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2024 DIGILAW 639 (KAR)

Special Land Acquisition Officer Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. B. Hanumanthi W/O. Sri. Anjineya

2024-11-26

KRISHNA S.DIXIT, VIJAYKUMAR A.PATIL

body2024
JUDGMENT : KRISHNA S.DIXIT, J. All these appeals seek to call in question multiple Judgments & Award(s) entered by the Reference Court under Section 18(1) of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894 whereby compensation has been enhanced after determining the market value of the lands acquired, afresh. In one set of these appeals preferred by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) is the immediate beneficiary of acquisition, mediate beneficiary being the Allottee. Both they complained that the enhancement of compensation is exponential qua the SLAO Award and the same is unjustified. In other set of appeals preferred by the claimants, grievance is that the enhancement of compensation falls short of what is legally due to them. II. FOUNDATIONAL FACTS OF THE CASE: a) The KIADB is a statutory entity established under Section 5 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966. As the title of the Act indicates, it is formed for the purpose of establishing/developing industrial area. It earmarks the areas comprising ordinarily private lands for being declared as industrial areas by the State Government. The Act provides for acquisition of private lands for public purpose on payment of compensation to the persons interested in the lands. It is the State Government, which notifies acquisition process under the provisions of Section 28 of the 1966 Act. The proposal was to acquire in all, 4950.61 acres in four villages of Ballari District; the extents of lands and villages in which they are situate are furnished in a tabular form below: Extent of lands Village 1636.53 acres Kuditini 1138.14 acres Kolagallu 2130.11 acres Veniveerapura 43.83 acres Yarangalige b) All these lands have been acquired under the provisions of 1966 Act for setting up industries, is not in dispute. The Preliminary Notification was published on 06.05.2010; the Final Notification was published on 23.08.2010; Notice under Sections 9 & 10 was issued on 29.05.2012; possession also came to be taken in due course. None of the landowners objected to the acquisition process. It is the case of claimants that on 28.09.2010, the Price Advisory Committee (PAC) meeting was convened under the Chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner of Ballari District; Rs.5,00,000/-, Rs.6,00,000/- and Rs.8,00,000/- were offered as compensation per acre depending upon the location, nature & potentiality of the lands. None of the landowners objected to the acquisition process. It is the case of claimants that on 28.09.2010, the Price Advisory Committee (PAC) meeting was convened under the Chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner of Ballari District; Rs.5,00,000/-, Rs.6,00,000/- and Rs.8,00,000/- were offered as compensation per acre depending upon the location, nature & potentiality of the lands. c) The PAC had fixed compensation at the rate of Rs.1,50,000/- for the lands in Kuditini Village, Rs.2,31,000/- for the lands in Kolagallu Village, Rs.1,86,000/- for the lands in Veniveerapura Village, and Rs.22,000/- for the lands in Yerangalige Village. This was per acre price. They did not agree to the same groaning that it was inadequate. Award came to be passed on 25.05.2013 accordingly. The claimants received the award amount under protest. Therefore, the Reference Cases arose under Section 18(1) of 1894 Act. The Allottee of the lands was impleaded as a respondent in the reference proceedings. The KIADB and the Allottee resisted the claim for enhancement of compensation. d) In the trial of all the clubbed Reference Cases, as many as 33 witnesses were examined from the side of claimants and 184 documents came to be produced & marked as Exs.P.1 to P.184. These documents inter alia comprised of General Awards, sketch of lands, statutory notices, Government Circulars, statistics of sale prices from Sub-Registrar’s Office, Sale Deeds, Section 11 notices; Section 12(2) notices, Encumbrance Certificates, Powers of Attorney, RTCs, Spot Inspection Reports, Valuation Report, LAC judgments, KIADB sketches, etc. From the side of respondents, one Smt. Saroja B.B., Special Land Acquisition Officer, was examined as R.W.1 and, in her deposition, 9 documents came to be produced & marked as Exs.R.1 to R.9. These documents comprised of General Award, Sub-Registrar’s Report, chart of beneficiaries & details of lands allotted to them, sketch of lands acquired, proceedings of PAC (JSW Steels & Shathavahana Ispat), High Court judgment & Sale Deeds. e) The Reference Cases in the subject LACs came to be allowed by the impugned Judgments & Award(s) enhancing the compensation with the observation: “…Hence, the compensation awarded by the LAO is enhanced for the lands fixed at Rs.5,00,000/- to Rs.10,00,000/- per acre, Rs.6,00,000/- to Rs.11,00,000/-per acre and Rs.8,00,000/- to Rs.13,00,000/- per acre (i.e. for each acre Rs.5,00,000/- has been enhanced)…”. The KIADB has preferred a set of appeals on the ground that exponential enhancement of compensation is unjustified. The KIADB has preferred a set of appeals on the ground that exponential enhancement of compensation is unjustified. On the contrary, claimants too have preferred other set of appeals grieving that determination of compensation at the hands of the Reference Court is frugal. The Allottee-Company had moved a Review Petition which came to be dismissed on 02.02.2023. However, challenge to the same in writ jurisdiction came to be allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. Accordingly, the Award came to be modified by downsizing the compensation amount as under: Village SLAO Award (Per Acre) Reference (Per Acre) Court Total (Per Acre) Kudithini Rs.1,50,000/- Rs.5,00,000/- Rs.6,50,000/- Veeniveerapura Rs.1,86,000/- Rs.5,00,000/- Rs.6,68,000/- Yerrangali Rs. 22,000/- Rs.5,00,000/- Rs.5,22,000/- Kolagallu Rs.2,31,000/- Rs.5,00,000/- Rs.7,31,000/- III. We have heard the learned Panel Counsel appearing for the KIADB, learned Senior Advocate representing the Allottee of lands and learned Advocates appearing for the claimants. We have also perused Appeal Papers and records. We have adverted to the relevance of an avalanche of Rulings cited at the Bar. Our discussion follows as under: 1. AS TO TRANSPOSITION OF ALLOTTEE OF LANDS AS A CO-APPELLANT IN THE APPEALS FILED BY KIADB: 1.1. The Allottee of the lands, M/s. Uttam Galva Ferrous Ltd., who happens to be one of the respondents in these appeals, has moved an application seeking transposition as a co-appellant in the appeals filed by the KIADB. Learned counsel appearing for the Allottee submitted that his client had participated in the proceedings of KIADB, of PAC and of LAC proceedings; he has been rightly arrayed as a respondent in both the sets of appeals; it is he who has to bear the brunt of paying enhanced compensation and therefore, he has legitimate right to be transposed as a co-appellant and that he is ready & willing to pay the ad valorem court fees, as well. He invokes the principles of natural justice. Learned advocates appearing for the claimants opposed the application for transposition heavily placing reliance on Apex Court decision in GREGORY PATROV VS. MANGALORE REFINERY & PETROCHEMICALS LTD. (2022) 10 SCC 461 1.2. Ordinarily, it is the State Government which exercises the power of eminent domain and thereby acquires private property for public purpose. In this case, accordingly the acquisition of lands has been accomplished under the provisions of Section 28/29 of 1966 Act principally at the instance of KIADB. MANGALORE REFINERY & PETROCHEMICALS LTD. (2022) 10 SCC 461 1.2. Ordinarily, it is the State Government which exercises the power of eminent domain and thereby acquires private property for public purpose. In this case, accordingly the acquisition of lands has been accomplished under the provisions of Section 28/29 of 1966 Act principally at the instance of KIADB. Therefore, ordinarily KIADB happens to be the beneficiary having interest in the land. However, when a large chunk of lands i.e., 4950.61 acres is allotted to an entity, it will be incongruous to not to hear it on the technical point of its being not a necessary or proper party. It is not in dispute that compensation has been paid in respect of very large extent of lands by way of consent awards. What prejudice would be caused to the claimants if the Allottee is heard in the matter, is not demonstrated except citing the decision supra. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.Dhyan Chinnappa graciously agreed that the transposition being a matter of formality, if his client is heard in the matter, no formal orders need to be passed on the request for transposition. We also noticed that in the appeals of the claimants no ground is taken up to falter impleadment of the Allottee by the Reference Court; this could have been raised as a grievance in their appeals as provided under Order XLIII Rule 1A of Amended CPC,1908. However, that has not been done. 1.3 Added, in matters like this, hearing all the stake holders would infuse a sense of justice in them, since gigantic financial implications are involved. If the enhancement of compensation is sustained, the burden would be on the Allottee of lands inasmuch as, the said allotment is admittedly subject to outcome inter alia of alteration of compensation amount in reference under Section 18 or Section 28A of the erstwhile Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is said that even God is said to have given an opportunity of hearing to Adam & Eve before punishing them for consuming the proscribed fruit in the Eden Garden. This broad view of ours does not offend the ratio in GREGORY PATROV supra. We have also noticed the observations of the Apex Court in its order in Civil Appeal Nos.621-700/2023 between B.RAVI PRAKASH, ETC. VS. This broad view of ours does not offend the ratio in GREGORY PATROV supra. We have also noticed the observations of the Apex Court in its order in Civil Appeal Nos.621-700/2023 between B.RAVI PRAKASH, ETC. VS. KIADB, disposed of on 31.01.2023 wherein Allottee of the kind has been treated as the beneficiary or at least as an entity which would have laid challenge to the enhancement of compensation done in reference jurisdiction. This decision is relied upon by the Advocate appearing for the claimants, of course, to press some other point. Much is not necessary to deliberate. Suffice it to say that the Allottee needed to be heard in the matter and accordingly, we have done. 2. AS TO RELEVANCY AND WEIGHTAGE OF THE SALE DEEDS AT EXS.P27 & P28: 2.1. Learned advocates appearing for the claimants vehemently argued that the Reference Court grossly erred in not acting upon the documents at Ex.P27 i.e., Sale Deed dated 02.02.2010 & Ex.P28 i.e., another Sale Deed dated 29.01.2010 and the reasons given for that are unsustainable. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dhyan Chinnappa appearing for the Allottee of the land and learned Panel Counsel appearing for the KIADB made submission in support of reasoning of the Court below, so far as the relevance and evidentiary value of these documents are concerned. In the Judgment & Award(s) rendered in LAC No.1/2014 connected with other LACs, this aspect of the matter has been discussed inter alia in paragraph Nos.33 to 36. The sale deed dated 02.02.2010 (Ex.P27) mentions Rs.25,00,000/- as consideration for the sale of one acre of agricultural land executed way back in February 2010; it comprises of a dry land. The sale deed dated 29.01.2010 (Ex.P28) mentions Rs.30,000/- as consideration; strangely, it is paid in cash…; it comprises of a house site admeasuring 30 x 41½ sq. ft. situate in a housing layout within the gaunthaana i.e., Ward No.7 of Kuduthini Gram Panchayat, although it is converted to non-agricultural user. Why it was so converted remains a mystery. Be that as it may. 2.2. Nothing is produced on record to show that these two properties are in the proximity of the lands in acquisition; true it is, both these properties are situate in the same village; that fact per se does not make the price pattern a Thumb Rule, several other factors obviously entering the fray. Be that as it may. 2.2. Nothing is produced on record to show that these two properties are in the proximity of the lands in acquisition; true it is, both these properties are situate in the same village; that fact per se does not make the price pattern a Thumb Rule, several other factors obviously entering the fray. Neither the sellers nor buyers nor the scribe nor the witnesses have been examined to vouchsafe the prices stated therein being true, despite all they hailing from the same village. No explanation is offered for not calling any of them to the witness box. It is not that all of them have gone with the wind or otherwise were not available. This is how learned Judge of the Reference Court has reasoned out at paragraphs 33 & 34 of the impugned judgment, although it is not that articulate. 2.3. In saying the above, we have also kept in mind Apex Court decision in CEMENT CORPORATION OF INDIA VS. PURIA (2004) 8 SCC 270 , wherein at para 33, it is observed, as under: “33. The submission of Mr. G. Chandrasekhar to the effect that the contents of a sale deed should be a conclusive proof as regard the transaction contained therein or the court must raise a mandatory presumption in relation thereto in terms of Section 51A of the Act cannot be accepted as the Court may or may not receive a certified copy of sale deed in evidence. It is discretionary in nature. Only because a document is admissible in evidence, as would appear from the discussions made hereinbefore, the same by itself would not mean that the contents thereof stand proved. Secondly, having regard to the other materials brought on record, the court may not accept the evidence contained in a deed of sale. When materials are brought on record by the parties to the lis, the court is entitled to appreciate the evidence brought on records for determining the issues raised before it and in the said process, may accept one piece of evidence and reject the other.” It hardly needs to be stated that the prices stated in the conveyances cannot be taken as gospel truths, although they may be taken as presumptive, depending upon variable circumstances. 2.4. 2.4. As already mentioned, these two sale deeds are executed more than two years anterior to the issuance of Preliminary Notification (06.05.2010). The Court below has rightly felt that there are other contemporaneous conveyances which taken together diminish the evidentiary weightage of Exs.P27 & P28, since they are in the nature of stray transactions. It was Aristotle who said “…For one swallow does not make a summer…”[The Nicomachean Ethics, 350 BC] (it is also ascribed to Shakespeare). Added Ex.P28 which mentions of 30 x 41½ sq. ft. site in a housing layout carved out in a ‘NA Land’, pales into insignificance when the acquisition involves thousands of acres of agricultural land. When acquisition is in acreage, ‘feet unit’ is not the right yardstick for the determination of market value vide SLAO VS. M.K.RAFIQ SAHEB AIR 2011 SC 3178 . Added to this, the Court below at Paragraph No.32 has referred to a plethora of documents which would become more plausible & forefront evidence. 2.5. To show that the prices stated in Exs.P27 & P28 cannot be taken at their face value at least for the purpose of determining the market value of the subject lands, our attention is rightly drawn to the observations of the Reference Court at Paragraph No.36 of the impugned judgment and we cannot disagree with its reason & logic. The Market Value Assessment Register Extract issued by the Sub-Registrar has been produced by the KIADB as Ex.R3 in the deposition of RW1. Its gist is as under: (a) During the year 2008, there were as many as 15 sale transactions in respect of lands in Kuidithini Village. Their statistical data is put in a tabular form for ease of understanding: Date of sale deeds Extent of Lands (in Acres) Consideration/price 10.01.2008 2.32 Rs.1,62,500/- 11.02.2008 1.00 Rs.80,000/- 28.01.2008 1.41 Rs.85,000/- 26.02.2008 4.98 Rs.3,33,000/- 11.08.2008 4.34 Rs.6,51,000/- 20.08.2008 6.86 Rs.6,18,000/- 22.08.2008 2.21 Rs.1,06,000/- 01.09.2008 3.10 Rs.6,20,000/- 20.02.2009 1.17 Rs.1,75,500/- 04.06.2009 3.15 Rs.2,84,000/- 13.08.2009 3.00 Rs.2,25,000/- 12.04.2009 12.66 Rs.12,15,000/- 24.04.2010 1.50 Rs.1,25,000/- 20.05.2010 5.15 Rs.3,87,000/- 27.05.2010 1.03 Rs.2,06,000/- Total 53.88 Rs.52,73,000/- The average of all this arithmetically works out to be Rs.97,866/- per acre. (b) Learned Judge of the Court below, has observed that during the period between February 2008 and May 2010, no land is sold in the Village of V.V. Pura for a price beyond Rs.3,00,000/- per acre. (b) Learned Judge of the Court below, has observed that during the period between February 2008 and May 2010, no land is sold in the Village of V.V. Pura for a price beyond Rs.3,00,000/- per acre. Similarly, during the period between April 2007 and March 2010, no land is sold in Haraginadooni Village for a price beyond Rs.3,00,000/- per acre. During the period between May 2007 and April 2010 lands were sold in Yarangali Village for a price lesser than Rs.3,00,000/- per acre. Learned Judge has rightly observed at Page No. 137 of the impugned Judgment & Award(s): “… perusal of the documents i.e., Ex.R3 discloses that the approximate value for which the lands have been alienated in the year 2008 to 2010 is not more than the amount in between Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.4,00,000/- per acre. Hence, if we compare the transactions from the year 2007 to 2010 as per Ex.R3 and Ex.P27, there is lot of difference in the amount of sale consideration which is highly inconsistent. As per Ex.P17 one acre of land in Sy.No.670 B2 was sold for Rs.25,00,000/- on 06.02.2010. But in the same village in the same area none of the lands has been sold more than Rs.3,00,000/- per acre as per Ex.R3. … Moreover the Ex.R3 is more probable than the Ex.P27, because the Ex.R3 was issued by the Sub-Registrar, Kurugodu. …” (sic). (c) It is also relevant to mention here that no explanation is offered by the claimants as to why they have not produced any sale statistics for the years proximately subsequent to the issuance of Preliminary Notification; if one wants to rely upon the sale transactions that precede the issuance of Preliminary Notification then with some arguable degree of proximity in time & place, one has to, in all fairness, produce similar statistical sale data for the immediately succeeding period, so that some guess work as to the variation of prices can be undertaken and a fair yardstick for the determination of market value can be secured. No explanation is offered from the side of claimants even before us as to why that exercise was not undertaken. It hardly needs to be stated that one who knocks at the doors of Court, has to do it with “clean head, clean heart & clean hands”. The Reference Court therefore, has rightly doubted the bonafide of claimants. No explanation is offered from the side of claimants even before us as to why that exercise was not undertaken. It hardly needs to be stated that one who knocks at the doors of Court, has to do it with “clean head, clean heart & clean hands”. The Reference Court therefore, has rightly doubted the bonafide of claimants. More discussion in this regard is not called for. 3. AS TO RELEVANCY OF JUDGMENT IN LAC NO.30/2013, AS A PIECE OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: 3.1. The Advocates appearing for the claimants vehemently submitted that Ex.P27 i.e. Sale Deed dated 02.02.2010 comprising one acre of land sold at a price of Rs.25,00,000/- was Ex.P23 in LAC No.30/2013 & connected matters, disposed off on 01.03.2016 whereby compensation was re-determined at the rate of Rs.30,20,270/- per acre; the said judgment was set aside by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in M.F.A. No.101713/2016 (LAC) & other cases, between KIADB VS. J.HANUMAKKA, on 08.01.2013; the order of the Co-ordinate Bench has been set at naught by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.621-700/2023 between ARCELOR MITTAL INDIA PVT. LTD. VS. B.PRAKASH, disposed off on 31.01.2023; even the Review Petition Nos.1414-1428/2023 & connected matters are also dismissed on 06.08.2024; that being the position, what has been awarded as enhanced compensation in LAC No.30/2013, would become a substantive evidence for granting enhancement in terms of claimants’ appeals. 3.2. Per contra, learned Advocates appearing for the KIADB and Allottee of the lands contended that the judgment rendered in the said LAC cannot constitute a substantive evidence inasmuch as: The same is not relevant under Sections 40 to 44 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; the enhancement of compensation in the said LAC has not been done as per the known principles obtaining in the field; the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench has been faltered on the technical point of locus standii and therefore, Apex Court order which has set aside the said judgment cannot be construed as affirming the factors on the basis of which enhancement of compensation was awarded. 3.3. When a judgment of any Court/Tribunal is produced as a document, ordinarily, it has to be treated as a piece of evidence regardless of its precedential value (if at all it has any). The general principle that a mere production of documents does not amount to proving its contents as being true & correct. 3.3. When a judgment of any Court/Tribunal is produced as a document, ordinarily, it has to be treated as a piece of evidence regardless of its precedential value (if at all it has any). The general principle that a mere production of documents does not amount to proving its contents as being true & correct. Several factors enter the field of assessment of its evidentiary value. A document produced by a party to the proceedings may be accepted as evidence, does not mean that the Court has to accept it blind foldedly and in all aspects. Merely accepting such documents does not mean that the Court is bound to treat them as absolutely reliable evidence. What is sought to be achieved is that the transactions recorded in the documents may be treated as evidence, just like any other, and it is for the Court to weigh all the pros & cons to decide whether such transaction can be relied on for determining the real price of the lands in question, vide LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER VS. V. NARASAIAH AIR 2001 SC 1117 . What is observed in MANOJ KUMAR VS. STATE OF HARYANA (2018) 13 SCC 96 , at Paragraph No. 25 being instructive, is reproduced: “25. The High Court has observed that the decision in Swaran Singh’s case has been affirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the special leave petition was dismissed. The dismissal of the special leave petition without assigning of reason cannot be treated as a binding precedent of this Court. The High Court treated as if this Court has decided the matter on merits and has approved the decision of the High Court. Even if that be so, the Courts are bound to take into consideration the various aspects as discussed in each and every case before relying upon and following the award or judgment in other cases relating to determination of the compensation as there is no res judicata in such cases. In each case, some change in the factual scenario is bound to the there such as quality of the land, category, time gap and largeness and smallness, deduction to be made. There are various factors which have to be taken into consideration only then, decision has to be rendered.” 4. In each case, some change in the factual scenario is bound to the there such as quality of the land, category, time gap and largeness and smallness, deduction to be made. There are various factors which have to be taken into consideration only then, decision has to be rendered.” 4. EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF JUDGMENT IN LAC NO.30/2013: 4.1 The judgment in LAC No.30/2013 & other connected matters granted enhancement of compensation to Rs.30,20,270/- per acre on the basis of evidentiary material, of course, after excluding the sale deed dated 02.02.2010 i.e. Ex.P.23 therein which happens to be Ex.P.27 herein. This enhancement was set at naught by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the subject MFAs only on the ground that KIADB was not arrayed as a party to the said LAC, only SLAO having been arrayed there and heard too. Therefore, matter was remanded to Reference Court. This remand came to be set aside by the Apex Court in the subject Civil Appeals on the ground that there was no need to issue notice to KIADB in the light of Section 20 of 1966 Act. This would become obvious by the observations made at Page No. 7 of the said decision which runs this way: “… In the impugned judgment, the High Court has noted that not only that the Award of the Reference Court was not challenged by the beneficiary Company, but during the course of hearing of the appeals, no submissions were canvassed by the learned counsel representing the beneficiary Company.” 4.2 The above observations were made by the Apex Court in the light of what was said by the Co-ordinate Bench at Paragraph No.20 of its order, while setting aside the subject LAC judgment. The following makes it clear: “20. We are astounded by the conduct of respondent No.3/beneficiary. No arguments were advanced on behalf of respondent No.3 albeit represented by a counsel. The following makes it clear: “20. We are astounded by the conduct of respondent No.3/beneficiary. No arguments were advanced on behalf of respondent No.3 albeit represented by a counsel. The trial Court having held that respondent No.3 is not a necessary party to the proceedings, Special Land Acquisition Officer not being a competent authority to challenge the order impugned, in the absence of notifying KIADB, the net result would be the order impugned attaining finality which would adversely affect the rights of the parties who are liable to pay the compensation more particularly, when the compensation amount is enhanced from Rs.1,50,000/- per acre to Rs.30,20,270/- per acre.” Judgments, after all, are nothing but opinions as to the existence or non-existence of certain facts. Going by all the above, we are of a considered opinion that the Apex Court judgment in the subject Civil Appeals cannot be construed as granting imprimatur to the enhancement of compensation granted in LAC No.30/2013 & other connected matters. What is relevant of the previous judgment of the court is its conclusion or finding, but not the evidence on which such conclusion or finding has been arrived at. Undoubtedly, it is open to the party, who opposes determination of compensation on the basis of previous judgment, to say that the land dealt with thereunder is not similar to the one covered in the subsequent case. It cottons with rules of logic, reason & justice. This view gains succor from Andhra Pradesh High Court decision in ASSISTANT COLLECTOR & LAO VS. PANDU RANGAIAH 1997 AIHC 2741 (DB). 5. AS TO ADMISSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT IN LAC NO.30/2013 AS A PIECE OF EVIDENCE: 5.1 The vehement submission of Mr.Dhyan Chinnappa that the subject LAC judgment does not fit into any of the provisions of Sections 40 to 44 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and therefore, it cannot be looked into for any purpose, appears to be too generalized a proposition. Section 40 makes court judgments admissible & relevant for the purpose of res-judicating “a second suit or trial”. Section 41 makes judgments rendered in probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction as the ones in rem; unquestionably, the LAC judgment being in personam, this provision is not invocable. Section 42 makes judgments in personam relevant if they relate to ‘matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry’. Section 41 makes judgments rendered in probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction as the ones in rem; unquestionably, the LAC judgment being in personam, this provision is not invocable. Section 42 makes judgments in personam relevant if they relate to ‘matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry’. Section 43 is an exception to Sections 40, 41 & 42 which makes the judgments relevant only when their very existence is in issue. Section 44 makes certain judgments relevant for being proved to have been obtained by fraud, collusion or at the hands of incompetent court. Section 42 read with Sections 11 & 13 of the Act makes LAC judgment to some extent relevant, in view of Apex Court decision in LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER VS. H.NARAYANAIAH (1976) 4 SCC 9 . We hasten to add that, binding nature of a judgment inter parte by virtue of res judicata or because it has been rendered in rem, is different from it being employed as a piece of evidence. This subtle difference needs to be kept in mind, which at times slips away. Suffice it to say that the LAC judgment cannot be outrightly rejected as being inadmissible for the purpose of determining compensation. 5.2 All the above being said, we have to bear in mind the following observations of Top Court of the country in NARAYANAIAH supra: “…The existence of a judgment would not prove the value of some piece of land not dealt with at all in the judgment admitted in evidence. Even slight differences in situation can, sometimes, cause considerable differences in value…”. Let us examine the LAC judgment from this perspective now: At internal Page 51 of the said judgment, there are two independent tables giving the statistical data of sale transactions for the block period of 2007-2010; the first table speaks of agricultural lands and the second mentions about non-agricultural ones; only the former being relevant, is reproduced below: 5.3 The statistical data relating to non-agricultural lands has animated the claim for enhancement of compensation, the Reference Court having treated lands in that case as having ‘NA potential’. However, that is not the case in the appeals at our hands. At Paragraph Nos. However, that is not the case in the appeals at our hands. At Paragraph Nos. 37 & 38, the Court below after examining the entire material on record has returned a specific finding that in the same villages, prices of the lands vary from place to place and that the subject lands do not have any special features unlike the lands comprised in LAC No.30/2013. It is the contention of claimants that: in Kudithini village there are several industrial establishments; these lands have conversion potential for industrial purpose; they come within the Vijayanagara Area Development Authority and they adjoin Ballari City or National Highway. However, no evidentiary material worth mentioning is placed on record to substantiate the same, as rightly observed by the Court below inter alia at Paragraph No.37 of the impugned judgment. 5.4 Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the allotee of lands is more than justified in telling us that, the determination of compensation made on the basis of ‘irrelevant’ evidentiary material cannot be sustained and such determination does not provide a comparable unit, either. He draws our attention to the registered Gift Deed dated 22.12.2009 (Item No.10) executed by one Smt. U.Obamma in favour of one Mr. U.Basavaraj who is none other than her son. It comprises of a small site admeasuring 16½x40 = 660 sq. ft. and a structure exists in that; its market value is shown to be Rs.2,05,000/-. As per the Schedule to the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 only a sum of Rs.1,750/- is paid as concessional stamp duty since transaction is between the family members. Such documents cannot readily be looked into as a guiding star for ascertaining the true market value. Similarly, the other document i.e., Item No.7 is a Memorandum of Equitable Mortgage dated 01.09.2009 executed by the loanee K.Basaiah in favour of State Bank of Mysore at Kampli. It is registered, is true. Only a small sum of Rs.880/- is paid by way of stamp duty. It also comprises of a tiny site 25x25 = 625 sq. ft. This mortgage secures a debt of Rs.3,50,000/-. For the same reason, this document is also irrelevant. That being the position, much credence cannot be attached to the judgment in LAC No.30/2013 which has heavily relied upon these documents at Ex.P.13, as discussed in Paragraph No.42 therein. 6. AS TO THE CLAIM FOR SAME COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS COMPRISED IN ONE ACQUISITION: 6.1. For the same reason, this document is also irrelevant. That being the position, much credence cannot be attached to the judgment in LAC No.30/2013 which has heavily relied upon these documents at Ex.P.13, as discussed in Paragraph No.42 therein. 6. AS TO THE CLAIM FOR SAME COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS COMPRISED IN ONE ACQUISITION: 6.1. The vehement submission of claimants that in view of NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST VS. VITTHAL RAO (1973) 1 SCC 500 AND UOI VS. HARINDERPAL SINGH (2005) 12 SCC 564 that the Market Value of a land in a particular village would be the Market Value for all other lands in the said village that are comprised in the same acquisition notification, appears to be too far fetched a proposition. Even in respect of lands in the same village, differences in their valuation may galore regard being had to a host of factors such as conversion potential, fertility levels, nature & location and therefore, treating them all as equal ignoring the demonstrable differences, would offend the rule of equality constitutionally enshrined in Article 14. ‘Equality’ enjoins, treating equals as equals, and not unequals as equals. A view in variance falls foul of E.P. ROYAPPA VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AIR 1974 SC 555 . 6.2. While discerning the ratio of a decision, one has to keep in mind a set of primary principles possessing higher normative value in the Legal System. Otherwise, the System, which is expected to function as a body of coherent principles, would have norms that may compete, if not conflict, with one another, each diminishing the value of other and thereby creating a chaotic market of values. That would not augur well to the civilized jurisdiction in general, and to the administration of justice in particular. A perusal of paragraphs 5 & 15 in HARINDER supra shows that the lands in five different villages were substantially similar in all respects and therefore, the Apex Court directed their equal treatment for the purpose of determining the compensation. All those lands were comprised in the very same notification figured only as one of the factors, at the most. That is not the case here, the differences in the nature, conversion potentiality, nearness to city, etc. being apparent. All those lands were comprised in the very same notification figured only as one of the factors, at the most. That is not the case here, the differences in the nature, conversion potentiality, nearness to city, etc. being apparent. A decision is an authority for the proposition that is laid down in the fact-matrix of a particular case, and not for all that, that would logically follow from what has been so laid down, said Lord Halsbury in QUINN VS. LEATHAM 1901 AC 495. 6.3. The vehement submission of learned Senior Advocate appearing for the claimants that on the principle enacted in Section 28-A of 1894 Act, all lands comprised in one Acquisition Notification should be treated as being equal in all respects and therefore their owners should be handed same recompense, is bit difficult to countenance: if lands from Kanniyakumari to Kashmir are notified for acquisition for laying a Railway Track, going by assertion of the claimants, same compensation has to be given to all those lands, notwithstanding the fact that a piece of land comprised in the notification is situate in the heart of city whereas another lies in a remote village. This, we say only to illustrate how illogical & unjust it would be, to do that. Compensation is determined principally on the basis of market value of the lands concerned. Obviously market value of land in Kashmir would be much different from that of the land in a tiny village nearby Kanniyakumari and other lands situate in between. 6.4 A wide preposition of the kind canvassed on behalf of claimants does not fit into the scope of Section 28-A of the erstwhile 1894 Act which provided for the re-determination of compensation. Such re-determination, section does not say, should result into payment of same compensation for all the lands comprised in one notification or situate in the same village. The terminology of this provision is significant: Sub-section (1) employs the term “amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined”; sub-section (2) employs the term “determining the amount of compensation”; and sub-section (3) employs the expression “for the determination”. It is a quasi-judicial exercise and notice to and hearing of all stake holders, is made mandatory. The terminology of this provision is significant: Sub-section (1) employs the term “amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined”; sub-section (2) employs the term “determining the amount of compensation”; and sub-section (3) employs the expression “for the determination”. It is a quasi-judicial exercise and notice to and hearing of all stake holders, is made mandatory. The text & context of this provision does not give scope for the argument that same compensation has to be given for all the lands comprised in one acquisition, disregarding the demonstrable differences obtaining in them. If law maker intended, the view now canvassed before us by the land-losers, the language of this Section could have been much different. The decision in ALI MOHAMMAD BEIGH VS. STATE OF J & K (2017) 4 SCC 717 does not support the contra view. In that case, the lands in three different villages were held to be similar in all respects and therefore, discrimination in the matter of compensation was not allowed. It is not on the ground that all they were comprised in one single notification. 7. AS TO ACQUISITION OF LAND AND PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION BY AGREEMENT U/S 29(2) OF KIAD ACT: 7.1. As already mentioned above, a huge extent i.e., 4950.61 Acres of land all situate in four different villages of the same taluka has been acquired. Of that, for 88.21% to be precise of land, the compensation has been determined by agreement u/s 29(2) of the 1966 Act. The PAC headed by the Deputy Commissioner of Ballari District had fixed the compensation as under: Rs.6,00,000/- for lands abutting the road connecting Kuduthini and Kurugodu; Rs.8,00,000/- for lands in Kolugollu village between the Railway Tracks and NH63; & Rs.5,00,000/- for all other lands per acre respectively. If owners of land nearly to the extent of 90% after deliberation have accepted the above values, sans any demur, it cannot be without any reason or rhyme. The determination of compensation by the PAC appears to be just & proper. It is not that non-parties too are bound by those arrangements; legally speaking they are not. However, when a big chunk of land-losers have accepted the determination of compensation, that cannot be brushed aside while re-determining the same in contested matters, especially when fraud, fabrication or the like are not alleged. It is not that non-parties too are bound by those arrangements; legally speaking they are not. However, when a big chunk of land-losers have accepted the determination of compensation, that cannot be brushed aside while re-determining the same in contested matters, especially when fraud, fabrication or the like are not alleged. On what basis the Reference Court has enhanced the compensation exponentially, remains a mystery wrapped in enigma. We are of a considered opinion that enhancement granted by the Reference Court is not justified to a large extent. That being said, there is scope for arguing that what has been awarded by the SLAO is a bit on the lower side. Justice of the case warrants that the enhancement granted by the Reference Court needs to be set at naught and the compensation awarded by the SLAO needs to be marginally enhanced. In the above circumstances, we make the following:- ORDER (i) The appeals filed by the KIADB/SLAO having been partly allowed, the impugned Judgement & Awards of the Reference Court are downwardly modified re-determining the market value of the subject lands by adding 30% of the sum specified in the SLAO Awards in question; the enhanced compensation shall be accordingly computed by taking into account all statutory admissibles and be paid to the concerned land-losers, forthwith. (ii) The amount deposited by the appellant – KIADB or the respondent - allottee if any, shall be remitted to the Reference Court for satisfying the modified award(s) as now made by us and the remainder if any (including the amount already deposited in the Reference Court), shall be refunded to the concerned, before long, after ascertaining credentials. (iii) As a consequence of the above, the appeals filed by the land-losers seeking enhancement of compensation laying challenge to the Judgement & Award(s) made by the Reference Court are hereby dismissed.