JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. Since both the appeals arise out of the common order, as such they are taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by this common order. Prayer: 2. Both the instant intra-court appeals, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, are directed against order/judgment dated 31.10.2014 passed by learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) with C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R), whereby and whereunder the original order dated 03.05.1995 passed in L.C. Case No. 11-12 of 1994-95 by the Land Reform Deputy Collector, Daltonganj; order dated 23.11.1995 in L.C. Appeal No. 01 and 02 of 1995-96 and order dated 06.10.1998 passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue in L.C. Revision Case No. 321 and 322 of 1995 have been quashed and set aside by allowing the writ petition. Brief facts of the case: 3. Brief facts of the case, as per the pleadings made in the writ petitions, read as under: 4. The respondent no. 6 executed two sale deeds being sale deed no. 2392 dated 24.03.1992, registered on 25.05.1994 in favour of the petitioner Urmila Devi [ subject matter of C.W. J.C. No. 72 of 1999 (R)] and sale deed no. 2393 dated 24.03.1992, registered on 25.05.1994 in favour of the petitioners Pushpa Devi and Urmila Devi [subject matter of C.W. J.C. No. 74 of 1999 (R)]. 5. The respondent no. 5 (appellant herein) filed an application dated 22.08.1994 under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1961’] claiming right of pre-emption and the same was registered as L.C. Case No. 11-12 of 1994-95. 6. The learned DCLR, Palamau allowed the said pre-emption case L.C. Case No. 11-12 of 1994-95 filed by the pre-emptor under Section 16(3) of the Act in favour of the respondent no. 5 [appellant herein] vide order dated 03.05.1995. 7. Thereafter the appeal was preferred by the writ petitioners against the said order which was dismissed vide order dated 23.11.1995. Being aggrieved with the appellate order a revision petition being Case No. 321 and 322 of 1995 which was also dismissed vide order 06.10.1998. 8. 5 [appellant herein] vide order dated 03.05.1995. 7. Thereafter the appeal was preferred by the writ petitioners against the said order which was dismissed vide order dated 23.11.1995. Being aggrieved with the appellate order a revision petition being Case No. 321 and 322 of 1995 which was also dismissed vide order 06.10.1998. 8. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the three consecutive authorities, the writ petitioners approached this Court by filing writ petitions being in C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) and C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R), which were heard together and allowed vide order dated 31.10.2014 holding that the courts below erred in recording the findings, which are not based on evidence, either oral or documentary and further the courts below have also failed to notice the nature of right of pre-emption. 9. The order dated 31.10.2014 passed by the learned writ court in C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) with C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R) is the subject matter of instant intra-courts appeal. 10. Thus, it is evident that the appellant-Rajendra Mishra filed applications claiming right of pre-emption, registered as L.C. Case No. 11-12 of 1994-95, before the D.C.L.R., Palamau under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 which were heard and were allowed vide order dated 03.05.1995. 11. Aggrieved thereof, the respondent-Urmila Devi and respondent-Pushpa Devi preferred two separate appeals being L.C. Appeal No. 1 of 1995-96 and 2 of 1995-96, which were heard together and dismissed vide common order dated 23.11.1995, against which revision applications being L.C. Revision Case No. 321 and 322 of 1995 were filed, which were heard together and dismissed vide common order dated 06.10.1998. 12. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the original, appellate and revisional authority, the petitioners preferred writ petitions being C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) and C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R), in which ground has been taken that right of pre-emption can be claimed for the entire property comprised in the sale deed and not with respect to the part of the property in the sale deed but form the application dated 22.08.1994 it would appear that the pre-emptor has claimed right of pre-emption only with respect to a part of property and thus, the application under Section 16(3) of Act, 1961 is not maintainable. 13. 13. The learned Single Judge, taking into consideration the submission advanced by the parties allowed the writ petitions vide order dated 31.10.2014 holding that the courts below erred in recording the findings, which are not based on evidence, either oral or documentary and further the courts below have also failed to notice the nature of right of pre-emption, against which the instant intra-court appeals have been preferred. Arguments on behalf of Appellants: 14. Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel for the appellant has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge : I. Learned Single Judge has not appreciated the factual aspect in right perspective since the ground of pre-emption was taken on the basis of appellant being the co-sharer and adjoining raiyats but the learned Single Judge merely on the ground that the appellant is not the co-sharer and in absence of documents pertaining to the co-sharer over the land in question without appreciating the fact, has interfered with the impugned orders, as such the impugned order is not sustainable in law. II. The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact that there is concurrent finding of three courts and without appreciating the fact finding recorded by the three consecutive courts have interfered with impugned order by quashing and setting aside the order passed by these courts. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from an error, as such requires interference by this Court. Submission of the Learned Counsel for the Respondents 16. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has defended the order passed by learned Single Judge on the following grounds : I. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that it is settled principle of law that the right of pre-emption can be claimed only with respect of entire property and not with respect to the part of property but from the application dated 23.08.1994 filed by the appellant it is evident that right of pre-emption was claimed only for part of property, as such provision as contained under 16(3) would not be applicable. Furthermore, it is established that the pre-emptor did not produce any document to establish that he is a co-sharer and therefore, the finding recorded by the courts below that the appellant is a co-sharer has been disbelieved by the learned Single Judge. II. The learned Single Judge has considered the fact of the gift having been made in favour of the daughter of the respondents-writ petitioners since the land in question has been gifted by virtue of gift deed in favour of his daughter. III. The learned Single Judge has further considered the fact that in the application dated 22.08.1994, the pre-emptor has not alleged that the gift -deed dated 22.07.1994 was sham document and further in the proceedings before the court the pre-emptor has not filed any document establishing himself as co-sharer. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the learned Single Judge since has taken into consideration these aspects of the matter therefore, the impugned order needs no interference by this Court. Analysis 18. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, gone across the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge as also the relevant provisions of law. 19. The factual aspect, which is not in dispute is that appellant-Rajendra Mishra filed pre-emption applications which was registered as L.C. Case No. 11-12 of 1994-95 before the D.C.L.R., Palamau under Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, claiming right of pre-emption which were heard together and allowed vide order dated 03.05.1995. Aggrieved thereof, the respondent-Urmila Devi and respondent-Pushpa Devi preferred two separate appeals being L.C. Appeal No. 1 of 1995-96 and 2 of 1995-96, which were also heard together and dismissed vide common order dated 23.11.1995, against which revision applications being L.C. Revision Case No. 321 and 322 of 1995 were filed, which were heard together and dismissed vide common order dated 06.10.1998. 20. 20. Being aggrieved with the order passed by the original, appellate and revisional authority, the petitioners preferred writ petitions being C.W.J.C. No. 72 of 1999(R) and C.W.J.C. No. 74 of 1999(R), which was allowed vide common order dated 31.10.2014 holding that the courts below erred in recording the findings, which are not based on evidence, either oral or documentary and further the courts below have also failed to notice the nature of right of pre-emption, against which the instant intra-court appeals have been preferred. 21. This Court, before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order as also the order passed by the revenue authorities, who have concurrently up-to all the three forums have ordered in favour of the respondent no.5 /appellant herein, deems it fit and proper to give reference of legal positions in case of concurrent findings of two or three consecutive authorities, there should not be any interference with the decision so taken having been concurred by two or three courts/forums but the said principle is to be applied only on the ground that if there is consideration of the factual as well as the legal proposition, based upon the applicability of the law and the fact. If the factual aspect has not been appreciated in the right prospective by the original authority or the appellate or the revisional authority, then the same is to be rectified by the High Courts in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exercising the power of judicial review. 22. This Court, therefore, is proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the orders passed by the revenue-authorities in three stages i.e., original, appellate and revisional. 23. This Court before considering the legality and propriety of the order passed by the revenue authorities deems it fit and proper to consider the application filed by the appellant. It is evident that ground has been taken by filing applications under section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 on the claim based upon the fact that the respondent-the appellant herein is the co-sharer. 24. This Court proceeding further requires to refer herein the provision of Section 16 (3) of the Act, 1961, which reads as under : 16. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer, etc. 24. This Court proceeding further requires to refer herein the provision of Section 16 (3) of the Act, 1961, which reads as under : 16. Restriction on future acquisition by transfer, etc. (3)(i) When any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed: Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. (ii) On such deposit being made the co-sharer or the raiyat shall be entitled to be put in possession of the land irrespective of the fact that the application under clause (i) is pending for decision: Provided that where the application is rejected, the co-sharer or the raiyat, as the case may be, shall be evicted from the land and possession there of shall be restored to the transferee and the transferee shall be entitled to be paid a sum equal to ten per cent of the purchase money out of the deposit made under clause (i). (iii) If the application is allowed, the Collector shall by an order direct the transferee to convey the land in favour of the applicant by executing and registering a document of transfer within a period to be specified in the order and, if he neglects or refuses to comply with the direction, the procedure prescribed in Order 21, Rule 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), shall be, so far as may be, followed. 25. 25. It is evident that Section 16 of the Act, 1961 deals with restriction on future acquisition by transfer, and clause 3 of sub-clause (i) says that when any transfer of land is made after the commencement of the Act to any person other than a co-sharer or a raiyat of adjoining land, any co-sharer of the transferor or any raiyat holding land adjoining the land transferred, shall be entitled, within three months of the date of registration of the document, of transfer, to make an application before the Collector in the prescribed manner for the transfer of the land to him on the terms and conditions contained in the said deed, subject to the condition that no such application shall be entertained by the Collector unless the purchase money together with a sum equal to ten percent thereof is deposited in the prescribed manner within the said period. 26. Two conditions are required to be observed in maintaining the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. The first condition is that the transfer of land is to be made after commencement of the Act 1961 and second condition is that right of be co-sharer must be there to make an application under Section 16(3). 27. Thus, the provision of Section 16 (3) incorporated in the Act is obviously with an intention to prevent fragmentation of land and to facilitate consolidation. With this intention, the legislature created a statutory right in favour of an adjoining raiyat or a co-sharer to stake a claim to pre-empt any land or piece of land sold adjoining to this land. 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions has dealt with the right of pre-emption holding the said right to weak right. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram, (2007) 10 SCC 448 wherein at para 16 of the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under : 16. ----. Even otherwise, the right of pre-emption is a very weak right, although it is a statutory right. The court, while granting a relief in favour of a pre-emptor must bear it in mind about the character of the right vis-à-vis the constitutional and human right of the owner thereof. 29. Similarly in case of Kumar Gonsusab v. Mohd. ----. Even otherwise, the right of pre-emption is a very weak right, although it is a statutory right. The court, while granting a relief in favour of a pre-emptor must bear it in mind about the character of the right vis-à-vis the constitutional and human right of the owner thereof. 29. Similarly in case of Kumar Gonsusab v. Mohd. Miyan, (2008) 10 SCC 153 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated the same view which reads as under : “”20. That apart, it is now well settled that the right of pre-emption is a weak right and is not looked upon with favour by courts and therefore the courts cannot go out of their way to help the pre-emptor. (See Radhakishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi [ AIR 1960 SC 1368 ].)” 30. Further in the case of Abdul Matin Mallick v. Subrata Bhattacharjee, (2022) 7 SCC 147 at paragraph 6.1 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “6.1. Thus, as observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid judgment in Bishan Singh [Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 838 ], the right of pre-emption is “a very weak right”. That being the character of the right, any provision to enforce such a right must, thus, be strictly construed. [Barasat Eye Hospital [Barasat Eye Hospital v. Kaustabh Mondal, (2019) 19 SCC 767 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] ]” 31. Now adverting to the fact of the instant case, it is evident that the respondent no. 5/appellant has filed an application in the capacity of co-sharer of the land in question. But very surprisingly, no document in support of the being co-sharer of the land has been brought to the notice of the revenue authorities but even then, the original authority as also the appellate and the revisional authority have not considered the aforesaid aspect that in absence of any valid document in support of said claim how the claim of maintaining application under Section 16(3) will be established in the capacity of co-sharer of the land in question. 32. The writ petitioners while challenging the order passed by the revenue authorities has taken the ground that in absence of any document pertaining to co-sharer over the land in question, the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 was not at all maintainable. 32. The writ petitioners while challenging the order passed by the revenue authorities has taken the ground that in absence of any document pertaining to co-sharer over the land in question, the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 was not at all maintainable. But the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been considered and travelling towards different directions order was passed in favour of respondent no. 5, the appellant herein by the revenue authorities. 33. The learned Single Judge has considered the aforesaid aspect of the matter to be a reason for interfering with the impugned order, therefore, the learned Single Judge while interfering with the order passed by the revenue authorities has considered the very issue of maintaining the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961 and when the learned Single Judge has found no document in support of the appellant being co-sharer, then where is the question to be established the claim of being a co-sharer to maintain application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961. 34. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the finding so recorded by the original authority will be said to suffer from perversity since the entire finding is based upon the status of being co-sharer by the respondent no. 5, the appellant herein. 35. The law is well settled that if any decision is being taken by the authorities if found to be perverse then the said order is required to be interfered with in exercise the power of judicial review. 36. Further, It is settled position of law that while exercising the power of writ of certiorari, the writ court is to consider the fact on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or perversity in the finding being its limited scope. 37. At this juncture, it would be proper for this Court to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan and Others, reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 SC, wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows : “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” 38. In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sawarn Singh and Another Vrs. State of Punjab and Others reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under : “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” 39. In Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos. 66 and 67 as hereunder : “66. In Heinz India (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos. 66 and 67 as hereunder : “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” 40. In General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa v. Giridhari Sahu, (2019) 10 SCC 695 the Hon'ble Apex Court has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. Conclusion 41. This Court on perusal of the ground taken on behalf of the appellant and the respondent no. 5, that the stand taken by respondent no. 5 for maintaining the application filed under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1961, which is exclusively on the ground of being co-sharer has not been considered by the appellate and the revisional authority although the same has been considered in right prospective by the original authority, is of the view that the non-consideration of the issue of non-availability of document in support of claim of co-sharer has also not been considered by the appellate and revisional authority. 42. 42. This Court, therefore, is of the view that if the order has been found to be perverse by the learned Single Judge which has not been appreciated by the appellate or revisional authority, then in such circumstances if the orders passed by the revenue authorities i.e., original, appellate and revisional authority if have been quashed by learned Single Judge the same cannot be said to suffer from an error. 43. Accordingly, this Court, is of the view that the order passed by learned Single Judge suffers from no error, as such both the appeals stand dismissed. 44. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.