ORDER : Arvind Kumar Verma, J. 1. This petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.PC challenging the impugned order dated 14.03.2024 (Annexure A- 1) passed in Revision Case No.22/2024 by which learned Additional Session Judge/Special Judge of Special Court for trial of CBI cases, Raipur, has allowed the revision filed by respondent No.2/complainant and set aside the order 29.12.2023 passed by learned JMFC, Raipur. 2. Relevant facts for disposal of this petition is that the petitioner is partner of M/s Neha Footwear (Partnership firm) and has duly registered having its active GST number. In the year 2016-2017, petitioner had borrowed sum of Rs.15,21,600/- from respondent No.2/complainant for the purpose of business. Subsequently, petitioner has returned sum of Rs.10,36,600/- alongwith interest. However, for the rest amount ie Rs.4,85,000/-, petitioner has given three cheques of his firm dated 13.07.2017, 28.07.2017, 10.08.2017 as well as gold as a security to respondent No.2. Subsequently on depositing the entire amount to respondent No.2, when petitioner asked for returning of Cheques and Gold, respondent No.2 with malafide intention presented the cheques for disbursement and when the cheques was dishonored, he initiated the proceedings against the petitioner under the Negotiable Instrument Act. Complaint case filed by respondent No.2 was registered as Complaint Case No.4402/2017 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur in which during trial statements of the parties were recorded. However, importance witnesses of the petitioner were not examined and the matter was closed for defence evidence on 26/08/2023 and, thereafter, list for final hearing. It is also alleged that respondent No.2 has malafidely implicated the petitioner by falsely stating that petitioner was the sole proprietor of M/s Neha Footwear firm. To bring the peculiar facts, on 05/09/2023 petitioner moved an application under Sections 311 & 315 of Cr.P.C for examination of Manager of concerned Bank as also of himself. After hearing both the parties, trial Court vide order dated 29/12/2023 (Annexure P/3) has allowed the application of petitioner holding that nothing prejudice will be caused to objector/respondent No.2 on allowing the application. Being aggrieved by order dated 29/12/2023, respondent No.2 filed revision application before the Revisional Court which came to be allowed on 14.03.2024 and order of trial Court has been set aside. Hence, this petition. 3. Being aggrieved by order dated 29/12/2023, respondent No.2 filed revision application before the Revisional Court which came to be allowed on 14.03.2024 and order of trial Court has been set aside. Hence, this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that impugned order passed by learned Revisional Court is illegal, perverse and contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and law laid down by the Apex Court, hence liable to be set aside. Complaint filed by respondent No.2 is not relating to the present petitioner as the Cheques were drawn in the name of the Partnership Firm. He further submits that application under Section 311 of Cr.P.C., for examination of witnesses, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which, revision is not maintainable. The application was moved under Sections 311 & 315 of Cr.P.C for examination of concerned Bank Manager as also of himself in order to bring on record correct facts and circumstances and also material for just disposal of the trial. Trial Court has vide power under Section 311 CrPC to examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case at any time, therefore, trial Court has rightly allowed the application filed by the petitioner. However, learned Revisional Court vide impugned order has erroneously set aside the order of trial Court. Rejection of application in the given facts and circumstances of the case would amount to failure of justice and it would also amount to abuse of process of the Court. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon order dated 11.11.2022 passed by this Court in CRR No.1121/2022 (Xyz Nil vs State of Chhattisgarh & Anr) as also the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Manju Devi vs State of Rajasthan & Anr (2019) 6 SCC 203 ; Mohanlal Shamji Soni vs Union of India & Anr., (1991) Supp 1 SCC 271; Sethuraman Vs. Rajamanickam (2009) 5 SCC 153 ; Sushil Suri versus CBI and Another decided on 06th May 2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 1109 of 2011; Varsha Garg vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors decided on 08th August 2022 in Criminal Appeal No.1021/2022. 4. Learned State Counsel opposing the submissions of counsel for the petitioner. 5. Rajamanickam (2009) 5 SCC 153 ; Sushil Suri versus CBI and Another decided on 06th May 2011 in Criminal Appeal No. 1109 of 2011; Varsha Garg vs The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors decided on 08th August 2022 in Criminal Appeal No.1021/2022. 4. Learned State Counsel opposing the submissions of counsel for the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No.2/complainant opposing the submission of counsel for the petitioner would submit that respondent No.2 filed a complaint case against the petitioner/accused under Section 138 of NI Act on the ground that the cheques given by petitioner amounting to Rs.4,85,000/-were dishonored on presenting for encashment. After service of summons, petitioner/accused appeared before the trial Court. During trial, respondent No.2/complainant examined himself and closed his evidence on 30.12.2022 and, thereafter, the matter was posted for recording of evidence of defence (petitioner/accused). The accused has examined one Amit Khubchandani as defence witness and, thereafter, submitted before the trial Court on 26.08.2023 that he does not want to adduce any other witness. Therefore, matter was posted for final hearing. Photocopies of the relevant order- sheets of trial Court is annexed alongwith reply as Annexure R/2-2. However, on 05.09.2023 when the matter was listed for final hearing, an application has been filed by accused/petitioner under Section 315 & 311 of Cr.PC for examination of Branch Manager or any other Authorized Officer of concerned Bank as also for his own examination. The petitioner para No. 4 of his application has pleaded that he is the partner of M/s. Neha Footwear, though he has been shown as proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. He also been pleaded that M/s. Neha Footwear is a partnership firm and to prove said fact, his examination is necessary. On the alleged application, respondent No.2 filed detailed reply, however, learned trial Court vide order dated 29.12.2023 has allowed the said application of accused/petitioner alongwith application for taking documents on record. Against which, respondent No.2/complainant preferred a revision, which was allowed and order of learned JMFC dated 29.12.2023 has been set-aside. He further submits that in cheque No.853318 (dated 13.07.2017), petitioner has signed as proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. Said cheque is annexed along-with reply as Annexure R/2-4, further Annexure R/2-5/acknowledgment also shows that petitioner is the proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. He further submits that in cheque No.853318 (dated 13.07.2017), petitioner has signed as proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. Said cheque is annexed along-with reply as Annexure R/2-4, further Annexure R/2-5/acknowledgment also shows that petitioner is the proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. Petitioner/accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC nowhere has taken a defence that he is the partner of M/s. Neha Footwear and saif firm is a partnership firm. Copy of statement of accused is annexed as Annexure R/2-7. Acknowledgment dated 11.07.2017 (Annexure R/2-5) also shows that petitioner/accused is the proprietor of the M/s. Neha Footwear. In bottom of the charge memo, plea of petitioner/accused shows that he has taken the amount as his own, even at that stage no such defence was taken. He further submits that the accused has closed his evidence and even in the list of witnesses, he never intended to examine any officials of Bank concerned. Order-sheets of trial Court also shows that Counsel appeared on behalf of the accused submitted that he does not want to adduce any further evidence. Before the trial Court an affidavit was filed by accused that he is ready to pay the cheque amount on or before 26.08.2023. Copy of affidavit dated 03.08.2023 is annexed as Annexure P2-10. Lastly, he contended that the petitioner has suppressed the material facts and not approached before this Court with clean hands. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Bhaskar Industries Ltd vs Bhiwani Denim & Apparels and Ors (2001) 7 SCC 401 ; Krishnan & Anr vs Krishnaveni & Anr (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; Sunderlal Patwa vs Shri Digvijay Singh & Anr decided on 23 July 2002 in Criminal Revision No. 141 of 2002. 6. Heard learned counsel for parties, perused the order-sheets of trial Court and other material/evidence available on record and also gone the judgment referred as above. 7. In acknowledgment dated 11.07.2017 (Annexure R/2-5), petitioner/accused has admitted that he is the proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. In the year 2016-2017, he borrowed sum of Rs.15,21,600/- from respondent No.2/complainant and subsequently, he returned sum of Rs.10,36,600/- alongwith interest. 7. In acknowledgment dated 11.07.2017 (Annexure R/2-5), petitioner/accused has admitted that he is the proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear. In the year 2016-2017, he borrowed sum of Rs.15,21,600/- from respondent No.2/complainant and subsequently, he returned sum of Rs.10,36,600/- alongwith interest. However, for the rest amount ie Rs.4,85,000/-, petitioner has given three cheques of his firm to the complainant ie (Rs.1,50,000/- Cheque No.853318 dated 13.07.2017; Rs.1,85,000/- Cheque No.582820 dated 28.07.2017; Rs.1,50,000/- Cheque No.748855 dated 10.08.2017). 8. Perusal of order-sheets of the trial Court also shows that after four years from issuing the cheques upon serving of summons, the petitioner/accused appeared before the trial Court on 28.01.2022 and seeks adjournment on the ground that there is chance of compromise between the parties. Respondent No.2/complainant closed his evidence on 30.12.2022 and, thereafter, matter was posted for recording of defence evidence. Accused intended to examine two witnesses as defence witnesses before the trial Court ie Amit Khubchandani & Deepak Gangwani and has also taken seven dates to examine them, however, he only examined Amit Khubchandani as defence witness and, thereafter, closed the evidence. Hence, matter was posted for final hearing. It is also evident that during evidence before the trial Court, petitioner/accused has never taken a plea that he is not a proprietor of Ms.Neha Footwear. 9. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down some guidelines in the case of Natasha Singh vs. CBI (State) (2013) 5 741. Relevant para held as under : "15. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. An application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must not be allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further, the additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties. Further, the additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties. Such a power must be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered by a witness, is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of rebuttal however, must be given to the other party. The power conferred under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The very use of words such as 'any Court', 'at any stage', or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings', 'any person' and 'any such person' clearly spells out that the provisions of this section have been expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. There is thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should therefore be, whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case." (emphasis supplied) 10. Relevant para of Sunderlal Patwa (supra) read thus : “10.This criminal revision does not invoke the inherent powers of the Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. and the same cannot be suo-motu exercised in view of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Madhu Limaye's case and further as per Amar Nath's case, the inherent powers cannot be exercised to defeat the bar under Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C.; 11. Relevant para of Krishnan & Anr (supra) reads as under : 10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397 (1) or under inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397 (3) or section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstance, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power and in appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity or procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings. The object of criminal trial is to render public justice, to punish the criminal and to see that the trial is concluded expeditiously before the memory of the witness fades out. The recent trend is to delay the trial and threaten the witness or to win over the witness by promise or inducement. These malpractices need to be curbed and public justice can be ensured only when expeditious trial is conducted. 11. In Madhu Limaye V/s. The State of Maharashtra [ (1977) 4 SCC 551 ], a three-Judge Bench was to consider the scope of the power of the High Court under Section 482 and Section 397 (2) of the Code. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put in order to facilitate expedient disposal of the case but in Section 482 it is provided that nothing in the Code which would include Section 397 (2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. This Court held that the bar on the power of revision was put in order to facilitate expedient disposal of the case but in Section 482 it is provided that nothing in the Code which would include Section 397 (2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction of the said two provisions in this behalf, it was held that though the High Court has no power of revision in an interlocutory order, still the inherent power will come into play when there is no provision for redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In that case, when allegations of defamatory statements were published in the newspapers against the Law Minister, the State Government had decided to prosecute the appellant for offence under Section 500 IPC. After obtaining the sanction, on a complaint made by the public prosecutor, cognizance of the commission of the offence by the appellant was taken to take trial in the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed the charges under Section 406. The Order of the Sessions Judge was challenged in revision in the High Court. On a preliminary objection raised on the maintainability, this Court held that power of the High Court to entertain the revision was not taken away under Section 397 or inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. 12. In V.C. Shukla V/s. State through C.B.I. (1980) 2 SCR 380 at 393], a four-Judge Bench per majority had held that sub-section (3) of Section 397, however, does not limit at all the inherent powers of the High Court contained in Section 482. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Court under Section 397 (1) of the Code. In the Rajan Kumar Machananda case, the case related to release of a truck from attachment, obviously on filing of an interlocutory application. It was contended that there was prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397 (2) of the Code. In that context it was held that it was not revisable under section 482 in exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. It was contended that there was prohibition on the revision by operation of Section 397 (2) of the Code. In that context it was held that it was not revisable under section 482 in exercise of inherent powers by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 397. On the facts in that case, it was held that by virtue of provisions contained in section 397 (3), the revision is not maintainable. In Dharam Pal case (supra) which related to the exercise of power to issue an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, it was held that the inherent power under Section 482 was prohibited. On the facts in that case it could be said that the learned Judges would be justified in holding that it was not revisable since it was prohibitory interim order of attachment covered under Section 397 (2) of the Code but the observations of the learned Judges that the High Court had no power under Section 482 of the Code were not correct in view of the ratio of this Court in Madhu Limaye's case (supra) as upheld in V.C. Shukla's case (supra) and also in view of our observations stated earlier. The ration in Deepti's case (supra) is also not apposite to the facts in the present case. To the contrary, in that case an application for discharge of the accused was filed in the Court of Magistrate for an offence under Section 498A, IPC. The learned Magistrate and the Sessions Judge dismissed the petition. In the revision at the instance of the accused, on a wrong concession made by the counsel appearing for the State that the record did not contain allegation constituting the offence under Section 498-A, the High Court without applying its mind had discharged the accused. On appeal, this Court after going through the record noted that the concession made by the counsel was wrong. The record did contain the allegations to prove the charge under Section 498A, IPC. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, has committed an error or law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court, since it failed to apply its mind, has committed an error or law in discharging the accused leading to the miscarriage of justice. In that context, this Court held that the order of the Sessions Judge operated as a bar to entertain the application under Section 482 of the Code. In view of the fact that the order of the High Court had led to the miscarriage of justice, this Court has set aside the order of the High Court and confirmed that of the Magistrate. 12. Relevant para of decision of Bhaskar Industries Ltd (supra) reads as under: “10. The above position was reiterated in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande & Ors. vs. Uttam and anr. { 1999 (3) SCC 134 }. Again in K.K. Patel and anr. vs. State of Gujarat and Anr. { 2000 (6) SCC 195 } this Court stated thus: It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objections raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.” 13. As far as the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner is concerned, the same is of no help of petitioner/accused being distinguishable on facts. 14. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable.” 13. As far as the decisions relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner is concerned, the same is of no help of petitioner/accused being distinguishable on facts. 14. Considering facts of case, pleadings made in petition, submissions of learned counsel for the parties, particularly acknowledgment dated 11.07.2017 (Annexure R/2-5) in which petitioner has admitted that he is the proprietor of M/s. Neha Footwear and borrowed the amount from respondent No.2/complainant, order-sheets of trial Court which shows that petitioner has taken seven dates to examine his witnesses before trial Court, but examined only one witness ie Amit Khubchandani as defence witness and, thereafter, submitted before the trial Court on 26.08.2023 that he does not want to adduce any other witness, further considering the principle of law laid down in above referred decisions, this Court is of the opinion that there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order dated 14.03.2024 (Annexure A-1) passed by learned Revisional Court. 15. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. No order as to cost.