ordered to be quashed and the detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case. 10. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.