JUDGMENT : 1. Appellant who was the petitioner in W.P. (C) No. 33694 of 2022 has filed this appeal challenging the judgment dated 30.11.2023 of the learned Single Judge. 2. Brief facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are as follows: Appellant is the Secretary-Registrar of ‘Technopark’ which is an entity fully owned by the Government of Kerala and registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literacy, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955. It is a promotional agency that creates infrastructure for IT/ITES Companies. The 1st respondent Municipal Corporation had issued Ext.P4 letter dated 22.06.2022 to the appellant enclosing arrear demand notices demanding payment of arrears of property tax with respect to the buildings of the appellant for the period 2016 to 2022. The total amount due as per Ext.P4 letter was Rs. 2,93,83,266/-. Appellant though initially paid some amounts due towards property tax, later desisted from making further payments on the premise that the 1st respondent Municipal Corporation has no authority or competence to collect property tax from the appellant since the appellant has been notified as an ‘industrial area’ under two statutes, viz. the Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Act, 1993 and the Kerala Industrial Single Window Clearance Boards and Industrial Township Area Development Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1993’ and ‘the Act of 1999’ respectively). Relying on its said status as an ‘industrial area’ appellant preferred Exts.P5, P6 and P7 representations before 1st and 2nd respondents inter-alia seeking a recall of the arrear demand notices. Inspite of the receipt of the said representations, the respondents did not act upon the same. Appellant apprehends that the 1st respondent may initiate coercive steps to realise the amounts claimed vide Ext.P4 letter and the arrear demand notices annexed thereto. Hence the Writ Petition was filed seeking the following prayers: “(i) A writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, calling for the records leading to Ext.P4 arrear demand notices and to quash the same along with Ext.P4 considering the same as illegal, arbitrary and claimed without authority. (ii) A writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent No. 2 to consider and pass appropriate orders on Exts.P5 to Ext.P7 and report the orders passed, before this Hon’ble Court, pending disposal of the above Writ Petition, that too within a time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court. (ii) A writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent No. 2 to consider and pass appropriate orders on Exts.P5 to Ext.P7 and report the orders passed, before this Hon’ble Court, pending disposal of the above Writ Petition, that too within a time frame fixed by this Hon’ble Court. (iii) A writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent No. 1 to refund the property tax amounts already collected by them to the petitioner as is claimed in Exts.P5 to P7 representation, as the said amounts are collected without any authority. (iv) Declare that no local self Government laws are applicable to such areas declared as ‘industrial areas’ as is seen from Exts.P1 to P3, which is exempted under Article 243Q(1) proviso of the Constitution of India. (v) To grant such other reliefs sought from time to time including the cost of this proceeding. (vi) a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction, directing the 4th respondent (impleaded through I.A. No. 1 of 2023) to declare the Technopark Industrial Area as Industrial Township as envisaged in Article 243 Q(1) proviso. (vii) a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction, directing the 4th respondent (impleaded through I.A. No. 1 of 2023) to constitute an ‘Authority’ for Technopark Industrial Area as contemplated in Sec. 14 and 15 of the Kerala Industrial Single Window Clearance Board and Industrial Township Area Development Act, 1999 as expeditiously as possible. (viii) a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction, directing the 1st respondent to strictly comply with the procedures established in the Rule 12 of Kerala Municipality (Property tax, Service Cess and Surcharges) Rules 2011 and issue proper assessment notices with liberty to prefer appeal against the same, if aggrieved.” 3. The 1st respondent Municipal Corporation filed a counter affidavit in the Writ Petition inter-alia challenging its maintainability on the ground that appellant being a fully owned Government entity, the Secretary-Registrar of the appellant ought not to have preferred a Writ Petition arraying the Government as a respondent, without first annexing a decision of the Executive Council of the appellant empowering/authorizing him to file such a Writ Petition. It was also contended therein that the statutes relied on by the appellant viz. It was also contended therein that the statutes relied on by the appellant viz. the Acts of 1993 and 1999 respectively do not stipulate any exemption from payment of property tax for entities like the appellant and hence the levy of tax by the 1st respondent cannot be termed as without jurisdiction. The 1st respondent also justified the issuance of Ext.P4 and the arrear demand notices, basing on the powers vested upon it under Section 233 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 and the Kerala Municipality (Property Tax, Service Cess and Surcharge) Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2011 Rules’). It was contended that since the appellant had failed to submit returns as envisaged under Rule 11 of the said Rules, assessments were duly carried out by the 1st respondent and demand notices for property tax were issued to the appellant. In reply, the appellant had effected some payments and later issued Exts.R1 (a) to (c) letters in which certain objections regarding differences in calculation of floor area ratio were pointed out and a reassessment of the floor area was sought. No objection was raised by the appellant in the said letters regarding maintainability of the demand notices or the competence of the 1st respondent to issue the same. Further, the 1st respondent also pointed out the existence of an alternate remedy by way of appeal to challenge the demand notices as stipulated under Rule 16 of the 2011 Rules. 4. A reply affidavit was filed by the appellant to the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent. An impleading petition to implead the additional 4th respondent as well as a petition for amendment of the Writ Petition were also filed by the appellant. The impleadment sought was duly allowed and the 4th respondent was added to the respondent array of the Writ Petition. 5. The learned Single Judge after hearing all parties, took note of the contention of the 1st respondent that though the area where from the appellant operates had been declared as an ‘industrial area’ the same has not yet been declared as an ‘industrial township area’. Thus, exemptions, if any, to which it may be entitled to as an ‘industrial township area’ under the relevant statute has not vested in the appellant. Thus, exemptions, if any, to which it may be entitled to as an ‘industrial township area’ under the relevant statute has not vested in the appellant. Further, the learned Single Judge also took note of the submission of the Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent that the Government may at appropriate time take a decision regarding declaring the relevant ‘industrial area’ within which the appellant is situated as an ‘industrial township area’ and may also consider the constitution of an ‘industrial township authority’ after taking all relevant aspects into consideration. The Writ Petition was accordingly disposed of by the learned Single Judge granting the appellant liberty to move an appropriate application/representation before the State Government seeking to declare the appellant which is now only an ‘industrial area’ be notified as an ‘industrial township area’ and for the constitution of ‘industrial township authority’. The learned Single Judge had also directed that if such an application/representation is preferred by the appellant, the State Government shall take a decision thereon in accordance with law, after due consideration of all aspects pertaining to the matter. As regards the property tax demanded from the appellant vide Ext.P4, the learned Single Judge concluded that no ground exists to re-open the assessments for levy of such tax which had been completed as early as in 2005 and the appellant was directed to discharge the outstanding tax liability to the 1st respondent, till an ‘industrial township authority’ is duly constituted. 6. This Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellant challenging the said judgment of the learned Single Judge. 7. We have heard Smt. Rashmi K.V. learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Sri. Suman Chakravarthi, learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent as well as the learned Government Pleader for respondents 2 to 4. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge, taking note of the fact that Government had vide Exts.P1, P2 and P3 already notified ‘Technopark’ as an ‘industrial area’ under the Act of 1993 as well as under the Act of 1999, ought to have set aside the arrears demand notices issued by the 1st respondent as arbitrary and unsustainable. Such notification under the statutes, according to the learned counsel, vests absolute immunity to the appellant from applying for licences, permits etc. Such notification under the statutes, according to the learned counsel, vests absolute immunity to the appellant from applying for licences, permits etc. Further, according to the learned counsel, the fact that appellant’s buildings are situated within such a notified ‘industrial area’ places them beyond the jurisdictional purview of the 1st respondent especially with respect to the levy of property tax. The learned counsel relies on Article 243Q(1) of the Constitution of India to buttress her said contention. 9. Article 243Q(1) of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “243 Q. Constitution of Municipalities (1) There shall be constituted in every State: (a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area. (b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area. (c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, in accordance with the provisions of this Part: Provided that a Municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part thereof as the Governor may, having regard to the size of the area and the municipal services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such other factors as he may deem fit, by public notification, specify to be an industrial township. (2) In this article ‘a transitional area’ or ‘a smaller urban area’ or ‘a larger urban area’ means such area as the Governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify by public notification for the purposes of this Part.” Relying on the proviso to the said Article and based on Exts.P1 to P3, the learned counsel contends that since the Technopark has already been declared as an ‘industrial area’ a local Government body like the 1st respondent has no authority to impose any tax on the appellant. Collecting tax from areas beyond their jurisdictional authority is a violation of the avowed mandates of Article 243 Q (1), and is an act of highhandedness which warrants interference by this Court, contends the learned counsel. 10. Collecting tax from areas beyond their jurisdictional authority is a violation of the avowed mandates of Article 243 Q (1), and is an act of highhandedness which warrants interference by this Court, contends the learned counsel. 10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent Municipal Corporation submits that the Government has only notified the appellant as an ‘industrial area’ under the Act of 1993 and the Act of 1999. Appellant has not yet been notified as an ‘industrial township’ under the Act of 1999. Further, an ‘industrial township authority’ as envisaged under the Act of 1999 has not yet been constituted. The claim for exemption and exclusion from property tax, assumes relevance only if an ‘industrial township area’ and a consequent ‘industrial township authority’ are in existence encompassing within its jurisdictional limits the premises of the appellant. According to the learned counsel, the limited objective of declaring an area as an ‘industrial area’ is to facilitate speedy issuance of various licences or clearances or certificates required under the various State enactments and thus to enable ease of commencing and conducting business from the relevant premises. Such notification as an ‘industrial area’ simplicitor does not enable the appellant to seek exemption from payment of property tax or to claim any exclusion which may be available to an ‘industrial township’ or to an entity situated within an ‘industrial township authority’ as envisaged under the Act of 1999. He contends further that the levy of property tax is undertaken by the Municipal Corporation as empowered by Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 and the 2011 Rules. The relevant statutes viz. the Act of 1993 as well as the Act of 1999, under which the appellant has been declared as an ‘industrial area’ do not envisage any exemption whatsoever from payment of property tax levied under the Kerala Municipality Act and Rules. The learned counsel also points to Exts.R1 (a), (b) and (c) issued by the appellant in response to the demand notices issued by the 1st respondent and submits that the appellant had already paid property tax in part and had conceded to the authority of the 1st respondent to demand property tax. The learned counsel also points to Exts.R1 (a), (b) and (c) issued by the appellant in response to the demand notices issued by the 1st respondent and submits that the appellant had already paid property tax in part and had conceded to the authority of the 1st respondent to demand property tax. He points out that in Exts.R1 (a), (b) and (c) the appellant had only requested to “reassess the demand notices and issue calculation statement for all TFC numbers” and to rectify the error in building number and to “issue us a fresh demand notice”. That the request in the concerned letter was only to “correctly account the paid amount against the concerned buildings”, the counsel states, points to an express admission by the appellant of the authority and competence of the 1st respondent to levy property tax. In view of the same, the substantive contentions now seen raised by the appellant are all mere after thought, contends the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. 11. We have considered the rival contentions. Buildings of the appellant with respect to which Ext. P4 arrear demand notices for property tax were issued are admittedly situated within the jurisdictional limits of the 1st respondent Municipal Corporation. Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 under Section 233, empowers the 1st respondent to collect property tax with respect to buildings situated within its limits. Section 235 of the said Act enumerates buildings which are exempted from such payment of property tax. Modalities regarding assessment, collection etc. of property tax by local self Government bodies like the 1st respondent are further stipulated in the Kerala Municipality (Property Tax, Service Cess and Surcharge) Rules, 2011. Appellant does not have a case that the subject buildings fall within any of the exempted categories of buildings enumerated in Section 235 of the Municipality Act thus placing them beyond the net of property tax envisaged under Section 233 of the Act. Appellant’s limited contention is that the said buildings are situated within an ‘industrial area’ notified under the Act of 1993 and the Act of 1999, thus entitling them to exemption. However, the enumerated list of exempted buildings in Section 235 does not include buildings situated in ‘industrial areas’ notified under the Act of 1993 and the Act of 1999. Appellant’s limited contention is that the said buildings are situated within an ‘industrial area’ notified under the Act of 1993 and the Act of 1999, thus entitling them to exemption. However, the enumerated list of exempted buildings in Section 235 does not include buildings situated in ‘industrial areas’ notified under the Act of 1993 and the Act of 1999. Neither the Municipality Act, 1994 nor the 2011 Rules envisage any exception or exemption from property tax to the buildings situated in such an ‘industrial area’. 12. It is trite law that exemption or exclusion from the liability to pay tax cannot be implied or assumed and such an entitlement should be clearly established with reference to a specific legal provision empowering the same. It is also settled that, if any doubt or ambiguity exists in interpreting such an exempting provision, vis-a-vis the question of such entitlement, benefit thereof must go to the State [Novopan India Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Hyderabad, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 606, Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. vs. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 21 and Union of India and Others vs. Wood Papers Ltd. and Another, (1990) 4 SCC 256 ]. Thus, it is incumbent on the appellant to point towards a specific legal norm on which the claim for exemption from payment of property tax could be based. Appellant has not been able to point towards any legal provision entitling it to seek exemption from property tax. Mere notification as an ‘industrial area’ cannot lead to an implied exemption from payment of property tax which is levied as empowered under law. The buildings of the appellant do not get exempted from the liability to pay property tax merely upon the appellant being notified as an ‘industrial area’ vide Ext.P1 to Ext.P3. Further, even assuming that exemptions from payment of property tax could be availed with respect to buildings situated within an ‘industrial township area’ or those within an ‘industrial township authority’ admittedly, the area within which property of the appellant is situated has not yet been notified so, as envisaged under Chapter III of the Act of 1999. An ‘industrial area’ envisaged under Section 2(f) of the Act of 1999 and an ‘industrial township area’ envisaged under Section 2(h) of the same statute are different and distinct entities. An ‘industrial area’ envisaged under Section 2(f) of the Act of 1999 and an ‘industrial township area’ envisaged under Section 2(h) of the same statute are different and distinct entities. Privileges that would flow upon being notified as either of these are also distinct and different. Further under the scheme of the said statute, viz. the Act of 1999, only an ‘industrial township authority’ constituted under Section 15 of the Act can assume the power to impose taxes and fee and realise fines that can be collected or realised under the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994. Admittedly no such ‘industrial township authority’ has been constituted encompassing within its jurisdiction, the buildings of the appellant. 13. We also note that the appellant had amended the Writ Petition and impleaded the 4th respondent so as to enable it to seek a direction from this Court to the said respondent to declare the appellant as an ‘industrial township area’ and to constitute an ‘industrial township authority’ by including within it, the premises of the appellant. The said prayers sought by the appellant in the Writ Petition, belie the contention regarding entitlement to exemption from property tax merely on the basis of being notified as ‘industrial area’ and points to the appellant’s realisation that an exemption from property tax can be aspired only upon being constituted as an ‘industrial township area’ situated within an ‘industrial township authority’ none of which have materialised so far. 14. We also find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that even in Exts.R1 (a), (b) and (c) issued by the appellant in response to the demand notices issued by the 1st respondent, the appellant had never challenged the authority or competence of the 1st respondent to levy property tax. The said letters we note were issued by the appellant to the 1st respondent in 2018 and in 2022. Thus having acceded to the levy and after having paid it in part, the appellant cannot be seen to do a volte-face and challenge the competence and authority of the 1st respondent to levy property tax. 15. The said letters we note were issued by the appellant to the 1st respondent in 2018 and in 2022. Thus having acceded to the levy and after having paid it in part, the appellant cannot be seen to do a volte-face and challenge the competence and authority of the 1st respondent to levy property tax. 15. As regards the contention raised by the appellant basing on the proviso to Article 243Q(1) of the Constitution of India, we note that the said proviso only envisage that the Governor may by a notification specify an area as an industrial township taking note of the services being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment. The said proviso does not assist the appellant in substantiating its challenge against the property tax levied by the 1st respondent since no notification as envisaged therein has been issued or produced with respect to the area wherein the appellant’s buildings are situated. Further, Section 235 of the Municipality Act, 1994 enumerates the buildings which are exempted from property tax, service cess etc. that could be levied by a Municipal Corporation under Section 233. Appellant does not have a case that the benefit of the said provision could be extended to the buildings of the appellant. On the said count also, the challenge against levy of tax put forth by the appellant fails. 16. In view of the above, we find the contention of the appellant in the Writ Petition that the 1st respondent has no authority to levy property tax on the buildings within the Technopark cannot be countenanced and the learned judge had validly and correctly declined the reliefs sought by the appellant in the said respect. 17. Regarding the correctness of the amounts claimed in the Ext.P4 arrear demand notices, we note that the appellant had the option of contesting the same before the appellate authority as envisaged under Rule 16 of the 2011 Rules. Appellant, however did not choose to invoke the said appellate remedy within the prescribed time. The counsel for the appellant submits that though the appellant is now desirous of invoking the said appellate remedy, the judgment of the learned Single Judge has effectively foreclosed the said option by holding that no ground exists to re-open the assessments which had been completed as early as in 2005. The counsel for the appellant submits that though the appellant is now desirous of invoking the said appellate remedy, the judgment of the learned Single Judge has effectively foreclosed the said option by holding that no ground exists to re-open the assessments which had been completed as early as in 2005. We note that the Ext.P4 notices, though they relate to the period commencing from 2016-17 onwards, were issued to the appellant only on 22.06.2022. Appellant had upon receipt thereof, filed the Writ Petition on 20.10.2022 inter-alia seeking to quash the same. Taking note of the fact that the appellant has been pursuing a legal challenge against the said arrear demand notices, albeit before a wrong forum, the right to prefer an appeal against Ext.P4 arrear demand notices ought not to be foreclosed to the appellant. Thus in the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it fit that the appellant be permitted to exercise the appellate remedy envisaged under Rule 16 of the 2011 Rules as against Ext.P4 demand notices. 18. In view of the above, we affirm the findings of the learned Single Judge on the merits of the matter. As regards Ext.P4 arrear demand notices, if the appellant prefers an appeal within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, the limitation period for preferring the appeal under Rule 16 of the 2011 Rules shall stand condoned as envisaged under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the appeal shall be disposed of in accordance with law by the concerned appellate authority. 19. With modification to the limited extent stated above, we confirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Writ Appeal is disposed of. No costs.