Kewla Bai W/o Late Ramavatar Sahu v. Raju Yadav S/o Budhwar Say Yadav
2024-01-18
SACHIN SINGH RAJPUT
body2024
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. This is an appeal for enhancement of compensation preferred against the impugned award dated 28.02.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba in Claim Case No. 28/2015 in connection with the death of Ramavtar Sahu in a road accident. 2. The claimants herein are the widow and minor children of the deceased. The accident is said to have occurred on account of the rash and negligent act of respondent No. 1 the driver of offending vehicle i.e. Tractor bearing registration No. CG-04-DA-4520 and Trolley No. CG-04-DM-2480. Deceased is pleaded to have been aged about 35 years at the relevant time earning Rs. 12,000/- per month by doing a private job. The compensation claimed was Rs. 1,10,00,000/-. 3. Learned Tribunal however dismissed the claim of the claimants inter-alia holding that the claimants have not been able to prove that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driver of the offending vehicle by its driver. Hence this appeal. 4. Counsel for the appellants/claimants submits that the accident took place on 23.04.2015; Dehati Nalisi was recorded on the same day and the FIR was registered on 24.04.2015. He submits that the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased was conducted and the post mortem report shows that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to road traffic accident (RTA), and the nature of death was accidental. Though one eye-witness to the accident namely Roop Singh is said to be there, from his cross examination it is apparent that at the time accident he was at home and did not see the accident, and for that learned Tribunal disbelieved the occurrence from the offending vehicle. Counsel for the appellants submits that the proceedings under the Motor Vehicle Act are summary ones and therefore strict compliance of the Evidence Act is not necessary. According to the counsel for the appellants, from the Dehati Nalisi, FIR and PM report, the accident from the offending vehicle is very much established and therefore the finding of the Tribunal rejecting the claim is absolutely perverse and needs to be set aside. 5.
According to the counsel for the appellants, from the Dehati Nalisi, FIR and PM report, the accident from the offending vehicle is very much established and therefore the finding of the Tribunal rejecting the claim is absolutely perverse and needs to be set aside. 5. Counsel for the respondents, in particular counsel for the insurance company supports the impugned award and submits that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving licence and thus there is violation of the Insurance policy, and that only the tractor was insured and not the trolley, and therefore the insurance cannot be held liable to pay compensation. 6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. While dealing with an identical question in the matter of Bimla Devi and Others vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under: “15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.” 8. In the matter of United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Shila Datta and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 509 it has been held under: “10. A claim petition for compensation in regard to a motor accident (filed by the injured or in case of death, by the dependant family members) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under section 165 of the Act is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis in the traditional sense. It is a proceedings in terms of and regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act which is a complete Code in itself.
It is a proceedings in terms of and regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act which is a complete Code in itself. We may in this context refer to the following significant aspects in regard to the Tribunals and determination of compensation by the Tribunals: (i) A proceedings for award of compensation in regard to a motor accident before the Tribunal can be initiated either on an application for compensation made by the persons aggrieved (the claimants) under section 166(1) or section 163-A of the Act or suo moto by the Tribunal, by treating any report of accident (forwarded to the tribunal under section 158(6) of the Act as an application for compensation under section 166 (4) of the Act. (ii) The rules of pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo moto initiated by the Tribunal. (iii) In a proceedings initiated suo moto by the tribunal, the owner and driver are the respondents. The insurer is not a respondent, but a noticee under section 149(2) of the Act. Where a claim petition is filed by the injured or by the legal representatives of a person dying in a motor accident, the driver and owner have to be impleaded as respondents. The claimants need not inplead the insurer as a party. But they have the choice of impleading the insurer also as a party respondent. When it is not impleaded as a party, the Tribunal is required to issue a notice under section 149(2) of the Act. If the insurer is impleaded as a party, it is issued as a regular notice of the proceedings. (iv) The words “receipt of an application for compensation” in section 168 refer not only to an application filed by the claimants claiming compensation but also to a suo motu registration of an application for compensation under section 166(4) of the Act on the basis of a report of an accident under section 158(6) of the Act. (v) Though the tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation.
(v) Though the tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. On receipt of an application (either from the applicant or suo motu registration), the Tribunal gives notice to the insurer under section 149(2) of the Act, gives an opportunity of being heard to the parties to the claim petition as also the insurer, holds an inquiry into the claim and makes an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. (Vide Section 168 of the Act). (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry (vide section 169 of the Act). (vii) The award of the Tribunal should specify the persons to whom compensation should be paid. It should also specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them. (Vide section 168 of the Act). (viii) The Tribunal should deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned within 15 days from the date of the award. (Vide section 168 (2) of the Act). We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.” 9. Further, in the matter of Dulcina Fernandes and Others vs. Joaquim Xavier Cruz and Another, (2013) 10 SCC 646 it has been held as under: 7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pickup van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 8. In United India Insurance Co.
8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted herein-below: “10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. *** *** *** (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it doews not do so as in an adversarial litigation. (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.” 10. In the matter of Sunita and Others vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Others, (2020) 13 SCC 486 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under: “7. The respondents challenged the evidence of Bhagchand (A.D.2) on the ground that his name was not mentioned in the list of witnesses set out in the charge-sheet (Exh.2) and could not have been near the spot when the accident occurred. For, he was a resident of Pakhala village, which was 3 (three) Kilometres away from the alleged accident spot. Despite these objections, the Tribunal accepted the veracity of Bhagchand’s deposition. It held that not all the eye-witnesses to the incident needed to be named in the charge-sheet and that the respondents had failed to ask Bhagchand any question during the cross examination so as to cast any doubt on the veracity of his statement. Further, the respondents had also failed to ask Bhagchand about giving any statement to the police. Bhagchand had deposed that on the day of incident, he was at his brother’s house in Shivad village, which did not preclude him from being an eye-witness to the incident.” 11.
Further, the respondents had also failed to ask Bhagchand about giving any statement to the police. Bhagchand had deposed that on the day of incident, he was at his brother’s house in Shivad village, which did not preclude him from being an eye-witness to the incident.” 11. In aforesaid view of the factual and legal discussion and keeping in mind the fact that in the present case Dehati Nalisi was recorded; prompt FIR was registered; post mortem examination on the body of the deceased was conducted, this Court is of the opinion that the death of the deceased was as a result of accident with the offending vehicle which was duly insured with respondent No. 3/ insurer, and therefore the finding of the Tribunal that the offending vehicle was not involved in the accident, is set aside. 12. Having arrived at that finding, this Court could have remanded the matter to the Tribunal for consideration of quantum, but looking to the accident having occurred in the year 2014 and that this appeal is pending since 2017, this Court itself deems it proper to proceed with that exercise. 13. Now the quantification of compensation. Though monthly income of the deceased has been pleaded to be Rs. 12,000/- looking to the fact that there is no cogent and reliable proof from the claimants in that regard, it is difficult for this Court to concede to that pleading as a whole. However, looking to the material available on record, considering the minimum wages prevailing at the time accident, his income is taken at Rs. 6,000/- per month and Rs. 72,000/- per annum. Adding 40% thereof (Rs. 28,800/-) towards future prospects, the annual loss of income comes to Rs. 1,00,800/-. 1/3rd thereof (Rs. 33,600/-) needs to be deducted towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased himself, and having done so the annual loss of dependency comes to Rs. 67,200/- and applying the multiplier of 15 looking to the age of the deceased i.e. 36 years, the total loss of dependency arrives at Rs. 10,08,000/-. This apart, a sum of Rs. 40,000/- towards spousal consortium is awarded to claimant/wife, Rs. 40,000/- each is awarded to claimants/children (two in number = 80,000/-), Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 15,000/- for funeral expenses. The total compensation thus comes to Rs. 11,58,000/-. Out of this amount, Rs.
10,08,000/-. This apart, a sum of Rs. 40,000/- towards spousal consortium is awarded to claimant/wife, Rs. 40,000/- each is awarded to claimants/children (two in number = 80,000/-), Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of estate and Rs. 15,000/- for funeral expenses. The total compensation thus comes to Rs. 11,58,000/-. Out of this amount, Rs. 6,00,000/- be invested in the fixed deposit in the name of appellant/wife for a period of two years. Like-wise Rs. 2,50,000/- each be invested in the name of claimants/children two in number, till they attain majority, and the remaining amount be disbursed to claimant/wife through bank transaction. The amount shall carry 6% interest per annum. 14. Appeal is thus allowed in part.