JUDGMENT : This appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 24.01.2024 passed by the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur in S.T. No. 289/2021 convicting the accused/appellant under Section 307/34 IPC and sentencing him to undergo RI for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- with default stipulations. 2. Case of the prosecution in brief is that on 06.06.2021, mother of the injured has lodged a report at police station alleging that on that day at about 8.30 p.m. after taking meals, her son went out for a walk and at about 11.30 pm, he came with stab injuries on his stomach and asked her to take him to the hospital. On being asked, he informed that on account of some old dispute, some scuffle took place between Arjun Rajak, Ravi Dheemar and Manish Dheemar and after hurling abuses and threatening to kill, beat him with hands and fists and the present appellant Ravi Dheemar stabbed with knife on his abdomen as a result of which his intestine came out. On the basis of the said information, FIR was registered for the Crime No. 646/2021 under Sections 294,506, 307, 34 IPC. On the basis of memorandum of the present appellant, he was taken into custody. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellants on 28.05.2021. since the co-accused namely Manish Dheewar and Arjun @ Arun Rajak were juvenile, they are being tried before the Juvenile Justice Board. 3. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution has examined as many as 10 witnesses. 4. The trial Court, after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as above against which the present appeal has been preferred. 5. Contention of the counsel for the appellant is that as there was some old dispute between the injured and the appellant Ravi Dheemar, on the date of incident ie. 06.06.2021, the appellant along with two juvenile in conflict with law, hurled abuses and threatened to kill and thereafter stabbed with knife. He submits that even if the whole prosecution story is found to be true, then also on the available facts and evidence of the case, no offence is made out under Section 307/34 IPC against the appellant. He submits that apart from this, all the witnesses are family members and there are material contradictions in the statement of the witnesses. He submits that even if the whole prosecution story is found to be true, then also on the available facts and evidence of the case, no offence is made out under Section 307/34 IPC against the appellant. He submits that apart from this, all the witnesses are family members and there are material contradictions in the statement of the witnesses. It is further contended that neither there was intention nor there was any knowledge of the other accused to kill the complainant, as the other accused were not armed with weapons. It is further contended that the injury was not sufficient to cause death and there has been material contradiction and omission in the statement of the witnesses. It is further stated that except the victim, the other witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution, therefore, the conviction cannot be sustained and conviction under Section 307 of I.P.C. deserves to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment it has been argued by the State counsel that the appellants have acted in such a manner that they have shared common intention to commit the offence. Thus, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence is based on sound principle of law and hence the judgment impugned does not require any interference. 7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 8. Geeta Talewar (PW-1) mother of the injured has stated that on the date of incident, at about 8-8.30p.m. her son had gone for a walk after taking meals and at about 11.20 p.m. he returned home and informed that he had been stabbed by the appellants and to take him to the hospital. When she asked about the injury sustained by him, he narrated that the accused/appellants have hurled abuses, with an intention to kill, assaulted with hands and fists and stabbed with knife on account of some old dispute. She has lodged the FIR Ex.P-1 at police Station Sarkanda and spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-2. 9. Injured Manoj Talewar (pw-2) has stated that on the date of incident, at about 10.30-11.00 pm. after taking meals he went for a walk and at that time, the accused/appellant started quarelling and abusing him. Thereafter, the present appelalnt stabbed him with a knife on his a abdomen and his intestine came out. 9. Injured Manoj Talewar (pw-2) has stated that on the date of incident, at about 10.30-11.00 pm. after taking meals he went for a walk and at that time, the accused/appellant started quarelling and abusing him. Thereafter, the present appelalnt stabbed him with a knife on his a abdomen and his intestine came out. He came home and informed about the incident to his mother and he was taken to CIMS hospital, Bilaspur where he was admitted and was under treatment for 15 days. Gopal Talewar (PW-3) is the father of injured Manoj Talewar and has made similar statement to that of PW-2 and 3. Dr. Yagneshwar Sharma (PW-6) has medically examined the injured Manoj Talewar and gave his report Ex.P-7 and has opined that there was intra abdominal content (tissues) seen coming out of injury site (suspected stab wound). There was perforation (through and through)in the size 0.5 x0.5 cm. each seen in anterior and posterior wall of ileum near mesenteric border at 3 ft. from IC junction (ileocecal junction). He has medically examined and performed surgery and the report is Ex.P-7. Dr. Shubha Ekka (PW-7) is the Assistant Profession of Surgery Department, CIMS, Bilaspur and she assisted in the surgery of the injured. 10. It is further stated that the said injuries were inflicted by sharp cutting weapon within 6 hours. The Doctor has further stated that the inflicted injury might have been inflicted by the said seized weapon i.e. Knife. In the background of this case, when the relationship between the medical evidence and ocular evidence is considered and tested, which shows that the injured has contended and maintained his stand that he received stab injuries and have named the present appellant of inflicting injury. The fact that earlier there was some quarrel between the appellant, accused persons and the injured and in furtherance of which the incident took place on account of which deadly injury was inflicted on the vital part of the body. The Doctor who operated the victim and stated that emergency operation was carried out and repair of the internal organ was also made since the bleeding was caused by the injury on the abdomen and ileocecal perforation. Thus, reading of the ocular evidence along with the medical evidence, inherent consistency appears and the probability of the incident has been established, which makes the statement of the witnesses creditworthy. Thus, reading of the ocular evidence along with the medical evidence, inherent consistency appears and the probability of the incident has been established, which makes the statement of the witnesses creditworthy. The probative value of the evidence i.e. injured and also the Doctor when are read together, it establishes that the injuries inflicted were fatal in nature, which could have taken the life of the injured. 11. In the instant case, injured Manoj Talewar (PW-2) has categorically stated that it is the appellant who caused knife injury to him on his abdomen. Evidence of this witness gets corroborated from the promptly lodged FIR (Ex.P-1) naming the appellant to be the perpetrator of crime and the medical report (Ex.P-7) by Dr. Yagneshwar Sharma(PW-6). In these circumstances, the complicity of accused/appellant in crime in question stands proved beyond reasonable doubt. 12. With respect to the evidence of victim, recently the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 513-514 of 2014 decided on 09.01.2017 in case of Baleshwar Mahto & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr., has reiterated the law laid down in case of Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which was reported in (2010) 10 SCC 259 , which reads as under : 28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone. “Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.” [Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar [ (1973) 3 SCC 881 :1973 SCC (Cri)563: AIR 1972 SC 2593 ], Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P.[ (1975) 3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919 : AIR 1975 SC 12 ],Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983SCC (Cri) 681], Appabhai v. State of Gujarat [1988 SuppSCC 241 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 559 : AIR 1988 SC 696 ], Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra [ (1995) 6 SCC 447 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1113], Bhag Singh [ (1997) 7 SCC 712 : 1997 SCC (Cri)1163], Mohar v. State of U.P. [ (2002) 7 SCC 606 : 2003 SCC(Cri) 121] (SCC p. 606 b- c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan [ (2008) 8 SCC 270 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 472],Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan [ (2009) 10 SCC 477 : (2010) 1SCC (Cri) 302], Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 12 SCC 546 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 630] and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [ (2010) 6 SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211]. 29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29) “28........In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident. 29. 29. In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [ (2004) 7 SCC 629 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [ (2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214]). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the courts below.” 30. The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.” 13. Therefore, if we interpret the aforesaid principles in the facts of this case, it would show that the injured has named the accused, therefore, the minor contradictions that all the accused were very much present at the time of occurrence and have actively participated to cause injury to victim cannot be easily ignored. 14. Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for a criminal act done by him. The principle of criminal liability is that the person who commits an offence is responsible for that and he can only be held guilty. However, Section 34 of the Penal Code makes an exception to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention, animating the accused leading to doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. However, Section 34 of the Penal Code makes an exception to this principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention, animating the accused leading to doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. It deals with doing of separate acts, similar or adverse by several persons, if all are done in furtherance of common intention. In such situation, each person is liable for result of that as if he had done that act himself. Section 34 of the Penal Code thus lays down a principle of joint criminal liability. The common intention is gathered from the manner in which the crime has been committed, the conduct of the accused soon before and after the occurrence, the determination and concern with which the crime was committed, the weapon carried by the accused and from the nature of the injury caused by one or some of them. 15. In the circumstances of this case and the statement of the victim would show that on the date of incident, at about 8.30 p.m. after taking meals, her son went out for a walk and at about 11.30 pm, he came with stab injuries on his stomach and asked her to take him to the hospital. On being asked, he informed that on account of some old dispute, some scuffle took place between Arjun Rajak, Ravi Dheemar and Manish Dheemar and after hurling abuses and threatening to kill, beat him with hands and fists and the present appellant Ravi Dheemar stabbed with knife on his stomach as a result of which his intestine came out. The appellants in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. did not give any explanation to entire conduct. The very preparation of the entire act would show that the accused had all intention to disable the injured at the time of assault with weapon. 16. As has been held in State of Rajasthan v. Shobha Ram reported in (2013) 14 SCC 732 wherein the Court while evaluating the case has reiterated the principle of Section 34 of the Penal Code, which reads as under : 8. 16. As has been held in State of Rajasthan v. Shobha Ram reported in (2013) 14 SCC 732 wherein the Court while evaluating the case has reiterated the principle of Section 34 of the Penal Code, which reads as under : 8. The nuances of Section 34 of the IPC have been explained by this Court in several decisions, but we will only refer to the decision in Nadodi Jayaraman v. State of T.N. [1992 Supp (3) SCC 161] and Saravanan v. State of Pondicherry [ (2004) 13 SCC 238 ]. In Saravanan, the Court has observed:- “9. Section 34 of IPC enacts that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons, is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The section thus lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is found in the existence of “common intention” animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. The section is intended to meet a case in which it is difficult to distinguish between the act of individual members of a party and to prove exactly what part was played by each of them. It, therefore, enacts that once it is found that a criminal act has been committed by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for the criminal act as if it were done by him alone. It is thus, an exception to the general rule of criminal jurisprudence that it is the primary responsibility of the person who actually commits a crime and only that person can be held guilty and punished in accordance with law for his individual act. 15. It is thus clear that the criminal act referred to in Section 34 IPC is the result of the concerted action of more than one person if the said result was reached in furtherance of the common intention and each person must be held liable for the ultimate result as if he had done it himself.” 17. A perusal of Section 34 of the IPC would clearly indicate that there must be two ingredients for convicting a person with the aid of Section 34 IPC. A perusal of Section 34 of the IPC would clearly indicate that there must be two ingredients for convicting a person with the aid of Section 34 IPC. Firstly, there must be a common intention and secondly, there must be participation by the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention. If the common intention is proved, it may not be necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must be arising out of the same common intention in order to attract the provision. The said principle is reiterated in a three-judge bench decision in Suresh v. State of U.P. [ (2001) 3 SCC 673 ] and Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu [ (1976) 3 SCC 779 ], wherein the court has stated that : “12.......The acts committed by different confederates in the criminal action may be different, but all must in one way or the other participate and engage in the criminal enterprise, for instance, one may only stand guard to prevent any person coming to the relief of the victim or may otherwise facilitate the commission of crime. Such a person also commits an "act" as much as his co-participants actually committing the planned crime.” In the case of an offence involving physical violence, the person who instigates or aids the commission of the crime must be physically present and such presence of those who in one way or the other facilitate the execution of the common design, is itself tantamount to actual participation in the “criminal act”. 10. Insofar as common intention is concerned, it is a state of mind of an accused which can be inferred objectively from his conduct displayed in the course of commission of crime and also from prior and subsequent attendant circumstances. As observed in Hari Ram vs. State of U.P. [ (2004) 8 SCC 146 ], the existence of direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. As observed in Hari Ram vs. State of U.P. [ (2004) 8 SCC 146 ], the existence of direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. Therefore, in order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence before a person can be vicariously convicted for the act of the other. 18. The Supreme Court in case of Birendra Das & Anr. v. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 236 has reiterated the principles laid down in case of Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 174 ], which is reproduced as under : 17. The Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1963 SC 174 ], while adverting to the concept of Section 34 IPC, has ruled thus: “13.... Like Section 149, Section 34 also deals with cases of constructive criminal liability. It provides that where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. The essential constituent of the vicarious criminal liability prescribed by Section 34 is the existence of common intention. If the common intention in question animates the accused persons and if the said common intention leads to the commission of the criminal offence charged, each of the persons sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by one of them. Just as the combination of persons sharing the same common object is one of the features of an unlawful assembly, so the existence of a combination of persons, sharing the same common intention is one of the features of Section 34.” 19. From perusal of entire statements of the witnesses, on proper scrutiny and analysis, the existence of motive and the act of the accused leads to point out that all the three accused had shared the common intention with meeting of minds, therefore, would make them liable for the offence committed irrespective of the role which they had played. From perusal of entire statements of the witnesses, on proper scrutiny and analysis, the existence of motive and the act of the accused leads to point out that all the three accused had shared the common intention with meeting of minds, therefore, would make them liable for the offence committed irrespective of the role which they had played. The conduct of the present appellant soon before and after the occurrence and the way, the injury was inflicted on the victim however leads to irresistible conclusion that all the accused had shared common intention with the accused who inflicted the injury. 20. In the result, the accused is liable to be punished under Section 307 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. The appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed. The appellant is in jail and therefore no further order for his surrender or arrest is required.