ORDER : (Laxmi Narayana Alishetty, J.) This Writ Petition is filed aggrieved by the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad, in O.A.No.780 of 2012, dated 19.09.2018. 2. Heard Sri J.Sudheer, learned counsel for petitioner and the learned Deputy Solicitor General of India appearing for respondents. 3. The brief facts leading to filing the present writ petition are as under: 3.1. While the petitioner was working as Superintendent, Bolarum III Range of Hyderabad-1 Commissionerate, he was issued with charge sheet, dated 27.04.2006 alleging that during the period from 21.05.2002 to 31.05.2003, he did not exercise proper control over the affairs of the factory of M/s. Handum Industries Limited (HIL), a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU), having factory at Medak District, manufacturing re-rolled products such as M.S.Rods, Bars, Flats, Channels, Angles etc. It was contended that M/s.HIL imported duty free raw materials viz., non-alloy steel blooms, billets, slabs and Ingots etc., and diverted the same to DTA without actually bringing the products to the factory for their intended use; that the petitioner accommodated the assessee in filing the fabricated ER-2 returns for the month of March, 2003, showing clearance of their finished goods to the tune of 14,286.790 Metric Tonnes, which is in contradiction to the quantities in the production registers recovered by the Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) Officers during the search operation in the factory premises. 3.2. It was contended that the fabricated returns were antedated and acknowledged by the petitioner as 07.04.2005 and this was done to scuttle the case registered by the DRI against the said firm. Thus, the applicant failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant and therefore, he has rendered himself liable for action under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The petitioner submitted his explanation to the charge memorandum denying the charges levelled against him. On denial of charges, an Inquiry Officer was appointed and after due enquiry, the Inquiry Officer held that the charge of accommodating the assessee namely, M/s HIL by acknowledging that the ER-2 return for the month of March 2003, had been antedated was proved, however, held that the charge that he did not exercise proper control over the affairs of the factory M/s HIL, 100% EOU, was not proved. Accordingly, it was held that the petitioner contravened Rule 3 (1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the representation of the petitioner, imposed a major penalty of reduction by four stages in time scale of pay equivalent to four increments from Rs.22,630/- to Rs.19,490/- in PB-II i.e., Rs.9,300-34,800/- for a period of 3 years and 6 months with effect from 02.02.2010. 4. Aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority contending that the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority had relied entirely upon the statement of Sri P.V.Ramana Reddy, dated 10.01.2004 and Shri Shaik Meera Mohiddin, dated 16.02.2004, which were recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 by the DRI behind his back. 5. The Appellate Authority, by Order dated 23.05.2012 rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner, confirming the penalty imposed upon him by the Disciplinary Authority. Aggrieved by the order dated 23.05.2012 of appellate authority, the petitioner approached the Tribunal by filing O.A.No.780 of 2012 and the Tribunal was pleased to dismiss the said O.A., vide order dated 19.09.2018. Aggrieved by the order of Tribunal, petitioner filed the present writ petition. 6. It has been contended by the learned counsel for petitioner that Sri Prasad Rao was the Presenting Officer before the Inquiry Officer and for the reasons best known to him, he had examined only one witness i.e., Managing Director of M/s.HIL. The said witness was cross-examined during the enquiry and he categorically stated that the facts given in the statement dated 10.01.2004 are not true and the contents of statement were recorded by the senior Intelligence Officer, DRI under duress and coercion. He further stated that nothing has been fabricated and the allegations leveled against the petitioner are not true and correct. 7. It has been contended that Management Witness i.e., Shaik Meera Moinuddin, was not produced for obvious reasons; that the Management has examined the company officers, viz., Surya Narayana and Suleman, whose evidence corroborate that petitioner has not violated any rule nor antedated ER-2 returns; that the witness who was examined on behalf of respondent Management categorically stated that ER-2 return was submitted within the stipulated time in the month of March, 2003. However, the respondent authorities without considering the evidence of witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the respondent-Management, has only relied upon the statements of P.V.Ramana Reddy and Shaik Meera Mohiuddin, which were recorded by the DRI and therefore, the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer that charge no.2 is proved is contrary to law and perverse finding. 8. It has been contended by the learned counsel for petitioner that non-production of witnesses by the Department is fatal to the allegation leveled against the petitioner; that the Tribunal erred in not taking into consideration the relevant facts and the material on record, and dismissed the O.A., without objectively considering the legal contentions raised by the petitioner, upholding the punishment imposed by the respondents, which would have cumulative effect on his pension consequent to his retirement on 31.08.2013; that on account of harsh and capital punishment, his retirement benefits would be affected and was also denied promotion to the next cadres. 9. It has been further contended that once the regular enquiry is conducted, the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry cannot be looked into until and unless the witnesses were examined in the regular enquiry, however, the Inquiry Officer relied upon the statements recorded in preliminary enquiry, which is contrary to law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, the charges leveled against petitioner are not proved by any legal evidence on record and thus, the punishment imposed is untenable and unsustainable in law and finally, prayed to set aside the impugned order dated 19.09.2018 and allow the writ petition. 10. Learned Deputy Solicitor General of India appearing for respondents had contended that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice as the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to present his case during the enquiry proceedings; that the present writ petition is not maintainable in view of settled legal proposition that judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate authority. It has been contended that respondents have followed the requisite procedure while recording the statements of witnesses; that the contention of the petitioner that there is no legal evidence on record to substantiate the charge is devoid of merit; that the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority has considered the evidence on record and passed a reasoned speaking order appreciating the evidence to prove the charges leveled against the petitioner, which was also upheld by the Tribunal and finally, contended that there are no merits in the writ petition and same is liable to be dismissed. 11. In support of the contention, learned Deputy Solicitor General placed reliance on the following decisions: i) K.I.Pavunny vs. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, (1997) 3 SCC 721 ;’ ii) Naresh J.Sukhawani vs. Union of India, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 663; iii) Surjeet Singh Chhabra vs. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 508 ; iv) Illias vs. Collector of Customs, Madras, 1968 SCC Online SC 117; v) Vinod Solanki vs. Union of Inida, (2008) 16 SCC 537 ; vi) P.Pratap Rao Sait vs. Collector of Customs, Cochin, 1987 SCC Online CEGAT 821; vii) Union of India and others vs. Ashok Kumar and others, (2005) 8 SCC 760 ; viii) Bijoy Ghosh vs. Union of India and others, WP No.16550 of 2004 of Delhi High Court; ix) Senior Superintendent of Post Offices vs. A.Gopalan, (1997) 11 SCC 239 ; x) Sunil Kumar Banerjee vs. State of West Bengal and others, (1980) 3 SCC 304 . 12. Perusal of the material placed on record would show that petitioner was issued a charge memo dated 27.04.2006 on the allegation that he did not exercise proper control over the affairs of the factory of M/s.HIL; that he accommodated the assessee in filing fabricated ER-2 returns for the month of March, 2003 showing clearance of their finished goods to the tune of 14286.790 MTs, which is in contradiction to the quantities indicated in the production registers recovered by the DRI officer during the search at the premises of M/s. HIL and to scuttle away the case registered by DRI and that the said fabricated returns for the month of March, 2003 was antedated and acknowledged by the petitioner as 07.04.2005. 13. 13. On denial of the charges by the petitioner, an Inquiry Officer was appointed and the Inquiry Officer on inquiry held that the charge of accommodating the assessee viz., M/s.HIL by acknowledging that the ER-2 return for the month of March, 2003 has been antedated was proved, however the charge that he did not exercise proper control over the affairs of the factory M/s. HIL, was not proved. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the inquiry report dated 26.12.2008 and on considering the representation of the petitioner, imposed the penalty vide order dated 02.02.2010. The appeals, preferred against the disciplinary authority dated 02.02.2010 and later, before the Tribunal, were rejected vide orders dated 23.05.2012 and 19.09.2018, respectively, and upheld the penalty imposed upon the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority. 14. Perusal of the oral evidence and the material placed on record would show that the charges levelled against the petitioner are based on the statements recorded before the Customs Officer and the material placed on record. The Inquiry Officer followed due procedure in conducting the inquiry; that the Inquiry Officer relied upon the substantive documentary evidence on record and revealed that “1) there were differences in manufacturing figures shown in RG-1 register and invoices seized by DRI and ER-2 return filed; 2) No ER-2 returns were forwarded by the petitioner to DRI when files pertaining to M/s.HIL were resumed by the DRI; and 3) M/s.HIL had used invoices from Sl.Nos.1-872 in the month of March, 2003 without intimation to the Range Officer, when compared to use of invoices bearing Nos.1 to 45 for 11 months (April, 2002 to February, 2003). 15. From the above observations, it is established that after DRI raided the premises of M/s.HIL, M/s.HIL in connivance with the petitioner, had manipulated a separate G-I Register for deemed exports to claim enhanced manufacturing in comparison of the figures reflected in RG-I register to weaken the case registered by the DRI and thereby the petitioner is found guilty of active connivance in helping M/s.HIL to manipulate and submit antedated ER-2 returns. The Disciplinary Authority, on considering the above observations, had imposed the punishment. 16. The Disciplinary Authority, on considering the above observations, had imposed the punishment. 16. The learned counsel for petitioner principally contended that the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority had relied entirely upon the statements of Sri P.V.Ramana Reddy, dated 10.01.2004 and Sri Shaik Meera Mohiddin dated 16.02.2004 recorded by the DRI behind his back; that it was the primary responsibility of the Department to produce the said Sri Shaik Meera Mohiddin as a prosecution witness as the Department has relied upon his statement given before the DRI; that the Management has examined the company officials viz., Surya Narayana and Suleman and their evidence also corroborate that the petitioner has not violated any rule nor antedated ER-2 returns. 17. Per contra, learned Deputy Solicitor General submitted that requisite procedure has been followed while recording the statements of witnesses; that P.V.Ramana Reddy, Managing Director of M/s.HIL, in his statement dated 10.01.2004, has explained elaborately in a very cogent manner about the affairs of M/s. HIL; that he stated that there was no production and clearance during the months of March and April, 2003; that the last sale of finished goods by M/s.HIL was on 25.02.2003; that after 25.02.2003, M/s.HIL had not sold any finished goods upto 08.04.2003 and that the production and clearance figures shown in ER-2 returns filed by them were false and imaginative; that the figures only shown to cover up the shortage in fulfilling the export obligations. 18. It has been contended that during the recording of statement of P.V.Ramana Reddy, at no point of time i.e., from the date of giving statement before DRI on 10.01.2004 to 18.09.2008, he complained about any physical or mental torture or any coercion or duress by the DRI. However, the retraction of the confessional statement containing admission of wrongdoings by the P.V.Ramana Reddy is made at the stage of cross-examination during departmental enquiry i.e., after 4 ½ years of his statement; that the deposition during his cross-examination runs contrary to evidence on record and also contrary to his own statements given on 13.05.2003, 03.07.2003, 08.10.2003 and 10.01.2004. The statement of Meera Mohiuddin, Inspector of Central Excise, recorded before the DRI officer, has not been retracted. The statement of Meera Mohiuddin, Inspector of Central Excise, recorded before the DRI officer, has not been retracted. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the proper procedure has been followed while recording the statements of witnesses and the petitioner was furnished with copies of statements and reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine all the witnesses. Therefore, contention of the petitioner that he was denied of proper opportunity is untenable. 19. In K.I.Pavunny (supra), Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed whether the confessional statement of the appellant made to the Customs Officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 though retracted at a later stage, is admissible in evidence and could form the basis for conviction and whether retracted confessional statement requires corroboration on material particulars from independent evidence. In paragraph-17 it was held that “By virtue of authority of law, the officer exercising the powers under the Act is an authority within the meaning of Section 24 of the Evidence Act. “…(4) Though the Customs Officer is an authority within the meaning of Section 24 of the Evidence Act, by reason of statutory compulsion of recording the statement or the accused giving voluntary statement pursuant to his appearing either after issuance of summons or after the appellant's surrender, such statement cannot be characterised to have been obtained by threat, inducement or promise…” 20. In Naresh J. Sukhawani (2 supra), the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-4 held that “…It must be remembered that the statement made before the Customs officials is not a statement recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Therefore, it is a material piece of evidence collected by Customs officials under Section 108 of the Customs Act. That material incriminates the petitioner inculpating him in the contravention of the provisions of the Customs Act…” 21. In Surjeet Singh Chhabra (3 supra), the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-3 held that “…It is true that the petitioner had confessed that he purchased the gold and had brought it. He admitted that he purchased the gold and converted it as a kara. It is contended that the petitioner had retracted within six days from the confession. Therefore, he is entitled to cross-examine the panch witnesses before the authority takes a decision on proof of the offence. He admitted that he purchased the gold and converted it as a kara. It is contended that the petitioner had retracted within six days from the confession. Therefore, he is entitled to cross-examine the panch witnesses before the authority takes a decision on proof of the offence. We find no force in this contention. The customs officials are not police officers. The confession, though retracted, is an admission and binds the petitioner. So there is no need to call panch witnesses for examination and cross-examination by the petitioner. 22. In A.Gopalan, (9 supra), the Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-5 held that “…a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings the standard of proof for proving the charge is the preponderance of probabilities…” 23. In Illias (4 supra), the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph-15 relied upon the recent decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e., i.e. Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal [Cr.Appeal No.27 of 1967] and Dady Adaaji Fatakia v. K.K. Ganguly, Asstt. Collector of Customs [Cr.Appeal No.46 of 1968]. The view expressed in State of Punjab vs. Barkat Ram case [ (1962) 3 SCR 338 ] with reference to the old Act has been reaffirmed on the question under consideration and it has been held that under the new Act also the position remains the same. In Dady Adaaji Fatakia case (referred to supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “For reasons set out in the judgment in Cr. A. 27/67 (Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal) [ Cr Appeal No. 27 of 1967] and the judgment of this court in Badku Joti Savant case we are of the view that a Customs Officer is under the Act of 1962 not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and the statements made before him by a person who is arrested or against whom an inquiry is made are not covered by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.” 24. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee (10 supra), the Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “4. We do not also think that the disciplinary authority committed any serious or material irregularity in consulting the Vigilance Commissioner, even assuming that it was so done. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee (10 supra), the Three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “4. We do not also think that the disciplinary authority committed any serious or material irregularity in consulting the Vigilance Commissioner, even assuming that it was so done. The conclusion of the disciplinary authority was not based on the advice tendered by the Vigilance Commissioner but was arrived at independently, on the basis of the charges, the relevant material placed before the Enquiry Officer in support of the charges, and the defence of the delinquent officer. …..” 25. In P.Pratap Rao Sait (6 supra), the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 3 held that “It is a settled proposition of law that by mere retraction the original statement does not lose all its evidentiary value. When the statement is retracted, all that the law requires is to look for some corroboration from the other evidence available on record.” 26. From the above citations, it is evident that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that mere retraction of original statement does not lose all its evidentiary value; that when the statement is retracted, all that the law requires is to look for some corroboration from the other evidence available on record; that the customs officials are not police officers; that confession, though retracted, is an admission and binds the petitioner, so there is no need to call panch witnesses for examination and cross-examination by the petitioner. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that with a view to arrive at a finding as regards the voluntary nature of statement or otherwise of a confession which has since been retracted, the Court must bear in mind the attending circumstances which would include the time of retraction, the nature thereof, the manner in which such retraction has been made and other relevant factors. 28. It is evident from the record that the disciplinary authority has considered the explanation submitted by the appellant and given opportunity of personal hearing and held the charge as proved to the extent of accommodating the assessee by acknowledging the ER-2 returns for the month of March, 2003 in back date to scuttle the case registered by the DRI by duly assigning reasons and thereby the petitioner has contrived Rule 3(1)(i)(ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. 29. 29. It is settled principle of law that the writ Court in exercise of power of judicial review cannot sit as an appellate forum and re-appreciate the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry and to come to a different conclusion from the conclusion arrived at in the domestic enquiry. The scope of judicial review against departmental proceedings is very narrow and confined to whether procedural formalities are complied; whether delinquent employee was given reasonable opportunity to establish his defence; whether there is appreciation of material on record before holding the employee guilty or findings are arrived based on surmises and conjunctures; whether disciplinary authority considered the material on record and arrived at independent conclusion; whether the concerned authority is having bias and prejudice against the employee and acted against the interest of the employee without observing due process and with predetermined notion of guilt. 30. In disciplinary proceedings against employee proof of allegation can be on principle of ‘preponderance of probabilities’ unlike in criminal proceedings. A master can severe relationship with his servant on proving misconduct. If master is a public sector undertaking, such relationship is regulated by set of regulations. Master is required to follow procedure envisaged in regulations before severing the relationship. The substantive requirement of the regulations is whenever misconduct is alleged, employee must be told of the allegation, supply material based on which such allegation is made, give an opportunity to rebut the allegations and on due consideration and by a reasoned order shall take a decision. In a given facts of the case, charge sheet need not be proved by leading oral evidence, but can be established based on documents on record. 31. From the above discussion, facts and circumstances of the case, and the legal position, this Court is of the considered view that the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the O.A.No.780 of 2012, dated 09.09.2018. The Writ Petition is devoid of any merit and no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order dated 09.09.2018 passed by the Tribunal. 32. Therefore, Writ Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.