JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J (1) In this criminal appeal, the accused-appellant is invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Section 374(2) of CrPC by calling in question legality, validity and correctness of impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 25.09.2018, passed in Special Criminal Case No.05 of 2017 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Pawan Kumar Yadav), by the Special Judge, constituted under the provision of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, (for brevity the “Act of 1989”), Korba (CG), whereby he has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence U/s. 376(2) of IPC r/w S.04 of POCSO Act, 2012 [However, in light of Section 42 of POCSO Act, punished only under Section 376(2) of IPC] Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs.1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 05 months. U/s. 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 Imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.5,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, additional rigorous imprisonment for 06 months. [Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently] (2) The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 05.02.2017, in the evening at about 07:00 PM, at Parsabhatha, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Balco, Korba (CG), beneath Kajihouse, in a lane (gali), the accused-appellant committed penetrative sexual assault with minor victim (PW-01), aged about 16 years, against her will and consent knowing fully well that she belongs to Scheduled Caste community and, thereby, said to have committed offences under Section 376(2) of IPC; under Section 04 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for brevity the “POCSO Act”) and also under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989. (3) Further case of the prosecution is that when victim (PW-01) reported the matter to the police by filing written complaint (Ex.P/01), firstly unnumber FIR (Ex.P/02) was registered against the appellant and wheels of investigation started running, in which, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P/05. Numbered FIR (Ex.P/15) was also registered. After obtaining necessary consent for the purpose of medical examination of the victim (PW-01) vide Ex.P/03, she was subjected to medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. K.B. Sonkar (PW-06). According to her MLC report (Ex.P/11), evidence of forceful penetrative intercourse/sexual assault are present and redness and congestion were also visible on her private part. After obtaining necessary consent for the purpose of medical examination of the victim (PW-01) vide Ex.P/03, she was subjected to medical examination, which was conducted by Dr. K.B. Sonkar (PW-06). According to her MLC report (Ex.P/11), evidence of forceful penetrative intercourse/sexual assault are present and redness and congestion were also visible on her private part. Further, victim’s vaginal slides were prepared and handed over to the police for analysis alongwith her undergarment, which were seized vide Ex.P/12. The accused-appellant was arrested vide Ex.P/16 and sent for medical examination. Appellant’s MLC report is Ex.P/13 and his undergarment was also seized vide Ex.P/19. The aforesaid seized articles were sent for chemical examination vide Ex.P/20 and, according to FSL report (Ex.P/21), it has been mentioned that stains of human sperm/semen were found on the vaginal slide of the victim as also in her undergarment. (4) Thereafter, in order to ascertain the correct age of the victim (PW-01), her birth certificate (Ex.P/08C) and birth register (Ex.P/14C) were obtained/seized vide Ex.P/06, wherein her date of birth has been recorded as 27.09.2002, meaning thereby, on the date of offence (i.e. 05.02.2017) the victim was minor aged about 14 years 05 months (less than 16 years). Moreover, in order to verify caste of the victim, her caste certificate (Ex.P/10C) issued by the Government of Chhattisgarh was also seized vide Ex.P/09, wherein it has been mentioned that the victim (PW-01) belongs to Schedule Caste category. After the statement of witnesses were recorded and investigation is completed, the appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences in the competent criminal Court having jurisdiction, which was thereafter committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. (5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 21 documents apart from Article A1, whereas the appellant in support of his defence, though not examined any witness, but exhibited 03 documents. (5) The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 17 witnesses and exhibited 21 documents apart from Article A1, whereas the appellant in support of his defence, though not examined any witness, but exhibited 03 documents. (6) The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict the appellant for offence punishable under Section 376(2) of IPC read with Section 04 of the POCSO Act as also under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 and sentenced him as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. (7) Mr. S.B. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the aforesaid offences. In view of questions framed and answers given by the victim (PW-01) in her statement before the Court, the learned trial Court has erred in law while holding the appellant guilty for the offences in question. There are various omissions and contradiction in the statements of prosecution witnesses. The medical evidence are also not reliable and substantive piece of evidence in the present case is missing. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the appellant has not committed the offence with the victim (PW-01) knowing fully well that she belongs to Schedule Caste category. Even otherwise, no question has been asked from the appellant in this regard in his statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC. Merely because the appellant knew the family members of the victim (PW-01), he has been convicted by the learned trial Court for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 by drawing presumption under sub-section (c) of Section 08 of the Act of 1989, whereas such presumption can only been drawn when there is other evidence available on record to hold that the appellant has committed sexual intercourse with the victim knowing fully when that she belongs to Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe community and presumption itself could not be treated as a ground to convict the appellant for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 where punishment for life has been prescribed. As such, presumption under Section 08 of the Act of 1989 has to be construed strictly and unless there is sufficient evidence to hold that the accused committed the crime with the victim knowing fully well that she belongs to SC/ST category, the presumption under Section 08 of the Act of 1989 could not be attracted. Learned counsel relied upon Sobha Hymavathi Devi v. Setti Gangadhara Swamy and other, AIR 2005 SC 800 ; Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 2014 SC 1782 : (2014) 12 SCC 595 and Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC Online SC 984 to bolster his submissions that appellant’s conviction and sentence for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 is liable to set aside. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in toto. (8) Per-contra, learned State counsel would submit that prosecution has been able to prove the offences beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent-State that in view of statement of the victim (PW-01), wherein she has clearly narrated the incident and implicated appellant herein to be the author of the crime in question, coupled with other evidence available on record, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for the offences mentioned hereinabove. Thus, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. (9) We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. (10) In the case at hand, the appellant has been convicted by the learned trial Court for offences: (a) under Sections 376(2) of IPC read with Section 04 of the POCSO Act and (b) under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989. Therefore, we will consider conviction for each of the offences one by one. As regards offence under Section 376(2) of IPC r/w Section 04 of the POCSO Act: (11) In this regard, it would be relevant to notice statement of the victim (PW-01). Therefore, we will consider conviction for each of the offences one by one. As regards offence under Section 376(2) of IPC r/w Section 04 of the POCSO Act: (11) In this regard, it would be relevant to notice statement of the victim (PW-01). The victim (PW-01) in her statement before the Court has clearly narrated the incident in question and implicated the appellant herein to be the author of the crime by stating that on the date and time of the offence, the appellant visited her house and, on the pretext that her father is calling to collect some purchased commodities, the appellant took her out of the house and, thereafter, on the way, committed sexual intercourse with her against her will and consent. The aforesaid statement of the victim (PW-01) is also duly corroborated by other evidence available on record i.e. (i) MLC report (Ex.P/13) of the victim, wherein it has been opined that evidence relating to penetrative intercourse/sexual assault are present on her body and redness alongwith congestion is also visible on her private part, which is duly supported by Dr. K.B. Sonkar (PW-06), who has medically examined the victim and (ii) FSL report (Ex.P/21), wherein it has been mentioned that stains of human sperm/semen were found on the vaginal slide and undergarment of the victim seized vide Ex.P/12. Furthermore, the victim (PW-01) was subjected to lengthy cross-examination, but nothing could be extracted from her to hold that the appellant has not committed sexual intercourse with her or she is telling lie before the Court in order to falsely implicate the appellant. As such, the testimony of victim (PW-01) coupled with other evidence available on record i.e. MLC report and FSL report inspire confidence and can be relied upon to hold the appellant guilty for the offences in question. Moreover, accordingly to birth certificate (Ex.P/08C) and birth register (Ex.P/14C), which were seized vide Ex.P/06, the date of birth of the victim (PW-01) has been recorded as 27.09.2002 and, therefore, it is quite clear that on the date of offence (i.e. 05.02.2017) she was minor aged about 14 years 05 months (less than 16 years). Moreover, accordingly to birth certificate (Ex.P/08C) and birth register (Ex.P/14C), which were seized vide Ex.P/06, the date of birth of the victim (PW-01) has been recorded as 27.09.2002 and, therefore, it is quite clear that on the date of offence (i.e. 05.02.2017) she was minor aged about 14 years 05 months (less than 16 years). As such, on the basis of aforesaid evidence available on record, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in holding the appellant herein guilty for offence punishable under Section 376(2) of IPC read with Section 04 of the POCSO Act, is strictly in accordance with law. We do not find any illegality or perversity in the said finding recorded by the learned trial Court and, for which, he has rightly been convicted and sentenced. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. As regards offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989: (12) Now the question would be whether the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, for which, he has been sentenced for life imprisonment, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? As regards offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989: (12) Now the question would be whether the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, for which, he has been sentenced for life imprisonment, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ? (13) In order to answer this plea, firstly it would be appropriate to notice the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in Para-63 of the impugned judgment while drawing presumption under Section 8(c) of the Act of 1989 and convicted the appellant for offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, which reads as under: ^^63- izdj.k esa tgka rd /kkjk 3(2)(v) vuwlwfpr tkfr@tu tkfr ¼vR;kpkj fuokj.k½ vf/kfu;e 1989 ds vkd"kZ.k dk iz'u gS /kkjk 3(2)(v) ,l-lh-@,l-Vh- ,DV ds vuqlkj %& +**Kkr fd og O;fDr vuqlwfpr tkfr vFkok vuqlwfpr tutkfr ds lnL; gS vFkok laifŸk ml lnL; ls lacaf/kr gSA ** D;ksafd vfHk;kstu dgkuh ds vuqlkj vkjksih dk ihfM+r ds ?kj vkuk tkuk Fkk ,oa vkjksih dk ihfM+r ds ?kj okyksa ls ?kfu"B laca/k Fkk ihfM+rk vkjksih dks pkpw dgdj cqykrh Fkh ,oa vkjksih dks ihfM+rk ds ckjs esa ,oa mldh tkfr ds ckjs esa vPNh rjg ls tkudkjh Fkh fd ihfMrk vuwlwfpr tkfr laoxZ dh lnL;k gSA ;gka /kkjk 8¼x½ ,l lh-@,l-Vh- ,DV 1989 dh mi/kkj.kk Hkh U;k;ky; }kjk dh tk,xhA /kkjk 8¼x½ ,l lh-@,l-Vh-,DV 1989 ds vuqlkj vfHk;qDr dks ihfMr vFkok mlds ifjokj dh futh tkudkjh Fkh] U;k;ky; vuqeku yxk,xk ds vfHk;qDr ihfM+r dh tkfr vFkok tutkfr;rk dh igpku ls fHkK Fkk] vU;Fkk fd izfrdwy izekf.kZr u gksA vr% vfHk;kstu /kkjk + 3(2)(v) ,l-lh-@,l-Vh- ,DV dks lansg ds ijs izekf.kr djus esa lQy jgk gSA^^ (14) It would be relevant to take note of the fact that the date of incident in the instant case is 05.02.2017, whereas Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 was amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016 by Act 1 of 2016. Prior to its amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016, Section 3(2)(v) stood as under: “3. Prior to its amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016, Section 3(2)(v) stood as under: “3. Punishment for offences of atrocities - (1) xxx xxx (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe - (i) to (iv) xxx xxx (v) commits any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine;” Prior to its amendment w.e.f. 26.01.2016, the unamended portion of Section 3(2)(v) was: “on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member” After the amendment, substituted portion of Section 3(2)(v) is: “knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member.” (15) Now, it would be relevant here to notice sub-section (c) of Section 08 of the Act of 1989, which reads as under: “8. Presumption as to offences.— In a prosecution for an offence under this Chapter, if it is proved that— (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim or his family, the Court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim, unless the contrary is proved.” (16) A focused perusal of above-quoted sub-section (c) of Section 08 of the Act of 1989 would show that in a prosecution for an offence under Chapter-II of the Act of 1989, if it is proved that the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim or his family, the Court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identity of the victim, unless the contrary is proved. The legislature has inserted sub-section (c) of Section 08 in the Act of 1989 by way of the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (1 of 2016) w.e.f. 26.01.2016, as it was felt necessary to amend Section 08 of the Act of 1989 relating to presumption as to the offences. The legislature has inserted sub-section (c) of Section 08 in the Act of 1989 by way of the Scheduled Caste and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (1 of 2016) w.e.f. 26.01.2016, as it was felt necessary to amend Section 08 of the Act of 1989 relating to presumption as to the offences. The aforesaid Amendment Act of 2015 (Bill), by which Section 8(c) was inserted was also referred to the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs. The said Committee submitted its report to the Rajya Sabha on 15th March, 2021, which was laid on the Table of Lok Sabha on 15th March, 2021, in which, issue relating to Atrocities and Crimes against Women and Children of SC/ST community was considered and it was found that the women and children belonging to the SC/ST community are subjected to all kinds of violence including sexual violence and high acquittal rates motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant and powerful communities for continued perpetration. Thus, the same led to insertion of sub-section (c) in Section 8 of the Act of 1989. (17) Section 8(c) of the Act of 1989 was also noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2021) 16 SCC 225 , in which, considering the Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children, it has been observed in Para-64 as under: “64. The Parliament Standing Committee Report on Atrocities Against Women and Children has observed that, “high acquittal rate motivates and boosts the confidence of dominant and powerful communities for continued perpetration” and recommends inclusion of provisions of SC & ST Act while registering cases of gendered violence against women from SC & ST communities. However, as we have noted, one of the ways in which offences against SC & ST women fall through the cracks is due to the evidentiary burden that becomes almost impossible to meet in cases of intersectional oppression. This is especially the case when courts tend to read the requirement of “on the ground” under Section 3(2)(v) as “only on the ground of”. This is especially the case when courts tend to read the requirement of “on the ground” under Section 3(2)(v) as “only on the ground of”. The current regime under the SC & ST Act, post the amendment, has facilitated the conduct of an intersectional analysis under the Act by replacing the causation requirement under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act with a knowledge requirement making the regime sensitive to the kind of evidence that is likely to be generated in cases such as these.” (18) Section 03 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for brevity the “IE Act”) defines the word “proved” as under: “Proved – A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.” (19) The term “prove” indicates the degree of certainty, which is required to treat a fact as proved. It provides for two conditions: (i) that a certain fact is a fact; in other words court “believes it to exist”; and (ii) that its existence is so probable that a prudent man would act on the assumption of its existence. What is required is production of such material on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. In M. Narsinga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) 1 SCC 691 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in Para-15 as under: “15. The word “proof” need be understood in the sense in which it is defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word “proved” in the Evidence Act. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given for the word “proved” in the Evidence Act. What is required is production of such materials on which the court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Hawkins vs. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Company, Ltd. [1911 (1) K.B. 988] observed like this: “Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion"” (20) The Supreme Court in the matter of Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2003) 7 SCC 56 with regard to “proof” pertinently held in Para-22 & 23 as under: “22. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case. Referring to of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise the inter-dependence of evidence and the confirmation of one piece of evidence by another--- 23. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.” (21) Now the question is how the proof is effected. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.” (21) Now the question is how the proof is effected. Proof is considered as the establishment of material facts in issue in each particular case by proper and legal means to the satisfaction of the Court and same is effected by: (i) evidence or statements of witnesses, admissions or confessions of parties, and production of documents; (ii) presumption (See: Sections 4, 79-90, 111-A, 113-A, 113-B & 114-A of IE Act); (iii) judicial notice (See: Sections 56 & 57 of IE Act); and (iv) inspection. Section 04 of the IE Act defines “may presume”, “shall presume”, which we are concerned, and also defines “conclusive proof”. The definition of “shall presume” is: “whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved”. Presumption, as indicated, are of three types: (a) presumption of fact; (b) presumption of law i.e. rebuttable presumption and (c) irrebuttable presumption of law or conclusive proof. “Shall presume” has been used in Sections 79-85, 89 & 105 of the IE Act. The term “shall presume” means that the Court is bound to take the fact as proved, until evidence is adduced to disprove it and the party interested in disproving must produce such evidence if he can. The expression “shall presume” as used in Section 8(c) of the Act of 1989 is also used in Section 04 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. (22) The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Andhra Pradesh v. V Vasudeva Rao, (2004) 9 SCC 319 has held that the presumption under Section 04 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is a presumption of law and, therefore, it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption. Their Lordships while dealing with Section 04 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 qua the expression “may presume” and “shall presume” as defined in Section 04 of the IE Act, have held that the presumption falling under “may presume” is “factual presumption” or “discretionary presumption”, whereas those falling under “shall presume” are “legal presumption” or compulsory presumption”. Their Lordships while dealing with Section 04 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 qua the expression “may presume” and “shall presume” as defined in Section 04 of the IE Act, have held that the presumption falling under “may presume” is “factual presumption” or “discretionary presumption”, whereas those falling under “shall presume” are “legal presumption” or compulsory presumption”. It has also been held that when the expression “shall be presumed” is employed in Section 4(1) of the Act, it must have the same import of compulsion and observed in Para-14 to 19 as under: “14. Before proceeding further, we may point out that the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" are defined in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). The presumptions falling under the former category are compendiously known as "factual presumptions" or "discretionary presumptions" and those falling under the latter as "legal presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". When the expression "shall be presumed" is employed in Section 4(1) of the Act, it must have the same import of compulsion. 15. When the sub-section deals with legal presumption, it is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition envisaged in the former part of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption under Section 4 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The Section does not say that the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence Act. (See M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., ( 2001 (1) SCC 691 ). 16. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. (See M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., ( 2001 (1) SCC 691 ). 16. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher Moulton L.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd., (1911) 1 KB 988, observed as follows: "Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration, because that is impossible; it must mean such evidence as would induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion". 17. The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be followed as the standard of proof. In reaching the conclusion the Court can use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are akin to presumptions in law. Law gives absolute discretion to the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the Court may have regard to common course of natural events, human conduct, public or private business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 18. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from another, the Court is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts. But it could as well be final if it remains undisturbed later. Presumption in law of evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the Court can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled. 19. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the Court can rely on a factual presumption. Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted the Court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof. However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted the Court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof. However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. This Court has indicated so in Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337 ; "A presumption can be drawn only from facts and not from other presumptions by a process of probable and logical reasoning"” (23) Similarly, in the matter of Sodhi Transport Co. and others v. State of UP and others, (1986) 2 SCC 486 , the Supreme Court has held that the words “it shall be presumed” used in Section 28-B of the UP Sales Tax, 1948 only requires the authorities concerned to raise a rebuttable presumption and, relying upon Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052 , held that a rule prescribing rebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence. Further while considering the meaning of rebuttable presumption, it has been held that a rebuttable presumption which is clearly a rule of evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and observed in Para-14 to 16 as under: “14. A presumption is not in itself evidence but only makes a prima facie case for party in whose favour it exists. It is a rule concerning evidence. It indicates the person on whom the burden of proof lies. When presumption is conclusive, it obviates the production of any other evidence to dislodge the conclusion to be drawn on proof of certain facts. But when it is rebuttable it only points out the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence on the fact presumed, and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed the purpose of presumption is over. Then the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and experience and are drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of facts, and circumstances. 15. In Izhar Ahmad khan v. Union of India, [1962] Suppl. Then the evidence will determine the true nature of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and experience and are drawn from the connection, relation and coincidence of facts, and circumstances. 15. In Izhar Ahmad khan v. Union of India, [1962] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 235 @ 257, Gajnendragadkar, J. (as he then was) explains the meaning of a rebuttable presumption thus : "It is conceded, and we think, rightly, that a rule prescribing a rebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence. It is necessary to analyse what the rule about the rebuttable presumption really means. A fact A which has relevance in the proof of fact and inherently has some degree of probative or persuasive value in that behalf may be weighed by a judicial mind after it is proved and before a conclusion is reached as to whether fact is proved or not. When the law of evidence makes a rule providing for a rebuttable presumption that on proof of fact A, fact shall be deemed to be proved unless the contrary is established, what the rule purports to do is to regulate the judicial process of appreciating evidence and to provide that the said appreciation will draw the inference from the proof of fact A that fact has also been proved unless the contrary is established. In other words, the rule takes away judicial discretion either to attach the due probative value to fact A or not and requires prima facie the due probative value to be attached in the matter of the inference as to the existence of fact B, subject of course, to the said presumption being rebutted by Proof to the contrary..." 16. In our opinion a statutory provision which creates a rebuttable presumption as regards the proof of a set of circumstances which would make a transaction liable to tax with the object of preventing evasion of the tax cannot be considered as conferring on the authority concerned the power to levy a tax which the Legislature cannot otherwise levy. In our opinion a statutory provision which creates a rebuttable presumption as regards the proof of a set of circumstances which would make a transaction liable to tax with the object of preventing evasion of the tax cannot be considered as conferring on the authority concerned the power to levy a tax which the Legislature cannot otherwise levy. A rebuttable presumption which is clearly a rule of evidence has the effect of shifting the burden of proof and it is hard to see how it is unconstitutional when the person concerned has the opportunity to displace the presumption by leading evidence.” (24) Furthermore, in M. Narsinga Rao (supra) the Supreme Court has held that legal presumption is to be understood as in terrorem i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act and observed in Para- 17 & 18 as under: “17. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from another, the court is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion to be drawn from other facts. But it could as well be final if it remains undisturbed later. Presumption in Law of Evidence is a rule indicating the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the court can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either disproved or dispelled. 18. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the court can rely on a factual presumption. Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled or rebutted, the court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof. However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. This Court has indicated so in Suresh Budharmal Kalani vs. State of Maharashtra [ 1998 (7) SCC 337 ]. However, as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. This Court has indicated so in Suresh Budharmal Kalani vs. State of Maharashtra [ 1998 (7) SCC 337 ]. A presumption can be drawn only from facts - and not from other presumptions by a process of probable and logical reasoning.” (25) In the matter of Union of India v. Pramod Gupta (Dead) by Lrs and other, (2005) 12 SCC 1 it has been held that whenever it is directed that Court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved and, it has also been held in terms of Section 04 of the IE Act that the expression “shall presume” cannot be held to be synonymous with “conclusive proof” and observed in Para-52 as under: “52. ….. The meaning of expressions 'may presume' and 'shall presume' have been explained in Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression 'shall presume' cannot be held to be synonymous with 'conclusive proof'.” (26) Returning to the facts of the present case in light of the above discussed principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court qua the meaning of word “proved”, as defined under Section 03 of the IE Act and further the Court “shall presume” the fact that the accused was aware of the fact, once the accused was having personal knowledge of the victim. The word “personal knowledge” has not been defined in the Act of 1989 and the same has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) as under: “Personal Knowledge – Knowledge gained through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief based on what someone else has said. Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires lay witnesses to have personal knowledge of the matters they testify about. Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires lay witnesses to have personal knowledge of the matters they testify about. An affidavit must also be based on personal knowledge, unless the affiant makes it clear that a statement relied on “information and belief”.” (27) Now, it has to be seen in the facts of the present case whether it has been proved by the prosecution by adducing legal evidence that the accused/appellant was having personal knowledge of the victim or her family in order to enable to draw the legal presumption, which is rebuttable in nature under sub-section (c) of Section 08 of the Act of 1989, for which, the learned trial Court did not rely upon any substantive piece of evidence, indeed, only relied prosecution story. However, 03 facts have been putforth by the prosecution to draw presumption under Section 08(c) of the Act of 1989, which are as under: “I. The appellant used to visit the house of the victim (PW- 01); II. The appellant and vicitm’s father, namely, Satish Khare (PW-02) were in close and friendly relationship; & III. The victim (PW-01) used to call the appellant as ‘Chachu’.” (28) With regard to above-noted points No. I & III, though question has been put to the appellant while recording his statement under Section 313 of CrPC, but he answered the same in negative. However, with regard to point No.II, no question has been asked/put to the appellant, as there is no evidence, either oral or documentary, available on record to substantiate the said fact. Therefore, the pivotal question would be whether the prosecution has been able to prove that the accused/appellant was having personal knowledge of the victim enabling the learned trial Court to presume that the appellant was aware about the victim’s caste, which the learned trial Court though recorded in affirmative, but did not consider any piece of evidence to hold that the appellant was having personal knowledge of the victim or her family members, yet drawn a presumption on the basis of prosecution case that the appellant was aware that the victim (PW-01) is a member of Schedule Caste community. Furthermore, the appellant while answering Question No.62, has denied that he used to visit the house of the victim (PW-01) and he has also denied the fact that the victim (PW-01) used to call him as “chachu”, as stated by Sushma Khare (PW-05), who is mother of the victim. Even otherwise, there is no independent witness to the said aspect that the appellant used to visit the house of the victim frequently and the victim (PW-01) used to call the appellant as “chachu” and, solely on the basis of the statements of the victim (PW-01) and her mother (PW-05), it cannot be presumed that the appellant was having personal knowledge of the victim or her family members vis-a-vis caste identity of the victim (PW-01), as the victim (PW-01) and her mother (PW-05) both appears to be interested witnesses to that extent and it would be risky and unsafe to accept the said statements to invoke sub-section (c) of Section 08 of the Act of 1989, more particularly, when presumption under Section 08(c) of the Act of 1989 is rebuttable presumption and same is not conclusive. In cases of like nature, where serious allegation of rape on the basis of caste identity of the victim has been leveled and, for which, by virtue of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 stringent punishment of imprisonment for life has been prescribed, in absence of any clinching evidence direct or circumstantial to prove the said fact, it cannot be held that the appellant was very well aware about the caste identity of the victim (PW-01), enabling the learned trial Court to presume the said fact of being aware of the caste identity of the victim (PW-01), in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Izhar Ahmad Khan (supra) followed in Sodhi Transport Co. (supra) and also in Pramod Gupta (supra). However, in the present case the said burden was on the prosecution to establish on the face of the record by leading evidence of clinching nature that on the date of the offence, the appellant was very well aware about the caste identity of the victim (PW-01), which the prosecution has miserably failed to do so and has not been able to discharge the said burden reasonably and satisfactorily. We hereby hold accordingly. We hereby hold accordingly. (29) In view of foregoing analysis, in our considered opinion, the prosecution has not been able to prove satisfactorily that the appellant was having personal knowledge of the victim or his family member in order to enable the learned trial Court to presume that the appellant was aware about the caste of the victim (PW-01) on the date and time of the offence. Consequently, the learned trial Court has erred in law while drawing presumption under Section 08(c) of the Act of 1989 without there being any substantive and legal available on record to hold that the appellant committed the crime in question with the victim (PW-01) knowing fully well that she belongs to SC category and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989 and the sentence of imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, is liable to be set aside. (30) Concludingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act of 1989, as imposed upon him by the learned trial Court, is hereby set aside. However, the conviction and sentences of the appellant for offence under Section 376(2) of IPC read with Section 04 of the POCSO Act are hereby affirmed/upheld and same shall remain as it is being well merited. (31) Consequently, this criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. (32) Let a certified copy of this judgment alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action.