Prasad, S/o. Sukumaran v. State Of Kerala, Represented By The Secretary To The Government, Department Of Labour, Government Secretariat
2024-06-13
DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The petitioners say that they have been offered permanent employment for loading and unloading works in a business establishment called “Nahlas Grant Hyper Mart”, in Thiruvananthapuram; and that they, therefore, applied for registration under Rule 26 A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules, 1981 (‘Rules’ for short). They allege that, however, without considering any of the germane aspects in its relevant perspective, the Assistant Labour Officer (ALO) rejected their applications, merely saying that the business has not yet commenced; and further that, if any more persons are registered, the employment opportunities of the already registered workers, who are included in the statutory Pool, would suffer. 2. The petitioners contend that, since the afore reasons are factually and legally untenable, they preferred appeals, under Rule 26 C of the “Rules”, before the Deputy Labour Officer (DLO), who, however, has merely reiterated what has been stated in Ext.P6 and upheld it, while passing his final order, namely Ext.P10. They thus pray that both Exts.P6 and P10 be set aside. 3. Sri.G.Sreekumar – learned counsel for the petitioner, explained that the factual findings in Exts.P6 and P10, that the business, where his clients propose to work had not commenced its operations, are untrue and recorded mischievously because, the statements given by them and the employer were to the specific effect that, it had been functioning much before their applications had been preferred. He submitted that this is substantiated by Exts.P3 and P4, which are the GST Registration Certificate and the Receipt issued by the Grama Panchayat to the establishment, as also from Ext.P5 Building Permit obtained by it; and hence, that Exts.P6 and P10 are in gross error. He then argued that, as far as the second reason in the impugned orders -namely that the already registered “Pool workers” would suffer, if other persons are allowed registration as “attached workers” -this has been already answered by this Court in several judgments that the provisions of the Kerala Headload Workers Act, 1978 (‘Act’ for short) do not provide for any such protection, but is only intended to regulate. He, thus, reiteratingly prayed that Exts.P6 and P10 be quashed and the competent Authority be directed to offer registration to his clients forthwith. 4.
He, thus, reiteratingly prayed that Exts.P6 and P10 be quashed and the competent Authority be directed to offer registration to his clients forthwith. 4. In response, however, Sri.Thomas Abraham, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent -Headload Workers Board, submitted that the objections raised by them before the competent Authorities are valid because, if more and more people are allowed registration as “attached workers”, then the existing “Pool workers” would be severely prejudiced, on account of denuded opportunities and income. 5. The learned Senior Government Pleader -Smt.Mable C.Kurian, also supported both Exts.P6 and P10, saying that the findings therein, that the business establishment was not operational, was based on a personal inspection by the ALO; and that the said Authority had thereafter given a statement before the DLO to such effect, when the appeal was decided by the latter. She then argued that, when there are existing “Pool workers” in the area, who are willing to carry on the loading and unloading activities for the establishment, further registrations are unnecessary; and that this has been correctly found by the Authorities in the impugned orders. She concluded her submissions, arguing that the ALO has also limpidly found that since the establishment was not functioning, none of the requisite records or registers were maintained by them; thus incapacitating any further enquiry. She thus prayed that this writ petition be dismissed. 6. I have evaluated the afore rival submissions, on the touchstone of the various materials available on record. 7. As rightly argued by the parties, there are broadly two reasons cited by the Authorities in rejecting the applications for registration made by the petitioners. 8. For one, there is a factual finding that the business – in which the petitioners propose to work -was not functioning; and consequently that they had not maintained the requisite registers and documents. 9. For the second, that the registration of the petitioners as “attached workers” would cause detriment to the already registered employees maintained in the statutory “Pool”. 10.
For one, there is a factual finding that the business – in which the petitioners propose to work -was not functioning; and consequently that they had not maintained the requisite registers and documents. 9. For the second, that the registration of the petitioners as “attached workers” would cause detriment to the already registered employees maintained in the statutory “Pool”. 10. As far as the second of the afore reasons is concerned, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court has found in several judgments in the past that, the “Act” or the Scheme under it, do not provide for any protection to already registered Pool workers from further registration of other persons, but that it can only regulate the same, through the applicable methods and relevant criteria. Since the learned Senior Government Pleader also affirms that the “Act” does not provide for any such blanket protection, nevertheless, asserting that the detriment to the existing “Pool workers” must be taken into account, I am certain that this objection, by itself, cannot be found favour with. This is because, even if there is the likelihood of any detriment to the existing “Pool workers”, it is for the Authorities to regulate it in such apposite manner as sanctioned, but cannot refuse further registration, even of “attached workers” to establishments, in an omnibus fashion, since there is no legal prohibition to such effect. 11. Coming to the first of the afore reasons, the petitioners have produced on record Exts.P3, P4 and P5 documents, to establish that the business is already being operated; and it is asserted by their learned counsel that the ALO had not made any proper inspection, but had entered into a conclusion for confutative reasons. Interestingly, the DLO affirms this opinion, relying upon the statement of the ALO, whose order was challenged before him in appeal. This is not a procedure acceptable in law because, when the statutory appellate Authority acts, he cannot rely upon the Authority whose order has been appealed against; but ought to have entered into his own conclusions, based on relevant and germane materials and inputs. 12. That said, it is the petitioners’ singular case that the business is functioning, as manifest from Exts.P3, P4 and P5 documents, as also from their statements and that of the employer before the ALO.
12. That said, it is the petitioners’ singular case that the business is functioning, as manifest from Exts.P3, P4 and P5 documents, as also from their statements and that of the employer before the ALO. However, these have not been given any benefit to, presumably because the petitioners did not produce the afore said documents before the competent Authorities at the relevant time. 13. I am certain that, therefore, the matter will require to be reconsidered by the Appellate Authority, after affording the petitioners an opportunity of producing all relevant documents because, the only reason which is now relevant in support of the opinion of the Authorities, to reject the applications of the petitioners, is that the business had not begun at the time when the same were made. Resultantly, I allow this writ petition and set aside Ext.P10; with a consequential direction to the DLO to reconsider the appeal of the petitioners, after affording them, as also the proposed employer, necessary opportunities of being heard again and of producing additional documents; thus culminating in an appropriate order and necessary action thereon, as expeditiously as is possible, but not later than three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Needless to say, while the afore exercise is completed, the “Board” and any other interested person, will also be offered opportunity of being heard; and the opinion of the DLO on all the contentions impelled before him, will be reflected in the resultant order.