ORDER : Sumathi Jagadam, J. The petitioner, who is mother of the detenu, namely, Lanjipalli Vinayak @ Vinay @ Raju, S/o Srinivasa Rao, aged 24 years, D.No.2-72, Pidimgoyyi Village, Rajamahendravaram Rural, East Godavari District, prays for writ of habeas corpus directing the respondent authorities to set the detenu at liberty by declaring the detention order in Roc.No.M1 (SEB.SOUTH)/479793/2023 dated 28.12.2023 passed by the 2nd respondent and the consequential confirmation order issued by the 1st respondent vide G.O.Rt.No.467, dated 28.02.2024, as contrary to law, arbitrary and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. The factual matrix of the case is thus: On the information furnished by the Sponsoring Authority/3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent, the Detaining Authority, having considered that the detenu is involved in following seven crimes and those crimes fall within the ambit of Section 2(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (1 of 1986) (for short, ‘the Act 1 of 1986’) and he is a bootlegger and acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, passed the detention order dated 28.12.2023 and later, the 1st respondent by virtue of G.O.Rt.No.467 dated 28.02.2024 confirmed the detention order. Sl. No. Crime No. and Section Name of Police Station Date 1 Cr.No.510/2020 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau Station, Korukonda 14.11.2020 2 Cr.No.511/2020 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau Station, Korukonda 15.11.2020 3 Cr.No.1094/2020 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau, South Station, Rajamahendravaram 25.12.2020 4 Cr.No.656/2021 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau Station, Korukonda 30.08.2021 5 Cr.No.47/2022 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau Station, Peddapuram. 07.01.2022 6 Cr.No.406/2022 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau, South Station, Rajamahendravaram 30.03.2022 7 Cr.No.270/2023 u/s 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 Special Enforcement Bureau, South Station, Rajamahendravaram 14.12.2023 3. The respondents filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 4. Heard arguments of Sri P. Rajesh Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri. Kader Basha learned Government Pleader representing learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents. 5. The respondents filed counter and opposed the writ petition. 4. Heard arguments of Sri P. Rajesh Babu, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri. Kader Basha learned Government Pleader representing learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the detenu was involved in seven cases, out of which, in six cases, he was granted bail, and in the other case, i.e., Crime No.270 of 2023, he was arrested and remanded to judicial custody. He would further submit that as on the date of passing the detention order, the petitioner was in judicial custody, and he was lodged in the Central Prison, Rajamahendravaram, and in that view, his committing any further offences is highly impossible. However, the Detaining Authority has mechanically ordered preventive detention without considering this fact. Learned Counsel would further submit that though there is no embargo for ordering preventive detention even when a particular detenu was in judicial custody by the date of detention order, still the Detaining Authority shall give cogent reasons for passing the detention order by specifically mentioning in the order that though the detenu was in judicial custody, the material placed before the said authority revealed that there was every likelihood of detenu getting bail and repeat the offences as a habitual offender and thereby his activities prejudice the public order. Without arriving at such subjective satisfaction with the aid of material placed before it, the Detaining Authority cannot simply pass a detention order. He further argued that in the instant case, though the detenu was in judicial custody, the Detaining Authority had not made a clear mention that the material placed before him manifested the likelihood of detenu getting bail and repeating his past illegal activities. Hence, the detention order is liable to be set aside on that ground also. 6. He further argued that in the instant case, though the detenu was in judicial custody, the Detaining Authority had not made a clear mention that the material placed before him manifested the likelihood of detenu getting bail and repeating his past illegal activities. Hence, the detention order is liable to be set aside on that ground also. 6. Per contra, learned Government Pleader representing learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents would submit that the petitioner was involved in seven cases within two years and 11 months i.e., from 14.11.2020 to 14.12.2023 and out of seven cases, charge sheets were laid in six cases, and he is repeatedly indulging himself in clandestine manufacture, possessing and sale of illicit distilled liquor in contravention of Section 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020 and in the manner prejudicial to the public health and public order, thus, he is a bootlegger as defined under Section 2(b) of Act 1 of 1986. In all these cases, the public analyst opined that the samples of contraband seized, i.e., I.D. liquor,are unfit for human consumption and injuries to public health. In view of the chemical analyst's report, the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The learned Government Pleader would further submit that the 2nd respondent passed the detention order in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Sections 3(1) & (2) read with Section 2(b) of Act 1 of 1986 read with G.O.Ms.No.18, General Administration (Law & Order) Department, dated 02.03.2015 and G.O.Rt.No.2425, General Administration (SC-I) Department, dated 15.12.2023, directing that the detenu shall be detained in Central Prison, Rajamahendravaram, and thereafter, the 1st respondent in exercise of its powers approved the order of detention. The learned Government Pleader would argue that the detenu was remanded to judicial custody in connection with Crime No.270 of 2023 dated 14.12.2023 on the file of the Special Enforcement Bureau Station, Rajamahendravaram South under Section 7(B) r/w 8(B) of the A.P.Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 2020. The learned Government Pleader would further submit that in the detention order, it was observed that in Crime No.270 of 2023 there is every possibility of the proposed detenu being released on bail and that he would thereafter likely to indulge in criminal activities and that it is essential to detain him in the prison to prevent him from doing further crimes. The learned Government, therefore, prayed the Court to dismiss the writ petition. 7. In P. Surendra Vs. the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Division Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as under: “Subsisting custody of the detenu, by itself, does not invalidate the order of preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. (Union of India v. Paul Manickam). It is not the law that no order of detention can validly be passed against a person in custody under any circumstances. (Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal v. Union of India ; Kamarunnissa4). If the facts and circumstances of the case so demand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention even if the person is in custody. Even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed (1) if the authority, passing the order, is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that, on being released, he would, in all probability, indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed, after recording satisfaction in this regard, the order would be valid. (Kamarunnissa; Paul Manickam). The detaining authority must show its awareness of the subsisting custody of the detenu, and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied, with cogent material, that there is a likelihood of his release and, in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. (Paul Manickam20). Factors, such as the detenu being in jail, must be objectively considered. If there are causal connections, and if a bona fide belief is formed, then there is nothing to prevent an order of preventive detention being served on a person who is in jail, provided the detaining authority is satisfied that there is an imminent possibility of his being released and set at liberty. (Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra). If there are causal connections, and if a bona fide belief is formed, then there is nothing to prevent an order of preventive detention being served on a person who is in jail, provided the detaining authority is satisfied that there is an imminent possibility of his being released and set at liberty. (Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra). Before an authority can legitimately come to the conclusion that the detention of a person is necessary to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, the authority must be satisfied that, if the person is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner, and that inevitably postulates freedom of action to the said person at the relevant time. If a person is already in jail, it cannot be rationally postulated that, if he is not detained, he would act in a prejudicial manner? At the point of time, when an order of detention is to be served on a person, it must be patent that the said person would act prejudicially if he is not detained, and that is a consideration which would be absent when the authority is dealing with a person already in detention. The satisfaction that it is necessary to detain a person, for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner, is the basis of the order of detention. (Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan ;). In case the detenu is already in custody, the detaining authority should apply his mind and show his awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention. The necessity of keeping such person under preventive detention should be clearly indicated. (Paul Manickam; YummanOngbiLembi Leima). The detaining authority must be aware, when he is passing the order of detention, that the detenu is in custody, and that cogent and relevant material disclose the necessity for making an order of detention. (Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad ; Ramesh Yadav; Vijay Narain Singh; Dharmendra Suganch and Chelawat; Kamarunnissa; Abdul Razak Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. S.N. Sinha, Commr. of Police ).” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ameena Begum Vs. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 . In the said judgment, the Apex Court referred its earlier decision in Rekha Vs. of Police ).” 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ameena Begum Vs. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587 . In the said judgment, the Apex Court referred its earlier decision in Rekha Vs. State of Tamilnadu, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 , wherein it is said as under: “Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged, one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, the detention order in question was also illegal for this reason.” 9. Except for stating in the order of detention that there is every possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that he would thereafter likely indulge in criminal activities, there is no material to show that there is every chance of the detenu being released on bail. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Rekha Vs. The state of Tamilnadu, referred supra, clearly stated that when the relevant provisions in the Penal Code are sufficient to deal with the situation, there is no reason for issuing the detention order. 10. Thus, from the above discussion, it is clear that though the detenu is already under judicial custody in connection with Crime No.270 of 2023 dated 14.12.2023 on the file of the Special Enforcement Bureau Station, Rajamahendravaram South, however, the Detaining Authority has not taken the said crucial fact into consideration and has not recorded its subjective satisfaction to order preventive detention despite the detenu was in judicial custody as on the date of the said order. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the detention order per se is illegal and liable to be set aside. 11. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the detention order per se is illegal and liable to be set aside. 11. Thus, on a conspectus of the facts and law as narrated supra, this Writ Petition is allowed, and the detention order in Roc.No.M1 (SEB.SOUTH)/479793/2023, dated 28.12.2023, passed by the 2nd respondent – District Collector, East Godavari District, is hereby set aside and the detenu, namely, Lanjipalli Vinayak @ Vinay @ Raju, S/o Srinivasa Rao, is directed to be released forthwith by the respondents, if the detenu is not required in any other cases. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, in this case shall stand closed.