JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State against the judgment dated 14.02.1991 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhilwara, Rajasthan in Sessions Case No. 55/1990 (State of Rajasthan vs. Dhool Singh & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the offences under Section 302/34 IPC. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which occurred in the year 1990 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1992. 3. At the outset, learned Public Prosecutor informs that accused-respondent no.1-Dhool Singh (Dhul Singh as mentioned in the death certificate dated 09.09.2022) has already expired on 20.07.2005, thus, now the present appeal survives only against accused-respondents no.2 & 3, and the arguments were heard only to the extent of the said surviving accused-respondents, and the adjudication in the instant appeal is being made accordingly. 4. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that a new born baby girl was delivered by the accused-respondent no.3 (3 months after marriage) on 06.05.1990 in Bheem Referral Hospital, whereafter the accused-respondents were on their way from Bheem to Shivpur with the said new born and they met Mithu Singh (P.W. 9); thereafter, the new born was left at the bank of the tank hidden behind stones by the accused-respondents. On 07.05.1990, Mithu Singh (P.W. 9) found the new born alive behind the stones and handed over the baby to the Police Station, Bheem; investigation in the matter accordingly began and the new born baby was handed over to the accused-respondents. 4.1. Thereafter, on 11.05.1990, the accused-respondent no.1-Dhool Singh filed a written report on 11.05.1990 before the Police Station Kareda, stating that the new born was delivered by his daughter (accused-respondent no.3) on 06.05.1990, however, the child died due to not getting milk; on such report, investigation began and during course of the investigation, sharp pressure signs were found on the baby’s neck i.e. 4 x 5 of red colour. Subsequently, all the accused-respondents were arrested for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC. 5. The learned Trial Court framed the charges against the accused-respondents, which were read over to the accused-respondents; the same were denied by the accused-respondents, sought due trial, and the trial accordingly commenced who thereafter before the learned Trial Court. 6. Subsequently, all the accused-respondents were arrested for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC. 5. The learned Trial Court framed the charges against the accused-respondents, which were read over to the accused-respondents; the same were denied by the accused-respondents, sought due trial, and the trial accordingly commenced who thereafter before the learned Trial Court. 6. During the course of trial, the evidence of 13 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 24 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution, whereas, no defence witness or document was produced by the accused in defence; whereafter, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 7. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment dated 14.02.1991, as above, against which the present appeal, has been preferred on behalf of the State. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State submits that during the course of investigation, the Police found a sharp sign on both sides of the neck of the newly born baby, and thus, the death of the said new born was not natural. 8.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the baby was murdered because all the accused-respondents thought the child to be an illegitimate one as the said child had been born only three months after the marriage of the accused-respondent no.3-Kailash Kanwar and thus the child would not have been accepted by the society. 8.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that the report Ex.P/12 which was presented by the concerned S.H.O. clearly showcases the brutal manner in which the new born baby was murdered. In furtherance, learned Public Prosecutor placed reliance on the postmortem report i.e. Ex.P/15 wherein it is clearly indicated in the opinion of the PW 7 Anil Kumar that the death of the new born baby took place due to asphyxiation. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that the accused-respondent no.2 had deposed in her statements that her daughter (respondent-accused no.3) had been married for two years and was living with her in-laws during the relevant period of time. 9.1. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that the accused-respondent no.2 had deposed in her statements that her daughter (respondent-accused no.3) had been married for two years and was living with her in-laws during the relevant period of time. 9.1. Learned counsel further submits that not even one of the 13 witnesses brought forth by the prosecution deposed anything substantial against the accused-respondents to prove guilt on their part. Learned counsel also submits that Ex.P/12 as relied upon by the learned Public Prosecutor was in fact written by PW 6 Gordhandas, Head Constable on the basis of the postmortem report, Panchnama laash and the statement given by accused-respondent no.1-Dhool Singh and PW-6 had admitted during examination that he never went to the Hospital, Bheem. 9.2. Learned counsel further submits that even after the statements of the Doctors, the learned Public Prosecutor has been unable to prove that the child found hidden behind the rocks by Mithu Singh was thereafter admitted in the hospital with the help of the Police and was in fact the child belonging to the accused-respondent no.3-Kailash Kanwar; further, even if the delivery of the deceased new born had taken place in the Hospital, Bheem itself or not, not a single witness belonging from the doctor personnel was able to identify any of the accused-respondents. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 11. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 11. This Court observes that on 06.05.1990, accused-respondent no.3-Kailash Kanwar had given birth to a child, and on 11.05.1990, the said child died due to not drinking milk; as per the report given by accused-respondent no.1-Dhool Singh to the Police, whereafter an investigation was conducted, and according to the chargesheet filed, on an earlier occasion i.e. on 06.05.1990, that a child had been found hidden behind rocks; subsequently, the child was admitted in Bheem Referral Hospital, whereafter the said child was handed over to the accused-respondents; however, no investigation was done at the time regarding the said incident, thus a conclusion was reached that since accused-respondent no.3-Kailash Kanwar had been married only three months prior (according to the report given by accused-respondent no.1-Dhool Singh, i.e. Ex.P/2) thus, the new born being an unwanted child had been murdered, and accordingly, the police arrested all the three accused-respondents and they were charged under Section 302/34 of IPC. 12. This Court further observes that PW1-Mangilal deposed that he never saw bloated stomach of accused-respondent no.3 and no statements were recorded by the Police; PW2 Sampat Kumar also, during the examination, stated that he never heard any rumours going around in the village regarding accused-respondent no.3, and further, during cross-examination stated that he did not sign Ex.P/3 Panchnama of dead body of the new born, after it was completely written, instead at the time when he put his signature, there were only 4-5 lines on the said document; he further deposed that Ex.P/3 wrongly contained about the new born baby being dead and everything else written there as well; furthermore, PW.3-Bal Singh stated that no child was given to accused-respondent no.1 Dhool Singh in front of him, and thereafter, another witness PW.4-Bhawar Singh deposed that no documents were made in front of him at the house of accused-respondent no.1. 12.1. 12.1. This Court also observes that PW-9, who had found the child on information received from one Dhanna Singh (PW-10), had informed the Police about the baby and the Police had then taken the new born to the Police Station, Bheem whereafter the child was admitted in Bheem Referral Hospital; PW-9 & PW-10 accompanied the child to the said Hospital, and subsequently, as deposed by PW10 three persons – an old man, an old woman and a girl came and the old woman was asked to sit on the bed where the new born was lying; other than this, as per the statement given by PW-10, he neither knew the names of these people nor did he stay further afterwards. 12.2. Furthermore, PW-9 also deposed the fact that he never went to Shivpur and even during the cross-examination, PW-9 denied ever giving the facts written in Ex.P/17 Statements given to Police by him, from C to D stating that the new born baby had been handed over to accused-respondent no.3-Kailash Kanwar, while her visit to the said Hospital. 12.3. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid statements given by the various witnesses as brought forth by the prosecution that none of them corroborated the investigation that took place, the entire prosecution story that was presented before the learned Trial Court and the documents placed on record. 13. This Court further observes that PW-5 Dr. Santosh Kumar, a personnel of the Bheem Referral Hospital, in the examination-in-chief before the learned trial court, deposed that a woman named Kailash was admitted in the hospital with a new born baby and the child was even examined by him (Ex.P/5 & 6), however, he did not recognize any of the accused-respondents nor did he know if any of the accused-respondents had visited the said hospital. 13.1. This Court also observes that another personnel, PW 11 Dr. Pratima Singh also deposed that she had done medical examination of Kailash Kanwar and had made parchi that the said woman had full time pregnancy (Ex.P/18), however, she did not recognize whether the thumb impression on the Indoor Ticket (Ex.P/19) was done before her or not, nor did she anywhere recognize the accused-respondent no.3-Kailash Kanwar in her statements, nor did it became clear if the delivery that had taken place was of accused-respondent no.3. 13.2. 13.2. Thus, the learned Trial Court rightly observed that the aforesaid medical personnel only threw light upon common medical facts and procedure, however from the said statements, it did not become clear if the child that had been admitted in the Hospital belonged to accused-respondent no.3, nor did it become evident that if delivery had taken place of accused-respondent no.3 and the medical personnel were unable to recognize the accused-respondent no.3. 14. This Court further observes that even though as per Ex.P/15 (Postmortem Report) prepared by PW-7 Dr. Anil Kumar, there was a line around the neck of the child, however as per PW.7, the said marks could have been formed by jewellery as well, thus though the child had died due to asphyxiation, but it could not be proved whether it was done intentionally or not. Therefore, the intention of the accused-respondents could also not be proved in the present matter. 15. At, this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive – inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): 38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: - “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:- (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 15.1. This Court also considers it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Narayan & Ors. (D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 250/1992, decided on 13.12.2022), as hereunder:- “In Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 2016 SC 5160 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court held that one of the golden threads which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if there are two perspectives arising from the evidence adduced in a matter, one inclining towards the guilt of the accused and another inclining towards the innocence of the accused, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. In a recent judgment dated 28th July, 2022 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 2119 of 2010 titled State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, the Apex Court has held that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited unless the view taken by Court is impossible or perverse. It was opined that if two views are possible, then the order of acquittal cannot be discarded only because the Appellate Court is of the view that conviction is more probable. Kistoora Ram, the Apex Court has held that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is limited unless the view taken by Court is impossible or perverse. It was opined that if two views are possible, then the order of acquittal cannot be discarded only because the Appellate Court is of the view that conviction is more probable. The order of acquittal would warrant interference only when the view taken by the lower court is not possible at all. In light of the above observations and considering the arguments advanced at the bar, this Court does not find any room for interference in the order passed by the learned trial Court. The story of the prosecution is not found proved beyond reasonable doubt and the plea of the accused regarding right to private defense is found to be reasonable and worth accepting”. 16. This Court also observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment regarding acquittal of the accused under Section 302/34 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in eye of law, because as per the settled principle of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, particularly in category of VI, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment, examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. This Court further observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. 18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.