JUDGMENT : Sandeep N. Bhatt, J. 1. Both these second appeals are filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('CPC' for short) by the original plaintiff. Second Appeal No. 257 of 2023 is arising from Regular Civil Appeal No. 31 of 2004 arising from Regular Civil Suit No. 186 of 1993, whereas Second Appeal No. 258 of 2023 is arising from Regular Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2004 arising from Regular Civil Suit No. 266 of 1996. The common order passed in both the Regular Civil Suits dated 1.5.2004 by the learned Second Joint Civil Judge, Ahmedabad Rural and the common order passed in both the Regular Civil Appeals dated 20.4.2023 passed by the learned First Appellate Court i.e. 8th Additional District Court, Ahmedabad Rural are challenged by way of these second appeals, by raising the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether in the facts of the present case the Agreement dated 28.05.1962 is an agreement with monthly license or a monthly lease hold rights giving document? 2. The Appellant being the monthly tenant without termination of the tenancy under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act whether such summary proceedings under the Public Premises Eviction Act could be resorted by the landlord absolutely without giving proper opportunity to establish title as a tenant in the subject land? 3. In the facts of the present case an unconditional undertaking in a writ proceedings on oath was given by the competent authority of the respondent-Ahmedabad Cantonment Board that the appellant will be given 30 x 30 ft alternative site and based on that the petition having being disposed of, can the respondent refuse to give alternative site without any legal justification and whether the respondent is estopped, from asking the appellant to vacate the premises held on monthly rent? 4. Having regard to the proprietary claim of the monthly tenant, of the appellant the authority ought to have resorted to a regular title suit in competent civil court as per the provisions of Public Premises Eviction Act 1959 or Public Premises Eviction Act 1972? 5. 4. Having regard to the proprietary claim of the monthly tenant, of the appellant the authority ought to have resorted to a regular title suit in competent civil court as per the provisions of Public Premises Eviction Act 1959 or Public Premises Eviction Act 1972? 5. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case when the appellant is in the settled possession since 1962 as a monthly tenant, whether such status of the appellant is in the nature of tenancy by holding over which cannot be snatched away without following procedure under the Transfer of Property Act? 6. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the monthly tenancy of the appellant and there readiness to pay rent as agreed between the parties, comes to an end automatically by efflux of time or termination of tenancy under Transfer of Property Act is a sine qua non to any purported eviction? 7. Whether the appellate Court has committed a jurisdictional error in not following the provisions of the Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure which are mandatory in nature as held in K Karuppuraj Vs M Ganesan reported in 2021(10) SCC 777 and whether the lower appellate Court having not followed as to how and in which manner the First Appellate Court has to decide appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and have failed to discharge the obligation vested on it on the basis of which the judgment and decree of Ld. First Appellate Court deserves to be quashed and set aside and whether the matter requires to be remanded to the First Appellate Court to frame points of determination in accordance with Order 41 Rule 11, 14, 15, 31 and 33 of the CPC as held by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in several cases including judgment in Second Appeal No. 104 of 2003 decided on 03.10.2022." 2. As the common judgment and order passed by the learned first appellate court and the learned trial court is under challenge in these second appeals, the facts are same, arguments advanced are same, they are being heard together and decided by this common judgment. 3. As the common judgment and order passed by the learned first appellate court and the learned trial court is under challenge in these second appeals, the facts are same, arguments advanced are same, they are being heard together and decided by this common judgment. 3. The brief facts, as stated in the memo of the appeals, are such that the case of the plaintiff in Regular Civil Suit No. 186 of 1993 was that a plot admeasuring 45 x 60 feet i.e. 2700 sq.ft. From the land bearing survey no.65/1616 (referred to as 'the suit property' hereinafter) situated in the cantonment area under the Ahmedabad Cantonment Board was leased to the plaintiff on 24.4.1949 by the defendant and the plaintiff was regularly paying rent thereof; that the lease was renewed from time to time and thus, she is in possession thereof since last more than 43 years; that the certificate under Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 was also issued by the defendant Board; that receipts too were issued by the defendant Board; that since years plaintiff separated from her husband and hence she was engaged in selling firewood for earning her livelihood and had no other source of income; that the defendant issued show cause notice dated 2.4.1979 asking as to why possession of the suit property be not taken back from her; that on 6.4.1979, she visited the office of the defendant and she was asked to file reply after which hearing was to be afforded before taking any decision thereon; however, before she could file any reply, the ex-parte order dated 13.4.1979 was passed under the provisions of Section 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1971) terming her possession as unauthorized and she was ordered to be vacated; against the said order, the plaintiff filed appeal under Section 9 of the Act of 1971 before the District Court which was dismissed and hence she filed Special Civil Application No. 1906 of 1979, wherein the defendant appeared on service of notice and on 28.7.1979 showed readiness to allot alternate plot in survey no.65/686 admeasuring 30 x 30 feet i.e. 900 sq.feet (hereinafter referred to as the alternate site); the said petition came up for hearing in the year 1988 and vide order dated 26.8.1988, the plaintiff was directed to deposit Rs. 3,000/- with the defendant board and the board was supposed to decide her representation for grant of aforesaid alternate site; that the defendant did nothing and therefore again in the year 1991, the plaintiff made a representation to the defendant whereupon the defendant Board vide letter dated 9.3.1991 asked plaintiff to produce necessary proofs/documents which she furnished in person, however, after a period of two years, on 10.2.1993, without providing any alternate site, passed an ex-parte order directing the plaintiff to hand over the possession of the suit property. 3.1. It is further averred in the appeals that therefore the plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No. 186 of 1993 seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking possession of the suit property till alternate site is allotted. It is averred that the defendant filed written statement in the said suit denying all the contentions and stated that the suit property was allotted to the defendant for a limited period i.e. upto 31.3.1979 by lease and licence and thereafter the permission was not extended and therefore, after the said date, the possession of the plaintiff was declared unauthorized. 3.2. It is further averred in the appeals that in Regular Civil Suit No. 266 of 1996, besides the contentions raised in above suit, the plaintiff claimed that she was earning her livelihood by raising and selling chicken and selling firewood from the suit property; that despite there being an order of status-quo in the previous suit i.e. Regular Civil Suit No. 186 of 1993, the Estate Officer of the board came on the suit premises on 10.4.1996 and threatened that if the plaintiff fails to vacate the suit property within 24 hours, the same will be demolished and goods taken away and therefore the plaintiff filed the second suit seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's business and further restraining it from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit property. Upon service of notice in this suit, the defendant appears and filed written statement contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the suit as it was barred under Section 15 of the Cantonment laws as well as suffered from vice of non-joinder of necessary parties as the owner of the suit land i.e. Union of India through Defence Secretary was not impleaded, the suit property was allotted only for one year and upon completion of one year, the board can extend for one year by decision in board meeting but such licence/lease has not been extended, that the plaintiff was permitted to sell firewood and at no point of time, the plaintiff was permitted to sell chicken, that the plaintiff was required to obtain necessary permissions from higher authorities, but she has failed to obtain such permission till date and therefore prayed to dismiss the suits. 3.3. Both the said suits were consolidated, issues were framed, decided together and were dismissed by a common order, against which the regular civil appeals were filed before the first appellate court, which were also dismissed by a common order and hence these second appeals are filed with the suggested substantial questions of law as mentioned hereinabove. 4. Heard learned advocate Mr.K.V. Shelat for the appellant in Second Appeal No. 257 of 2023 and learned senior advocate Mr. Mehul Shah for the appellant in Second Appeal No. 258 of 2023 and learned advocate Mr.R.C. Sejpal for the respondent. 4.1. Learned senior advocates for the appellant has made the following submissions: (1) The plaintiff is a tenant of the Cantonment Board ever since 1949 till 1979 and the said fact is admitted by the defendant-Cantonment Board in written statement Exh.12 that the suit land was given to the plaintiff upto 31.3.1979 on leave and licence and thereafter the permission was not granted; that the notice under Section 4 of the Act of 1979 never asked for any rent from the plaintiff. (2) That though the defendant gave an undertaking in the Special Civil Application No. 1906 of 1979 to give alternate site, nothing was done and the plaintiff already made representation on 11.8.1988 and hoping that the defendant will give the alternative site, the petition was withdrawn, however, the defendant rejected the representation of the plaintiff after she deposited Rs. 3,000/- as rent covering period upto 1989. 3,000/- as rent covering period upto 1989. That the appellant again applied on 6.3.1991 to the Director Cantonment Board to either give alternative place or to continue with existing accommodation on such terms and conditions which they deem fit, to which the defendant gave reply on 10.2.1993 that representation filed by the petitioner was rejected on 11.8.1988 and the application for seeking allotment of alternative land was rejected on 19.8.1988 and asked for possession. (3) That the Government of India wrote a letter dated 13.1.1997 to the Director, Pune for allotment of alternative site and also asked that once the undertaking is given by CEO and Estate Officer before this Court on oath, then why the same is not done and comments were called for, however, shockingly the defendant supplied incorrect facts and stated that the premises was given to the plaintiff only for one year in the year 1979 and was not given on lease. (4) Referring to the plaintiff's cross examination, it is submitted that the stand of the board was clear that the land belongs to Cantonment Board and that the entire management of the land is by CEO of cantonment; that a lease agreement was executed and lease rent and licence fee were taken by the plaintiff; that the evidence at page nos.87 and 88 clearly show that since 1949 the subject land was given and cantonment board Ahmedabad has extended the licence till 1978. (5) That during the pendency of the suit, under the RTI Act, the plaintiff applied for communication of the resolution dated 19.3.1991, various orders for production of original documents and original rejection letter by the board, but the same was refused contending that it is the board executive committee's decision and therefore the defendant is not bound to communicate such decision to the plaintiff. That the rejection orders passed below the representations made by the plaintiffs were passed without assigning any reasons for the same. (6) That the issue with regard to the maintainability of the suit for injunction and preservation of possession is maintainable or not is decided in affirmative and the learned trial court has come to the conclusion that it is maintainable and even then the defendant did not file any appeal or cross- objections for the same. (6) That the issue with regard to the maintainability of the suit for injunction and preservation of possession is maintainable or not is decided in affirmative and the learned trial court has come to the conclusion that it is maintainable and even then the defendant did not file any appeal or cross- objections for the same. In the same way, the issue with regard to whether the suit is suffering from non-joinder of necessary parties is also answered that it is not suffering from so and the civil suit is maintainable as per section 108(3) for injunction against the Cantonment Board. (7) That the learned appellate Court did not frame points of determination as contemplated under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC and no issue regarding jurisdiction is framed by the learned appellate Court and still the learned appellate court reversed the issue regarding jurisdiction by holding that even if it is not barred under Cantonment Act, the suit is not maintainable under Section 15 of the Act of 1972. (8) Learned senior advocate Mr. Shah has referred to various pages of the paper book viz. (8) Learned senior advocate Mr. Shah has referred to various pages of the paper book viz. licence issued by the cantonment board from 1949, General Land Register of the Cantonment Board in which there is a mention regarding lease which came to be extended from the first lease deed period by doubling the rent; the lease deed executed on 28.5.1962 for a period of five years; rent receipts and the last payment was on 1.9.1988; that the CEO of the board filed his reply in special Civil Application No. 1906 of 1979 to the effect that as per the suggestion made by this court, he has visited alongwith the plaintiff's advocate and their advocate to see alternative site and have selected alternative site of 30 ft x 30 ft in place of existing 45 ft x 60 ft equal to 2700 sq.fts and the board has agreed to allot the alternative accommodation; the cantonment board through its authorized officer gave undertaking on oath to this court about the board ready to provide the alternative site selected by them which is 1/3rd of the existing area for the same purpose of wood stack; the map and undertaking to give alternative premises to be offered to the present appellant; the representation dated 11.8.1988 and 19.8.1990, the representation dated 6.3.1991, the resolution of the Cantonment Board, rejection of the representations of the appellant, the Cantonment Board informed the Member of Parliament that board has already rejected the representation and the matter is subjudice before the learned civil court. (9) That the Transfer of Property Act came into force in 1882, the Cantonment Act came into force in 1924 and the plaintiff is allotted the suit property under Section 280 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 by Cantonment Board, Ahmedabad and therefore it is only the Cantonment Act which is applicable and not Act of 1971 and when the property is given under a law, action can only be taken under that Act and not under the Act of 1971; that the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that the Act of 1971 is a summary remedy and when there is a bonafide dispute of the plaintiff or the person against whom the proposed action under the Act of 1971 is sought, the authority must file a suit on title, further, it is also held that even if the property is allotted under Cantonment Act, a civil suit is maintainable by the allottee by the Cantonment Board. (10) That the Cantonment Act, 1924 thus do not bar jurisdiction of civil court in relation to fresh cause of action which has accrued in our case on the ground of not renewal or not continuing the appellant in the premises and alternatively in not abiding the undertaking given to the Court in relation to the alternative premises to the extent of 1/3rd of existing premises; (11) That though there is an argument by the defendant that the rent is not paid for several years, as a matter of fact, there is no issue of any arrears claimed or alleged, that it is held by the learned trial Court that the rent is paid till 1979; that the plaintiff has paid rent upto 1988 amounting to Rs. 3,000/- as per the order of this Court and further, in the suit notice, there is no mention of any arrears and it is a simplicitor notice of eviction without mentioning under which Act it is issued and therefore the suit for injunction filed by the plaintiff was under the immediate threat. 4.2. Learned advocate Mr. Shelat and learned senior advocate Mr. Shah appearing for the appellant in the appeals respectively, therefore, submitted that both the lower courts below have erred in dismissing the suits and appeals respectively and therefore, the same needs to be interfered with in this appeal by admitting these second appeals and framing the substantial questions of law. 4.3. Learned advocate Mr. Shelat and learned senior advocate Mr. Shah appearing for the appellant in the appeals respectively, therefore, submitted that both the lower courts below have erred in dismissing the suits and appeals respectively and therefore, the same needs to be interfered with in this appeal by admitting these second appeals and framing the substantial questions of law. 4.3. In support of the submissions, learned advocated for the appellants have relied on the following judgments: (1) Lakhi Ram (Dead) Through Lrs Vs. Trikha Ram & Ors. Reported in (1998) 2 SCC 720 . (2) North Eastern Railway Administration Gorakhpur Vs. Bhagwandas (Dead) by Lrs reported in (2008) 8 SCC 511 . (3) Pirgonda Hongonda Patil Vs. Kalgonda Shodgonda Patil reported in AIR 1957 SC 363 . (4) Pandit Iswardas Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1979) 4 SCC 163 . (5) Banarsi Vs. Ram Phal reported in AIR 2003 SC 1989 . (6) Karuppuraj Vs. M Ganesan reported in 2021(10) SCC 777 . (7) State of Gujarat Vs. Ratilal A Vaishnav reported in 1984 GLH(UJ) 25. (8) S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India reported in 1990 (4) SCC 594 . (9) Suhas H Pophale Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its Estate Officer reported in (2014) 4 SCC 657 . (10) Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji Vs. Union of India reported in (2019) 20 SCC 705 . (11) Banatwala and Company Vs. LIC of India and another reported in 2011(13) SCC 446 . (12) Cantonment Board Meerut Vs. L.Kamla Prasad reported in AIR 1947 Allahabad 243. (13) Akram Mea Vs. Secunderabad Municipal Corporation reported in AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 859. (14) Yenugu Achayya Vs. Ernaki Venkata Subba Rao reported in AIR 1957 AP 854 . (15) Farooqui Begum (Dead) by legal representatives Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2022) 10 SCC 399 . 5. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Sejpal for the original defendant submits that both the Courts below have concurrently held against the plaintiff. (14) Yenugu Achayya Vs. Ernaki Venkata Subba Rao reported in AIR 1957 AP 854 . (15) Farooqui Begum (Dead) by legal representatives Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2022) 10 SCC 399 . 5. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. Sejpal for the original defendant submits that both the Courts below have concurrently held against the plaintiff. His submissions can be summarized as follows: (1) the prayers in the suit are only for getting an alternate piece of land to the land the plaintiff is illegally occupying, which is admittedly of the ownership of the Union of India and under the management of Cantonment Board, Ahmedabad and such prayer is made only on the basis of an undertaking filed by then CEO of Cantonment Board before this Court in the petition being Special Civil Application No. 1906 of 1979. (2) that the plaintiff has lost before all the authorities and courts. (3) that the undertaking filed in the Special Civil Application in nutshell states that the plaintiff is an unauthorized occupant/encroacher as her lease period got over since long; that the plaintiff has violated the terms of the lease deed, which expired since long; that the plaintiff is not paying heed to eviction notices' that the plaintiff can be given an alternative piece of land on the condition that the plaintiff shall get written sanction of such lease from the competent authority i.e. government of India, Ministry of Defence, with reclassification of that land, within six months henceforth; that the undertaking was without prejudice to the government's rights; that the plaintiff shall vacate the present land forthwith; that the undertaking was filed only in the capacity of CEO, Cantonment Board. (4) That the plaintiff herself did not abide by the undertaking as she admittedly did not comply with any of the conditions of it neither she got any sanction from the Ministry of Defence, who owns the land nor she vacated the unauthorizedly occupied land; that the only direction while disposing of the petition was that the plaintiff will make a representation and that may be considered by the defendant and further protection was given for a period of one week if the representation is rejected and the representation was rejected later on; that the plaintiff files the suits wherein the undertaking is sought to be implemented, thus, the present frivolous litigation has started and has continued upto 2024 with all kinds of efforts to delay the proceedings after obtaining interim injunction in the matters-right from the suit. (5) Learned advocate Mr. Sejpal submitted that the entire case may be restricted to the prayers prayed for in the suit as the litigation cannot travel beyond the prayers and the prayers in the suit is only with regard to the undertaking of the CEO of 1979, which was an undertaking in a proceeding, that too, with conditions, that the plaintiff did not act upon it by fulfilling her part. (6) That the original plaintiff passed away since long, the heirs have not vacated the suit property, that the plaintiff has sought for the land as a deserted lady, without any support to live her life, the said claim is objected by the defendant in the counter affidavit stating that the lady is just used as the pretext and the family is quite affluent, having started a poultry farm at the place, they have cars, they have built rooms on the land, which are used to rent out to unknown persons etc., which are contrary to the then lease deed which got over in 1966, as per the said lease deed, the lady had to use the land only for staking wood so that she can sell the wood and earn her livelihood. (7) The plaintiff has admitted in her cross examination that she has not paid anything towards rent or any other charges after 1971 and the plaintiff is in arrears for more than 34 years, there is no document on record to support the claim of the plaintiff that she is in possession since 1949, only one lease deed of 1961 is on record, which has expired in 1966. (8) That the mandatory notice under Section 273 of the Cantonments Act was admittedly not given. The plaintiff has filed application in the suit which was to waive a notice under Section 80 of the CPC as State of Gujarat was a party to the proceeding; that Section 80 does not apply when there is specific provision of Section 273 as above stated and State of Gujarat is not a party to the proceeding; thus, in absence of any notice prior to the suit or an application under Section 273, the suit was not maintainable. (9) There are concurrent findings by both the lower courts and therefore, the plaintiff has lost at both the levels, it is settled law that in such scenario, this Court, would normally not interfere unless both the courts have committed some grave error on facts and/or law, there is no error in the present case by either of the courts and therefore, the second appeal is required to be dismissed. (10) that the argument made by learned senior advocate Mr. Shah for the appellant in one of the appeals that it was the cantonment board who had to take the sanction for grant of land for the lease in favour of the plaintiff is directly contrary to the words of the undertaking, relied upon by him only. (11) That the judgments of both the Courts below particularly the lower appellate court are absolutely just and proper, on all issues, the appellate court has gone into all the aspects of the matter that were left out by the lower court and therefore the same is required to be upheld. (12) That the proceedings for recovery of the amount for illegal usage of government land for all these decades are already on against the plaintiff including the heirs. (12) That the proceedings for recovery of the amount for illegal usage of government land for all these decades are already on against the plaintiff including the heirs. (13) As regards the civil application for amendment of the prayers in the plaint at the stage of second appeal, it is submitted that Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC and its proviso clearly state that no amendment can be granted after the trial has started, and there is nothing in the application for amendment that was not there at the time of filing of the suit, the suit was filed before 31 years and the party has not found it necessary to do anything all these decades and therefore the application for amendment is as frivolous as the main second appeal. 5.1. Learned advocate Mr. Sejpal has, therefore, submitted that the learned lower courts have not committed any error in dismissing the suits and appeals respectively and therefore this second appeal is required to be dismissed as there is no substantial question of law which is required to be framed. 5.2 In support of his submissions, he has relied on the following submissions: (1) Nazir Mohamed Vs J.Kamala and others reported in (2020)19 SCC 57 (2) Mahant Dhangir Vs Madan Mohan reported in 1987 Supp SCC 528. 6. I have considered the submissions made at the bar, perused the material on record including the impugned judgments. 7. It transpires from the record that the suit was filed, written statement was filed, issues were framed after consolidation of both the suits and thereafter the evidence was led before the learned trial Court as under: Sr.No. Exh. Description Examination of Hasinabibi Sariyakhan Pathan-plaintiff herself Documentary evidence: Sr.No. Exh. Description 1 to 5 178 to 182 Receipts issues by defendant board towards rent paid by the plaintiff 6 183 Receipt in respect of Rs.3000/- deposited by plaintiff pursuant to order of the High Court in SCA No.1906 of 1979 7 184 Reply dated 11/08/1975 in response to the notice dated 01/08/1975 8 185 Registration Certificate issued under Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. 9 186 Certified copy of the order of Hon’ble High Court in SCA/ 1906/1979. 10 187 Lease Agreement of suit property executed between the President of India and the plaintiff. Defendant’s evidence : Oral evidence: Sr.No Exh.No. Description 1 192 Examination of Sunilbhai Rameshchandra – Engineer of the defendant board. 9 186 Certified copy of the order of Hon’ble High Court in SCA/ 1906/1979. 10 187 Lease Agreement of suit property executed between the President of India and the plaintiff. Defendant’s evidence : Oral evidence: Sr.No Exh.No. Description 1 192 Examination of Sunilbhai Rameshchandra – Engineer of the defendant board. 2 206 Examination of Shankarbabu Venkatraman – Executive of the defendant board. Documentary evidence: Sr.No. Exh. Description 1 193 Plaintiff’s application to the defendant Board seeking allotment of alternate site 2 198 Copy of notice dated 10.02.1993 issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. 3 199 Letter dated 13.01.1997 addressed to the Principal Director, DE, Ministry of Defence, Southern Command sent on behalf of Director General, Defence Estates. 4 200 Reply dated 10.3.1997 sent by the defendant to Director, Defence Estates, Southern Command. 5 201 Notice dated 13.02.2002 issued u/s 118 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 by the defendant directing plaintiff to remove nuisance. 8. After considering the evidence and the arguments advanced by learned advocates for the parties, the suits were dismissed, against which the appeals were filed before the lower appellate court, wherein the points of consideration were framed and they were discussed in detail and thereafter, the appeals were dismissed. 9. The suit revolves around the point that in the first round of litigation, an undertaking was given by the defendant that they will provide the plaintiff with an alternative site, however, the same was not done and therefore the action taken by the defendant to evict the plaintiff is not just and proper. If the material placed on record is perused in connection with this, the order passed in the Special Civil Application No. 1906 of 1979 was passed on the basis of undertaking produced by the defendant. The undertaking states that (A) The petitioners shall apply and arrange for obtaining prior written sanction of government Authority i.e. Government of India, Ministry of Defence granting them the leasehold rights in appropriate schedule and get registered lease documents for the lease of this plot and also reclassification of land within six months henceforth ........ The undertaking states that (A) The petitioners shall apply and arrange for obtaining prior written sanction of government Authority i.e. Government of India, Ministry of Defence granting them the leasehold rights in appropriate schedule and get registered lease documents for the lease of this plot and also reclassification of land within six months henceforth ........ (E) Present site of unauthorized occupation shall be vacated by the petitioners forthwith and damages causes as assessed till the time of clearance of present site shall be paid over to the Cantonment Board by the petitioners forthwith." Based on this, the order was passed in the petition to the effect that, "the learned advocate for the petitioners further states that the petitioner will deposit Rs. 3,000/- before the respondent authority on or before 31.8.1988, which would be amount due to the respondent authorities, according to the petitioners. If such amount is deposited, the respondent-authority may accept the same under protest and subject to all their rights and contentions. The learned Advocate for the petitioner further states that till the aforesaid representation is decided by the respondent- authority, petitioners may not be dispossessed from the land in question. This request is reasonable and, therefore, it is directed that the respondent-authority may not dispossess the petitioners from the land in question, till the said representation is decided by the authorities concerned and for a further period of one week thereafter." 10. Thus, the direction was consideration of the representation of the plaintiff which, as per the said undertaking, was further subject to plaintiff "obtaining prior written sanction of Government Authority i.e. Government of India, Ministry of Defence granting them the lease hold rights in appropriate schedule and get registered lease documents for the lease of this plot and also reclassification of land within six months henceforth." Though the plaintiff during her cross-examination has denied the suggestion to the effect that she was required to obtain sanction from Pune Head Office and though she has further stated that she had initiated procedure to obtain such permission, she has not produced any documents showing that she even wrote a request letter to the Pune Head Office. Thus, upon consideration of the material available on the record, it is apparent that it was the plaintiff who failed to obtain necessary clearances, sanction etc., and until that was done, the defendant could not have made the allotment on its own. Thus, upon consideration of the material available on the record, it is apparent that it was the plaintiff who failed to obtain necessary clearances, sanction etc., and until that was done, the defendant could not have made the allotment on its own. 11. On conjoint reading of the documentary evidence produced on the record, it appears that the plaintiff was allotted suit property in the year 1949 for selling firewood and coal and plaintiff was regularly paying rent thereof, however, the fact remains, which is admitted by the plaintiff herself in cross-examination that, she has not paid any amount after 1971. Thereafter, the amount of Rs. 3,000/- was deposited which were considered as arrears upto 31.8.1988 as ordered by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1906 of 1979, which was accepted by the defendant-Board under protest. Even then, the plaintiff is in arrears of rent as on the date of filing of the suit for about 4 years and 7 months and as on today, the plaintiff is in arrears for more than 35 years and still enjoying the possession of the property. 12. Further, if the lease deed placed on record at Exh.187 is seen, it is titled as "Special Lease Form". It is further mentioned that it has been executed by virtue of rules made under Section 280 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 and hence governed by Rule 8 of the Cantonment Property Rules read with Section 109 of the Cantonments Ac, 1924. Further, it is evidence from the said lease deed, that the same was executed on 28.5.1962 and it was for a period of five years from 3.11.1961 and it does not appear to have been renewed in writing and it was granted with a specific direction that "not to use the said land otherwise than for stacking wood and in accordance with provisions of Section 144 of the Cantonments act, 1924.... and also "on expiration or sooner determination of this lease peaceably to surrender to the lessor the land hereby demised together with all structures and other constructions erected or made thereon...." similarly anything to be done under the said lease was supposed to be done with permission in writing by the Cantonment Board. Thus, though the said document is a lease deed, the same was not extended in writing and therefore the validity of the same cannot be accepted. Thus, though the said document is a lease deed, the same was not extended in writing and therefore the validity of the same cannot be accepted. The plaintiff has failed to produce the lease deed of the year 1949 though it is claimed that they are having possession of the property since 1949 by way of lease deed. 13. There are certain facts involved in these appeals; the plaintiff claimed in the suits that she is deserted lady and was so required to eke a living which she did by selling firewood on the suit property and also raising and selling chicken, however, upon considering the lease deed at Exh.187 it is apparent that the land was given only the purpose of selling firewood and change of purpose, without prior permission in writing was not permissible, there is no document showing such permission being granted. Even the ownership of land is essentially of Union of India, which is not joined as party in the proceedings. 14. Further, when the direction was given by this Court to make representation and directed the defendant to decide the said representation, the said representation was rejected, she could have revived the petition, instead she opted for filing the suit and obtained status-quo therein and by way of this, she did not pay the rent, enjoyed the rent free accommodation for a long 35 years, rushed to the Court for further protection without following the order passed by this Court in the previous round of litigation, which cannot be tolerated as it is a huge loss to the public exchequer. 15. I am restraining myself in reappreciating the record of the case in detail, as both the lower courts below, more particularly, the learned lower appellate Court, has dealt with all the issues in detail, after framing the points of consideration and also have covered all the points, that may have been left out by the learned trial Court. When the plaintiff has failed to produce any documentary evidence as to on what basis she is continued in possession of the suit land for such a long period, there is nothing else to be looked into as she is enjoying the possession of the land for so many years without paying a single pie to the government, which is a huge loss to the government exchequer which cannot be tolerated. The plaintiff has resorted to all the technicalities of law by raising all type of contentions but did not produce any documentary evidence to proof that on what basis she is in possession of the suit land and also did not take any steps to comply with the order passed in the petition by this Court long back in the year 1979. No relief can be granted to such persons, which both the learned courts below have rightly not done by giving a well reasoned order, which is not required to be interfered with by this Court in this second appeal as there is no perversity, illegality, infirmity or error of fact/law in the impugned orders. At the stage of second appeal, the Court has to consider whether there is any substantial question of law which need to be framed if at all there is a grave error committed by both the courts below, which is not there in the present case. 16. With regard to the judgments cited by learned advocate for the plaintiff, the learned lower appellate Court has discussed them in detail and also given a detailed finding as to whether they are applicable to the facts of the present case or not, with proper reasoning. The facts of the said cases are totally different from the facts of this case and therefore, though there cannot be any dispute with regard to the ratio laid down in the said judgments, the same cannot be applied to the present case. 17. Section 100 of CPC reads as under: "[100. Second appeal.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." 18. It is fruitful to refer the judgment in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs Gurcharan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 875 which are reproduced as under: "7. The parameters of an appeal under Section 100, CPC passing muster are well established. The section itself dictates that such an appeal shall only be maintainable when the case involves a substantial question of law or that the appellate decree has been passed ex parte. the latter, obviously is not the case. This court has, in a multitude of decisions, expounded on what may be termed as a substantial question of law to satisfy the requirements of section 100. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2- Judge Bench), it was observed:- "27. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ], this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) "21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth [Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 ] are set out hereinbelow : (SCC p. 554, para 21) "21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means- of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta, SCC OnLine PC 31 : (1927-28) 55 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase "substantial question of law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju, 1951 SCC OnLine Mad 100 : AIR 1951 Mad 969 ] : (Chunilal case [Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) '5. ... when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], AIR p. 1318, para 5) '5. ... when a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular facts of the case it would not be a substantial question of law.' 28. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way." (Emphasis supplied) 14. As already noted above, another ground of objection taken by the Appellant is the fact of the impugned judgment entering into a reappreciation of evidence. While it is true that ordinarily, in second appeal, the court must not disturb facts established by the lower court or the first appellate court. However, it is also equally well recognised that this rule is not an absolute one or in other words, it is not a rule set in stone. In Nazir Mohamed (supra) this Court has recognised three conditions in which a court in such jurisdiction, may disturb findings of fact. They are:- "(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." 15. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." 15. A Bench of three learned Judges, recently in Balasubramanian v. M. Arockiasamy (Dead) Through LRs., had referred to, with approval judgment rendered in Ramathal v. Maruthathal (two-Judge Bench) wherein it was observed that the restraint in interfering with questions of fact under the jurisdiction of second appeal, is not an absolute rule. Where the court is of the view that the conclusions drawn by the court below do not have a basis in the evidence led or it is of the view that the appreciation of evidence "suffers from material irregularity" the court will be justified in interfering with such findings." 19. It is also fruitful to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nazir Mohamed vs. J. Kamala reported in (2020)19 SCC 57 , wherein, it is observed in paragraphs 22, 23, 32, 33.2, 33.3, 55 and 56 as under: "22. A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal. It was not open to the Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to reanalyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal. 23. Section 100 of the CPC, as amended, restricts the right of second appeal, to only those cases, where a substantial question of law is involved. The existence of a "substantial question of law" is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. 32.2 In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra vs. Ramalingam, AIR 1963 SC 302 . 32.2 In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra vs. Ramalingam, AIR 1963 SC 302 . An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter. 33.2 The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. 33.3 A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. 55. When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose. Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal can not satisfy the mandate of Section 100 of the CPC." 20. In view of the above discussion, as there is no illegality or perversity found and no substantial questions of law is emerging in the appeal, these second appeals are required to be dismissed. Accordingly, dismissed. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. 21. The Civil Applications for stay are disposed of as no orders are required to be passed in view of the dismissal of the second appeals. 22. Accordingly, dismissed. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. 21. The Civil Applications for stay are disposed of as no orders are required to be passed in view of the dismissal of the second appeals. 22. The Civil Applications are filed for amendment of the prayers in the plaint. However, as the second appeals are dismissed by this detailed order, I am restraining myself from entering into the point whether the same can be permitted at the stage of second appeal or not and the civil applications are disposed of in view of the order passed in the second appeals. Learned advocate Mr. Shelat and learned senior advocate Mr. Shah for the appellant in both the appeals have requested for stay of this order as the interim relief is operating throughout the pendency of the proceeding, which is objected by learned advocate Mr. Sejpal for the opponent. Considering the fact that the Court has opined that the appellant has no locus and enjoying the possession illegally since so many years and that the land is government land, no further protection can be granted. Hence, the request is rejected.