JUDGMENT : (U. Durga Prasad Rao, J.) Challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 03.11.2022 in I.A.No.771/2018 in O.S.No.75/2017 passed by the VI Additional District Judge, Kadapa allowing the petition filed by the respondents/defendants No.1 & 2 under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of C.P.C. r/w Sec. 34 of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short ‘SARFAESI Act’) and rejecting the plaint. 2. The factual matrix of the case is thus: (a) Plaintiffs filed O.S.No.75/2017 on the file of Principal District Judge, Kadapa against the Syndicate Bank and some others for declaring the plaintiff’s title over the plaint schedule site of Ac.0- 22½ cents out of Ac.0-90 cents in Kadapa Town and permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with plaintiff’s peaceful possession thereof and also for declaration that the sale deed No.525/2006, dated 20.01.2006 executed by D4 in favour of D3 registered before S.R.O., Kadapa is null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. (b) Plaintiff’s case is that, the 1st plaintiff is the wife of late Karumuri Munaiah, and plaintiffs 2 to 4 are their children. The said Karumuri Munaiah was the absolute owner of the suit schedule property which was purchased by him from Bheema Rama Chandraiah under a registered sale deed No.1110/1982, dated 20.02.1982 and he was enjoying the same. Previously land in an extent of Ac.0-90 cents in Sarcar punji D.No.205/4, Ac.0-50 cents in Sarcar punji D.No.204/3 and Ac.0-41 cents in Sarcar punji D.No.206/5 were owned by D4 who acquired the same under registered sale deed No.2681/1968, dated 06.07.1968 from one D.Pichaiah. Later on, 4th defendant along with his father Shaik Dasthagiri sold away their properties which include Ac.0-90 cents of land by leaving Ac.0-10 cents for road in Sarcar punji D.No.205/4 in which suit schedule property fell in favour of Bheema Rama Chandraiah under a registered sale deed No.1855/1980, dated 30.04.1980. The said Bheema Rama Chandraiah enjoyed the property and developed the land and sold away to various persons. In that process, Bheema Rama Chandraiah sold away the suit schedule property with specific boundaries and measurements to 1st plaintiff’s husband Karumuri Munaiah under registered sale deed No.1110/1982, dated 20.02.1982. Ever since, the plaintiff’s family has been in enjoyment of the same. However, the vendor has not handed over the link documents to Karumuri Munaiah. In that process, Bheema Rama Chandraiah sold away the suit schedule property with specific boundaries and measurements to 1st plaintiff’s husband Karumuri Munaiah under registered sale deed No.1110/1982, dated 20.02.1982. Ever since, the plaintiff’s family has been in enjoyment of the same. However, the vendor has not handed over the link documents to Karumuri Munaiah. While so, Karumuri Munaiah died on 19.03.2008 leaving behind the plaintiffs as his clause-I heirs. After his death, the plaintiffs have been enjoying the suit schedule property. (c) While so, during September, 2016 the plaintiffs came to know that the defendant No.3 has created fake registered document as if he purchased the total extent of Ac.0-90 cents in Sarcar punji D.No.205/4 from 4th defendant under registered sale deed No.525/2006, dated 20.01.2006 and mortgaged the same to defendant Nos.1 & 2 bank which includes suit schedule property. In July, 2017 plaintiffs came to know that defendant bank has been conducting auction of suit schedule property by invoking the provisions of SARFAESI Act, as the 3rd defendant committed default in payment of the loan amount. The 3rd defendant has no valid title and right over an extent of Ac.0-90 cents in Sarcar punji D.No.205/4 which covers the suit schedule property. He fabricated some registered sale deeds with the connivance of some people and defrauded bank and thereby, the bank also will not get any right or title over the suit schedule property. Hence, the suit against defendant Nos.1 & 2-Bank and defendants 3 & 4-the parties to the alleged sham collusive sale deed dt.20.01.2006. 3. Pending the suit, the defendant bank filed I.A.No.771/2018 under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC r/w Section 34 of SARFAESI Act to reject the plaint on the main ground that the 3rd defendant has mortgaged the subject property and obtained loan and he committed default and thereby the bank initiated recovery proceedings under SARFAESI Act and complied all the necessary proceedings according to the Act and at this juncture the borrower and his henchmen hatched a plan to stall the auction proceedings and filed a collusive suit. It is strongly contended that this suit is barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and if the plaintiffs have any grievance, they have to approach the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. It is strongly contended that this suit is barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and if the plaintiffs have any grievance, they have to approach the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The plaintiffs opposed the said petition contending that the defendants 3 & 4 colluded together and created bogus sale deed to usurp the property of the plaintiffs and thus they committed fraud on plaintiffs as well as bank and therefore, the bank cannot proceed with the sale proceedings under SARFAESI Act and the plaintiffs are entitled to avail common law remedy before a civil court to seek declaration of plaintiff’s title over the plaint schedule property and for injunction. The trial Court considering the ambit of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act held that the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit of this nature in view of the embargo created under Section 34 of the said Act and accordingly rejected the plaint. Hence, the instant appeal by the plaintiffs. 4. Heard arguments of Sri K.B.Ramanna Dora, learned counsel for appellants and Sri T.B.L.Murthy, learned counsel for respondents 1 & 2-Bank. 5. Reiterating the same contention, learned counsel for appellants Sri K.B.Ramanna Dora would contend that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit schedule property inasmuch as the husband of the 1st plaintiff late Karumuri Munaiah purchased the suit schedule property under a registered sale deed dt.20.02.1982 from Bheema Rama Chendraiah and ever since, he enjoyed the same and after his death, the plaintiffs being his clause-I heirs are enjoying the suit property and except plaintiffs none others have any right, title or interest over the suit property. However, the respondents/defendants 3 & 4 created a sham and collusive sale deed dated 20.01.2006 as if the 3rd defendant purchased the suit property from the 4th defendant and thereby the 3rd defendant being the owner of the said property, mortgaged in favour of the respondents/defendants 1 & 2. Learned counsel would vehemently argue that respondent/defendant 4 has no right over the property and therefore he cannot execute a sale deed in favour of respondent/defendant 3 and he in turn cannot mortgage the same in favour of the bank and the entire transaction is a collusive one and vitiated by fraud. Learned counsel would vehemently argue that respondent/defendant 4 has no right over the property and therefore he cannot execute a sale deed in favour of respondent/defendant 3 and he in turn cannot mortgage the same in favour of the bank and the entire transaction is a collusive one and vitiated by fraud. Therefore, the plaintiffs can question the validity auction proceedings in a civil court and the suit for declaration and injunction is maintainable under law and Section 34 will not come in the way. To buttress his contention, he placed reliance on Mrs. Leelamma Mathew v. M/s Indian Overseas Bank, 2023(1) ALD 159. 6. In oppugnation, learned counsel for respondents 1 & 2-Bank T.B.L.Murthy would argue that Section 34 SARFAESI Act engrafts a bar on the suit being filed before the civil court because the subject matter i.e., the alleged fraud and alleged title of the plaintiffs can be determined by the DRT. Hence, the trial Court has rightly rejected the suit on the petition being filed by the respondent-bank. He placed reliance on Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal and Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 479 . 7. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the O.S.No.75/2017 is barred in view of Section 34 of SARFAESI Act and whether the finding of the trial court in this regard is sustainable under law? 8. Point: Section 34 of SARFAESI Act which is the bone of contention in this case reads thus: “4. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction. - No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)” On a plain reading, the above section explicates that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine. Now the pertinent question in this case is whether the clause “in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine” encompasses in itself, a suit of the present nature wherein fraud and collusion are attributed against the respondents 3 & 4/defendants 3 & 4. What is the true import of the term “in respect of any matter” is no more resintegra. In Jagdish Singh’s case (supra 2) facts are that the Bank of India has advanced loan to respondent No.10 through its proprietor/ respondent No.6 on 17.02.2000 and loan was secured by equitable mortgage executed by respondents 7 to 9 in respect of a land. Respondents 6 to 8 have also created equitable mortgage on three houses which were there in their respective names. Original title deeds of aforesaid properties were deposited before the bank. Since, the borrowers committed default, the bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act and took steps under section 13(4). The land was auctioned on 08.11.2005 and confirmed in favour of the highest bidder i.e., the appellant. He paid the entire auction price and the sale was confirmed in his name. At that juncture, respondents 7 to 9 challenged the sale notice by filing an application before the DRT, Jabalpur which was dismissed. Thereafter, respondents 1 to 5 filed a civil suit in the Court of District Judge, Barwani against the appellant as well as the bank and respondents 6 to 9 alleging that the suit properties which were mortgaged by respondents 7 to 9 in favour of the bank are belonging to HUF (Hindu Undivided Family) and those properties were purchased by respondents 6 to 8 in their individual names with the funds of HUF. Thus, the respondents 1 to 5 sought for a declaration of title, partition and permanent injunction against the respondents 7 to 9. The bank filed preliminary objection before the civil court stating that in view of section 34 r/w section 13 of SARFAESI Act, civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The civil court upheld the preliminary objection and held that if the plaintiffs have any right, they ought to have filed an appeal under section 17 of the DRT Act and not a suit in view of the specific bar contained in section 34 of SARFAESI Act. The civil court upheld the preliminary objection and held that if the plaintiffs have any right, they ought to have filed an appeal under section 17 of the DRT Act and not a suit in view of the specific bar contained in section 34 of SARFAESI Act. Accordingly, the civil court allowed the application filed by the bank under Order VII Rule 11 CPC holding that the suit was not maintainable. (a) Aggrieved, the plaintiffs in the said suit filed civil appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the said appeal was allowed by the High Court holding that since the plaintiffs have raised the question of title on the basis of the joint family property and they being the members of the HUF, the suit was maintainable. Aggrieved by the said decision, the auction purchaser filed appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court. 9. In the backdrop of above facts, the Apex Court referred the judgment of the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 wherein it was held thus: “22. The scope of Section 34 came up for consideration before this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (supra) and this Court held as follow: 50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr. Salve, one of the counsel for the Respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken "or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act". A full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken "or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act". That is to say, the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under Sub-section (4) of Section 13.” (emphasis supplied) Placing reliance on the above decision, the Apex Court in this case held thus: “24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, Sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower's debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realizing the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the "measures" referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding "in respect of any matter" which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression 'in respect of any matter' referred to in Section 34 would take in the "measures" provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. The expression 'in respect of any matter' referred to in Section 34 would take in the "measures" provided under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any "measures" taken by the borrower under Subsection (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. (emphasis supplied) The civil court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 Code of Civil Procedure as well.” Accordingly, it was held that civil court’s jurisdiction was completely barred in that matter 10. Needless to emphasize that above decision would squarely apply to the present case on hand, for, in this matter also the bank has initiated the proceedings under Section 13 of the Act and therefore, the appellants/ plaintiffs if feel that the respondents in collusion created a sale deed in respect of the subject property and mortgaged in favour of the bank, they can agitate before the DRT, but they cannot file a suit in view of express bar engrafted under section 34 of the Act. The decision cited by learned counsel for appellants can be distinguished on facts. In that case, the auction purchaser had not challenged the auction sale, but she filed a suit claiming damages against the bank for delivering the lesser extent of the land by obtaining amount for higher extent. In that backdrop, the suit was held to be maintainable. That is not an issue here and in this case, on the allegation of the fraud, the appellants/plaintiffs are questioning the title of the borrowers on one hand and also the proceedings initiated by the bank under the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, the remedy of the appellants/plaintiffs is one under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, but not in the common law court. The trial court has rightly rejected the plaint. We find no merits in the appeal. 11. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances no costs. Therefore, the remedy of the appellants/plaintiffs is one under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act, but not in the common law court. The trial court has rightly rejected the plaint. We find no merits in the appeal. 11. Accordingly, appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances no costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, pending if any in this appeal, shall stand closed.