JUDGMENT : 1. Present petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following reliefs. “(a) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus and be pleased to hold and declare that the entire inquiry conducted against the petitioner is without following the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the whole of the charge-sheet and the inquiry report and the final show-cause notice and the punishment be declared as illegal and void and the same be quashed and set aside. (b) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the punishment is illegally inflicted and the final show-cause notice and the order of punishment are altogether different and therefore the same is illegal and the order be quashed and set aside. (c) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the petitioner has been wrongly refused the promotion and the sealed cover procedure has not been followed and the junior to the petitioner is promoted and therefore the order of promotion to any junior be declared as illegal and void and the petitioner be directed to be promoted to the higher post accordance with law. (d) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold and declare that the recovery which has been started is illegal and therefore the order of deduction of salary be ordered to be stayed and the deduction of every month of Rs.23,043/- from the salary of the petitioner be ordered to be stopped and the same be declared as illegal and the amount which has been collected so far be ordered to be returned with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. (e) Pending admission, hearing and/pr final disposal of this petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the final order and consequently the deduction of salary be stayed. (f) Such other and further relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem just, fit and expedient be granted. (g) Costs of this petition be provided for to the petitioner.” 2. (f) Such other and further relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem just, fit and expedient be granted. (g) Costs of this petition be provided for to the petitioner.” 2. Facts of the present case, in nutshell, are that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Manager in the Central Workshop and Transport Section and he was assigned certain duties of handling MACT cases and purchase of petrol and diesel for the Corporation and one Shri B. M. Upadhyay was assigned the same duties and he was also given duties with regard to MACT Cases for this entire period except one year beginning from 01.05.1999 to 11.06.2000, which the petitioner was Incharge of such cases. That due to negligence, a charge-sheet came to be issued to the petitioner with respect to handling MACT cases and petrol diesel work during the period from 05.02.1996 to 27.06.2001 whereby eight charges were levelled against the petitioner, which revolves non-compliance of directions of the then Joint Director Mr.J. S. Makwana and in the entire charge-sheet, no allegation of any financial loss was averred against the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that after completion of departmental inquiry, the Inquiry Officer has submitted a report mainly on the basis of the deposition of Mr.J.S. Makwana and Inquiry Officer has not considered the fact that the petitioner was not In-charge of MACT cases during the entire five years period, but he was only In-charge of one year and the petrol diesel duties were jointly shared by him and several other officers including one Mr.B. M. Upadhyaya, however, only the petitioner found guilty of five charges out of eight charges. It is the case of the petitioner that the final show-cause notice issued to the petitioner along with the report of the Inquiry Officer, which came to be replied by the petitioner and the case was heard by the then Labour Officer along with Mr.D. B. Makwana and after considering the relevant documents, the Disciplinary Authority held that the petitioner was not guilty of any charges and after retirement of Mr.D. B. Makwana, without hearing the petitioner, another report was prepared by the Labour Officer and next Deputy Commissioner held that the petitioner was guilty for five charges similar to inquiry report, which was placed before the Municipal Commissioner, who passed the order imposing penalty of Rs.2,76,000/- and stoppage of five increments. The petitioner preferred appeal, which was not entertained on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and, thereafter, review application came to be filed by the petitioner, which was rejected on the ground that no such case for review was made out. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order and consequential deduction of salary of the petitioner, the present petition is filed. 4. Heard Mr.Meet Kakadia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 5. Mr.Meet Kakadia, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the charges leveled against the petitioners are not proved and no any evidence led by the department to prove the charges against the petitioner. He would submit that out of eight witnesses, seven witnesses did not know anything about the charges. He would submit that the petitioner having duties for a period of only one year and the charges with regard to the MACT cases are of the year 1995- 1996 and upto 2000. He would submit that before inflicting the punishment, the department has to give notice for proposed punishment, which was not done and even the inquiry was not properly conducted and no charges were proved and the whole inquiry report is without proof of such documents. He would submit that the entire report of the Inquiry Officer and acceptance the same by the authority is illegal and not sustainable in the eye of law. He would submit that there was no notice or mention with regard to financial loss or proposed punishment, in the initial charge-sheet or during the proceedings on the basis of the vague calculation, penalty of Rs.2,76,000/- is imposed. He would submit that the respondent authority has not considered the reply filed by the petitioner and not considered the fact that he was not appointed as MACT case handler for the entire time during which he has been penalized and one Mr.Upadhyay and other workers jointly responsible for petrol diesel work, who were not penalized and the entire inquiry was one sided affair without adequate consideration of the say of the petitioner. He would submit that though the petitioner was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses, only one witness deposed against him and no opportunity was given to lead evidence and, therefore, there is clear breach of violation of principles of natural justice. He would submit that though the petitioner was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses, only one witness deposed against him and no opportunity was given to lead evidence and, therefore, there is clear breach of violation of principles of natural justice. He would submit that the final showcause notice and the final order both are completely different to each other and punishment inflicted upon the petitioner is disproportionate to the charge levelled against him. He would submit that there is clear discriminatory treatment since one Mr.Upadhyay who is at fault was let off with a penalty of Rs.1,000/- and the petitioner was imposed much higher punishment. He would also submit that the entire basis of the calculation of penalty is absolutely vague as it is based on assumption and such calculation cannot be tenable in the eyes of law. He has submitted that there is a gross violation of the principles of natural justice and the hearing of the case of the petitioner was done by one Mr.D. B. Makwana and the final report and order was passed by another. Over-and-above, the oral submissions, learned counsel of the petitioner has also submitted the written submissions. He would submit that considering over all facts of the case, the present petition may be allowed. 5.2 In support of his case, Mr.Kapadia, learned counsel has referred to relied upon the following decisions. (1) M/s. Shree Ram Packaging & Another Vs. Union of India & Another reported in 1990 (2) G.L.H. 343 ; (2) Yusufbhai Alibhai Maulvi Vs. State of Gujarat and others rendered in Special Civil Application No.6728 of 2017 dated 25.07.2017; (3) Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in (2017) 2 SCC 308 ; (4) Anil Kumar Vs. Presiding Officer reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 ; (5) Shankar Dass Vs. Union of India reported in (1985) 2 SCC 358 ; 6. Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would oppose the present petition and submit that the department has caused financial loss on account of negligence on the part of the petitioner. Presiding Officer reported in (1985) 3 SCC 378 ; (5) Shankar Dass Vs. Union of India reported in (1985) 2 SCC 358 ; 6. Mr.H. S. Munshaw, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would oppose the present petition and submit that the department has caused financial loss on account of negligence on the part of the petitioner. He would submit that the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 18.08.2001 and the final order is passed on 04.04.2009 and during this inquiry period, the petitioner was given opportunities to defend himself and all submissions made and the submissions of the petitioner have been taken into consideration by the Inquiry Officer, which is evident from perusal of the report of the Inquiry Officer. He would submit that the Inquiry Officer has given the report after proper appreciation of evidence on record and after giving fair hearing to the petitioner and the inquiry report is a reasoned one and each and every issue which is framed in the charge-sheet has been properly and correctly dealt with. He would submit that the petitioner was in charge of MACT cases as he was in Central Workshop during 1996 to 2001 and after the evidence of the witnesses, the Presiding Officer has made written submissions in support of the charges and come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved and the department has given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to prove his case. He would submit that the decisions referred to and relied upon on behalf of the petitioner are not applicable to the present case. He would submit that the petition being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 7. In the case of Allahabad Bank (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-7, 8 and 9 as under:- “7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. But it is equally true that in a case where the Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of the Disciplinary Authority. All told the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. 8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo the same afresh. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. That course could have been followed even in the present case. The matter could be remanded back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for a proper enquiry and a fresh report and order. But that course may not have been the only course open in a given situation. There may be situations where because of a long time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority. That is precisely what the High Court has done in the case at hand. The High Court has taken note of the fact that the respondent had been placed under suspension in the year 2004 and dismissed in the year 2005. The dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in the year 2006 but the writ petition remained pending in the High Court for nearly seven years till 2013. During the intervening period the respondent superannuated on 30th November, 2011. Not only that he had suffered a heart attack and a stroke that has rendered him physically disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now have turned 65 years of age. Any remand either to the Enquiry Officer for a fresh enquiry or to the Disciplinary Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is the fact that the High Court has found, that there was no allegation nor any evidence to show the extent of loss, if any, suffered by the bank on account of the alleged misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the High Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore, properly exercised. 9. The next question is whether the respondent would be entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral benefits in full or part. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/retiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for the period between the date of removal and the date of superannuation. The High Court has been rather ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High Court has directed release of service/retiral benefits, it is not clear whether the same would include salary for the period between the date of removal and the date of superannuation. Taking a liberal view of the matter, we assume that the High Court's direction for release of service benefits would include the release of his salaries also for the period mentioned above. We are, however, of the opinion that while proceedings need not be remanded for a fresh start from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of superannuation would not also be justified. We, therefore, allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent entitled to continuity of service till the date of his superannuation with all service benefits on that basis, he shall be entitled to only 50% of the salary for the period between the date of his removal from service till the date of superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his favour. The order passed by the High Court shall, to the extent indicated above, stand modified. The parties shall bear their own costs.” 8. In the case of Anil Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 5 and 6 as under:- “5. We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the enquiry officer. It is well-settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the enquiry officer has a duty to act judicially. The enquiry officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipse dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him or was considered not creditworthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the enquiry officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well-settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. V/s. Union of India, this court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar V/s. State of U.P., this court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more he so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case the enquiry report is an order sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been a more gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour court and the High court. 6. Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be a reasoned one. The court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. The court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable.” 9. In the case of Shankar Dass (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-7 as under:- “7. It is to be lamented that despite these observations of the learned Magistrate, the government chose to dismiss the appellant in a huff, without applying its mind to the penalty which could appropriately be imposed upon him insofar as his service career was concerned. Clause (a) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) of the Constitution confers on the government the power to dismiss a person from service "on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge". But, that power, like every other power, has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. Surely, the Constitution does not contemplate that a government servant who is convicted for parking his scooter in a no-parking area should be dismissed from service. He may, perhaps, not be entitled to be heard on the question of penalty since clause (a) of the second proviso to Art. 311(2) makes the provisions of that article inapplicable when a penalty is to be imposed on a government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge. But the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly. Considering the facts of this case, there can be no two opinions that the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant is whimsical.” 10. The questions raised in the present petition as to whether the Court can interfere in the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority after evaluating the evidence while exercising the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or not and whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate the charges levelled against the petitioner or not. 11. This Court has considered the facts of the case and submissions canvassed on behalf of both the sides. 11. This Court has considered the facts of the case and submissions canvassed on behalf of both the sides. This Court has also perused the affidavit-in-reply, affidavit-in-rejoinder and further affidavit filed on behalf of the respective parties and the decisions cited at the Bar. It appears from the material on record that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Manager and he was assigned work of handling MACT cases and purchase of petrol and diesel for the Corporation and due to negligence, a charge-sheet came to be issued and eight charges were levelled against him and an inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and submitted the report and on the basis of the report, the respondent imposed penalty and stoppage of five increments. It also appears that the petitioner preferred appeal which was not entertained on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and, thereafter, he filed review application, which came to be rejected. 12. After appreciating the contentions and the defence raised by the petitioner during the course of the inquiry, the inquiry officer has submitted a report to the Disciplinary Authority. The delinquent was given full opportunity to raise his defence and after considering the reply and the defence, the Disciplinary Authority has come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved and thus, the impugned order of punishment imposed is just and proper as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court time and again. 13. It is well settled law that the burden of proof in the departmental proceedings lies upon the delinquent/s, who is challenging the impugned action of the respondent more particularly the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. Now, it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Orissa Mining Corporation Limited Vs. Ananda Chandra Prusty reported in (1996) 11 SCC 600 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme court has decided the question of burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-6 as under:- “6. On a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of charges we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. In the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-6 as under:- “6. On a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case including the nature of charges we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The position with respect to burden of proof is as clarified by us hereinabove viz., that there is no such thing as an absolute burden of proof, always lying upon the department in a disciplinary inquiry. The burden of proof depends upon the nature of explanation and the nature of charges. In a given case the burden may be shifted to the delinquent officer, depending upon his explanation. For example take the first charge in this case. The charge was that he made certain false nothings on account of which loans were disbursed to certain ineligible person. The respondent's case was that those nothings were based upon certain documents produced and certain records maintained by other employees in the office. In such a situation it is for the respondent to establish his case. The department is not expected to examine those other employees in the office to show that their acts or records could not have formed the basis of wrong notings made by the respondent.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme has reiterated that the burden of proof in the departmental proceedings lies upon the delinquent if he wants to examine the witnesses in support of his defence, thereby he has to establish his innocence. Here in the present case, the petitioner has failed to establish his defence by examining the witnesses. 15. So far as the scope of interference, while exercising the powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the departmental proceedings is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again declared that once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, normally the High Court may not interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. 16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of C S. Amin Vs. Assistant General Manager SBI, Region III & 2 reported in 2016 LawSuit (Guj) 1916 and Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi Vs. 16. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of C S. Amin Vs. Assistant General Manager SBI, Region III & 2 reported in 2016 LawSuit (Guj) 1916 and Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi Vs. Surat Municipal Corporation and 2 reported in 2017 LawSuit (Guj) 9 where in this Court has decided similar issue as involved in the present petition. 17. In the case of C. S. Amin (supra), this Court has held and observed in paras – 29, 30 and 31 as under:- “29. I may quote the observations of the Division Bench as under:- The doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule evolved in England in Council of Civil Services Union Vs. Minister for Civil Services (1983) 1 AC 768 and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited Vs. Wednesbury Corporation - 1948 2 All ER 680 have been applied by the Courts in India in various decisions. In Union of India Vs. C.G. Ganayutham - AIR 1997 SC 3387 , the Supreme Court considered the ambit and scope of the doctrine of proportionality and Wednesbury rule in the light of various judicial pronouncements and laid down the following propositions: " (1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles. (3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith, as long as the European Human Rights Convention (Contention) is not incorporated into English Law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgement to find out if the decision maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgement on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon. (4)(a) The position in our country in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgement as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgement of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms." In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. (4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms." In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra - (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court reiterated the otherwise well settled principles of law on the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the employer and laid down the following propositions:- "It is a settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Further, it is a well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgement for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority." In Om Kumar Vs. Union of India - AIR 2000 SC 3689 , the Supreme Court traced the history of the principle of proportionality, referred to the propositions culled out in Ganayutham's case (supra), noticed the decision of the House of Lords in R. Vs. Chief Constable of Sussesc ex.p. International Trader's Ferry Ltd. (1999) 1 All ER 129, wherein the principles of Wednesbury and proportionality were almost equated and held that where the decision of an administrative authority is attacked being arbitrary, the principle of secondary review will have to be kept in mind. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgement which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below: "28. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgement which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below: "28. By 'proportionality' we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the Legislature or the Administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will see that the Legislature and the administrative authority 'maintain a proper balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, liberties, or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to serve. The Legislature and the administrative authority are, however, given an area of discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality." "29. The above principle of proportionality has been applied by the European Court to protect the rights guaranteed under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 and in particular, for considering whether restrictions imposed were restrictions which were 'necessary' - within Arts.8 to 11 of the said Convention (corresponding to our Art. 19(1) and to find out whether the restrictions imposed on fundamental freedoms were more excessive than required. (Handyside V. UK (1976) 1 EHR p.737) Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention contain provisions similar to Art. 21 of our Constitution relating to life and liberty. The European Court has applied the principle of proportionality also to questions of discrimination under Art. 14 of the Convention (corresponding to Art.14 of our Constitution). (See European Administrative Law by J. Schwaze, 1992. Pp.677- 866)." "66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Art.14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional Courts as primary reviewing Courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the Administrator. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a primary reviewing authority." "67. Here the Court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the Administrator and is, in essence, applying 'proportionality' and is a primary reviewing authority." "67. But where, an administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under Art. 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the Administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors in to consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. (In G.B. Mahajan V. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 at p. 111 :( AIR 1991 SC 1153 at . 1165), Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that 'reasonableness' of the Administrator under Art. 14 in the context of Administrative Law has to be judged from the stand point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular V. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 at Pp. 679- 680: (1994 AIR SCW 3344 and at Pp.3369-70 In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC V. Hoti Lal, (2003) 3 SCC 605 , the Supreme Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as under:: AIR 1996 SC 11 ); Indian Express Newspapers Vs. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 at p.691: ( AIR 1986 SC 515 at Pp.542- 43): Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Association V. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 at p.241 : ( AIR 1990 SC 334 at p.368: 1990 Lab IC 324 at p.358) and U.P. Financial Corporation V. GEM CAP (India) Pvt.Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 , at p. 307: (1993 SC 1435 at p.1439), while judging whether the administrative action is 'arbitrary' under Art.14 (i.e. otherwise than being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always." "71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Art.14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Art.14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the Administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rate cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and (in) such extreme or rate cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment." In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC V. Hoti Lal (2003) 3 SCC 605 , the Supreme Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as under: "The Court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go in to the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptional." (underlining is ours) In Director General, RPF V. Ch. Sai Babu (2003) 4 SCC 331 , the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court should ordinarily not interfere with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority in the matter of imposition of punishment and observed: "Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of the charges proved, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works." 30 The above noted decision of this Court gives a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose the particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the High Courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinion for the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has also been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproportionate or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. For determination of the question whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, the Court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved, the past conduct of the employee, the punishment if any imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned to the employee having due regard to their sensitiveness, performance norms if any laid down by the employer and above all the paramount requirement of maintaining discipline in the service.” 18. In the case of Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi (supra), this Court has held and observed in paras – 17, 18 and 21 as under:- “17. It is now well settled by a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court that in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should not venture into the reappreciation of evidence or interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority in the inquiry proceedings, if the same are conducted in accordance with law or go into the reliability/adequacy of evidence, or interfere, if there is some legal evidence on which the findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks the conscience. 18. It is equally well settled that the High Courts in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 can only consider whether the inquiry held by the competent authority was in accordance with the procedure established by law, and the principles of natural justice, whether irrelevant or extraneous consideration and/or exclusion of admissible or material evidence or admission of inadmissible evidence being influenced the decision rendering it vulnerable. 21. In a very recent pronouncement in the case of Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran [ 2015(2) SCC 610 ], the Supreme Court in details has explained the position of law so far as the scope of interference in the matter relating to the disciplinary proceedings is concerned. I may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court from paras 12 to 20 as under: ” 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a). the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b). the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c). The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a). the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b). the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c). there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d). the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e). the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f). the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g). the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h). the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i). the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13 Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). reappreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14 In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao1, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: "7. .....The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 15 In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ], the principles have been further discussed at paragraphs 21 to 24, which read as follows: "21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ). First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh ( AIR 1969 SC 966 ) said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ). 24. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ). 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." 16 These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh [ (1977) 2 SCC 491 ]. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: "4. ...... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. ..…" 17 In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T. T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 : ( AIR 2014 SC 1141 ), these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything. 18 On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in the impugned order dated 28.02.2000, had arrived at the following findings: "Article was held as proved by the Inquiry authority after evaluating the evidence adduced in the case. Under the circumstances of the case, the evidence relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P. Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the charge framed against him and he did not controvert the contents of the said letter dated 11.12.92 during the time of inquiry. Nor did he produce any defence witness during the inquiry to support his claims including that on 23.11.92 he left the office on permission. There is nothing to indicate that he was handicapped in producing his defence witness. .…" 19 The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20 Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. 20 Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values.” 19. So far as the quantum of punishment is concerned, the Court would not interfere in the order of the Disciplinary authority passed on the basis of the departmental inquiry by evaluating the evidence and by recording the findings based upon the evidence led before the Disciplinary Authority. 20. It is worthwhile to refer to and relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. T. T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 and in the case of State Bank of Indai V. A.G.D. Reddy reported ni 2023 (11) Scale 530. 21. In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras – 18 and 30 as under:- “18. In Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra) this Court opined that the unauthorized absence was not a grave misconduct inasmuch as the employee had proceeded on leave under compulsion because of his grave condition of health. Be it noted, in the said case, it has also been observed that no reasonable disciplinary authority would term absence on medical grounds with proper medical certificate from Government doctors as a grave misconduct. 30. Be it noted, in the said case, it has also been observed that no reasonable disciplinary authority would term absence on medical grounds with proper medical certificate from Government doctors as a grave misconduct. 30. After so stating the two-Judge Bench proceeded to say that one of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment is whether any reasonable employer would have imposed such punishment in like circumstances taking into consideration the major, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances after excluding irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. It is apt to note here that in the said case the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violated any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is telltale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the court at his own will. Learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of "habitual absenteeism" is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. Learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of "habitual absenteeism" is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate.” 22. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India Vs. A. G. D. Reddy wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-32 as under:- “32. From the above discussion, it is clear that it could not be said that the Enquiry Report, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the order of the Appointing Authority are based on no evidence or are perverse. Even if we eschew the report insofar as the aspect of non-submission of control form, the transgression of the area of operation and non-declaration of the immovable property and certain other charges are concerned, the order of penalty can be sustained.” 23. The above-mentioned decisions of this Court gives a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose the particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the High Courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinion for the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproprtionate or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. It has been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproprtionate or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. 24. On perusal of the aforesaid aspects, this Court is of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority based upon the inquiry report, the prayer sought for by the petitioner that during the course of inquiry and departmental proceedings there is breach of principles of natural justice as the petitioner was not given an proper opportunity is against the facts of the present case. In fact, the petitioner ought to have examined the witnesses in his favour and by leading cogent evidence, he could have established his defence before the Disciplinary Authority, however, he has not examined any witnesses except the witness who has referred to and relied upon by the otherside. It is settled legal position that for proving the guilty not to examine number of witnesses but only one witness is sufficient to prove the guilt. In the present case, one of the witnesses who have deposed against the petitioner. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has some animosity with the petitioner and, therefore, he deposed against the petitioner. Considering the facts of the case, this Court is of the opinion that this Court is not sitting in appeal over the disciplinary proceedings and therefore this Court is not evaluated or dwelled into the evidence by the Disciplinary Authority. 25. Considering the totality of facts, this Court is of opinion that the authority has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct, which was sufficient to impose punishment upon. This Court finds no reasons to interfere with the same either. 26. Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case and the decisions of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the opinion that the respondent - authority has recorded its findings after perusing and going through the materials on record and, therefore, the respondent – authority has not committed any error in passing the impugned order and hence, the present petition is devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 27. 27. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.