JUDGMENT : (A.Y. Kogje, J.) 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed for following relief:- “A) The Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing and setting aside the impugned order No.PCB /PASA/DTN/735/2023 dated 29.08.2023 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Surat City at Annex- A;” 2. Thus, essentially, the challenge is to the order of detention dated 29.08.2023 passed by the Police Commissioner, Surat, respondent No.2 herein, by which the petitioner has been detained as a “dangerous person” based on two offences registered against him, details of which are as under:- Sr. No. Name of Police Station CR No. and date Sections Date of bail Order 1 Chowk Bazar Police Station, Surat Part-A-11210012230057 of 2023 dated 06.01.2023 307, 324, 323, 337, 452, 143, 147, 18, 149, 34, 427 and 450 of IPC 135 of GP Act 08.05.2023 2 Chowk Bazar Police Station, Surat Part-A-11210012231168 of 2023 dated 24.08.2023 323, 504, 506(1) and 114 of IPC and 135 of GP Act 28.08.2023 3. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the order of detention impugned in this petition deserves to be quashed and set aside on the ground of registration of the offences under the Indian Penal Code by itself cannot bring the case of the detenue within the purview of definition under section 2(c) of the Act. Further, learned advocate for the detenue submits that illegal activity likely to be carried out or alleged to have been carried out, as alleged, cannot have any nexus or bearing with the maintenance of public order and at the most, it can be said to be breach of law and order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Further, except statement of witnesses, registration of above FIR/s and Panchnama drawn in pursuance of the investigation, no other relevant and cogent material is on record connecting alleged anti-social activity of the detenue with breach of public order. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submits that it is not possible to hold on the basis of the facts of the present case that activity of the detenue with respect to the criminal cases had affected even tempo of the society causing threat to the very existence of normal and routine life of people at large or that on the basis of criminal cases, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by rule of law by disturbing public order. 3.1 It is submitted that the offences are pertaining bodily injuries against individuals and will therefore not amounting to breach of public order as no where in the grounds of detention, it is coming out that the sporadic act of the petitioner has caused disturbance to public order. In any case, option was always available to the detaining authority to resort to cancellation of bail of the petitioner. 4. As against this, learned AGP submitted that the detaining authority had sufficient material on the record to pass the order of detention. Not only that, there are other supporting evidences also which the detaining authority has taken into consideration like drawing of panchnama, which led to discovery of vehicle of which theft was committed. The two FIRs registered against the petitioner are under Chapter-16 and 17 of IPC, thereby attracting the ingredients of “dangerous person”. 5. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there is no live link between the two offences as the first offence was registered in January 2023 and the second was registered in August 2023. From perusal of FIRs, the disputes appear to be private in nature. Moreover, in the second offence, the petitioner was released on the same day. The detaining authority has therefore committed an error in considering two separate offences to treat the petitioner as “habitual offender”. 6. From perusal of FIRs, the disputes appear to be private in nature. Moreover, in the second offence, the petitioner was released on the same day. The detaining authority has therefore committed an error in considering two separate offences to treat the petitioner as “habitual offender”. 6. The subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law, inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any baring on the public order as required under the Act and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. Unless and until, the material is there to make out a case that the person has become a threat and menace to the Society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that all social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a person within the meaning of section 2(c) of the Act. Except general statements, there is no material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner, which is dangerous to the public order. In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v/s. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1970 SC 852 ], where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows : “Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof ? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” 7. As is held in the preceding paras, the offence in which the petitioner is involved, is against private individuals, demanding money from them, which have been reported and the petitioner has been enlarged on bail and therefore, ordinary law is sufficient to prevent the petitioner from indulging in further offence, particularly when the petitioner has been granted bail in connection with both the offences on which the detaining authority has relied upon to arrive at a subjective satisfaction. At the same time, the detaining authority has not taken into consideration restoring to the procedure for cancellation of bail. 8. In the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazeen v/s. State of Telanga and Ors and Syed Sabeena v/s. State of Telangana and Ors. rendered in Criminal Appeal No.908 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.4260 of 2022 and Criminal Appeal No.909 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.4283 of 2022 dated 22.06.2022, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made following observations in para 17:- “17. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenue is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and/or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 9. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 9. One more aspect which requires consideration is the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority relying upon the statements of secret witnesses and concluding that the petitioner is such a headstrong person that nobody is ready and willing to go ahead and give adverse statement or file an FIR. Such a subjective satisfaction is vitiated on the ground that in connection with the offence registered against the petitioner, witnesses have given their statements and in these statements, details of the witnesses are also available. Therefore, subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority invoking of privilege under Section 9(2) of the Act stands vitiated. The Division Bench of this Court in an unreported judgment judgment in case of Vijay Alias Ballu Bharatbhai Ramanbhai Patni (Kaptiywala) Vs. State of Gujarat in LPA No.454 of 2020 dated 31.08.2020 has dealt with this aspect of invoking Section 9(2) for not disclosing names of secret witnesses and after examining the law on the issue, has held as under in para-42:- “42 In this view of the matter, the detaining authority while exercising powers under Section 9[2] of the PASA Act for claiming privilege is expected to consider the general background, character, antecedents, criminal tendency of propensity etc. of the detenu. In the instant case, if the grounds of detention are considered, all that is recorded by the detaining authority is that the fear expressed by the witnesses is found to be genuine and correct by the detaining authority. The detaining authority has recorded that it has carefully scrutinized, examined and considered all the materials that were produced before him by the sponsoring authority. It is, therefore, clear that the detaining authority, while verifying the statements of the witnesses and while considering the question of exercising the privilege under Section 9(2) of the PASA Act, has not taken any independent steps for considering general background, character, antecedents, criminal tendency etc. while recording subjective satisfaction, but has relied solely on the material produced by the sponsoring authority. There is no contemporaneous record to indicate the steps taken by the detaining authority and the grounds and reasons for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. It is therefore very difficult to conclude that the detaining authority has considered general background, character, antecedents, criminal tendency and propensity etc. There is no contemporaneous record to indicate the steps taken by the detaining authority and the grounds and reasons for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. It is therefore very difficult to conclude that the detaining authority has considered general background, character, antecedents, criminal tendency and propensity etc. of the detenu while arriving at the subjective satisfaction, for the need for exercise of powers under Section 9(2) of the PASA Act and claim privilege by not disclosing identity of the anonymous witnesses.” 10. No need to say when a citizen is deprived of his personal liberty by keeping him behind the bar under the provisions of the PASA law without trial by the competent court, the detaining authority is required under the law to justify its action and in absence of reply/counter affidavit, the averments made in the petition remain unchallenged and uncontroverted. 11. This Court by judgment and order dated 08.01.2024 in SCA Nos.16797 of 2023 has quashed order of detention qua co- detenue. 12. In view of above, we are inclined to allow this petition, because simplicitor registration of FIR/s by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority cannot have recourse under the Act and no other relevant and cogent material exists for invoking power under section 3(2) of the Act. 13. In the result, the present petition is hereby allowed and the impugned order of detention dated 29.08.2023 passed by the respondent–detaining authority is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenue is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. 14. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service is permitted.