JUDGMENT : Vivek Kumar Birla, J 1. Heard Shri Gulab Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Krishna Kumar Singh, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking quashing of the order dated 10.08.1989 passed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Meerut as well as the order dated 24.12.1994 passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the order dated 25.04.1997 passed by the Inspector General of Police and the order dated 22.10.2003 passed by the Tribunal in Claim Petition No.709 of 2003. 3. Stamp reporter has reported laches of 7 years and 29 days in filing present petition on the date of reporting on 18.02.2011. 4. To explain the delay learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to paragraph nos. 2 and 14 to 37. The grounds for explaining the laches of 7 years and 29 days is that after decision of the Tribunal dated 22.10.2003, petitioner reached Allahabad on 01.01.2004 where some imposter met him at Allahabad Railway Station and took him to Advocate Shri Suresh Swaroop Saxena, who ultimately promised to file a petition and take all relevant papers along with expenses and get his signature on Vakalatnama and some other watermark papers on 01.01.2004 and Shri Suresh Swaroop Saxena also gave his landline number. The petitioner thereafter waited for six months. Thereafter on 04.08.2004 he was informed that a counter affidavit was called for. Subsequently, on 06.12.2004 it was informed that no counter affidavit was filed. Thereafter, the petitioner came to Allahabad on 08.07.2005 for filing rejoinder affidavit and expenses were also given. It is stated that the petitioner was in continuous touch with Shri Saxena and he always assured him that he need not to worry about the case and the case would come on his turn for hearing. Thereafter after waiting long time on 18.12.2010 he tried to contact with Shri Saxena, then some lady in the house of Shri Saxena took the phone and said that Shri Saxena is no more. Thereafter, petitioner came to Allahabad on 20.12.2010 and contacted the family of Shri Saxena and tried to find out records of his case, but the same cannot be found. Thereafter, petitioner came to Allahabad on 20.12.2010 and contacted the family of Shri Saxena and tried to find out records of his case, but the same cannot be found. Thereafter, he contacted the present counsel, who made enquiries and found that no such petition was filed in the name of the petitioner, namely, Noor Mohammad either in the Allahabad High Court or in the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad. The petitioner, therefore, engaged the present counsel and handed over all the relevant papers after obtaining fresh certified copy of the order dated 22.10.2003 and thereafter the present petition was filed by Shri Gulab Chandra, learned counsel. 5. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no deliberate delay on the part of the petitioner and such huge delay is liable to be condoned. 6. Although, the explanation so submitted seems to be faultless, however, we are not impressed as the petitioner, who was working as Constable in civil police was dismissed from service is undisputedly a literate person and in case the alleged petition was filed by the earlier counsel, he neither tried to take copy of the petition, nor copy of the counter affidavit or copy of the rejoinder affidavit filed in such petition for long seven years. Further, he not even cared to ask the number of the writ petition allegedly filed at his instance from the counsel for all such long more than 7 years, therefore, we are not convinced with the explanation so submitted. 7. We have also noticed that Claim Petition no.709 of 2003 filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal was also not within one year of limitation as against the order dated 25.04.1997 the claim petition was filed after six years on 13.08.2003. 8. However, in view of the fact that present petition is pending for the last 13 years and affidavits have also been exchanged, we proceed to consider the case on merits. 9. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that charge against the petitioner was that on 05.12.1986 he was found lying in police uniform in a drunken state at Hapur Bus Stand and was taken to the police station and thereafter his medical examination was conducted. As per medical report, he was in a drunken state. 9. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that charge against the petitioner was that on 05.12.1986 he was found lying in police uniform in a drunken state at Hapur Bus Stand and was taken to the police station and thereafter his medical examination was conducted. As per medical report, he was in a drunken state. Thereafter, a preliminary enquiry was conducted; witnesses were examined and in the preliminary enquiry the charges were found to be proved that he was found lying in a drunken state in police uniform at Hapur Bus Stand and he tarnished the image of the Police Department, therefore, inquiry was directed to be conducted. 10. It is submitted that in the regular inquiry, the petitioner filed an application dated 14.11.1998 for examining the doctor concerned, who alleged to have issued the medical certificate, but his application was not considered. Thereafter, the petitioner moved another application dated 28.11.1988 before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Meerut for deputing another Presiding Officer but this application was also not considered. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Enquiry Officer has not afforded proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, nor he appreciated the explanation submitted by him; he also did not record any cogent finding of facts and submitted final enquiry report dated 05.06.1989 before Disciplinary Authority. On the aforesaid report, a show cause notice was issued to him on 19.06.1989, to which petitioner submitted his explanation on 19.07.1989 through Reserve Inspector (R.I.) but the said explanation was ignored. Thereafter, the Senior Superintendent of Police without giving any notice for oral evidence, dismissed the petitioner from service by the impugned order dated 10.08.1989, which is in contravention of Service Rules. Against the said order dated 10.08.1989, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, which was rejected in a most mechanical manner without application of mind on 24.12.1994. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a Revision before the Inspector General of Police, which was rejected on 25.04.1997. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Tribunal by filing Claim Petition No.709 of 2003, which was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 22.10.2003 on the ground of latches. 11. Further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that prescribed procedure has not been followed in the proceedings against the petitioner and the petitioner has been illegally dismissed from service. 11. Further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that prescribed procedure has not been followed in the proceedings against the petitioner and the petitioner has been illegally dismissed from service. He submits that the alleged misconduct does not warrant any major penalty under the provision of U.P. Police Subordinate Officer (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1991. Submission, therefore, is that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 12. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the State-Respondent submitted that due procedure as applicable for conducting enquiry was conducted and the petitioner was afforded full opportunity of hearing and it is a case of gross misconduct where the petitioner was found lying at Hapur Bus Stand in a drunken state in police uniform. The petitioner being a Constable is a member of disciplined force has committed gross misconduct and has rightly been dismissed from service. Learned Standing Counsel further submitted that there are huge laches in approaching the Tribunal, therefore, Tribunal has rightly dismissed the Claim Petition filed by the petitioner being time barred and orders of Disciplinary Authority are also in accordance with law warranting no interference. Submission, therefore, is that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 13. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the records. 14. Before proceeding further it would be appropriate to take note of the law as settled by Hon’ble Apex Court in respect of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings particularly in a case where member of disciplined force was found intoxicated. One of us (Vivek Kumar Birla, J.) has considered the law in almost identical facts of the case in Mahipal vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2018 (4) ADJ 258 relating to U.P. Police Officers of Subordinate Rank (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, where the petitioner was found to have consumed liquor; his medical examination was conducted and thereafter, he was dismissed from service. Paragraph 10 whereof is quoted as under:- “10. I have considered identical submissions in another matter being Writ-A No. 61116 of 2011 (Satya Prakash Singh vs. State of UP and others). Relevant paragraphs whereof are quoted as under: "The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not medically examined and his blood and urine test was not carried out to ascertain that he had taken liquor or not. Relevant paragraphs whereof are quoted as under: "The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not medically examined and his blood and urine test was not carried out to ascertain that he had taken liquor or not. He submits that the punishment of dismissal from service is excessive. He further submits that there was no eye witness of the incident. A perusal of record clearly indicates that a finding of fact has been recorded that an incident had taken place and the petitioner had indulged in scuffle, while he was under intoxication. All these findings of fact cannot be looked into under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, even a glance over the enquiry report clearly demonstrates that the incident that had taken place is not in dispute and the petitioner had tried to certify the question of intoxication by saying that he was under treatment of a Homoeopathic doctor and was having medicines containing alcohol and that he had consumed medicine in a little excessive quantity. The medical examination of the petitioner was carried out at the Primary Health Centre, Gangapur, Varanasi and the doctor had certified that foul smelling was coming from the petitioner and he was also injured. Dr. B.N. Shukla who was treating the petitioner and was produced by the petitioner had stated that smell of alcohol exists about 10 -15 minutes after consumption of medicines. Undisputedly, it cannot be said that such medicine was taken by the petitioner on the spot of the incident whereas he was also taken to the Primary Health Centre and in between considerable time must have expired but still foul smell was coming from the mouth of the petitioner, which according to his own witness Dr. B.N. Shukla, Homoeopath, smell should not come after 10 -15 minutes, even if the version of the petitioner is taken to be correct that he had consumed homoeopathic medicine and was smelling foul for this reason. Under any circumstances, I do not find that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are so perverse in nature which may warrant interference by this Court. The petitioner is a member of disciplined force and as such for such misconduct I do not find that any interference to the quantum of punishment is required by this Court. Under any circumstances, I do not find that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are so perverse in nature which may warrant interference by this Court. The petitioner is a member of disciplined force and as such for such misconduct I do not find that any interference to the quantum of punishment is required by this Court. Reference may be made in this regard to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Samar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others 2011 (9) SCC 94 wherein a constable was found guilty of consuming liquor, the Hon'ble Apex Court refused to interfere. A reference may also be made to a judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran 2015 (2) SCC 610 . Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of the judgment in the case of P. Gunasekaran supra are quoted as under: "19. The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to reappreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values. 21. The impugned conduct of the respondent working as Deputy Office Superintendent in a sensitive department of Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values. 21. The impugned conduct of the respondent working as Deputy Office Superintendent in a sensitive department of Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also. Thereafter, it is not open to the High Court to go into the proportionality of punishment or substitute the same with a lesser or different punishment. These aspects have been discussed at quite length by this Court in several decisions including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 , Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, 1997 (7) SCC 463 , Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC 386 , Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association and another, 2007 (4) SCC 669 , Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, 2009 (15) SCC 620 and the recent one in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra)." Relevant paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the judgment in Samar Bahadur Singh (supra) are quoted as under: "5. Counsel appearing for the Appellant has submitted before us that a criminal case was also instituted for the aforesaid incident in which he was acquitted and therefore, in the departmental proceeding also which was initiated he should also have been acquitted and the same should have been allowed to be ended in his favour. He further submits that in any case it has come in evidence that the Appellant was advised to take medicine which he had taken and, therefore, there was some smell of liquor from the medicine when a medical check-up was done. Relying on the same, counsel submits that the entire charge is concocted and therefore, he is required to be held not guilty of the charge. The next submission of the counsel appearing for the Appellant is that the punishment given to the Appellant is disproportionate to the charges levelled against him. 6. We have considered all the aforesaid submissions in the light of the records that are available with us. The medical report which is placed on record indicates that the Appellant had consumed alcohol, but he was not intoxicated. 6. We have considered all the aforesaid submissions in the light of the records that are available with us. The medical report which is placed on record indicates that the Appellant had consumed alcohol, but he was not intoxicated. The Appellant was missing from the headquarters on 27.10.1991 from the morning and he was caught in the case registered under Section 392I.P.C. in the evening. The Appellant wishes to make a defence that he was advised to take medicine but the prescription which is placed in the departmental proceedings does not indicate that any medicine was prescribed in that prescription. The Appellant was arrested in the criminal case in connection with stealing of a bottle of foreign liquor and even during that time he had consumed alcohol prior to the incident. These facts have been brought out in the inquiry proceedings initiated against him in which the Appellant did not participate. Therefore, whatever allegations have been brought against him, have been proved by placing cogent materials on record, which go unrebutted due to his absence in the proceedings. We also find that the Appellant has been charged on the ground of negligence, dereliction of duty and consuming liquor. The aforesaid facts are found proved in the departmental proceedings. 8. Now, the issue is whether punishment awarded to the Appellant is disproportionate to the offence alleged. The Appellant belongs to a disciplinary force and the members of such a force is required to maintain discipline and to act in a befitting manner in public. Instead of that, he was found under the influence of liquor and then indulged himself in an offence. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to interfere with the satisfaction arrived at by the disciplinary authority that in the present case punishment of dismissal from service is called for. The punishment awarded, in our considered opinion, cannot be said to be shocking to our conscience and, therefore, the aforesaid punishment awarded does not call for any interference." 15. In Union of India and Others vs. Constable Sunil Kumar, AIR 2023 SC 554 wherein the C.R.P.F. personnel was found to have consumed liquor while on government duty and threatened the senior officer. In Union of India and Others vs. Constable Sunil Kumar, AIR 2023 SC 554 wherein the C.R.P.F. personnel was found to have consumed liquor while on government duty and threatened the senior officer. While upholding the dismissal and considering the argument that penalty of dismissal was disproportionate to wrong/misconduct committed, order of dismissal was found to be justified and it was held that such penalty of dismissal cannot be said to be disproportionate and/or strikingly disproportionately to the gravity of the wrong and under the circumstances of the case order of Division Bench interfering in the order of penalty of dismissal imposed and ordering reinstatement of the respondent. Paragraphs 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 whereof are quoted as under:- “6.1 While holding that the penalty of dismissal can be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong, what is weighed with the Division Bench of the High Court is that as the respondent was found to be in a state of intoxication when not on duty and considering Section 10, he is deemed to have committed a less heinous offence. Whether a member of the force has committed a heinous offence or a less heinous offence as per Sections 9 and 10 of the CRPF Act, 1949 would have bearing on inflicting the punishment as provided under Sections 9 and 10 but has no relevance on the disciplinary proceedings/departmental enquiry for the act of indiscipline and/or insubordination. In the case of Surinder Kumar (supra), it is observed that even in a case when a CRPF personnel was awarded imprisonment under Section 10(n) for an offence which though less heinous, he can be dismissed from service, if it is found to be prejudicial to good order and discipline of CRPF. Under the circumstances, the reasoning given by the High Court that as the respondent is deemed to have committed a less heinous offence, the order of penalty of dismissal can be said to be disproportionate is not required to be accepted. 6.2 Even otherwise, the Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred in interfering with the order of penalty of dismissal passed on proved charges and misconduct of indiscipline and insubordination and giving threats to the superior of dire consequences on the ground that the same is disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. 6.2 Even otherwise, the Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred in interfering with the order of penalty of dismissal passed on proved charges and misconduct of indiscipline and insubordination and giving threats to the superior of dire consequences on the ground that the same is disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. In the case of Surinder Kumar (supra) while considering the power of judicial review of the High Court in interfering with the punishment of dismissal, it is observed and held by this Court after considering the earlier decision in the case of Union of India Vs. R.K. Sharma; (2001) 9 SCC 592 that in exercise of powers of judicial review interfering with the punishment of dismissal on the ground that it was disproportionate, the punishment should not be merely disproportionate but should be strikingly disproportionate. As observed and held that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Article 226 or 227 or under Article 32 of the Constitution. 6.3 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision(s) to the facts of the case on hand, it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal can be said to be strikingly disproportionate warranting the interference of the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the facts and circumstances of the case and on the charges and misconduct of indiscipline and insubordination proved, the CRPF being a disciplined force, the order of penalty of dismissal was justified and it cannot be said to be disproportionate and/or strikingly disproportionate to the gravity of the wrong. Under the circumstances also, the Division Bench of the High Court has committed a very serious error in interfering with the order of penalty of dismissal imposed and ordering reinstatement of the respondent.” 16. Relying upon the aforesaid judgments Honourable Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition C) No.1883 of 2010 (Ex CT/GD Om Prakash vs. Union of India and Others) under similar charges upheld the punishment of dismissal observing that the member of police force is expected to be highly disciplined and cannot be permitted to do away with such like activities. 17. 17. A reference may also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble apex Court in Ex-Constable/Dvr Mukesh Kumar Raigar vs. Union of India and Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 27. Paragraphs 12 and 13 whereof reads as under:- “12. Again, a three-judge Bench in case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) & Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, circumscribing the power of judicial review by the constitutional courts held as under: “24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. xxxxxxx 26. xxxxxxx 27.xxxxxxxx 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” 13. In view of the afore-stated legal position, we are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court had rightly set aside the order passed by the Single Bench, which had wrongly interfered with the order of removal passed by the respondent authorities against the petitioner. The petitioner having been found to have committed gross misconduct right at the threshold of entering into disciplined force like CISF, and the respondent authorities having passed the order of his removal from service after following due process of law and without actuated by malafides, the court is not inclined to exercise its limited jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.” 18. The law regarding the scope of judicial review by the constitutional courts was again considered in the case of Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. Vs. Ajit Kumar Singh and Anr., AIR 2023 SC 2388 . Relevant extract whereof reads as under:- “…….The views expressed by this Court on the scope of judicial review in Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, are extracted below: "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25-27 xx xx xx 28. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25-27 xx xx xx 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained ." (emphasis supplied) 19. Reference may also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 wherein it was held that once the finding of fact recorded by the disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the Tribunal, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the Court. Paragraphs 12, 13, 20, 21 and 24 of the judgment are quoted as under:- “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 20. go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 20. On perusal of the above quoted law it is, therefore, now well settled position that the High Court shall only look into the aspect as to whether the enquiry was conducted as per procedure; the High Court shall not reappreciated the evidence; the High Court shall not interfere with the conclusion in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; the High Court shall not go into the adequacy of the evidence; the High Court shall not go into the reliability of the evidence; the High Court shall not interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which the findings can be based; the High Court shall not correct the error of facts, however grave it may appear to be; the High Court shall not go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 21. We need not burden our judgment by making reference to other case law wherein such settled principles of law have been reiterated. 22. Now, reverting back to the facts of the present case we may recollect that charge on the petitioner was that on 05.12.1986 at about 3:40 pm he was found lying in police uniform in a drunken state at Hapur Bus Stand near Tanga Stand. Perusal of inquiry report would clearly reflect that he was granted full opportunity of hearing by fixing dates for the purpose of submitting his reply for producing evidence and witnesses in his favour. It has also clearly come on record that when he was found in a drunken state he was immediately taken to the police station and immediately thereafter his medical examination was conducted. Dr. S.N. Sharma in his report has clearly written that he has consumed alcohol and is under deep intoxication. This report was supplied to him. The witnesses on behalf of the Department were examined. The petitioner was not present on several dates. Dr. S.N. Sharma in his report has clearly written that he has consumed alcohol and is under deep intoxication. This report was supplied to him. The witnesses on behalf of the Department were examined. The petitioner was not present on several dates. It has further been mentioned in the enquiry report that after conclusion of the evident of the prosecution side on 29.04.1989 special messenger was sent to the resident of the delinquent employee that statement of prosecution witnesses are over and he may produce any witness or submit statement in his defence. This communication was duly served upon him, however, he did not appear before the Disciplinary Authority thereafter impugned order of dismissal from service dated 10.08.1989 was passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Meerut. Representation filed by the petitioner against the said order was also rejected by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 24.12.1994. Thereafter, petitioner filed revision which was also rejected vide impugned order dated 25.04.1997 passed by the Inspector General of Police. Subsequently, the petitioner approached the State Public Services Tribunal challenging the aforesaid orders. The Tribunal recorded that no claim petition was filed before the Tribunal within one year and there was delay of about six years in filing the claim petition, therefore, the same was dismissed on the ground of delay at the admission stage itself. So far as the present petition is concerned, the Stamp Reporter has reported laches of 7 years and 29 days in filing the present petition on the date of reporting on 18.02.2011. The explanation submitted by the petitioner has already been considered by the Court on the sole ground that the petiton was pending for last about 13 years. 23. In this background of the case we find that there was no procedural defect in conducting the enquiry; finding of facts have been recorded that the petitioner was found lying in police uniform in a drunken state at Hapur Bus Stand near Tanga Stand and Doctor has also certifying the same. The petitioner in spite of sufficient notice has not come forward during enquiry proceeding to dislodge the prosecution case. He was also given opportunity of hearing by the disciplinary authority, however, he did not come forward to show cause written or oral. We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity in the entire procedure. 24. The petitioner in spite of sufficient notice has not come forward during enquiry proceeding to dislodge the prosecution case. He was also given opportunity of hearing by the disciplinary authority, however, he did not come forward to show cause written or oral. We, therefore, do not find any legal infirmity in the entire procedure. 24. The present petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.