JUDGMENT : (P. Sam Koshy, J.) Heard Mr. A.Venkatesh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Sathakarni K, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. G.Narender Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for HMWS & SB appearing for the respondents. 2. Aggrieved by the order dated 27.12.2014 passed by the X Addl. Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad (for short the ‘Court below’) in Arbitration O.P. No.1212 of 2013, the instant appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter the ‘Act of 1996’) has been filed by the appellant. 3. The questions of law to be decided in the instant appeal are:- 1. Whether non-compliance of Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter the ‘Act of 2006’) would vitiate an award passed? 2. Whether the provisions of Section 18, particularly Sub-Section (2) of the Act of 2006, is a mandatory provision or not? 4. The facts relevant for adjudication of the present dispute are that respondent No.1 herein i.e. M/s. Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board had invited tenders from the manufacturers of Water Meters/Authorized Dealers/Agencies for the work of supply, fixing and maintenance of 1000 Nos. of 15 mm dia single jet water meter confirming to ISO 4064 Class-B and maintenance of existing working meters for a period of three years each under O&M Divisions. The committee constituted for finalization of the tender recommended the appellant herein (respondent No.1 before the Court below) as an agency for O&M Division Nos.1, 6, 7, 9 and 10 and an agreement was also entered into. 5. It was alleged that the appellant failed to execute the work as per the specifications and it was also alleged that the appellant in spite of receiving letters from respondent No.1 failed to submit the details of maintenance as per the agreement. In the process, there was some dispute and the appellant herein thereafter moved before respondent No.2/A.P. State Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Hyderabad (hereinafter the ‘Facilitation Council’). In the process, there was some dispute and the appellant herein thereafter moved before respondent No.2/A.P. State Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Hyderabad (hereinafter the ‘Facilitation Council’). After the notices were issued, the Facilitation Council without following due process as is envisaged under the Act of 2006 had passed an award dated 31.03.2012 in Case No.31 of 2011 which was communicated to the parties on 22.06.2012 and which was subjected to challenge before the Court below vide Arbitration O.P. No.1212 of 2013 under Section 19 of the Act of 2006 read with Section 34 (2) (iii) (v) and (b) (ii) of the Act of 1996. 6. The Court below vide the impugned award held that since the Facilitation Council did not comply with the mandatory provisions under the Act of 2006, particularly Section 18(2) and (3), the award was bad in law and the same was set aside. It is this order under challenge in the instant appeal. 7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant only contended on the aspect of Section 18(2) not being mandatory and it is only obligatory and therefore the award dated 31.03.2012 was not required to be interfered with. It was also contended that even otherwise mere non-compliance of the provisions under Section 18(2) would not by itself vitiate the award which has been passed after hearing both the parties and no prejudice as such would be caused only on account of non-compliance of Section 18(2) of the Act of 2006. 8. It was further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the respondents having participated in the arbitration proceedings before the award was passed and the award being finally passed would amount to waiving of their objection so far as Section 18(2) of the Act of 2006 is concerned and also by implication it would amount to respondents having accepted the proceedings to be settled by way of arbitration and the award so passed therein. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the very purpose of enacting the Act of 2006 was for the early redressal of the grievance of suppliers like the appellants and it was in this context keeping this in mind that the Facilitation Council proceeded and decided the case by passing the award dated 31.03.2012. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the very purpose of enacting the Act of 2006 was for the early redressal of the grievance of suppliers like the appellants and it was in this context keeping this in mind that the Facilitation Council proceeded and decided the case by passing the award dated 31.03.2012. As such, it does not warrant any interference, nor can it be said to be contrary to law or contrary to the object and purpose for which the Act of 2006 was enacted. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant lastly contended that the term ‘shall’ used in Section 18(2) of the Act of 2006 has also to be read as ‘may’ as the provision is not which is mandatory, but is only obligatory. 10. In support of the said contentions, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions: 1. Lila Gupta Vs. LaxmiNarain and Ors., 1978 (4) ALR 682 2. Owners and Parties interest in M.V. “Valipero” Vs. Fernandeo Lopez and Ors., (1989) 4 SCC 671 3. Prasun Roy Vs. Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority and Another, (1987) 4 Supreme Court Cases 217 4. Mumtaz Yarud Dowla Wakf Vs. Badam Balakrishna Hotel Pvt. Ltd. and Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1378 5. Silpi Industries and Ors. Vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and Ors., 2021 (224) AIC 18 6. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Vs. State of Telangana and Ors., Order dated 12.02.2024 in Writ Petition No.1603 of 2023 7. M/s. Srirasthu Shopping Mall Vs. Micro And Small Enterprises and Ors., Order dated 18.01.2023 in Writ Petition No.38797 of 2022. 11. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel opposing the appeal contended that upon plain reading of Section 18 of the Act of 2006, it is very explicit that once when the parties resort to the provisions of the Act of 2006 or once when the parties approach the Facilitation Council for redressal of their grievance it is mandatory for the Facilitation Council to have adhered to the provisions under the Act of 2006. 12. It was also the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that since admittedly or rather undisputedly as the provisions enshrined under Section 18 having not been invoked or having not been resorted to, the Court below was justified in setting aside the award dated 31.03.2012 passed by the Facilitation Council. 12. It was also the contention of the learned Standing Counsel that since admittedly or rather undisputedly as the provisions enshrined under Section 18 having not been invoked or having not been resorted to, the Court below was justified in setting aside the award dated 31.03.2012 passed by the Facilitation Council. Thus, the appeal being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 13. Before we proceed further, it would be relevant at this juncture to take note of the mechanism provided for settlement of dispute where there is delayed payments made to the Micro and Small Enterprises. Section 17 and Section 18 of the Act of 2006 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Facilitation Council in the course of proceeding of recovery of an amount. For ready reference, Section 17 and Section 18 of the Act of 2006 are reproduced herein under: “17. Recovery of amount due.—For any goods supplied or services rendered by the supplier, the buyer shall be liable to pay the amount with interest thereon as provided under section 16. 18. Reference to Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation in the matter or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution or centre, for conducting conciliation and the provisions of sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to such a dispute as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of that Act. (3) Where the conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful and stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer to it any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in subsection (1) of section 7 of that Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council or the centre providing alternate dispute resolution services shall have jurisdiction to act as an Arbitrator or Conciliator under this section in a dispute between the supplier located within its jurisdiction and a buyer located anywhere in India. (5) Every reference made under this section shall be decided within a period of ninety days from the date of making such a reference.” Simultaneously, Section 24 of the Act of 2006 further envisages that the provisions of Section 15 to 23 having overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. 14. From plain reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions, what is evidently clear is that the Act of 2006 becomes a special Act and further as per Section 24 of the Act of 2006, the provisions of Section 15 to 23 shall have an overriding effect over any other provisions of law for the time being in force. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Bihar Rajya M.S.E.S.K.K. Mahasangh and Others, (2005) 9 SCC 129 in paragraph Nos.45 and 47 held as under: “45. A non obstante clause is generally appended to a section with a view to give the enacting part of the section, in case of conflict, an overriding effect over the provision in the same or other Act mentioned in the non obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions of the Act mentioned in the non obstante clause, the provision following it will have its full operation or the provisions embraced in the non obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the enactment or the provision in which the non obstante clause occurs. …. … .. 47. Normally the use of a phrase by the legislature in a statutory provision like “notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act” is equivalent to saying that the Act shall be no impediment to the measure (see Law Lexicon words “notwithstanding anything in this Act to the contrary”). Use of such expression is another way of saying that the provision in which the non obstante clause occurs usually would prevail over other provisions in the Act. Use of such expression is another way of saying that the provision in which the non obstante clause occurs usually would prevail over other provisions in the Act. Thus, non obstante clauses are not always to be regarded as repealing clauses nor as clauses which expressly or completely supersede any other provision of the law, but merely as clauses which remove all obstructions which might arise out of the provisions of any other law in the way of the operation of the principal enacting provision to which the non obstante clause is attached. (See Bipathumma v. Mariam Bibi [(1966) 1 Mys LJ 162], Mys LJ at p. 165.)” 16. Keeping in view the non-obstante clause i.e. Section 24 of the Act of 2006, it is evidently clear that the Legislature in its wisdom while enacting the Act of 2006 specifically wanted those disputes which come up before the Facilitation Council to be resolved only through the procedure as is provided under Section 18 of the Act of 2006. 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijeta Construction Vs. Indus Smelters Ltd. and Another, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3436 held at paragraph No.13 as under: “13. As per Sub-Section (3) of Section 18 after conciliation fails under Sub-Section (2) of Section 18 of the MSMED Act, and conciliation initiated under sub-section (2) is not successful, conciliation stands terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing ADR services for such arbitration and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was in pursuance of an arbitration agreement referred to in subsection (1) of section 7 of that Act. Therefore only after the procedure under Sub-Section (2) of Section 18 is followed and the conciliation fails and then and then only the arbitration proceedings commences and thereafter the provisions of the Arbitration Act shall then apply.” 18. The aforesaid principle laid down in Vijeta Construction (supra) has been further reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2021) 19 Supreme Court Cases 206 wherein in paragraph Nos.14 to 17, it has been held as under: “14. The aforesaid principle laid down in Vijeta Construction (supra) has been further reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2021) 19 Supreme Court Cases 206 wherein in paragraph Nos.14 to 17, it has been held as under: “14. From a reading of Sections 18(2) and 18(3) of the Msmed Act it is clear that the Council is obliged to conduct conciliation for which the provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would apply, as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of the said Act. Under Section 18(3), when conciliation fails and stands terminated, the dispute between the parties can be resolved by arbitration. The Council is empowered either to take up arbitration on its own or to refer the arbitration proceedings to any institution as specified in the said section. It is open to the Council to arbitrate and pass an award, after following the procedure under the relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Sections 20, 23, 24 and 25. 15. There is a fundamental difference between conciliation and arbitration. In conciliation, the conciliator assists the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, in an impartial and independent manner. In arbitration, the Arbitral Tribunal/arbitrator adjudicates the disputes between the parties. The claim has to be proved before the arbitrator, if necessary, by adducing evidence, even though the rules of the Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act may not apply. Unless otherwise agreed, oral hearings are to be held. 16. If the appellant had not submitted its reply at the conciliation stage, and failed to appear, the Facilitation Council could, at best, have recorded the failure of conciliation and proceeded to initiate arbitration proceedings in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to adjudicate the dispute and make an award. Proceedings for conciliation and arbitration cannot be clubbed. 17. In this case, only on the ground that the appellant had not appeared in the proceedings for conciliation, on the very first date of appearance, that is, 6-8-2012, an order was passed directing the appellant and/or its predecessor Jharkhand State Electricity Board to pay Rs 78,74,041 towards the principal claim and Rs 91,59,705 odd towards interest. 17. In this case, only on the ground that the appellant had not appeared in the proceedings for conciliation, on the very first date of appearance, that is, 6-8-2012, an order was passed directing the appellant and/or its predecessor Jharkhand State Electricity Board to pay Rs 78,74,041 towards the principal claim and Rs 91,59,705 odd towards interest. As it is clear from the records of the impugned proceedings that the Facilitation Council did not initiate arbitration proceedings in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” 19. The Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of M/s. Sew Infrastructure Limited Vs. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council and Another, Order dated 12.05.2022 in Writ Appeal No.56 of 2022 in paragraph No.25 referring to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijeta Construction (supra) has held as under: “25. In M/s Vijeta Constructions (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the clauses of conciliation of the Council observed that conciliators are to assist the parties in an independent and impartial manner in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute and at that stage the Facilitation Council is not required to adjudicate the dispute. At that stage the Facilitation Council has no jurisdiction to make thorough enquiry and take evidence. However, once the conciliation fails and the settlement is not arrived at during the conciliation and thereafter when the arbitration proceeding commences as per Section 18(3), the Facilitation Council as an arbitrator shall have all the powers of the arbitrator as are available under the provisions of the A & C Act.” 20. In the instant case also, from the admitted factual matrix, what is apparent is that since there was a dispute between the appellant and respondent No.1, the appellant approached the Facilitation Council. Since the very existence of the Facilitation Council was under the provisions of the Act of 2006, it was incumbent upon the Facilitation Council to have adhered to the procedure prescribed under Section 18. In the instant case, admittedly neither was there any conciliation proceedings drawn as is required under Section 18(2), neither was there any arbitration proceedings drawn under Section 18(3) and the Facilitation Council straightaway passed an award on 31.03.2012. 21. Recently, the Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court in the case of G.P.T. Infraprojects Limited and Another Vs. In the instant case, admittedly neither was there any conciliation proceedings drawn as is required under Section 18(2), neither was there any arbitration proceedings drawn under Section 18(3) and the Facilitation Council straightaway passed an award on 31.03.2012. 21. Recently, the Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court in the case of G.P.T. Infraprojects Limited and Another Vs. State of Jharkhand, through Secretary and Others, 2024 SCC OnLineJhar 184 in somewhat similar circumstances held at paragraph Nos.33 and 34 as under: “33. The records of the case indicate that on 02.09.2013 after refusing to grant further time to the buyer, the Facilitation Council straightaway proceeded to draw the award and also recorded that an award was drawn in two copies and was kept in the record and was to be placed before the Director-cum-Chairman for his signature/approval and thereafter, the signature on the award was to be obtained by all the members. The record indicates that the last proceeding which had taken place in presence of the parties was on 02.09.2013 and thereafter, there were internal file notings regarding information obtained about the status of the supplier as a small-scale industry, quantification of the award etc. There is neither any material to show that any proceeding was recorded to indicate that the concilliation had failed nor there is any proceeding to show that any decision whatsoever was taken by the Facilitation Council either by themselves entering into arbitration upon failure of concilliation or to refer to any other person for the purposes of arbitration in terms of section 18(3) of the Act of 2006. Meaning thereby that the Facilitation Council did not exercise any power whatsoever in terms of the Act of 1996 read with section 18(3) of the Act of 2006 to enter into reference and it has been established without any doubt in the mind of this Court that the order/award of the Facilitation Council which was impugned in the writ petition has been passed without entering into reference. 34. Considering the narration of the proceedings before the Facilitation Council from the records of the Facilitation Council as mentioned in details in the above paragraphs, this Court is of the considered view that the present case is squarely covered by the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijeta Construction (Supra) and Jharkhand UrjaVikas Nigam Limited (Supra). In such circumstances, the impugned order passed by the learned writ Court asking the buyer to file petition under section 34 of the Act of 1996 to challenge the award passed by the Facilitation Council and impugned before the learned writ Court cannot be sustained in law as the award passed by the Facilitation Council is not an award passed under the Act of 1996 in view of the fact that the Facilitation Council never entered into reference to act as an Arbitrator to enable them to pronounce an award which could be subject matter of challenge under section 34 of the Act of 1996. The so called award passed by the Facilitation Council and impugned in the writ proceedings is a nullity in law and is fit to be set aside and matter is required to be remitted before the Facilitation Council to proceed as per law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijeta Construction (Supra) and Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited (Supra).” 22. This High Court also in the case of M/s. Indu Projects Limited Vs. Telangana Micro & Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Order dated 12.11.2019 in Writ Petition No.24112 of 2016 dealing with a similar question of law, held at paragraph Nos.17 to 23 as under: “17. Section 18 (2) requires the Council to first explore possibility of conciliation by itself or by taking assistance of any institution or centre by making a reference. While conducting conciliation, Sections 65 to 81 of Act, 1996 are applicable. These sections are included in Part-III of the Act, 1996. Part-III deals with conciliation mechanism. Thus, under the Act, 2006, process of conciliation should start by asking the parties to the dispute to submit brief written statement describing general nature of the dispute and the points at issue (Section 65). There upon conciliation process would proceed and would terminate, resolving the dispute or otherwise. Termination of conciliation process can be at the instance of the conciliator(s) or the parties (Section 76). 18. If conciliation process fails to yield result, the Council can arbitrate the dispute. The provisions of Act, 1996 are applicable to conduct arbitration proceedings. Act, 2006 makes a departure from consent to resolve dispute by arbitration to compulsory arbitration mechanism to resolve the dispute. This is clear from Section 18(3) of the Act, 2006. 18. If conciliation process fails to yield result, the Council can arbitrate the dispute. The provisions of Act, 1996 are applicable to conduct arbitration proceedings. Act, 2006 makes a departure from consent to resolve dispute by arbitration to compulsory arbitration mechanism to resolve the dispute. This is clear from Section 18(3) of the Act, 2006. On failure of conciliation process the Council can set in motion Arbitration proceedings and consent of parties is not required. However, before resorting to compulsory arbitration and subject the parties to arbitration, the Council must explore the possibility of conciliation mechanism. 19. Only when conciliation process is not successful and was terminated without any settlement, the Council acquires jurisdiction to assume the role of arbitrator. These two steps are to be followed sequentially and no power is vested in the Council to side step and directly jump to the stage of holding arbitration proceedings. Again at this stage, it can conduct arbitration proceedings on its own or refer to any institution or centre. Thus, to reach stage of Sub-section 3, Sub-section 2 of Section 18 has to be complied. It is a well thought out scheme of the Act. In order to resolve the dispute amicably conciliation must be held and only if conciliation fails, the council should move to next stage. That being the statutory scheme, in the case on hand, on receipt of claim petition, Conciliation proceedings were not conducted by the council, but straightaway proceeded to arbitration stage. 20. The Council is creature of the statute and it has to work within the framework of the statute. When Section 18 of the Act, 2006 prescribes particular mode to resolve a dispute raised before it, the Council is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed and cannot circumvent. No discretion is vested in the Council to circumvent the procedure, evolve its own procedure and adopt a particular mode of attending to the dispute. Further, the objective of Section 18 is very clear i.e., high priority is assigned to resolution of dispute by conciliation. Thus, holding conciliation is an essential element of the scheme and can not be circumvented. The Council comprises experts and they are supposed to have special skill to hold conciliation and persuade parties to resolve the dispute. Further, the objective of Section 18 is very clear i.e., high priority is assigned to resolution of dispute by conciliation. Thus, holding conciliation is an essential element of the scheme and can not be circumvented. The Council comprises experts and they are supposed to have special skill to hold conciliation and persuade parties to resolve the dispute. Duty is cast on the Council to first attempt to resolve dispute by conciliation and only if it has failed, it should move to the next stage. 21. Learned counsel for 2nd respondent sought to contend that petitioner admitted in his statement of defence that conciliation proceedings failed between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent. In view thereof, there is no need for the council to conduct conciliation proceedings and, therefore, council has not erred in conducting arbitration proceedings. 22. Said contention is stated to be rejected. A plain reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act, 2006 makes very clear that it is mandatory for the council to conduct conciliation and only on termination of conciliation proceedings without settlement, it can proceed to the next stage. The failure of conciliation between the parties before the institution of claim petition has no relevance to apply the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 18 of the Act, 2006. The Council must record reasons on steps taken by it for resolution of dispute by conciliation and failure thereof and then only should proceed to hold arbitration proceedings. Further, even assuming what is stated by Sri Vishnuvardhan Reddy, is true, the Council ought to have atleast recorded reasons as to why it was resorting to Arbitration straight away, though Act, 2006 read with Act, 1996 does not vest such discretion in the Council. From the reading of the decision of the Council, it is seen that there is no whisper on even the alleged failures of earlier conciliation process, assuming it can take note of such process. 23. It is settled principle of law that when a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner the Tribunal established under that statute must do in that manner and in no other manner (Deepak Babaria and another vs. State of Gujarat and others, 2014(3) SCC 502 ). Thus, the Council clearly erred in directly proceeding to hold the arbitration proceedings. Thus, the Council clearly erred in directly proceeding to hold the arbitration proceedings. The council further erred in not adverting to the objection raised by the petitioner on this aspect and recording reasons why said objection is not valid.” 23. From plain reading of the pleadings and contentions put forth on either side, what is evidently clear is that the award dated 31.03.2012 which was under challenge before the Court below was not one which was awarded invoking the provisions of the Act of 1996. At the same time, the said award dated 31.03.2012 also was not one which was passed invoking the provisions as is envisaged under Section 18 of the Act of 2006. In the light of the award dated 31.03.2012 being neither under the Act of 1996 nor under the provisions of Section 18 of the Act of 2006, the award becomes nullity in the eye of law and cannot be sustained irrespective of the fact that considerable period of time has lapsed since the award was passed. What is illegal at the first instance would remain illegal for all times to come and the same cannot be enforceable only on account of efflux of time that has passed. 24. As an outcome of the discussions made in the preceding paragraphs, this Bench has got no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that the two questions of law framed by this Bench is to be answered in the affirmative. 24.1 This in other words means, because of non-compliance of the statutory requirement as is envisaged under Section 18, particularly Section 18(2) and Section 18(3), the award at the first instance if any passed would stand vitiated. 24.2 At the same time, on the basis of the light of the judicial pronouncements emphatically dealing with the said subject, forces this Bench to reach to the only conclusion that can be drawn that of Section 18 being a mandatory provision and those provisions needs to be adhered to. Non-adherence of the requirement under Section 18, particularly Section 18(2) and Section 18(3), the award passed in contravention to the mandatory provisions becomes nullity and void ab initio. 25. The instant appeal thus is devoid of merit and the same deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. Non-adherence of the requirement under Section 18, particularly Section 18(2) and Section 18(3), the award passed in contravention to the mandatory provisions becomes nullity and void ab initio. 25. The instant appeal thus is devoid of merit and the same deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. Nonetheless, considering the fact that the award dated 31.03.2012 passed by the Facilitation Council has been set aside by the Court below, the natural consequence that would be following is that the dispute stands remitted back to the Facilitation Council. Given the fact that the award was set aside by the Court below is one which has been passed in the year 2012 and by now it is almost twelve years of time that has lapsed, the Facilitation Council is expected of immediately seizing of the matter and ensuring an early conclusion of the proceedings as early as possible, preferably within an outer limit of six months from the date either of the parties enter appearance before the Facilitation Council. No costs. 26. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall stand closed.