Harishchandra Sahu S/o Shri Kejuram Sahu v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development
2024-08-30
RAJANI DUBEY
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : RAJANI DUBEY, J. 1. Since the aforesaid petitions arise out of common cause of action, they are being decided by this common order. 2. The petitioners have filed the aforesaid petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking following relief (S) :- “10.1. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call the entire records pertaining the case of petitioner, from the respondent authorities. 10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondent authorities to give appointment to the petitioner in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III in pursuance of advertisement dated 12.03.2007, by placing him in his proper position in the final merit list, in accordance with law. 10.3 That, any other relief/order which may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case including award of the costs of the petition may be given.” 3. Brief facts of the case, as projected by the petitioners in the aforesaid petitions, are that the respondent Janpad Panchayat had issued an advertisement (Annexure P/1) on 12.03.2007 inviting applications for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III and total 113 posts were published, out of which, 28 posts were reserved for other backward caste category candidate. The petitioners being eligible, belonging to the other backward caste category, participated in the selection process, however petitioner in WP(S) No. 6208/2014 obtained 54 marks out of total 100 marks and secured 3rd position in the waiting list of OBC category and the petitioner in W.P.(S) No.6209/2014 obtained 52.91 marks out of total 100 marks and secured 285th position in overall merit. The final merit list (Annexure P/3) was issued by the respondent Janpad Panchayat after completing the entire selection process and also issued the appointment order on 08.08.2007. Accordingly the appointed candidates joined the service and started working in all the advertised posts. 4.
The final merit list (Annexure P/3) was issued by the respondent Janpad Panchayat after completing the entire selection process and also issued the appointment order on 08.08.2007. Accordingly the appointed candidates joined the service and started working in all the advertised posts. 4. According to the petitioners, due to criminal act of forgery committed by certain persons in connivance with certain appointed Shiksha Karmis, their numbers were increased either on the basis of forged documents or without any basis, thereby putting them over and above the petitioners and placing the petitioners in the lower position in the merit list, which was revealed when complaint was filed and about 69 Shiksha Karmi Grade-III appointed in pursuance of said advertisement were terminated from service on the ground of obtaining appointment by way of forgery and if the above 69 forged Shiksha Karmi Grade-III would have not been appointed or placed over and above the petitioner in the merit list, then the petitioner would have been placed in the select list and would have been appointed in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III. Further, out of above 69 forged Shiksha Karmis, more than 25 Shiksha Karmis have obtained appointment being other backward caste category candidate and if they were not mentioned in the merit list, the petitioner would have been very much mentioned in the selection list obtaining much higher ranking and aptly clear that the petitioners would have been secured seat of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III in unreserved category by virtue of his merit. 5. Further case is that since the termination of 69 Shiksha Karmi Grade-III is on the basis of obtaining appointment by way of forgery, therefore their appointment and selection becomes void ab-initio right from beginning and nullity before the eye of law and the merit list ought to be prepared among the available meritorious candidates, including the petitioner to bring it within the postulates of the right of equality enshrined upon the petitioners by virtue of Article 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. Other candidates namely Raghavendra Singh Chouhan son of Shri Geeta Singh Chouhan, resident of Village-Baiharsari, Post-Chhirha, Tahsil-Bemetara, District-Durg, placed at serial no. 540 in the overall merit list and obtained 50.12 marks, out of 100 marks, was appointed in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III by showing his number as 55.12 marks in the other backward caste category in Arts subject.
540 in the overall merit list and obtained 50.12 marks, out of 100 marks, was appointed in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III by showing his number as 55.12 marks in the other backward caste category in Arts subject. Similarly the candidate namely Duman Lal Sahu son of Sukalu Ram Sahu, resident of village-Pora, Post- Andhiyarkhor, Tahsil-Nawagarh, placed at serial no. 434 in the overall merit list and obtained 51.20 marks in the selection list, was appointed in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III by showing his number as 55.70 marks, without any rhyme or reason and thus the candidates obtained lower marks than the petitioners have been appointed by the above selection process. Hence, these petitions. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned inaction on the part of respondents is bad in law, arbitrary, malafide, unreasonable, unauthorized, unwarranted, illegal, unjust and discriminatory, therefore, hit by the postulates of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. Both the petitioners duly eligible, qualified and meritorious candidate, entitled for appointment in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III in pursuance of advertisement dated 12.03.2007. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners are entitled to be placed much above in the merit list according to their merit and status for appointment in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III. The petitioners were placed in the merit list by criminal act of about 69 candidates in connivance with other responsible persons, which is void ab-initio right from the beginning and nullity before the eye of law. It has been also submitted that if the merit list ought to have been prepared without any forgery or criminal act, the petitioners would have been secured much higher position in the merit list and would have been appointed in the post of Shiksha karmi Grade-III. There is no fault on the part of the petitioners and the petitioners were deprived of the appointment due to deliberate criminal act of the forged candidates with the help of other responsible persons. If the petitioners are not appointed in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III, then the same would be in violation of postulates of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India because the petitioners did not get the equal opportunity due to criminal act and default of others, without there begin any fault on their part.
If the petitioners are not appointed in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III, then the same would be in violation of postulates of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India because the petitioners did not get the equal opportunity due to criminal act and default of others, without there begin any fault on their part. So, the respondent authorities may be directed to give appointment to the petitioner in the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III in pursuance of the advertisement dated 12.03.2007 7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents strongly opposed the prayer of the petitioners and submits that the final select list was published in the year 2007 and as per the provisions contained in the Recruitment Rules of Shiksha Karmis/Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), the validity of the final select list has already expired after completion of 1 year from issuance of it and the list in which the petitioners’ name found place has already expired and therefore, the petitioners cannot be appointed from the said final select list which has already expired. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioners have filed these petitions after six years and it suffers from delay and latches, therefore, these petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. It is not disputed that the petitioners appeared in the examination which was conduced in pursuance of the advertisement dated 12.03.2007 and it is also not disputed that the final select list was issued on 08.08.2007 (Annexure P/3). According to the petitioners, the appointment of 69 candidates were cancelled on the ground of forgery, as such, the petitioners are entitled for appointment on the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III. 10. While dealing with the issue of delay and latches, this Court on the decision in W.P.(S) No.654/2016 [Anuradha Khare Vs. High Court of C.G. & Ors.] dated 03.04.2024, referring to the decision of this Court in J. P. Dubey vs State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in 2023 SCC Online Chh 4711 held in paras 7 & 8 as under :- “7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan (supra), held in paras 15 and 16 as under :- “15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc.
Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan (supra), held in paras 15 and 16 as under :- “15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc.9 the Court observed that it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice. 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 8. Reverting to the facts of the case, admittedly the petitioner has filed the instant petition on 7.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 8. Reverting to the facts of the case, admittedly the petitioner has filed the instant petition on 7. 10.2016 after his superannuation, after lapse of about 5 years and no satisfactory explanation has been offered in this regard in his petition.” 11. Reverting to the facts of the case, it is apparent that final list was published on 08.08.2007 and appointment of candidates were cancelled by the Collector, Durg on 21.07.2008 but the petitioners by way of these petitions approached this Court on 24.11.2014 i.e. after about 6 years and no satisfactory explanation has been offered in this regard, as such considering the facts and circumstances of the case and applying the ratio of this Court in Anuradha (supra), I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petitions. 12. The aforesaid writ petitions being bereft of any substance deserve to be and are hereby dismissed accordingly. No costs.