JUDGMENT BASIC FACTS: 1. This petition is filed to challenge the judgment and order dated 11th April 2019, passed by the Maharashtra State Waqf Tribunal allowing the Waqf Application No. 01/2010 filed by respondent no.5 under section 83 (2) of the Waqf Act, 1995 ('said Act'). By the impugned judgment and order, the resolution passed by the State Government on 25th May 2018 and letter dated 19th December 2018, issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board, are quashed and set aside. 2. By the resolution dated 25th May 2018, the State Government, in the exercise of the powers under Section 97 of the said Act, directed the Maharashtra State Board of Waqf to cancel the No Objection Certificate ('NOC') dated 25th July 2011, issued for the development of the property belonging to respondent no.4-Waqf. By the letter dated 19th December 2018, the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board authorized the Regional Waqf Officer to file a criminal complaint against the trustee of respondent no.4-Waqf and respondent no.5, who was appointed as the developer to develop the Waqf's property. 3. The petitioner claims to be an interested party in respondent no.4-Waqf and, feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order, has filed this petition. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 4 and 5 raised a preliminary objection on the locus of the petitioner to challenge the judgment and order passed by the Waqf tribunal. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION: 4. The learned counsel for respondents no. 4 and 5 raised the preliminary objection on two counts. The first objection is that the petitioner has no locus to file the writ petition as he is neither an interested party nor an aggrieved party. The second objection is that the petition may not be entertained as there is an alternate remedy of filing a revision under Section 83(9) of the said Act. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 5. In response to the preliminary objections raised on behalf of respondents nos. 4 and 5, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the NOC dated 25th July 2011, is a forged document and that such NOC was never issued by the Chief Executive Officer. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner, being a devotee of the said Waqf, is an interested party. 4 and 5, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the NOC dated 25th July 2011, is a forged document and that such NOC was never issued by the Chief Executive Officer. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner, being a devotee of the said Waqf, is an interested party. The petitioner, being a devotee, has a right to offer his prayers at the Waqf property and thus is an aggrieved party as he will not be able to offer his prayers if the Waqf property is developed, in view of the NOC. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, submitted that the petitioner, being an interested party as well as an aggrieved party, has the locus to challenge the judgment and order passed by the Waqf Tribunal. With reference to the preliminary objection that there is an alternate remedy of filing a revision application under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the remedy under Section 83(9) enables a party to file a revision application in this court. Thus, according to him, there is no substance in the objection raised that the petition may not be entertained on the ground of the availability of an alternate remedy. Even if a revision application is filed to challenge the impugned order, the same would lie before this court. Hence, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that only the nomenclature of the litigation would change; however, the scope of the challenge would remain the same. 7. In support of the submission that the petitioner is an interested party as well as an aggrieved party, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the pleadings in the memo of the petition and the petitioner's short affidavit, additional affidavit and affidavit-in-rejoinder. By relying upon the pleadings, he submitted that respondents nos. 4 and 5 have practised fraud to grab the Waqf's property. He submitted that the Waqf Board had filed a written statement and an affidavit dated 20th September 2021 before the Waqf Tribunal and contended that the resolution dated 10th June 2011, NOC dated 25th July 2011 and Development agreement dated 26th September 2011 are null and void and have no legal status. Thus, he submitted that even the Waqf Board has filed an affidavit-in-reply, stating that the Waqf Board has never issued an NOC as claimed by respondent no.5. 8. Thus, he submitted that even the Waqf Board has filed an affidavit-in-reply, stating that the Waqf Board has never issued an NOC as claimed by respondent no.5. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent no.5 has acted in collusion with the person claiming to be the lessee of the Waqf property. The consent terms filed by the lessee and respondent no.4-Waqf would reveal that respondent nos. 4 and 5 have committed fraud on this Court. The resolution alleged to have been passed by the Waqf Board in its meeting held on 10th June 2011 and the NOC alleged to have been issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board on 25th July 2011, were doubtful, and the same were challenged in various proceedings filed in this court. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the lessee i.e. Gulam Husain Rassiwala had filed Writ Petition No. 9682 of 2016, challenging the NOC issued by the Waqf board. However, respondent nos. 4 and 5 entered into the Consent Terms with the lessee and the said Writ Petition was disposed of. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, respondent nos. 4 and 5, by acting in collusion with the original lessee, have abused the process of law to grab the Waqf property. He submitted that the original lessee had filed Writ Petition No. 4388 of 2018 for challenging the judgment and order dated 8th March 2018, passed by the Waqf Tribunal. The said lessee had filed a separate Writ Petition No. 9682 of 2016, seeking direction to renew the lease in his favour. He submitted that respondent nos. 2, 4 and 5 and the said lessee filed consent terms in Writ Petition No. 9682 of 2016. However, they deliberately did not disclose the correct and relevant facts before this court. Pursuant to the consent terms, the said original lessee withdrew other Petitions, i.e. Writ Petition No. 6258 of 2012, Writ Petition No. 9682 of 2016, Writ Petition No. 4388 of 2018 and Contempt Petition No. 307 of 2018 as respondent no.5 had agreed to pay Rs. 9.5 Crores to the said lessee. Learned counsel thus submitted that the original lessee filed Writ Petition No. 6058 of 2012 to protect the Waqf property; however, the same was withdrawn at the cost of the interest of the Waqf property. 9.5 Crores to the said lessee. Learned counsel thus submitted that the original lessee filed Writ Petition No. 6058 of 2012 to protect the Waqf property; however, the same was withdrawn at the cost of the interest of the Waqf property. Thus, in such circumstances, the petitioner was left with no other remedy but to challenge the impugned order passed by the Waqf Tribunal to protect the interest of the Waqf property. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 30th November 2023, filed by the petitioner to support his submissions that there was a conflict of interest between respondent no.4, i.e. the Waqf and respondent no. 5-Developer. Though there is a conflict of interest between respondents nos. 4 and 5, they have engaged the same advocate to represent them before this Court. The Director of respondent no.5 has committed a criminal offence and intends to grab the Waqf property, which is donated for imparting religious education to the Muslim community. Hence, the petitioner is a beneficiary as defined under the Waqf Act and, thus, interested in the Waqf property. Thus, the petitioner, being an interested person, is aggrieved as the Waqf property is being alienated illegally. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present petition to protect the Waqf property. If the Waqf property is developed pursuant to the NOC issued by the Waqf Board, the petitioner will be deprived of getting the benefit of the waqf property and hence is an aggrieved person. 11. By relying upon paragraphs 16 and 17 of the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 30th November 2023, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there are various decisions of various High Courts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court taking the view that any Muslim would be interested in the properties of Waqf and thus would be aggrieved if such properties are alienated and transferred or disposed of illegally. Though respondents nos. 1 and 2 are under obligation to protect the waqf property, they have overlooked the serious illegalities committed by respondents nos. 4 and 5, and hence, the judgment and order passed by the Waqf Tribunal is not challenged by the said respondents. Learned counsel, thus, submitted that various allegations of fraud, collusion and forgery are demonstrated by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 12. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the entire record and proceedings with respect to respondent no. Learned counsel, thus, submitted that various allegations of fraud, collusion and forgery are demonstrated by the petitioner in the present writ petition. 12. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the entire record and proceedings with respect to respondent no. 4-Waqf in Waqf Suit No. 27 of 2021 also demonstrates the illegalities by respondents nos. 4 and 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the original NOC and the resolution allegedly passed by the Waqf Board are not available in the record and proceedings; hence, Waqf Suit No. 27 of 2021 is filed by the petitioner. Thus, the allegations made against respondents nos. 4 and 5, who have committed fraud by obtaining a fraudulent NOC dated 25th July 2011 for obtaining a favourable order from the Waqf Board, are required to be examined by this Court. 13. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following decisions Sk. Safk and Ors Vs Board of Wakfs and Ors, 2021 SCC Online Cal 250, Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan Vs Radha Kishan and Others, (1979) 2SCC 468. By relying upon the aforesaid decisions, he submitted that when the High Court has power on its own motion under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act, the definition of the word 'the aggrieved person' or 'interested person' is required to be given wider meaning. Hence, the petitioner would fall under the definition of 'interested person' as well as 'aggrieved person' and is thus entitled to challenge the impugned order passed by the Waqf Tribunal. He further submitted that this Court had passed an ad-interim relief in favour of the petitioner. Respondent no. 5 had filed an application for modification of the said interim relief, and this court had entertained and granted a modification of the interim relief as prayed by respondent no.5. He, thus, submitted that now, at this stage, respondent nos. 4 and 5 are not entitled to raise a preliminary objection on the locus of the petitioner for challenging the impugned judgment and order. Learned counsel thus submitted that even if an alternate remedy under Section 83 is available, the powers under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out the order dated 29th January 2014, passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6058 of 2012. Learned counsel thus submitted that even if an alternate remedy under Section 83 is available, the powers under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out the order dated 29th January 2014, passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 6058 of 2012. He submitted that the said petition was filed by the original lessee. He submitted that this Court, by recording a prima-facie finding that the NOC dated 25th July 2011, issued by the State Waqf Board in purported exercise of power under Section 32(4) of the Waqf Act, was without jurisdiction and had thus admitted the Writ Petition. By the said order, ad-interim relief was also granted by which there was an order of status quo in operation. However, by order dated 12th January 2021, the said original lessee withdrew the said petition. Hence, the order of status quo granted by this court came to an end in view of the withdrawal of the petition. Thereafter, respondent no. 5 challenged the Government Resolution by which the NOC granted for the development of the property was cancelled. The suit filed by respondent no.5 is allowed by the impugned order. He, thus, submitted that once there was an order of status quo passed by this court, which was in operation till 12th January 2021, the Waqf Tribunal should have restrained from passing the impugned order dated 11th April 2019. He submitted that since the impugned order was passed during the order of status quo passed by this Court, it amounts to committing contempt of this Court. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus submitted that respondent nos. 4 and 5 intend to grab the Waqf property. Hence, in view of the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the technical objection on the locus of the petitioner cannot be examined without looking into the merits of the matter. In view of the illegality committed by respondent nos. 4 and 5, the petitioner has the locus to file the present petition to protect the Waqf property. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there were four petitions pending in this court raising objections to the action of respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the attempt to grab the Waqf property. He submitted that by filing consent terms in three writ petitions all the four petitions stood withdrawn. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that there were four petitions pending in this court raising objections to the action of respondent nos. 4 and 5 in the attempt to grab the Waqf property. He submitted that by filing consent terms in three writ petitions all the four petitions stood withdrawn. He, thus, submitted that the action of respondent nos. 4 and 5 amounts to committing fraud on this Court. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the State Government had directed an inquiry by passing the order on 23rd March 2018. Pursuant to the said inquiry, a resolution was passed by the State Government for cancelling the NOC issued by the Waqf Board. He further submitted that the register maintained by the Waqf Board shows that NOC contains an outward number with regard to some properties situated in Pune. However, by using the said outward number, forged NOC was prepared for the present property, which is situated at Panvel. There was an inquiry initiated pursuant to the order passed by the State Government, and in the inquiry, it was found that the NOC relied upon by respondents nos. 4 and 5 was forged; hence, the State Government passed a resolution in the exercise of powers conferred under Section 97 of the Waqf Act. The Waqf Tribunal has set aside the resolution passed by the State Government cancelling the NOC for the development of the Waqf property. He submitted that neither the Waqf Board nor the State Government had challenged the setting aside of the orders passed by the State Government. Hence, the petitioner was constrained to approach this Court when he learnt about the aforesaid facts when the actual construction started in the month of June 2021. He, therefore, submitted that to protect the waqf property, the petitioner has the locus to file the present petition. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS NOS. 4 AND 5: 17. Learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 submitted that the preliminary objection is based on the provision of Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act and not only on the ground that since the impugned order is revisable, the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not be entertained, in as much as even the revisional jurisdiction vest in this Court. 4 and 5 submitted that the preliminary objection is based on the provision of Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act and not only on the ground that since the impugned order is revisable, the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not be entertained, in as much as even the revisional jurisdiction vest in this Court. He thus submitted that even when the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is invoked, the parameters of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act are required to be taken into consideration. 18. According to the learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 4 and 5, unlike the expression "person interested" defined in Section 3(k) of the Waqf Act, the expression "person aggrieved" is not defined. The requirement of Section 83(9) is that the party aggrieved can invoke the revisional jurisdiction. The petition does not contain any pleading as to how the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order. According to the learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Section 83(2) is misconceived, as the same deals with the locus of a party to approach the Waqf Tribunal. The term "aggrieved person" used in Section 83(9) is much narrower compared to the term "interested person" used in Section 83(2). Hence, only by claiming to be an interested party the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction under Section 83(9) in the absence of any pleading about how he is aggrieved by the impugned order. 19. Learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 4 and 5 submitted that after the impugned order was passed on 11th April 2019, the petitioner filed a Suit before the Waqf Tribunal on 1st February 2021, praying for an order of injunction. The petitioner has not challenged the NOC in the said suit. Hence, in view of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code ('CPC'), there is a bar to challenge the said NOC in the present petition filed on 17th February 2021. In the Waqf Suit filed before the Tribunal, the petitioner could have challenged the NOC as well as the resolution. However, he has chosen not to challenge the same before the Tribunal. In the Waqf Suit filed before the Tribunal, the petitioner could have challenged the NOC as well as the resolution. However, he has chosen not to challenge the same before the Tribunal. The resolution passed by the Waqf Board is never challenged by any party, and the said resolution is still subsisting, as seen on the official website of the Waqf Board. 20. Learned senior counsel submitted that respondents nos. 4 and 5 filed an application for rejection of the suit filed by the petitioner before the Waqf Tribunal by filing an application under Order VII of Rule 11 of CPC. However, the said application was rejected by the Waqf Tribunal. Hence, respondent nos. 4 and 5 have filed Civil Revision Application No.209 of 2023 in this Court. He submitted that the said Civil Revision Application is admitted by order dated 31st August 2023, and the further proceedings before the Waqf Tribunal are stayed. 21. Learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 referred to the findings recorded by the Waqf Tribunal in the impugned judgment from paragraph 39 onwards. He submitted that the Waqf Tribunal has examined all the records of the Waqf Board and held that the resolution passed by the State Government is illegal. He relied upon the resolution of the Waqf Board dated 8th June 2011 and the NOC dated 25th July 2011 issued pursuant to the said resolution. He submitted that there was never any challenge to the resolution passed by the Waqf Board. Hence, the petitioner, after a period of more than 10 years, is not entitled to raise any doubt on the resolution passed by the Waqf Board. Learned counsel submitted that under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act, only the aggrieved person is entitled to challenge the order passed by the Waqf Tribunal. The petitioner has not pleaded a single ground in support of his submission that he is an aggrieved person. in the entire arguments made on behalf of the petitioner, nothing is shown as to how the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Thus, the petitioner, not being an aggrieved person, is not entitled to challenge the judgment passed by the tribunal. 22. Learned senior counsel for respondents nos. in the entire arguments made on behalf of the petitioner, nothing is shown as to how the petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Thus, the petitioner, not being an aggrieved person, is not entitled to challenge the judgment passed by the tribunal. 22. Learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Ranjit Merchant and others Vs Kishor Ved and others , Second Appeal No. 469 of 2009, dated 25th January 2010. to support his submissions that an interested party necessarily need not be an aggrieved party who can be said to have suffered a legal grievance. 23. Learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 submitted that the remedy to challenge the resolution of the waqf board and the NOC is time-barred. The Board's Resolution and the NOC were never under challenge. However, the State Government, by the resolution dated 25th May 2018, had cancelled the NOC. The State Government's resolution is quashed and set aside by the Tribunal's order impugned in this petition. Hence, this petition, in effect, raises a challenge to the Board's resolution and the NOC after more than ten years by invoking writ jurisdiction, which amounts to abuse of the process of the law. He relied upon the legal principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions of State of Punjab Vs Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 and State of Punjab and another Vs Bakaran Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 709 . He, thus, submitted that it is a well-established principle of law that if a party finds an order to be void, the same has to be challenged within a reasonable time, i.e. three years. In the present case, the petitioner has not even pleaded as to how he is aggrieved by the impugned order and has invoked extraordinary powers under Article 227 to challenge the NOC after ten years, only on the ground that he is an interested party. Hence, this is not a fit case to exercise powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. SUBMISSIONS IN REJOINDER ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 24. In response to the submissions made on behalf of respondents nos. 4 and 5, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the expressions 'interested and aggrieved person' are interdependent and hence, both expressions are not interchangeable. SUBMISSIONS IN REJOINDER ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 24. In response to the submissions made on behalf of respondents nos. 4 and 5, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the expressions 'interested and aggrieved person' are interdependent and hence, both expressions are not interchangeable. He submitted that Section 72 of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act is deleted; therefore, the decision in the case of Ranjt Merchant relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 is not applicable to the present case. He submitted that even otherwise, Section 72 of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act did not give any suo moto power as given under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act. Hence, powers under the Maharashtra Public Trust Act and powers under the Waqf Act cannot be equated. He thus submitted that the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 would not preclude the petitioner from exercising his right and locus to challenge the impugned order passed by the Waqf Tribunal. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS. 2 AND 3 25. The learned counsel for respondents nos. 2 and 3, i.e. the Waqf Board and the Chief Executive Officer of the Board ("waqf board"), submitted that the resolution passed by the Waqf Board is not denied. However, the NOC relied upon by respondents nos. 4 and 5 was never issued by the Board. He submitted that respondent no.5, being the developer, was neither an aggrieved person nor an interested person; however, he had approached the Waqf Tribunal. Hence, even the petitioner has the right to challenge the order passed by the Waqf Tribunal. Learned counsel further submitted that sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act provides a list of people who can sue. The directions issued by the Waqf Tribunal are an order, and therefore, the action taken by the State Government directing to lodge FIR could not have been interfered with by the Waqf Tribunal. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction. He pointed out that an Additional Affidavit dated 28th November 2023 is filed by the Board's CEO to explain that earlier affidavit was filed on the basis of the available record believing the same to be original. Hence, the petitioner is entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction. He pointed out that an Additional Affidavit dated 28th November 2023 is filed by the Board's CEO to explain that earlier affidavit was filed on the basis of the available record believing the same to be original. However, it has been reported based on the record produced before the Tribunal in Waqf Suit No. 27 of 2021 that the original NOC is not traceable. Hence, he requested to discard the earlier affidavit filed on behalf of the Board supporting the NOC. He, therefore, submitted that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is a power of superintendence and thus, if the Waqf Tribunal is wrong in law and facts, the present Writ Petition is required to be entertained by the exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that this Court can even suo moto invoke the jurisdiction under sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act and also exercise powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ANALYSIS: 26. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties. This petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the judgment and order passed by the Waqf Tribunal allowing an application filed by respondent no. 5 under Section 83(2) of the Waqf Act. The petition also prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the State Waqf Board and its Chief Executive Officer to restore the Government Resolution dated 25th May 2018 issued by the State Government and file a criminal complaint against the developer and the Waqf. 27. By the impugned order, the Tribunal allowed the application filed by the developer, quashing and setting aside the Government Resolution dated 25th May 2018 directing the Maharashtra State Board of Waqf to cancel the NOC issued for the development of the property belonging to the Waqf. The Tribunal also set aside the letter dated 19th December 2018, issued by the Chief Executive Officer of the Waqf Board, authorising the Regional Waqf Officer to file a criminal complaint against the trustee of the Waqf and the developer. Thus, the petitioner in this petition challenges the Tribunal's order and supports the Government Resolution directing the setting aside of the NOC for the development of the Waqf property. 28. Thus, the petitioner in this petition challenges the Tribunal's order and supports the Government Resolution directing the setting aside of the NOC for the development of the Waqf property. 28. The impugned judgment and order is passed under Section 83(2) of the Waqf Act. Sub-section (7) of Section 83 gives finality to the decision of the Tribunal and binding effect on the parties to the application. An appeal against any decision or order of the Tribunal is barred by sub-section (9) of Section 83. The proviso to subsection (9) of Section 83 provides revisional jurisdiction to the High Court to be exercised suo moto or on an application of the Board or any person aggrieved. The petitioner was not a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal. The preliminary objection is that in view of the available remedy of revision, this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India may not be entertained. However, it is also submitted by the learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 that since even the revision application lies to the High Court, the preliminary objection is not only on the nomenclature. However, it is submitted that even while entertaining a petition under Article 227, the parameters contemplated under sub-section (9) of Section 83 are required to be considered. Thus, the argument raising the preliminary objection emphasises the term "aggrieved person" referred to in the proviso to the sub-section (9) of Section 83. It is, thus, argued that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be invoked only by an aggrieved person, and therefore, even the writ jurisdiction can be invoked only by an aggrieved person. Thus, the second argument on the preliminary objection is that the petitioner, not being an aggrieved person, has no locus to challenge the Tribunal's order. 29. Thus, given this backdrop, it is necessary to refer to the legal principles settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Devi Vs Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board and others, (2021) 15 SCC 15 relied upon the learned counsel for the petitioner. 29. Thus, given this backdrop, it is necessary to refer to the legal principles settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Devi Vs Bihar State Sunni Wakf Board and others, (2021) 15 SCC 15 relied upon the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the argument that the Waqf Tribunal's Order could not be challenged by way of a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as only a revision in terms of proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 could be preferred, held as under in paragraphs 22 and 25; "22. Therefore, when a petition is filed against an order of the Wakf Tribunal before the High Court, the High Court exercises the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is wholly immaterial that the petition was titled as a writ petition. It may be noticed that in certain High Courts, petition under Article 227 is titled as writ petition, in certain other High Courts as revision petition and in certain others as a miscellaneous petition. However, keeping in view the nature of the order passed, more particularly in the light of proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act, the High Court exercised jurisdiction only under the Act. The jurisdiction of the High Court is restricted to only examine the correctness, legality or propriety of the findings recorded by the Wakf Tribunal. The High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred under proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act does not act as the appellate court. 25. Therefore, the petition styled as one under Article 226 would not bar the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under the Act and/or under Article 227 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction of the High Court to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of determination of any dispute by the Tribunal is reserved with the High Court. The nomenclature of the proceedings as a petition under Article 226 or a petition under Article 227is wholly inconsequential and immaterial. " emphasis applied 30. Thus, even if the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is invoked, the High Court exercises jurisdiction under the Waqf Act. Hence, the nomenclature would not make any difference. The nomenclature of the proceedings as a petition under Article 226 or a petition under Article 227is wholly inconsequential and immaterial. " emphasis applied 30. Thus, even if the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is invoked, the High Court exercises jurisdiction under the Waqf Act. Hence, the nomenclature would not make any difference. However, the parameters contemplated under Section 83 of the Waqf Act are required to be taken into consideration. Thus, to examine whether the petitioner can be termed as an 'aggrieved person' as contemplated under the proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act or not, it is necessary to understand the provision of Section 83 as a whole. A complete and harmonious reading of Section 83 of the Waqf Act shows that the Waqf Tribunal's jurisdiction can be invoked by any mutawalli or person interested in a waqf or any other person aggrieved by an order made under the Act or rules framed thereunder by filing an application as contemplated under subsection (2) of Section 83 of the Act. The power of revision under sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act is vested with the High Court on its own motion or on an application of the Board or any person aggrieved as contemplated in the Proviso to the said sub-section (9). Thus, it is clear that when a person has an interest in the waqf and, therefore, claims to be an "interested person", he can invoke revisional powers if he is an aggrieved person as contemplated under the Proviso to the sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act. 31. Thus, if a person is an interested person having a right to invoke the Tribunal's jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section 83, the revisional jurisdiction under sub-section (9) of Section 83 can be invoked if the interested person is aggrieved by the Tribunal's decision. The different terms used in sub-sections (2) and (9) of Section 83 of the Act show that only being an interested person may not be a ground to invoke revisional jurisdiction unless the person is aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal. The Proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act also gives suo-moto powers to the High Court to call for and examine the records relating to any dispute, question or other matter which has been determined by the Tribunal. 32. The Proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act also gives suo-moto powers to the High Court to call for and examine the records relating to any dispute, question or other matter which has been determined by the Tribunal. 32. In the present case, the preliminary objection raised is on the locus of the petitioner to invoke the revisional jurisdiction. It is argued that the petitioner is neither an 'interested person' nor an 'aggrieved person'. For the purpose of deciding the preliminary objection on the locus of the petitioner to challenge the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, it is necessary to first examine whether the petitioner is an "interested person". To examine whether the petitioner is an interested person, it is necessary to understand the objects and the scheme of the Waqf. If the petitioner is found to be an interested person, it is further necessary to examine whether the petitioner being an interested person is aggrieved by the Tribunal's decision. Thus, for the purpose of examining whether the petitioner is an aggrieved person, it will be necessary to understand the nature of the development of the Waqf property permitted by the Board. 33. It is the petitioner's case that he, being a devotee of the Waqf, has a right to offer his prayers at the Waqf property and thus is an aggrieved person as he will not be able to offer his prayers if the Waqf property is developed, in view of the NOC; hence, he is entitled to challenge the NOC. Development of a waqf property ipso facto may not mean that a devotee's right to offer prayers at the waqf property is adversely affected. Thus, it will be necessary to understand the objects and scheme of the Waqf and the nature of development permitted by the Board. A perusal of the petitioner's pleadings indicates that the petitioner is claiming to be an interested person in the Waqf and wants to protect the Waqf property, as according to the Waqfnama dated 2nd November 1925, the Waqf properties were dedicated to the Almighty and were to be used only for charitable purpose and imparting religious education to the children belonging to the Muslim community. It is, thus, the petitioner's case that any alienation and development of the Waqf properties for commercial purposes is not permissible. It is, thus, the petitioner's case that any alienation and development of the Waqf properties for commercial purposes is not permissible. It is further the petitioner's case that the Board and the Board's CEO are not acting in the interest of the Waqf, and they failed to challenge the impugned order. Hence, after he noticed construction activities on the Waqf properties, he approached this Court. 34. The petitioner's further pleadings emphasise the facts about the litigation between the original lessee of the waqf property and the waqf. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the interim order of status quo passed in one of the petitions filed by the lessee. He further submitted that the Waqf properties were protected during the pendency of the said petition. However, respondent nos. 4 and 5 entered into consent terms in one of the petitions and the petition in which the interim order was operating, and the other pending petitions were withdrawn. Thus, it is argued on behalf of the petitioner that every attempt is made to grab the Waqf property and deprive the beneficiaries of the Waqf from utilising the Waqf property for the objects of the Waqf. Thus, it is the petitioner's case that he, being interested in the Waqf, intends to protect the Waqf property and is therefore aggrieved by the impugned order. Hence, it is submitted that the terms 'interested person' and 'aggrieved person' cannot be read independently. 35. Here, it is necessary to note a contrary stand taken by the Board by filing two affidavits in reply. A perusal of an additional Affidavit dated 28th November 2023 filed by the Board's CEO states that the record produced before the Tribunal in Waqf Suit No. 27 of 2021 shows that the original NOC is not traceable. Hence, it is requested to discard the earlier affidavit filed on behalf of the Board supporting the NOC. The learned counsel for the Board argued that if the Waqf Tribunal is wrong in law and facts, the present Writ Petition is required to be entertained by exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and even invoke suo moto jurisdiction under sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Act. Thus, prima facie it appears that there is some substance in the argument of the petitioner that no attempts are made by respondent nos. 1 and 2 to protect the Waqf property. Thus, prima facie it appears that there is some substance in the argument of the petitioner that no attempts are made by respondent nos. 1 and 2 to protect the Waqf property. However, I do not see any substance in the petitioner's argument that there is any conflict of interest between respondents nos. 4 and 5, and therefore, they cannot be represented by the same advocate. Even otherwise, the same is irrelevant to the controversy regarding the petitioner being an interested and aggrieved person. 36. Thus, the sum and substance of the petitioner's arguments is that the petitioner is an interested person in the Waqf and, therefore, aggrieved by the Tribunal's Order, as it revives the fabricated NOC permitting the development of the Waqf properties for commercial purposes, that was directed to be cancelled by the State Government. 37. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record two compilations of judgments. However, he has relied upon a selected few judgments of the Apex Court, this Court and other High Courts to support his arguments that the petitioner, being an interested person and an aggrieved person, has the locus to challenge the Tribunal's order impugned in this petition. I have gone through those relied-upon judgments in the case of Jasbhai Desai VS Roshan Kumar and others, (1976) 1 SCC 671 , Union of India Vs Nareshkumar and others, (2019) 18 SCC 586 , In Re Sidebothem, (1880) 14 CH D 458, M S Jayaraj Vs Commissioner of Excise, (2000) 7 SCC 552 , and Rajendra Agrawal Vs State of Maharashtra and others, 2013(1) Mh LJ 163. 38. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the decision of Jasbhai Desai has referred to the decision of the Chancery Division in the case of Re Sidebothem. The point for consideration before the Chancery Division arose out of a bankruptcy proceedings dealing with a contention that an undischarged bankrupt had no locus standi as he cannot be termed as an 'aggrieved person'. In this context, it was held that a person aggrieved has to be a person who suffered a legal grievance. The point for consideration before the Chancery Division arose out of a bankruptcy proceedings dealing with a contention that an undischarged bankrupt had no locus standi as he cannot be termed as an 'aggrieved person'. In this context, it was held that a person aggrieved has to be a person who suffered a legal grievance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the decision of Jasbhai Desai, was dealing with an issue of whether the proprietor of a cinema theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematograph films was entitled to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction to challenge a No Objection Certificate granted under the Bombay Cinema Rules 1954, to a rival party. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the decision of Jasbhai Desai also discussed various other Indian, English and American judgments on the expression 'aggrieved person' and 'locus standi' in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari and pointed out categories of persons in reference to the expression 'aggrieved person'. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of MS Jayaraj discussed the legal principles laid down in Jasbhai Desai and other subsequent decisions and held that the earlier strict interpretation regarding locus standi is changed and a much wider canvass has been adopted in later years regarding a person's entitlement to move the High Court involving writ jurisdiction. Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of M S Jayaraj considered the expanded concept of the locus standi and, considering the facts of that case, refused to reject the plea solely on the point of locus standi and proceeded to consider the case on merits. The decision of this Court in the case of Rajendra Agrawal dealt with the point of locus standi of a party who was the original complainant and sought to challenge the Government's Order reviving the keroscene licence by setting aside the order cancelling the licence under the Maharashtra Schedule Commodities, Retail Dealers Licensing Order 1979. This Court discussed the various decisions on the point of locus standi and aggrieved person, including the decisions in the case of Jasbhai Desai and M.S. Jayaraj and by taking into consideration the legal principles held that the expression 'person who is likely to be aggrieved thereby' in Clause 15(1) of the said 1996 Order necessitates liberal interpretation and thus took a view that the controversy could be decided by hearing the matter on merits. 39. 39. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sk. Safikand others Vs Board of Wakfs and others, 2021 SCC Online Cal 2507 which deals with the proposition on the maintainability of a suit before the Waqf Tribunal by a person interested in the Waqf. Thus, the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the powers under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act are discussed in the context of the challenge raised by the original plaintiffs concerning the correctness, legality and propriety of the Tribunal's findings in the suit filed before the Tribunal by the petitioner before the High Court. He also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Board of Muslim Waqfs Rajasthan Vs Radha Kishan and others, (1979) 2 SCC 468 which dealt with a challenge to the decision of the High Court holding inclusion of the property as waqf property to be not binding on the mortgagee purchasers who were strangers to the waqf. Thus, the said decision dealt with the question of interested persons in context with the challenge raised by the strangers to the Waqf before the Commissioner of Wakfs under the Wakf Act 1954. 40. Though none of these decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner deals with the expression 'aggrieved person' in the proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act, the legal principles as settled in these decisions give a wider interpretation to the expression 'locus standi' in the context of the grievance made with reference to the facts of those cases. 41. In the decision of Ranji Merchant relied upon by the learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5, this Court has discussed the legal principles laid down in the decisions of Re Sidebotham and Jasbhai Desai and held that the expression 'person aggrieved' is much narrower than the expression 'person having interest'. This Court, thus, held that though the applicants in the case of Ranjit Merchant were persons having an interest in the trust, they cannot be said to be persons who have suffered a legal grievance and therefore cannot be said to be 'persons aggrieved" to be able to resort to Section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. This Court, thus, held that though the applicants in the case of Ranjit Merchant were persons having an interest in the trust, they cannot be said to be persons who have suffered a legal grievance and therefore cannot be said to be 'persons aggrieved" to be able to resort to Section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that Section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act has been now deleted. Hence, the legal principles laid down based on the deleted provision of law cannot be applied to the present case. In my view only because Section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act is later on deleted from the statute book, it cannot be said that the legal principles laid down in the said decision are to be ignored. However, the observations made by this court on the expression 'aggrieved person' in the case of Ranji Merchant are after considering the case on merits. In the present case, the preliminary objection on the locus of the petitioner to raise a challenge to the Tribunal's order is on the ground that he is not an aggrieved person as contemplated in the proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act. Hence, the observations of this Court in the case of Ranji Merchant on the expression 'aggrieved person' cannot be of any assistance to the arguments of the learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 at this preliminary stage without examining the merits of the case. 42. Another argument raised by the learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 is on how the facts of the present petition have unfolded which shows that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person. Admittedly, the petitioner filed a Waqf Suit in the Tribunal praying for an injunction order against respondent no. 5 after the impugned order was passed; however, the Board's resolution to issue an NOC for the development of the Waqf property or the NOC issued pursuant to the said resolution is not under challenge in the said suit. Since the Government's resolution directing the cancellation of the NOC is set aside by the Tribunal's order, the Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the Tribunal's order. 43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Punjab l/s Gurdev Singh, relied upon by learned senior counsel for respondents nos. Since the Government's resolution directing the cancellation of the NOC is set aside by the Tribunal's order, the Petitioner has filed this petition challenging the Tribunal's order. 43. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of Punjab l/s Gurdev Singh, relied upon by learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5, dealt with the validity of an order passed against the party challenging the same after a lapse of reasonable time. This decision is followed in the similarly situated facts of the case of State of Punjab and another Vs Bakaran Singh. In the present case, the petitioner has immediately invoked the writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the Tribunal's Order, which deals with the challenge to the NOC issued by the Waqf Board on 25th July 2011 for the development of the waqf property pursuant to the resolution passed by the Waqf Board on 10th June 2011. In view of the aforesaid facts of the case, the legal principles settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 are not applicable to the present case. 44. The petitioner has filed a suit before the waqf tribunal, and the issue of whether the petitioner is an interested person and has a cause of action to file the suit is pending adjudication in the Civil Revision Application No. 209 of 2023 filed by respondent no. 5, which is admitted by order dated 31st August 2023. 45. To examine the issue of whether the petitioner is an interested person and an aggrieved person, it would be necessary to examine the scheme and objects of the Waqf and the effect of the development of the Waqf properties on the Waqf's objects. Thus, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of respondents nos. 4 and 5 on the locus of the petitioner to file the present petition needs to be examined on the basis of whether the petitioner is an interested person as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 83 and if he is an interested person, whether he is an aggrieved person as contemplated under the proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act. Hence, the decision in the Civil Revision Application will have a bearing on the issue of whether the petitioner is an aggrieved person on the ground of being an interested person in the Waqf. 46. Thus, I am of the view that the objection raised by the learned counsel for respondents nos. 4 and 5 on the locus of the petitioner on the ground that he is neither an interested person nor an aggrieved person cannot be decided as a preliminary issue without examining the merits of the case. In my opinion, the expression 'person aggrieved' in the proviso to sub-section (9) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act cannot be read dehors the expression 'interested person' used in sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the Waqf Act. 47. Hence, it would be appropriate to tag this petition with Civil Revision Application No. 209 of 2023 so that it can be heard finally. By order dated 6th June 2022 passed in Interim Application No. 2916 of 2022, the interim order dated 19th April 2022 is vacated. The said order dated 6th June 2022 recorded the undertaking filed by respondents nos. 4 and 5, and directions were issued to the Waqf Tribunal to decide the application below Exhibit 5 in Suit No. 27 of 2021. Hence, no further orders on interim relief at this stage. However, parties are at liberty to apply. 48. Hence, for the reasons recorded above following order is passed: (i) Rule. To be heard with Civil Revision Application No. 209 of 2023. (ii) Office is directed to take steps to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for necessary directions for listing this petition and Civil Revision Application No. 209 of 2023 before the same court. (iii) Interim Application No. 16757 of 2023 to be heard after both the matters are listed before the same Court.