ORDER : Question involved: 1. The short question involved in the writ petition is, as to when a disciplinary proceeding is said to be initiated against the Bank officer in terms of Regulation 45(3) of the Regional Rural Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 (for short ‘the Regulations of 2010’) whether it is on formal framing and issuance of charge-sheet to the delinquent Bank officer seeking his explanation to the allegations made in the charge-sheet or mere decision by the Bank to initiate disciplinary proceeding would be sufficient for initiation of disciplinary proceeding in terms of the aforesaid Rule? 2. The aforesaid question arises in the following factual backdrop: Relevant facts in brief: 3. The petitioner herein was subjected to notice/order dated 29-5-2014 (Annexure P-1) informing him by the respondent Bank that the Bank has taken decision to initiate disciplinary proceeding against him as per Regulation 45 of the Regulations of 2010 and before any formal charge-sheet is drawn and issued instituting disciplinary proceeding against him, he was allowed by the respondent Bank to superannuate on 31-5-2014. Thereafter, on 26-7-2014, formal charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner vide Annexure P-4 informing him that the Bank has taken decision to institute disciplinary proceeding and disciplinary proceeding is being commenced and on 17-8-2015, the respondent Bank has taken final decision to initiate departmental enquiry against him. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that since charge-sheet was issued on 26-7-2014/17-8-2015 and the petitioner was allowed to superannuate on 31-5-2014, and further, as per the settled law since departmental proceeding has not been initiated prior to his superannuation in terms of Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010, therefore, issuance of charge-sheet on 26-7-2014/17-8-2015 is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. It is the further case of the petitioner that the applicable rule does not permit the Bank to initiate departmental enquiry after superannuation and decision to initiate departmental enquiry by the Bank is quite different from initiation of departmental enquiry, as departmental enquiry has to be initiated after taking decision to hold departmental enquiry and thereafter, formal charge-sheet has to be drawn, issued and served to the delinquent employee, which in the instant case, admittedly and undisputedly, only decision has been taken on 26-7-2014/ 17-8-2015 to hold disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. It is not the case of the petitioner that formal charge-sheet was drawn and issued before superannuation, though not served to him. Therefore, charge-sheet issued vide Annexure P-4 and all the subsequent proceedings deserve to be quashed and the respondent be directed to pay all the retiral benefits to the petitioner along with 18% interest. 5. Return has been filed by the respondent Bank stating inter alia that decision to initiate departmental enquiry has already been taken and informed to the petitioner on 29-5-2014 vide Annexure P-1 and misconduct committed by the petitioner has also been incorporated in Annexure P-1. It has further been stated in the reply that no particular form of charge-sheet is prescribed in the Regulations of 2010 and therefore it will be deemed that charge-sheet has already been issued against the petitioner on the date of superannuation on 31-5-2014. Therefore, no formal charge-sheet can be found in the format prior to issuance of charge-sheet on 26-7-2014 and prior to formal initiation of departmental enquiry on 17-8-2015. As such, it is a case where Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 squarely attracts and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. No rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioner. Submissions on behalf of the petitioner: 6. Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that though the alleged decision to initiate departmental enquiry against the petitioner has been taken on 29-5-2014, yet the petitioner was allowed to superannuate on 31-5-2014 and thereafter, only on 26-7-2014, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner and on 17-8-2015, final decision has been taken to commence departmental enquiry against him and therefore Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 would not attract as in terms of Regulation 45(3), disciplinary proceedings cannot be said to have been initiated as no disciplinary proceeding was initiated as on 31-5-2014 and it is not the case of the respondent that formal charge-sheet was drawn on 29-5-2014 and it was issued though not served to the petitioner. In that view of the matter, Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 would not attract in the present case and subsequent institution of departmental proceeding is per se without jurisdiction and without authority of law and it is liable to be quashed. In that view of the matter, Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 would not attract in the present case and subsequent institution of departmental proceeding is per se without jurisdiction and without authority of law and it is liable to be quashed. He would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of UCO Bank and Another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694 followed in the matter of UCO Bank and Another v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, (2008) 5 SCC 257 to buttress his submission. Submissions on behalf of the respondent Bank: 7. Mr. N. Naha Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank, would submit that the respondent Bank has already taken decision to initiate departmental enquiry against the petitioner as on 29-5-2014 vide Annexure P-1 and all the allegations and misconduct of negligence on the part of the petitioner have already been incorporated in Annexure P-1 and charges are already there in memo dated 29-5-2014 (Annexure P-1), therefore, in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Delhi Development Authority v. H.C. Khurana, (1993) 3 SCC 196 and State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur and Others v. Prabhu Dayal Grover, (1995) 6 SCC 279 the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Submissions of the Amicus Curiae: 8. Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned amicus curiae, would submit that correctness of the judgments rendered in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) and Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra) was doubted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Canara Bank v. D.R.P. Sundharam, (2016) 12 SCC 729 and answered in the matter of Canara Bank v. D.R.P. Sundharam, (2016) 12 SCC 724 by holding that by virtue of the provisions contained in Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Canara Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979 [pari materia to Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010, which is the issue before this Court] “a disciplinary proceeding initiated by means of a charge-sheet prior to the retirement of a bank employee would continue even after his retirement in view of the deeming provision contained in the said Regulation 20(3)(iii) by which the officer is deemed to continue in service till completion of the proceedings” and thus, requirement of bank employee is sine qua non for continuance of disciplinary proceeding even after his retirement. 9. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection. 10. It is well settled that in public services, disciplinary action is taken after initiating and completing disciplinary proceedings. The entire procedure for initiating and concluding disciplinary proceedings is generally governed by rules having statutory force. Disciplinary proceedings are held in exercise of the domestic jurisdiction of the employer. The holding of such proceedings of which enquiry into the misconduct of the employee (generally referred to as a departmental enquiry) is the most important feature and is a precondition to the imposition of any punishment on a public servant. A departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function. It is initiated by drawing/framing of charge-sheet and issuance and service of charge-sheet to the delinquent employee/officer. The charges should be specific, definite and setting out the details of the incident which formed the basis of the charges. Enquiry has to be conducted fairly, objectively and not subjectively. An enabling provision for continuation of enquiry after retirement when available in relevant rules, it is permissible to continue the enquiry. Where a statute raises a legal fiction for which departmental proceedings would be deemed to have been continued even after retirement, such continuation proceedings are not illegal. As such, it is open to the employer to continue the disciplinary proceedings if the enquiry is pending on the date of retirement, if the rules so provide. Applicable Regulations: 11. In light of the above background, it would be appropriate to notice the applicable Regulations in this regard which will deal with institution and continuance of disciplinary proceedings after superannuation of the Bank officer. Regulation 45 of the Regulations of 2010 provides for disciplinary proceedings after retirement. It states as under: “45. Disciplinary proceedings after retirement: (1) An officer or employee who is under suspension on a charge of misconduct and who attains the age of superannuation, shall be deemed to be in service even after the age of superannuation for the specific purpose of continuation and conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and issue of final orders thereon. (2) The officer or employee who is under suspension shall not be eligible for any subsistence allowance for the period beyond the date of superannuation. (2) The officer or employee who is under suspension shall not be eligible for any subsistence allowance for the period beyond the date of superannuation. (3) The officer or employee against whom disciplinary proceeding has been initiated shall cease to be in service on the date of superannuation but the disciplinary proceeding shall continue as if he was in service until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. (4) The officer or employee against whom disciplinary proceedings has been initiated shall not receive any pay and/or allowances after the date of superannuation and also not be entitled for the payment of retirement benefits till the proceeding is completed and final order is passed thereon except his own contribution to Contributory Provident Fund (CPF). Explanation: For the purpose of this regulation, the normal retirement benefits such as encashment of privilege leave and Gratuity may be withheld till the completion of the disciplinary proceeding and passing of final order by the Competent Authority and the release of benefits shall be as per the final order of the Competent Authority.” 12. Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 deals with the situation where the officer or employee against whom disciplinary proceedings have been initiated though shall cease to be in service on the date of superannuation, yet disciplinary proceedings shall continue by the legal fiction “as if he was in service”, until the proceedings are concluded and final order is passed in respect thereof. Legal Fiction and its Effect: 13. A careful perusal of clause (3) of Regulation 45 of the Regulations of 2010 would show a legal fiction, “as if he was in service”, has been employed therein. Legal fiction in other words is to enact a deeming provision for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really exist provided the declaration of non-existent facts as existing does not offend the constitution. Although the word ‘deemed’ is usually used, a legal fiction may be enacted without using that word and the words ‘as if’ can also be used to create a legal fiction (See Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Ltd. and Another, (2013) 5 SCC 470 ). Although the word ‘deemed’ is usually used, a legal fiction may be enacted without using that word and the words ‘as if’ can also be used to create a legal fiction (See Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation and Another v. Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Ltd. and Another, (2013) 5 SCC 470 ). It is well settled that in interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created, and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. 14. The Supreme Court in the matter of Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. (2007) 6 SCC 528 has observed that legal fiction, it is well settled, must be construed having regard to the purport of the statute. 15. A focused perusal of clause (3) of Regulation 45 of the Regulations of 2010 would show that in case when disciplinary proceeding is initiated against the officer of the Bank then despite his attaining the age of superannuation, the disciplinary authority is well within its right to continue the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the legal fiction created thereunder i.e. “as if he was in service.” Thus, when a valid disciplinary proceeding is initiated by the reason of legal fiction in terms of Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010, the delinquent officer would be deemed to be in service although he has reached the age of superannuation. Judicial Precedent on the Issue: 16. In this regard, the celebrated decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Others v. K.V. Jankiraman and Others, (1991) 4 SCC 109 may be gainfully noticed herein in which their Lordships have unequivocally held as under: “16. On the first question, viz. as to when for the purposes of the sealed cover procedure the disciplinary/ criminal proceedings can be said to have commenced, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has held that it is only when a charge-memo in a disciplinary proceedings or a charge-sheet in a criminal prosecution is issued to the employee that it can be said that the departmental proceedings/criminal prosecution is initiated against the employee. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The sealed cover procedure is to be resorted to only after the charge-memo/charge-sheet is issued. The pendency of preliminary investigation prior to that stage will not be sufficient to enable the authorities to adopt the sealed cover procedure. We are in agreement with the Tribunal on this point....” 17. The principle of law laid down in K.V. Jankiraman’s case (supra) was followed with approval in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) in which Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ Services Regulations, 1979, which is pari materia provision to Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 which is the issue in the case in hand, was the issue therein and their Lordships considering the said provision and also relying upon the earlier decisions in the matters of Coal India Ltd. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra, (2007) 9 SCC 625 and Union of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak, (2007) 6 SCC 704 proceeded to hold that a departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued. It has been observed in paragraph 21 of the report [Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra)] as under: “21. The aforementioned Regulation, however, could be invoked only when the disciplinary proceedings had clearly been initiated prior to the respondent's ceasing to be in service. The terminologies used therein are of seminal importance. Only when a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against an officer of the bank despite his attaining the age of superannuation, can the disciplinary proceeding be allowed on the basis of the legal fiction created thereunder i.e. continue “as if he was in service.” Thus, only when a valid departmental proceeding is initiated by reason of the legal fiction raised in terms of the said provision, the delinquent officer would be deemed to be in service although he has reached his age of superannuation. The departmental proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated merely by issuance of a show-cause notice. It is initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued (See Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman). The departmental proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated merely by issuance of a show-cause notice. It is initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued (See Union of India v. K.V. Jankiraman). This aspect of the matter has also been considered by this Court recently in Coal India Ltd. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra wherein it was held that date of application of mind on the allegations levelled against an officer by the competent authority as a result whereof a charge-sheet is issued would be the date on which the disciplinary proceedings are said to have been initiated and not prior thereto. Pendency of a preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself cannot be a ground for invoking Clause 20 of the Regulations. Albeit in a different fact situation but involving a similar question of law in Coal India Ltd.10 this Court held: “13. It is not the case of the appellants that pursuant to or in furtherance of the complaint received by the Vigilance Department, the competent authority had arrived at a satisfaction as is required in terms of the said circulars that a charge-sheet was likely to be issued on the basis of a preliminary enquiry held in that behalf or otherwise. 14. The circular letters issued by the appellants put restrictions on a valuable right of an employee. They, therefore, are required to be construed strictly. So construed, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the conditions precedent contained therein must be satisfied before any action can be taken in that regard.” It was furthermore observed that: “20. A departmental proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated only when a charge-sheet is issued.” (See also Union of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak)” 18. Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) was subjected to review before the Supreme Court in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra) and it has been held by their Lordships that the first step for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding is drawing up of a charge-sheet by the disciplinary authority and unless and until, a charge-sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceeding for the purpose of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, cannot be initiated. It has been further held that drawing up of a charge-sheet, therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding. Their Lordships observed in paragraph 29 of the report [Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra)] as under: “29. It has been further held that drawing up of a charge-sheet, therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding. Their Lordships observed in paragraph 29 of the report [Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra)] as under: “29. In terms of the 1976 Regulations drawing up of a charge-sheet by the disciplinary authority is the first step for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding. Unless and until, therefore, a charge-sheet is drawn up, a disciplinary proceeding for the purpose of the 1976 Regulations cannot be initiated. Drawing up of a charge-sheet, therefore, is the condition precedent for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding. We have noticed in Para 15 of our judgment that ordinarily no disciplinary proceedings can be continued in absence of any rule after an employee reaches his age of superannuation. A rule which would enable the disciplinary authority to continue a disciplinary proceeding despite the officers reaching the age of superannuation must be a statutory rule. A fortiori it must be a rule applicable to disciplinary proceedings.” 19. The principle of law laid down in K.V. Jankiraman’s case (supra), Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) and Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra) have been followed in the matter of Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and Others v. Ananta Saha and Others, (2011) 5 SCC 142 holding that disciplinary proceedings commence only when a charge-sheet is issued to the delinquent employee. However, the correctness of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) and Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra) was doubted by the Supreme Court in D.R.P. Sundharam’s-I case (supra) and answered in D.R.P. Sundharam’s-II case (supra) in which pari materia provision i.e. Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Canara Bank (Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979, was the issue before their Lordships and their Lordships after exhaustive consideration held that Regulation 20(3)(iii) is a stand-alone provision, and observed as under: “8. On an exhaustive consideration of the manner in which the provisions have been analysed and the clear and unambiguous language of the same and also having regard to the provisions of the 1976 Regulations of the Bank with regard to initiation of disciplinary proceeding we have no doubt in our mind that the meaning given to the provisions of the Regulations in the said case is correct and does not require any reconsideration. From the above it would follow that by virtue of the provisions contained in Regulation 20(3)(iii), a disciplinary proceeding initiated by means of a charge-sheet prior to the retirement of a bank employee would continue even after his retirement in view of the deeming provision contained in the said Regulation 20(3)(iii) by which the officer is deemed to continue in service till completion of the proceedings. 9. In the present case, the proceedings have been initiated by submission of the charge-sheet after the retirement of the respondent. Having regard to the fact that the Regulations in force in Canara Bank are pari materia with those in UCO Bank considered in the aforesaid decision, we deem it appropriate to affirm the orders of the High Court and dismiss the appeal.” 20. Furthermore, lastly, in the matter of UCO Bank and Others v. M.B. Motwani (Dead) through LRs. and Others, 2023 SCC Online SC 1327 the decisions in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) and Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra) were followed with approval and it has been held as under: “24. From the aforesaid referred judgments of this Court especially by a larger Bench consisting of Three Judges, in our opinion, there is no merit in the present appeal as the principles laid down therein have been followed by the High Court. In the case in hand, the deceased employee had attained the age of superannuation on 31.07.1991, whereas the chargesheet was issued to him on 07.12.1991. Meaning thereby that on the date of his superannuation, no disciplinary proceeding was pending against him.” Discussion and Analysis: 21. Admittedly, in the instant case, halfhearted decision to initiate disciplinary proceeding was taken hastily on 29-5-2014, but neither formal charge-sheet was drawn nor it was put to service amounting to issuance of charge-sheet to the petitioner and charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner only on 26-7-2014 seeking his explanation on the allegation made in the charge-sheet, however, in the mean time, the petitioner was allowed to superannuate on 31-5-2014. It is not the case of the respondent Bank that formal charge-sheet was drawn and issued to the petitioner prior to his superannuation on 31-5-2014, but it could not be served him, as issuance of charge-sheet though not served to the delinquent officer would amount to sufficient compliance of Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010. 22. It is not the case of the respondent Bank that formal charge-sheet was drawn and issued to the petitioner prior to his superannuation on 31-5-2014, but it could not be served him, as issuance of charge-sheet though not served to the delinquent officer would amount to sufficient compliance of Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010. 22. In this regard, decision of the Supreme Court in H.C. Khurana’s case (supra) may be profitably noticed herein in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that framing the charge-sheet, is the first step taken for holding the enquiry into the allegations, on the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and observed as under: “9........the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings cannot be subsequent to the issuance of the charge-sheet, since issue of the charge-sheet is a consequence of the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Framing the charge-sheet, is the first step taken for holding the enquiry into the allegations, on the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The charge-sheet is framed on the basis of the allegations made against the government servant; the charge-sheet is then served on him to enable him to give his explanation; if the explanation is satisfactory, the proceedings are closed, otherwise, an enquiry is held into the charges; if the charges are not proved, the proceedings are closed and the government servant exonerated; but if the charges are proved, the penalty follows. Thus, the service of the charge-sheet on the government servant follows the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and it does not precede or coincide with that decision....” 23. Furthermore, decision of the Supreme Court in K.V. Jankiraman’s case (supra) was explained by their Lordships in H.C. Khurana’s case (supra) by stating that issuance of charge-sheet would mean that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings is taken and translated into action by despatch of the charge-sheet leaving no doubt that the decision had been taken, and it has been observed pertinently in paragraphs 13 & 14 of the report [H.C. Khurana’s case (supra)] as under: “13.......The word ‘issued’ used in this context in Jankiraman it is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent, means service on the employee. We are unable to read Jankiraman in this manner. We are unable to read Jankiraman in this manner. The context in which the word ‘issued’ has been used, merely means that the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings is taken and translated into action by despatch of the charge-sheet leaving no doubt that the decision had been taken. The contrary view would defeat the object by enabling the government servant, if so inclined, to evade service and thereby frustrate the decision and get promotion in spite of that decision......... 14. ‘Issue’ of the charge-sheet in the context of a decision taken to initiate the disciplinary proceedings must mean, as it does, the framing of the charge-sheet and taking of the necessary action to despatch the charge-sheet to the employee to inform him of the charges framed against him requiring his explanation; and not also the further fact of service of the charge-sheet on the employee. It is so, because knowledge to the employee of the charges framed against him, on the basis of the decision taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings, does not form a part of the decision making process of the authorities to initiate the disciplinary proceedings, even if framing the charges forms a part of that process in certain situations. The conclusions of the Tribunal quoted at the end of Para 16 of the decision in Jankiraman which have been accepted thereafter in Para 17 in the manner indicated above, do use the word ‘served’ in conclusion No. (4), but the fact of ‘issue’ of the charge-sheet to the employee is emphasised in Para 17 of the decision. Conclusion No. (4) of the Tribunal has to be deemed to be accepted in Jankiraman only in this manner.” 24. As such, from the aforesaid discussion, it is apparently clear that: 1. the halfhearted decision to hold disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was taken hastily by the Bank on 29-5-2014 vide Annexure P-1 prior to his superannuation. 2. no formal charge-sheet was drawn against the petitioner and the petitioner was allowed to superannuate on 31-5-2014 by the respondent Bank. 3. charge-sheet was formally drawn and issued/despatched by the Bank for service to the petitioner on 26-7-2014 vide Annexure P-4 and on 17-8-2015, formal disciplinary proceeding was initiated/commenced. 4. 2. no formal charge-sheet was drawn against the petitioner and the petitioner was allowed to superannuate on 31-5-2014 by the respondent Bank. 3. charge-sheet was formally drawn and issued/despatched by the Bank for service to the petitioner on 26-7-2014 vide Annexure P-4 and on 17-8-2015, formal disciplinary proceeding was initiated/commenced. 4. the legal fiction employed in Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 is to the effect, if the disciplinary proceeding has already been initiated on the date of superannuation of the petitioner “as if he was in service.” 5. there is no enabling provision in the Regulations of 2010 for institution of departmental enquiry after superannuation of the officer of the bank. 6. charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner as on 26-7-2014/17-8-2015, whereas, admittedly, on that date, the petitioner stood superannuated from the post which he was holding in the respondent Bank. 7. the pari materia provision in the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ Services Regulations, 1979 was considered by the Supreme Court in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) and Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra). 8. judgments in Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-I case (supra) and Rajinder Lal Capoor’s-II case (supra) were doubted in D.R.P. Sundharam’s-I case (supra) and approved by a larger Bench consisting of Three Judges of the Supreme Court in D.R.P. Sundharam’s-II case (supra). 25. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the aforesaid factual and legal position, it is quite vivid that in the instant case, though the decision to initiate/hold disciplinary proceeding has been taken by the respondent Bank against the petitioner on 29-5-2014, but the petitioner was allowed to superannuate on 31-5-2014 and only thereafter, formal charge-sheet has been drawn and issued on 26-7-2014 and thereafter, disciplinary proceeding was initiated/commenced on 17-8-2015 much after superannuation of the petitioner from the post which he was holding in the Bank. As such, it cannot be held for the purpose of Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010 that disciplinary proceeding had already been initiated against the petitioner on the date of superannuation which will continue by the reason of legal fiction “as if he was in service” employed in Regulation 45(3) and there is no enabling provision in the Regulations of 2010 which confers jurisdiction and authority to the respondent Bank to institute/initiate disciplinary proceeding against him, as no departmental enquiry was initiated on the date of superannuation attracting Regulation 45(3) of the Regulations of 2010. 26. So far as the decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent in Prabhu Dayal Grover’s case (supra) is concerned, same is clearly distinguishable to the facts of the present case. In that case, perusal of paragraph 6 of the judgment would show that letter dated 3-4-1980 was served to the respondent therein by the Bank with not only the allegation of misconduct, but list of witnesses and documents were also placed on record. In that view of the matter, their Lordships of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Bank dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondent therein and held that letter dated 3-4-1980 though not answers the description of a formal charge-sheet but specifically discloses the charge, accompanied by copy of complaint containing details of the allegations and thus, fulfills the requirements of Regulation 68(2)(iii) of the State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Officers’ Service Regulations, 1979. 27. Consequently, initiation of departmental proceeding after superannuation of the petitioner is per se illegal, without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Accordingly, the charge-sheet Annexure P-4 and subsequent proceedings instituting departmental proceeding against the petitioner are hereby quashed. The respondent Bank is directed to pay all the retiral benefits to the petitioner within 45 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 28. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. No order as to costs. 29. Before parting with the record, this Court appreciates the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned amicus curiae, who in short notice, not only argued the matter and assisted the Court, but also submitted brief written submission.