JUDGMENT : H.P. Sandesh, J. This miscellaneous first appeal is filed challenging the order dated 06.01.2024 passed in A.P.No.89/2022 by the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mangaluru and consequently set aside the arbitral award passed in No.C.DIS.ARB(2). NH.LAQ.CR – 127/2017-18 DATED 19.04.2022 passed by respondent No.2 for enhancing the compensation at the rate of Rs.1,28,800/- per cent. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. 3. The factual matrix of the case is that a notification came to be issued for acquiring the land for the purpose of widening of National Highway No.66 at Kotekar village under Section 3A(1) of the National Highways Act (for short ‘NH Act’) on 08.02.2010 and the Special Land Acquisition Officer passed the award determining the compensation in respect of the land bearing Sy.No.24/5B measuring 546.34 square meters residential converted land situated in Kotekar village, Mangaluru taluk for which compensation was determined at Rs.1,00,000/-per cent considering the same as dry land. The respondent herein filed a petition under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act to the Deputy Commissioner, D.K., Mangaluru being aggrieved by the determination of compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- per cent. Respondent No.2 i.e., the Arbitrator-cum-Deputy Commissioner of D.K., Mangaluru, vide order dated 19.04.2022, determined the compensation as Rs.1,28,800/- per cent considering the land as residential in nature with 9% interest as applicable under Section 3H(5) of the NH Act and with all benefits admissible under the provisions of RFCTLARR Act, 2013. The appellant herein has filed the Arbitration Petition before the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mangaluru challenging the arbitral award passed by respondent No.3 and the District and Sessions Judge, dismissed the said petition vide order dated 06.01.2024. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal is filed before this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant would vehemently contend that inspite of the award has been passed considering the material available on record, Arbitrator has committed an error in enhancing the compensation from Rs.1,00,000/- per cent to Rs.1,28,800/- per cent holding that the land acquired has good potential for future development and the said approach is erroneous. It is also contend that the Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act is required to exercise the powers as conferred under Section 3G(7) of the NH Act, 1956 and extracted the said provisions. It is also contend that the Arbitrator under the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act is required to exercise the powers as conferred under Section 3G(7) of the NH Act, 1956 and extracted the said provisions. It is also contend that the competent authority by considering the relevant material passed the well reasoned award on 17.08.2011 which does not call for interference. The District Judge has erred in not taking note of the said provision. The Arbitrator has also misinterpreting the judgment passed by the Apex Court and the ordinance/notification issued by the Government of India No.S.O.2368(E) dated 28.08.2015 by which the provisions of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are made applicable with effect from 01.01.2015 as such the Arbitrator has passed the impugned award enhancing the compensation by making the provisions of said Act retrospectively to the land acquired without jurisdiction and authority of law. 5. The counsel also would vehemently contend that the land was acquired by the SLAO and CA as per notification dated 08.02.2010 which was published under Section 3A of the NH Act and award was passed on 17.08.2011 by following the provisions of the NH Act. However, the Arbitrator passed an impugned award enhancing compensation by directing the respondent to recalculate the compensation under the provisions of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 which came into force with effect from 01.01.2015 and the Government of India issued notification that the provisions of Schedule – I, II and III of RFCTLARR Act are made applicable with effect from 01.01.2015 and passed the impugned order directing to recalculate the compensation and pay all the admissible benefits under the said Act and hence, Arbitrator committed an error in passing such an order and ought not to have invoke the provisions of RFCTLARR Act. The counsel for the appellant also would vehemently contend that the Arbitrator has failed to give reasons as held by the Apex Court that a quasi-judicial authority is required to assign reasons for passing the order and the very approach of the Arbitrator is erroneous and no reasons are assigned and Arbitrator has lost sight of the fact that compensation amount already paid and determined under Section 3H(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. 6. 6. The District Judge also when the said grounds has been raised, also failed to consider the material available on record and committed an error in accepting the reasons of the Arbitrator and also the scope of Section 34(2) of the Act and the power exercised by the Arbitrator is against the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The counsel also would vehemently contend that Section 3(J) is clear that the new enactment is not applicable for National Highways Act and Section 3(J) excluding applicability of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 resulting in non-grant of solatium and interest in respect of lands acquired under the NH Act. Inspite of it, the District Judge committed an error and misunderstood the judgment of the Apex Court. Hence, it requires interference of this Court. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent in his arguments would vehemently contend that, the Trial Court has not committed an error in dismissing the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and explanation to Section 34 is very clear that for the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute. The counsel would vehemently contend that though properties were acquire in the year 2010, award was passed in the year 2011 and it is a continuous proceedings and arbitration petition was disposed of in the year 2022. The District Judge also taken note of the judgment of the Apex Court and also taken note of the notification of the Union of India and opined that only compensation was paid in part, not entire compensation and hence, rightly comes to the conclusion that new enactment of 2013 is applicable to the case on hand. The counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2019) 9 SCC 304 in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER vs. TARSEM SINGH AND OTHERS. The counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in (2019) 9 SCC 304 in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER vs. TARSEM SINGH AND OTHERS. The counsel referring this judgment would contend that Apex Court, in this judgment held that Section 3-J excluding applicability of LA Act, 1894 resulting in non-grant of solatium and interest in respect of lands acquired under National Highways Act, which were available if lands were acquired under Land Acquisition Act, held, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment of the High Court affirmed. 8. The counsel also brought to notice of this Court paragraph 13 of the said judgment wherein a discussion was made with regard to Fourth Schedule of the New Act to be read along with Section 105 expressly includes under item 7, the National Highways Act, 1956. In item 9, this schedule also includes the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. By a Notification dated 28.08.2015 issued under Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act. The result is that both before the 1997 Amendment Act and after the coming into force of the 2013 Act, soltium and interest is payable to landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for the purposes of National Highways. The counsel also brought to notice of this Court a details discussion made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment particularly brought to notice of this Court paragraph 48 of the judgment wherein also discussion was made with regard to ordinance as well as the notification have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust’scase reported in (1973) 1 SCC 500 and as the Central Government has considered it necessary to extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments. The counsel also brought to notice of this Court paragraph 52 of the said judgment wherein it is held that Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. The counsel also brought to notice of this Court paragraph 52 of the said judgment wherein it is held that Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. The counsel referring this judgment would vehemently contend that contention of the appellant counsel that Section 3-J is clear that same is not applicable cannot be accepted. 9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and also the grounds which have been urged in this appeal and the principles laid down in the judgment referred supra, the point that would arise for the consideration of this Court are: 1. Whether the I Additional District and Sessions Judge committed an error in confirming the order passed by the Arbitrator in applying the provisions of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 in awarding the compensation? 2. What order? Point No.1: 10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and also on perusal of the material available on record, it is not in dispute that National Highways has issued notification on 08.02.2010 for acquiring the property of the respondent. It is also not in dispute that the Land Acquisition Officer has passed the award determining the compensation in respect of the subject matter of the acquired land determining the compensation as Rs.1,00,000/- per cent. The Arbitrator revised the same enhancing to Rs.1,28,800/- per cent. The contention of the appellant that the Arbitrator committed an error in enhancing the compensation and fails to take note of Section 3G(7) of the NH Act that the Arbitrator while determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), shall take into consideration the market value of the land on the date of publication of the notification under Section 3A and also the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other immovable property in any manner and the competent authority considered the above relevant material while passing the award on 17.08.2011. It has to be noted that the District Judge, while considering the material available on record taken note of the fact held that the land acquired was converted land and the same was converted for non-agricultural purpose that is for residential purpose and while determining the compensation by Special Land Acquisition Officer taken note of the fact that it is a dry agricultural land and the same is erroneous. The District Judge also while considering the material available on record taken note of Section 3G(7) of the NH Act in paragraph 24 and also taken note of various factors and law and calculation for compensation made by the authority has been rectified by the Arbitrator and the same is observed in paragraph 25. In paragraph 26 also discussed in detail regarding passing of an order by the Arbitrator that is in respect of awarding of compensation. 11. The other contention of the appellant’s counsel is that the provisions of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 would not apply to the acquisition in question and Arbitrator ought not to have invoked the same and District Judge also taken note of the fact that Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was repealed and new enactment brought in the year 2013 and came into force on 01.01.2014 and the object for bringing new enactment was also discussed in paragraph 28 and also discussed Section 26 of the 2013 Act criteria to be adopted for assessing the market value which has been dealt in paragraph 29. In paragraph 31 also taken note of Section 105(1) of the 2013 Act wherein a provision is made that provisions of 2013 Act shall not apply to the enactment specified in Fourth Schedule subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 105. In paragraph 31 also taken note of Section 105(1) of the 2013 Act wherein a provision is made that provisions of 2013 Act shall not apply to the enactment specified in Fourth Schedule subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 105. The District Judge also taken note that the National Highways Act, 1956 finds mention in Fourth Schedule and also observation is made that under sub-section (3) of Section 105 within one year from the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, the Central Government by a notification could make applicable the beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act with regard to determination of compensation in accordance with First, Second and Third Schedule to the enactment specified in Fourth Schedule and comes to the conclusion that the application of new Act shall be made with exceptions or modification that it may not result in reduction of compensation or dilution of the provisions of the 2013 Act. The District Judge also in detail discussed Ordinance No.9 of 2013 Act was promulgated on 31.12.2014 extending the provisions of the 2013 Act to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specific in Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act. To give continuity, Ordinance No.4 of 2015 dated 03.04.2015 and Ordinance No.5 of 2015 dated 30.05.2015 were promulgated. Ordinance No.5 of 2015 lapsed on 31.08.2015. The order dated 28.08.2015 was issued by the Central Government exercising power under Section 113 of 2013 Act. The order came into effect from 01.09.2015. The Central Government extended the benefit of 2013 Act with regard to determination of compensation, rehabilitation and settlement to the land acquired under enactment mentioned in Fourth Schedule to 2013 Act. The object of this was to extent the benefit of the 2013 Act uniformly to the land acquired under the enactments in Fourth Schedule of 2013 Act. It is also very clear that ordinances are issued only with an intention to clarify the confusion created by the circulars. It was clarified by the comprehensive guidelines that Section 24 of the 2013 Act is not applicable to the acquisition under the National Highways Act. Clause 4.6 (i) and (ii) elucidated that the relevant date for determination of the market value is the date on which notification under Section 3A of 1956 Act was published. Sub-clause (iii) of clause 4.6 deals with applicability of First, Second and Third Schedule appended to the 2013 Act. Clause 4.6 (i) and (ii) elucidated that the relevant date for determination of the market value is the date on which notification under Section 3A of 1956 Act was published. Sub-clause (iii) of clause 4.6 deals with applicability of First, Second and Third Schedule appended to the 2013 Act. Sub-clause 4.6(iii) has three clauses. Clause (a) provides two instances in which compensation is to be paid in accordance with First Schedule to the 2013 Act. In all cases where award was not announced under Section 3G of 1956 Act till 31.12.2014 or where the award is announced but compensation not paid as on 31.12.2014 in respect of majority of land holding under acquisition. Sub-clause (b) deals with cases where the award under Section 3G of 1956 Act was announced before 01.01.2015 but the full amount of award was not deposited by the acquisition agency with CALA. In such cases also, the compensation is to be determined in accordance with First Schedule with effect from 01.01.2015. As per sub-clause (c) where the process of land acquisition is deemed to be complete and settled, such cases are not to be reopened. The pre-requisites under sub-clause (c) are that on or before 31.12.2014 the award under Section 3G of 1956 Act was announced by CALA, the amount deposited by the acquiring agency CALA and compensation paid to the land owners in respect of majority of land holdings under acquisition. The District Judge also while considering the applicability of new enactment also discussed in detail and in view of clause-4.6(iii)(a) of the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways dated 28.12.2017, if award had been announced but compensation had not been paid in respect of majority of the land holdings under acquisition as on 31.12.2014, the compensation would be payable in accordance with First Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act 2013. 12. The District Judge having taken note of these aspects and also taken note of the case on hand held that land was acquired in the year 2010 but award was passed in the year 2011 and also not stated by the appellant that on what date, they made the compensation and the National Highway Authority is in possession of all documents pertaining to acquisition. When they have not produced the documents for having paid the compensation in entirety and also they did not take up the specific contention that the amount has been paid, the authority was directed to furnish the date of payment, but they did not provide the same. Hence, invoked Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act and is not produced, would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Having taken note of the said fact in consideration comes to the conclusion that RFCTLARR Act are applicable to the case on hand. In the case on hand also appellant has not placed any documents before this Court, even for having paid the entire compensation. 13. It is also important to note that the District Judge also while passing an order taken note of the decision reported in (2019) 9 SCC 304 in the case of UNION OF INDIA vs TARSEM SINGH AND OTEHRS and particularly taken note of paragraphs 40 and 41 regarding invoking of new enactment. 14. The counsel for the respondent also brought to notice of this Court paragraph 13 of the judgment which reads as follows: “13. The First Schedule to the said Act provides that solatium equivalent to 100% of the market value multiplied by various factors, depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area, constitutes minimum compensation package to be given to those whose land is acquired. The Fourth Schedule to this Act, to be read along with Section 105, expressly includes under Item 7, the National Highways Act, 1956. In Item 9, this Schedule also includes the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. By a Notification dated 28-8-2015 issued under Section 105 read with Section 113 of the 2013 Act, it is provided that the 2013 Act compensation provisions will apply to acquisitions that take place under the National Highways Act. The result is that both before the 1997 Amendment Act and after the coming into force of the 2013 Act, solatium and interest is payable to landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for purposes of National Highways. This is one other very important circumstance to be borne in mind when judging the constitutional validity of the 1997 Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997 to 2015.” (emphasis supplied) 15. This is one other very important circumstance to be borne in mind when judging the constitutional validity of the 1997 Amendment Act for the interregnum period from 1997 to 2015.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Having read this paragraph 13, it is very clear that the Apex Court discussed the provision of Section 105 as well as taken note of Fourth Schedule to the Act and item 9 of the Schedule also includes the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 so also inclusion of National Highways Act. Hence, it is clear that the National Highways Authority also included if any acquisition is made. 16. The Apex Court also in detail discussed with regard to Article 14 of the Constitution of India that there cannot be any discrimination and discussed in paragraph 25 and 26 and also even discussed the judgment of Nagpur Improvement Trust’s case referred supra regarding discrimination is concerned and comes to the conclusion that if any acquisition, there cannot be any discrimination. The counsel for the respondent also brought to notice of this Court paragraph 48 of the said judgment wherein once again the judgment of Nagpur Improvement Trust’s case was discussed in detail and held that new enactment as well as the Central Government also issued the notification to extend the benefits available to the landowners generally under 2013 Act similarly, whose lands are acquired under 2013 enactment specified in the Fourth Schedule and also an observation is made that NH Act being one of aforesaid enactments and also observation is made that this being the case it is clear that the Government has itself accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust’s case would apply to acquisitions which take place under the National Highways Act and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public purposes under the 2013 Act. 17. This Court would like to extract the very paragraph 48 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “48. 17. This Court would like to extract the very paragraph 48 of the said judgment which reads as follows: “48. It is thus clear that the Ordinance as well as the notification have applied the principle contained in Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, (1973) 1 SCC 500 , as the Central Government has considered it necessary to extend the benefits available to landowners generally under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, the National Highways Act being one of the aforesaid enactments. This being the case, it is clear that the Government has itself accepted that the principle of Nagpur Improvement Trust would apply to acquisitions which take place under the National Highways Act, and that solatium and interest would be payable under the 2013 Act to persons whose lands are acquired for the purpose of National Highways as they are similarly placed to those landowners whose lands have been acquired for other public purposes under the 2013 Act. This being the case, it is clear that even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments. The judgments delivered under the 1952 Act as well as the Defence of India Act, 1971, may, therefore, require a re-look in the light of this development. [The Defence of India Act, 1971, was a temporary statute which remained in force only during the period of operation of a proclamation of emergency and for a period of six months thereafter — vide Section 1(3) of the Act. As this Act has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.] In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, Union of India v. Chajju Ram, (2003) 5 SCC 568 , has been referred to a larger Bench. As this Act has since expired, it is not included in the Fourth Schedule of the 2013 Act.] In any case, as has been pointed out hereinabove, Union of India v. Chajju Ram, (2003) 5 SCC 568 , has been referred to a larger Bench. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6036, in Jang Bahadur v. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine P&H 6034, in Union of India v. Abhinav Cotspin Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 19319 is correct, whereas the view of the Rajasthan High Court in Banshilal Samariya v. Union of India, 2005 SCC OnLine Raj 572 : 2005-06 Supp RLW 559 is not correct.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Having considered the discussions made in paragraph 48, an observation is made that this being the case, it is clear that even the Government is of the view that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the National Highways Act, when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments. 19. It is also brought to notice of this Court that the Apex Court held that provisions of Section 3J is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Having considered the principles laid down in the judgment referred supra and also discussions made in the judgment and also the contentions, the very contention of the counsel for the appellant that the Arbitrator committed an error in invoking new enactment of 2013 Act AND same is not applicable cannot be accepted and in detail District Judge while considering the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act discussed the same elaborately and rightly comes to the conclusion that the same is applicable. The very contention that discussion made in paragraph 36 of the judgment is not correct cannot be accepted and rightly comes to the conclusion that the same is also applicable. 20. The very contention that discussion made in paragraph 36 of the judgment is not correct cannot be accepted and rightly comes to the conclusion that the same is also applicable. 20. The other contention of the counsel for the appellant that Section 3J is clear not applicable also cannot be accepted and the very contention that even District Judge also misunderstood the judgment is also cannot be accepted and even the Apex Court in the said judgment categorically held that excluding applicability of LA Act, 1894 resulting in non-grant of solatium and interest in respect of lands acquired under National Highways Act, which were available if lands were acquired under Land Acquisition Act, held, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. When clear discussion was made with regard to Fourth Schedule and each Schedule of the new enactment and also a clear discussion was made with regard to the guidelines as well as notifications and also the Union of India issued the notification and even discussion was made that Government also did not oppose the same in the judgment referred supra and the District Judge also in paragraph 34 in keeping the ordinance as well as Section 105(1) of the 2013 Act held that in the absence of any material for having paid the entire compensation and also it is a continuous process of determination of the compensation and the matter was also referred to the Arbitrator-cum-Deputy Commissioner who has been arrayed as respondentNo.2 in the A.P.No.81/2022 and award was also passed on 19.04.2022 subsequently to the new enactment and new enactment is applicable and the very contention of the appellant’s counsel that award passed in the year 2011 itself and cannot invoke new enactment cannot be accepted. Hence, I do not find any merit in the appeal. Accordingly, the point No.1 is answered as negative. Point No.2: 21. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER The miscellaneous first appeal is dismissed.