ORDER : 1. Challenge in this petition is to the order dated 19.10.2023 (Annexure P/1) passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur, circuit Bench at Bilaspur, whereby the original application of the petitioner has been dismissed affirming the order dated 2.3.2021 (Annexure P/2) passed by the Director, Postal Services (Headquarters) Raipur by which the order imposing penalty of censure by the disciplinary authority was set aside and de novo enquiry was ordered. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner is working on the post of Post Master, Rural Post Office, Accounts Office, Branch Bhinodi, Sarsiva, Baloda-Bazar. He joined his services on 11.2.1977 and retired after completion of 40 years of service. During his service period on 4.2.2017 Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat-Khamariya made telephonic complaint to Sub Divisional Inspector, Post Office, Balodabazar against the petitioner that he is making irregular payments to MNREGA employees, on which respondent No. 2 issued charge sheet to the petitioner on 4.9.2017 (Annexure P/3). Since the departmental witnesses did not state anything against the petitioner and the charges leveled against him could not be proved in the departmental enquiry, Sr. Superintendent of Post Office, Raipur passed an order on 11.4.2019 (Annexure P/6) of censure only against the petitioner which was challenged in appeal before the Director, Postal Services, and on 2.3.2021 (Annexure P/2) the appellate authority set aside the order of censure and ordered for a de novo enquiry against the petitioner. The said order was challenged by the petitioner by filing Original Application before learned Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) at Jabalpur, Circuit Bench at Bilaspur. However, by the impugned order dated 19.10.2023 learned CAT dismissed the original application upholding the order of the appellate authority. Hence this petition for the following reliefs: “10.1 To issue a writ and/or an order in the nature of appropriate writ do issue calling the records from the respondent authorities concerned for perusal of this Hon'ble Court, if thinks fit in the facts & circumstances of case. 10.2 To issue a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 19/10/2023 passed in Original Application No. 203/00632/2022 (ANNEXURE P-1) by Central Administrative Tribunal at Jabalpur (Circuit Bench, Bilaspur), Chhattisgarh. 10.2 To issue a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 19/10/2023 passed in Original Application No. 203/00632/2022 (ANNEXURE P-1) by Central Administrative Tribunal at Jabalpur (Circuit Bench, Bilaspur), Chhattisgarh. 10.3 To issue a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the order dated 02/03/2021 passed by respondent number 3 for being illegal/unjustified which is marked herewith as ANNEXURE P-2 to the writ petition. 10.4 To issue an appropriate writ, order or direction requiring the opposite parties to pay heavy cost to the petitioner for subjecting him to unwarranted harassment and mental anguish. 10.5 To issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and necessary in the circumstances of the case may also be passed; and 10.6 To allow the writ petition with costs.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned orders passed by the respondents are arbitrary, fallacious, prejudicial and contrary to the established provisions of law. The order of de novo proceedings of the appellate authority is prima facie illegal, arbitrary and causing prejudice to the petitioner. Once a penalty has been imposed, the same cannot be set aside by issuing an order of de novo enquiry without following the due procedure as enunciated under the applicable rules. Respondent No. 3 does not have power under Rule 18 of the Department of Posts, Gramin Bank Sevaks (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 (in short “the Rules, 2011”) to pass an order for de novo enquiry/proceedings after punishment for censure has already been imposed. It is settled proposition of law that the appellate authority in disciplinary proceedings acts in a quasi-judicial capacity and order passed has to be reasoned one and showing application of mind dealing with the contentions raised in the appeal and if it is not done, the appellant order is vitiated. From bare perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority it is crystal clear that the decision taken is unjustified and deplorable as it is devoid of any application of mind and the respondents have resorted to a hyper technical approach. From bare perusal of the order passed by the appellate authority it is crystal clear that the decision taken is unjustified and deplorable as it is devoid of any application of mind and the respondents have resorted to a hyper technical approach. Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the respondent-State authorities have violated the fundamental and constitutional rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India and it also amounts to violation of human rights. The order of the appellate authority directing a de novo enquiry is a non-speaking and unreasoned order and rather it appears to be arbitrary and actuated with malice. Learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the fact that the order impugned has been passed without application of mind and following the rules enumerated for adjudicating the same and for this reason alone the order dated 19.10.2023 (Annexure P/1) of the Tribunal and the order dated 2.3.2021 (Annexure P/2) passed by respondent No. 3/appellate authority are liable to be set aside. Reliance has been placed on the decisions in the matters of Nathaniel Ghosh vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh and Others, 1980 SCC Online Gau 36; R.P. Bhatt vs. Union of India and Others, (1986) 2 SCC 651 ; order dated 26.7.2021 passed by this High Court in WPS No. 6065 of 2010 in the matter of Tikam Chand Thakur vs. State of C.G. and Others and in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Rakesh Mohan, (2020) 19 SCC 375 . 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondents strongly opposed the prayer of the petitioner and submitted that as per Rule 18 of the Rules, 2011, the appellate authority passed the order of Annexure P/2 in accordance with law whereby de novo enquiry has been ordered. Learned Tribunal considering the grounds raised by the petitioner rightly dismissed the his application holding that there is no illegality or irregularity in the order of the appellate authority. Hence this petition is without any substance and as such, liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the documents filed by the petitioner that he was working on the post of Post Master, Rural Post Office, Accounts, Balodabazar-Bhatapara. Hence this petition is without any substance and as such, liable to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. It is clear from the documents filed by the petitioner that he was working on the post of Post Master, Rural Post Office, Accounts, Balodabazar-Bhatapara. On a complaint against the petitioner, an enquiry was initiated against him and after enquiry, punishment of censure was passed by the disciplinary authority on 11.4.2019 which was challenged by the petitioner in appeal before the Director, Postal Services, Headquarters and vide order dated 2.3.2021 the appellate authority while setting aside the order of censure, directed for de novo proceedings. Against this order, the petitioner filed original application before the learned Tribunal and by the impugned order dated 19.10.2023 his application was dismissed. From bare perusal of the order dated 11.4.2019 passed by the disciplinary authority it is seen that the disciplinary authority found that all the charges are not proved against the petitioner and hence imposed penalty of censure on him. The operative para of the order dated 11.4.2019 reads as under: ^^eSusa Ádj.k ls lEcaf/kr vkjksii=] nLrkostksa] tkap jiV] tkap jiV ds fo:} vH;kosnu dk voyksdu fd;kA foHkkxh; tkap esa yxk;s x, lHkh vkjksi fl} ugha gksuk ik;k x;k gSA vfHk;kstu xokgksa us Hkh vkjksiksa ds foijhr c;ku fn;k gSA rFkkfi vfHk;kstu xokg Jh jken;ky lkgw us vkjksfir thMh,l }kjk eujsxk Hkqxrku fu;fer :i ls ugha fd;k tkuk cryk;k gSA blds vykok vfHk;kstu nLrkost ihMh&4 ds vuqlkj vkjksfir thMh,l }kjk c;ku ugha fn;k x;k gSA blds fy, leqfpr naM nsuk vko';d gSA vr% eSa chŒ,yŒ tkaxMs Áoj v/kh{kd Mkd?kj jk;iqj] xzkeh.k Mkd lsod ¼vkpj.k ,oa fu;kstu½ fu;ekoyh 2011 ds fu;e 5 esa fufgr 'kfDr;ksa dk Á;ksx djrs gq, Jh udqy Álkn ds'kjokuh xzkŒ MkŒ ls 'kk[kk Mkdiky ¼iqV vkQ½ fHkuksnh ys[kk dk;kZy; ljlhoka dks ^^fuank** dk naM nsrk gwaA** The petitioner filed appeal against the said order and the appellate authority found that some documents were not included in the enquiry and hence setting aside the order of censure directed for de novo proceeding. The operative para of the appellate order reads as under: ^^vihykFkhZ }kjk ÁLrqr ,oa Ádj.k ls lacaf/kr lHkh rF;ksa ,oa nLrkostksa dk xgu v/;;u fd;k x;k rFkk bl fu"d"kZ ij igqapk gwa fd vihykFkhZ ds fo:} tkjh fd;s x;s vkjksi i= esa Ádj.k ls lacaf/kr nLrkostksa eujsxk [kkrk Øekad 5601525741 ,oa 5601505781 dh iklcqdksa] fudklh QkeZ] eujsxk tujy] 'kk[kk Mkd?kj ys[kk jftLVj ,oa nSfud ys[kk dks 'kkfey ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj u gh iapkukek fnukad 12-08-2017 dk vkjksiksa ls dksbZ laca/k gSA** Learned Tribunal after hearing both the parties dismissed the application of the petitioner on the ground that under Rule 18 of the Rules, 2011, the appellate authority can pass any order which it may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of RP Bhatt (supra) held in Para 5 of its order as under: “5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director-General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director-General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2), viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director-General is liable to be set aside.” 8. This Court also observed in the case of Tikam Chand Thakur (supra) in Paras 11 to 14 of its order as under: “11. It is well settled position of law that the appellate authority in disciplinary proceeding acts in quasi-judicial capacity and order passed has to be reasoned one and showing application of mind to the question raised by the appellant and if it is not done, the appellate order is vitiated. [See Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and Others v. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 3 SCC 469 ] 12. [See Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and Others v. Madhusudhan Rao, (2008) 3 SCC 469 ] 12. The Supreme Court reiterated this principle of law by observing that an appellate authority by deciding statutory appeal is not only required to give hearing to the Government servant, but pass a reasoned order dealing with the contention raised in the appeal. [See Deokinandan Sharma v. Union of India and Others, (2001) 5 SCC 340 ] 13. Even if the appellate order is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority it may not be speaking order, but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind in compliance with the requirement of law while exercising his jurisdiction particularly when the rules required application of mind on several factors and several contentions had been raised and he was bound to assign reasons so as to enable the Court reviewing its decision to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the rule required to do. [See Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 713 ] 14. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the aforesaid provision and the judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that appeal preferred by the petitioner has not been considered by the appellate authority in the light of clause (a) to (c) of Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966 and dismissed the appeal by unreasoned and non-speaking order on 21.6.2010, which ought to have been considered by the appellate authority in the light of clause (a) to (c) of Rule 27(2) of the Rules of 1966.” 9. Again in the matter of Rakesh Mohan (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in Para 6 of its order as under: “6. In J.N. Roy Biswas (1976) 1 SCC 234 , this Court has held that if for some technical or other good ground procedural or otherwise, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second inquiry cannot be launched. In J.N. Roy Biswas (1976) 1 SCC 234 , this Court has held that if for some technical or other good ground procedural or otherwise, the first enquiry or punishment or exoneration is found bad in law, there is no principle that a second inquiry cannot be launched. There is no quarrel over the said proposition of law, but in the instant case, as we find, apart from the ground that there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice, the tribunal in the first round has expressed its opinion on the merits of the case and quashed the punishment. In such a situation, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant had no authority to initiate a proceeding on the self-same charges.” 10. In the present case also, the disciplinary authority having found that all the charges leveled against the petitioner are not proved, imposed a penalty of censure on him. However, the learned appellate authority in its order dated 2.3.2021 after observing the reply of the petitioner, without considering the objection raised by him, found that certain documents were not included in the disciplinary enquiry and Panchnama dated 12.8.2017 is not related to the charges, and thus setting aside the order of censure directed for de novo proceeding. Bare perusal of both these orders makes it clear that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have not passed reasoned and speaking order. From the reply of the petitioner it is evident that several grounds were raised by him and as such, the appellate authority was bound to assign reasons in respect of those grounds while passing the order. However, without any new ground and without complying with the applicable rules, the appellate authority passed the order. It is pertinent to mention here that the department did not file any appeal and did not challenge the order of censure on any ground and it is the petitioner who challenged the order of censure in appeal but the appellate authority while setting aside the order of censure, directed for de novo proceeding against him which is against the rules. It had no authority to issue such direction for filling up the lacuna in the departmental enquiry. Learned Tribunal also did not consider all the grounds raised by the petitioner and dismissed his application by the impugned order which is not sustainable in law. 11. It had no authority to issue such direction for filling up the lacuna in the departmental enquiry. Learned Tribunal also did not consider all the grounds raised by the petitioner and dismissed his application by the impugned order which is not sustainable in law. 11. For the afore-stated reasons, the petition is allowed. Both the orders dated 19.10.2023 and 2.3.2021 (Annexure P/1 & P/2) are hereby set aside. Since the petitioner has retired from service and the disciplinary authority found no charges proved against him, hence the order dated 11.4.2019 (Annexure P/6) of censure is also set aside. The petitioner thus stands exonerated of all the charges leveled against him. No order as to cost.