ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Twin questions that emanate for consideration in this writ petition are, 1. Whether Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would be applicable to the Government servant who has been reinstated on acquittal from the criminal charges? and 2. Whether he would be entitled for full back-wages from the date of conviction till the date of reinstatement on acquittal? 2. The aforesaid questions would arise in the following factual backdrop: - 3. The petitioner being Junior Engineer working in the Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited, was subjected to charge-sheet and ultimately, he was convicted by the Special Judge in Special Criminal Case No.11/2002 on 20-2-2004 for offences under Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and on appeal being preferred by the petitioner herein, he was acquitted by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.206/2004 on 9-4-2012 and he was reinstated in service on 24-5-2012 by the order of the respondent herein i.e. the CSPDCL, and he was given all the service benefits except back-wages holding that from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement / joining, he will not be entitled for back-wages and it has been held to be the extraordinary leave without pay and allowances by order dated 8-4-2013. 4. Feeling aggrieved against refusal to grant back-wages from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition stating inter alia that though he has been reinstated, but refusal to grant back-wages is arbitrary and unjustified and he is entitled for back-wages also under Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules. Thus, a prayer has been made for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to give the petitioner full salary from the date of termination till his reinstatement with all consequential benefits. 5. The respondents have filed return stating inter alia that the petitioner’s writ petition questioning the order of termination has been withdrawn and Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would be applicable to a case where a Government servant is placed under suspension and is reinstated in service on revocation of the said suspension. 5. The respondents have filed return stating inter alia that the petitioner’s writ petition questioning the order of termination has been withdrawn and Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would be applicable to a case where a Government servant is placed under suspension and is reinstated in service on revocation of the said suspension. It has further been stated that since the petitioner was not under suspension for the period of his absence and he was dismissed from service on receipt of the judgment of his conviction and order of his sentence, the period between his dismissal and reinstatement on acquittal was therefore not spent under suspension by any stretch of imagination and therefore he is not entitled to claim any benefit under the said Fundamental Rule. It has also been stated that since the petitioner has not worked on the post from the date of conviction till the date of reinstatement, he has rightly been denied back-wages. 6. Mrs. Renu Kochar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that though the petitioner has been reinstated, but back-wages from the date of conviction till the date of reinstatement have not been granted which he is entitled by virtue of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 7. Ms. Veena Nair, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, would submit that Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would apparently be not applicable in case of the petitioner, as the petitioner was not placed under suspension and not reinstated in service on revocation of said suspension and he was not under suspension for the period of his absence, rather he was dismissed from service pursuant to his conviction in criminal case by the jurisdictional criminal court, therefore, the said Fundamental Rule would not be applicable to him and he would not be entitled for back-wages. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar, (1996) 11 SCC 603 , he would not be entitled for back-wages. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar, (1996) 11 SCC 603 , he would not be entitled for back-wages. As such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. In order to answer the questions formulated herein-above, it would be appropriate to notice Rule 54-B(1) of the Fundamental Rules, which states as under: - F.R. 54-B (1) When a Government servant who has been suspended, is re-instated or would have been so re-instated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the authority competent to order re-instatement shall consider and make a specific order- (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with re-instatement or the date of his retirement on superannuation, as the case may be; and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.” 9. A careful perusal of sub-rule (1) of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would show that when a Government servant, who has been suspended, is reinstated or would have been so reinstated but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension, the competent authority to order reinstatement shall consider and make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement on superannuation, as the case may be; and whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. However, it is not the case of the petitioner that he was placed under suspension and directed for reinstatement while revoking the suspension, as he was terminated from service on conviction of criminal charges by the jurisdictional criminal court, therefore, Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable. 10. However, it is not the case of the petitioner that he was placed under suspension and directed for reinstatement while revoking the suspension, as he was terminated from service on conviction of criminal charges by the jurisdictional criminal court, therefore, Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable. 10. A Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Munnalal Mishra v. Union of India and others, 2005 (3) M.P.H.T. 125 (DB) considered the issue threadbare with regard to applicability of Rules 54, 54-A & 54-B of the Fundamental Rules and held that when a Government servant is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in pursuance of any disciplinary proceedings, but without inquiry on the ground of conviction in a criminal case, then F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B would not apply and F.R. 17(1), which deals with ‘no work, no pay’, would apply. It has been observed in paragraph 10 of the report as under: - “10. But when a Government (or Railway) servant is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in pursuance or any disciplinary proceedings, but without inquiry on the ground of conviction in a criminal case, then F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B (or corresponding Rules 1343, 1344 and 1345 of Railway Code) would not apply. As a consequence, we will have to fall back on the general principles and Fundamental Rule No. 17 (1) which provides that no work will mean no pay. Therefore, the Government (or Railway) servant will not be entitled to any pay for the period when he was not in service. He will be entitled to be reinstated from the date of acquittal. If he is not reinstated on acquittal, he will be entitled to pay and allowances from the date of acquittal. This position is made clear by the Supreme Court in several decisions.” 11. This issue in hand is also well settled and no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 12. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121 , the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval. 13. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal, AIR 1994 SC 552 , the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …” 14. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim, (2013) 11 SCC 67 , the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India, (2005) 8 SCC 747 , held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: - “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 15. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 15. Coming back finally to the facts of the present case, it is quite vivid that the petitioner was convicted by the jurisdictional criminal court by judgment dated 20-2-2004 for offences under Sections 7 & 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pursuant to which his services were terminated by order dated 25-2-2004, but immediately, on his acquittal from the criminal charges on 9-4-2012 by this Court, he was reinstated by order dated 24-5-2012, however, he has been denied back-wages from the date of conviction to the date of reinstatement, as the respondent CSPDCL was unable to take the services of the petitioner due to his facing criminal charges and as such, in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra), Baldev Singh (supra) and Mohammed Abdul Rahim’s case (supra), subsequent acquittal of the petitioner though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction and thus, he would not be entitled for back-wages from the date of conviction to the date of reinstatement. Concludingly, it is held that Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable to the petitioner herein in the present case, as firstly, he has been convicted and later on, he has been reinstated on acquittal from the criminal charges and consequently, Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable and thus, he would not be entitled for back-wages from the date of conviction till the date of reinstatement by the competent authority. Both the questions are answered accordingly. 16. In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ petition, it deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own cost(s).