JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Instant Letters Patent Appeal lays challenge to judgment dated 6.4.2021, whereby learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissed CWPOA No. 5629 of 2020, having been filed by the appellant/petitioner (in short the “petitioner”), seeking therein direction to the respondents to count the period of incarceration either in police or judicial custody, ending on his acquittal, in FIR No. 207 of 2021, under Section 20 of ND &PS Act, registered at PS Chamba, towards seniority and pensionary benefits. 2. Precisely, the facts necessary for adjudication of the case at hand are that the petitioner was initially engaged as daily wage Beldar in IPH Sub-Division Dhawala, Division Chamba at Guwari Khundel Scheme in the month of August, 1994, and since then, he had been working continuously with 240 days in each calendar year till 1.10.2001, when he was apprehended by the police in connection with FIR No. 207 of 2001, registered under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. Pursuant to registration of aforesaid case, petitioner came to be arrested. After completion of investigation, police presented charge sheet in the competent court of law and ultimately, he was tried in Session Trial No. 47 of 2001. Since prosecution failed to prove the allegation leveled against the petitioner in the FIR detailed herein above, he was acquitted on 30.11.2002. During the course of the trial, petitioner remained disengaged from the service, however, after his acquittal, he was reengaged w.e.f. 11.12.2002 i.e. 11 days after the date of acquittal of the petitioner by the competent court of law. 3. Since respondent did not count the period of absence during which petitioner remained in the police and judicial custody, he was not regularized in December, 2003 on completion of eight years continuous service w.e.f. his initial engagement in August, 1994. To the contrary, respondents considered the engagement of the petitioner w.e.f. 11.12.2002, as fresh engagement and thereafter, after completion of eight years period starting from December, 2002, his services were regularized vide order dated 15.4.2012. To the contrary, respondents considered the engagement of the petitioner w.e.f. 11.12.2002, as fresh engagement and thereafter, after completion of eight years period starting from December, 2002, his services were regularized vide order dated 15.4.2012. Though petitioner claimed before the respondents that he is entitled to be treated on duty for continuity and regularization of his service during the period he remained in police/ judicial custody between 1.10.2001 and 30.11.2002 and the period between acquittal and rejoining i.e. 30.11.2002 to 11.12.2002, but aforesaid prayer of him was not paid any heed, as a result thereof, petitioner was compelled to approach the erstwhile HP State Administrative Tribunal by way of OA No. 7065 of 2018, which subsequently on account of its abolishment came to be transferred to the writ court for adjudication and was re-registered as CWPOA No.5629 of 2020, praying therein for following reliefs: “1. That the period of absence from duty on account of Police/Judicial Custody w.e.f. 01-10-2001 till the date of joining after the acquittal in FIR No. 207/2001 registered in Police Station Chamba and the period between the date of reengagement and acquittal may be treated as a continuous period of service for qualifying service. 2. That the Respondents be directed to regularize the service of the applicant w.e.f. December, 2002 on completion of service of 8 calendar years as per policy of the government as also forwarded by the Respondents. 3. That all consequential benefits may also be allowed to the applicant. Any other relief this Hon’ble Tribunal deems fit & proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be allowed to the applicant in the interest of justice.” 4. Learned Single Judge on the basis of pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties, held the petitioner not entitled to the relief, as detailed herein above, and dismissed the writ petition vide judgment impugned in the instant proceedings. 5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, petitioner approached this Court in the instant appeal, praying therein to set-aside the impugned judgment and direct the respondents to count the period of absence of the petitioner as detailed herein above. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 7. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the appeal and further canvassed by Mr. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 7. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the appeal and further canvassed by Mr. I.D. Bali, learned Senior counsel, representing him, is that learned Single Judge erred in placing heavy reliance upon Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, which defines “continuous service” because none of the contingencies as provided under the aforesaid provision of law existed in the case of the petitioner, rather he on account of extraordinary circumstances was unable to join the duty during the pendency of the trial. He submitted that immediately after acquittal in the aforesaid case, respondents themselves reengaged the petitioner and as such, period of absence on account of incarceration in jail ought to have been taken into consideration by the respondents for the purpose of seniority and back wages. He submitted that since no departmental proceedings ever came to be initiated against the petitioner and he was exonerated in the criminal proceedings, coupled with the fact that respondents themselves permitted the petitioner to rejoin his duties on 11.12.2002, there was no occasion, if any, for the department to not to count his services for a period, during which petitioner remained absent on account of pendency of the trial. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Bali, placed heavy reliance upon judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 172 of 2010 titled State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Gurdev Singh, decided on 24.2.2011, whereby appeal having been filed by the respondents, laying therein challenge to judgment dated 8.3.2010 in CWP(T) No. 11738 of 2008 came to be dismissed. Mr. Bali while making this Court peruse the aforesaid judgment vehemently argued that similarly situate person, who also remained absent from the duty w.e.f. 10.3.1989 to 8.10.1990 on account of pendency of the criminal trial, was given benefit of service for the period, during which he remained out from the service on account of pendency of the criminal trial. 8. Per contra, Ms. Seema Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, supported the impugned judgment and argued that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and as such, no interference is called for. 8. Per contra, Ms. Seema Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, supported the impugned judgment and argued that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and as such, no interference is called for. She vehemently argued that immediately after registration of the FIR and arrest of the petitioner, his services were terminated and as such, thereafter, reengagement w.e.f. 11.12.2002, after his acquittal cannot be said to be in continuation of earlier engagement made in the year, 1994, rather same was a fresh engagement. Learned Deputy Advocate General argued that since petitioner completed eight years daily wage service with 240 days in each calendar year in the year 2012, he was rightly regularized w.e.f. 15.4.2012. Learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that since at the time of registration of criminal case, appellant/petitioner was daily wage employee, there was no occasion, if any, for the respondent department to initiate disciplinary proceedings, but otherwise misconduct on the part of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that case under Section 20 of the NDPS Act was registered against him and pursuant to FIR, he remained in jail. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record vis-à-vis reasoning assigned in the judgment impugned in the instant proceedings, this Court is persuaded to agree with Mr. I.D. Bali, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that learned Single Judge wrongly placed much reliance upon 25 B of the Industrial Disputes Act, while considering prayer made by the petitioner. Section 25 (B) of the Act, could not be made applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case for the reason that “continuous service” as defined under Section 25(B) specifically deals with a situation where service of a workman was interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. 10. Otherwise also, Chapter-VA, wherein Section 25-B has been provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, specifically provides for Lay-off and retrenchment. 10. Otherwise also, Chapter-VA, wherein Section 25-B has been provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, specifically provides for Lay-off and retrenchment. Section 25 A provides that Sections 25C to 25E shall not apply to industrial establishments to which Chapter VB applies, to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per working day have been employed in the preceding calendar month or to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently. Section 25-B defines “continuous service”, but it specifically starts with note that “For the purposes of this Chapter, meaning thereby, definition of the continuous service as given in Section 25-B, otherwise would be read for the purposes of Chapter VA, which specifically deals with lay-off and retrenchment. It would be apt to take note of the Section 25 herein below: “CHAPTER VA LAY-OFF AND RETRENCHMENT 25A. Application of sections 25C to 25E.—(1) Sections 25C to 25E inclusive 4 [shall not apply to industrial establishments to which Chapter VB applies, or—] (a) to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per working day have been employed in the preceding calendar month; or (b) to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only intermittently. (2) If a question arises whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or whether work is performed therein only intermittently, the decision of the appropriate Government thereon shall be final. [Explanation.—In this section and in sections 25C, 25D and 25E, “industrial establishment” means— (i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of section 2 of the Factories Act 1948 (63 of 1948); or (ii) a mine as defined in clause (i) of section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952); or (iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951).] 25B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,— (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock- out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer— (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than— (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than— (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation.— For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which— (i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.” 11. Explanation to aforesaid Section 25 B(2) clearly provides that number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, and other situations given in the explanations. If Section 25-B is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that definition of “continuous service” given in this Section is specifically in context of lay- off and retrenchment. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that petitioner was initially engaged as Beldar in the month of August, 1994, and since then, he had been working continuously with 240 days in each calendar year till 1.10.2001, on which date, he was apprehended by the police in connected with FIR No. 207 of 2001. It is also not in dispute that after registration of FIR, petitioner remained out of job till the time he was acquitted in session trial No 47 of 2001 vide judgment dated 30.11.2002. It is also not in dispute that after 11 days of his acquittal, petitioner was re-engaged on 11.12.2002. It has been specifically averred in the writ petition that respondents after having seen the judgment of the acquittal reengaged the appellant/petitioner and there is no material adduced on record suggestive of the fact that on 11.12.2002, some vacancy had arisen qua which petitioner was offered fresh engagement against the post of Beldar. Apart from above, there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that that on 11.12.2002, when allegedly, petitioner was engaged afresh, few other daily wagers were also employed. It is difficult to digest that on 11.12.2002, only one vacancy of daily wager Beldar had become available in the department and against the same, petitioner was given the appointment. 12. Though learned Deputy Advocate General vehemently argued that after registration of FIR No. 207 of 2001, services of the petitioner were terminated on account of mis-conduct, but there is nothing on record to demonstrate that order thereby terminating the services of the petitioner, on account of registration of a criminal case, was passed against the petitioner, meaning thereby, w.e.f. 1.10.2001, though petitioner remained on the rolls of respondents, but during this period he remained absent. After passing of the judgment of acquittal dated 30.11.2002, respondents engaged the petitioner w.e.f. 11 12.2002, but there is nothing on record to demonstrate that aforesaid engagement of the petitioner made on 11.12.2002, was a fresh engagement. If it is so, period during which petitioner remained absent on account of incarceration in connection with a criminal case, could not have been ignored for the purpose of seniority. No doubt since petitioner failed to work during the aforesaid period, he was rightly not held entitled to back wages, but once, during aforesaid period, petitioner was prevented from joining the duty on account of his incarceration in a criminal case and he was acquitted subsequently, period of absence ought to have been taken into consideration for the purpose of seniority. 13. We find that coordinate Bench of this Court in similar facts and circumstances that too in the case of similarly situate person namely Gurdev Singh, upheld the judgment dated 8.3.2010, passed by the learned Single Judge in CWPT No. 11738/2008, wherein direction came to be issued to the respondents to count the period w.e.f. 10.3.1989 to 8.10.1990, during which he remained absent on account of a criminal case, for the purpose of qualifying service. It is not in dispute that after passing of the judgment dated 24.2.2011 in LPA No. 172 of 2010, person namely Gurdev Singh was not only regularized from the due date, but period during which he remained absent i.e. 10.3.1989 to 8.10.1990 was also counted for the purpose of seniority. 14. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ranchhodji Chaturjii Thakore v. Superintending Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) and Anr. (1996) 11 Supreme Court Cases 603, wherein in similar facts and circumstances though Hon’ble Apex Court held the petitioner not entitled to back wages, but period of absence during which, he remained incarcerated, was ordered to be counted towards seniority. Relevant paras of the afore judgment read as under: “2. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that, admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC for his involvement in a crime committed on October 1, 1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted the petitioner under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. This case does not warrant interference for the reason that, admittedly, the petitioner was charged for an offence under Section 302 read with 34 IPC for his involvement in a crime committed on October 1, 1986. The Sessions Judge had convicted the petitioner under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On that basic the respondents had taken action to have him dismissed from service since he was working as Junior Clerk in the respondent-Electricity Board. The petitioner challenged the validity of the dismissal order by way of a special civil application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Pending disposal, the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated October 14,1992 acquitted him of the offence. Consequently, while disposing of the writ petition, the learned single judge directed the respondent to reinstate him into the service with continuity of the service, but denied back wages. The petitioner then filed letters Patent Appeal No.319/93 which was dismissed by the impugned order dated August 26,1993. Thus, this special leave petition. 3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is: whether he is entitled to back wages? It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basic of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant, Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference.” 15. Reliance is also placed upon Union of India and Ors. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference.” 15. Reliance is also placed upon Union of India and Ors. v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 Supreme Court Cases 121, wherein it has been held that employees dismissed from service on conviction and reinstated on acquittal in appeal would not be entitled to back wages for a period of absence i.e. from the date of dismissal to reinstatement, which would otherwise be counted towards his service. “4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefore does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon for the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefore and operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in [1996] 11 SCC 603 (supra). If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest or by department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and it after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges, a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing re-instatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be re-instated, in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court in so far as it directed payment of back wages are liable to be and is hereby set aside.” 16. In case titled Banshi Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and Anr (2007) 1 Supreme Court Cases 324, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that grant of back wages is not automatic, rather would depend upon the facts of each case. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that long pendency of the trial or the criminal appeal may not be attributed to acts of omission and commission, but once a person is reinstated in service, the entire period during which he remained under suspension, would be considered for awarding him pensionary benefits. Relevant paras No. 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment read as under: “7. The appellant had all along remained under suspension for eleven years. He undoubtedly received subsistence allowance during the said period. 8. It may be true that the reason for long pendency of the trial or the criminal appeal filed by him may not be attributed to his acts of omission and commission but the fact remains that the entire period between 13.7.1976 and the date when he reached his age of superannuation he did not work. He was placed under order of suspension validly from 1976 to 2.10.1987. Legality of the order of dismissal on the basis of the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 25.2.1985 has also not been questioned. It is true that his services were dispensed with as he had been convicted in a criminal case involving grave misconduct. On his acquittal, he was to be reinstated in service. He has been directed to be paid his pensionary benefits. The entire period during which he remained under suspension, thus, would be considered for calculating his pensionary benefits. Continuity of his service has also not been denied to him. The only question which arises for consideration, as noticed hereinbefore, is as to whether in a situation of this nature back wages should have been granted to him.” 17. The entire period during which he remained under suspension, thus, would be considered for calculating his pensionary benefits. Continuity of his service has also not been denied to him. The only question which arises for consideration, as noticed hereinbefore, is as to whether in a situation of this nature back wages should have been granted to him.” 17. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State Bank of India and Ors v. Kamal Kishore Prasad, wherein it has been held as under: “10. Since much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent on Rule 19(1) and 19(3) of the SBIOSR Rules, the same are reproduced for the sake of convenience. "19.(1) An officer shall retire from the service of the Bank on attaining the age of fifty-eight years or upon the completion of thirty years' service or thirty years' pensionable service if he is a member of the Pension Fund, whichever occurs first. Provided that the competent authority may, at its discretion, extend the period of service of an officer who has attained the age of fifty-eight years or bas completed thirty years' service or thirty years' pensionable service as the case may be, should such extension be deemed desirable in the interest of the Bank, so however, that the service rendered by the concerned officer beyond 58 years of age except to the extent of the period of leave due at that time will not count for purpose of pension. Provided further that an officer who had joined the service of the Bank either as an officer or otherwise on or after July, 19, 1969 and attained the age of 58 years shall not be granted any further extension in service. Provided further that an officer may, at the discretion of the Executive Committee, be retired from the Bank's service after he has attained 50 years of age or has completed 25 years' service or 25 years' pensionable service as the case may be, by giving him three months' notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof. Provided further that an officer may, at the discretion of the Executive Committee, be retired from the Bank's service after he has attained 50 years of age or has completed 25 years' service or 25 years' pensionable service as the case may be, by giving him three months' notice in writing or pay in lieu thereof. Provided further that an officer who has completed 20 years' service or 20 years' pensionable service, as the case may be, may be permitted by the competent authority to retire from the Bank's service, subject to his giving three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof unless this requirement is wholly or partly waived by it. 19.(2) .......... …… ….. ....... 19.(3) In case disciplinary proceedings under the relevant rules of service have been initiated against an officer before he ceases to be in the Bank's service by I the operation of, or by virtue of, any of the said rules or the provisions of these rules, the disciplinary proceedings m'ay, at the discretion of the Managing Director, be continued and concluded by the authority by which the proceedings were initiated in the manner provided for in the said rules as if the officer continues to be in service, so however, that he shall be deemed to be in service only for the purpose of the continuance and conclusion of such proceedings. Explanation: An officer will retire on the last day. of the month in which he completes the stipulated service or age of retirement." 11. On the bare perusal of the said Rules it clearly transpires that as per Rule 19(1) of the Rules, an officer could retire from the service of the bank on attaining the age of 58 years or upon the completion of 30 years’ service or 30 years’ of pensionable service if he is a member of the Pension Fund whichever occurs first, subject to the provisos mentioned therein. As per the Rule 19(3), in case the disciplinary proceedings under the relevant rules of service have been initiated against an officer before he ceases to be in the Bank’s service by operation of, or by virtue of any of the rules, the disciplinary proceedings may at the discretion of Managing Director be continued and concluded, as if the officer had continued to be in service. However, the officer in that case shall be deemed to be in service only for the purpose of the continuance and conclusion of such proceedings. 12. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent were already initiated and had stood concluded, culminating into dismissal from service as per the order dated 11.08.1999 passed by the Appointing Authority. The said order was challenged by the respondent by filing the Writ Petition, which came to be allowed by the Single Bench on 26.03.2009 whereby the order of dismissal was set aside, nonetheless the Appellant-Bank having preferred the LPA No. 378 of 2003, the Division Bench had stayed the operation and implementation of the said order passed by the Single Bench on 9.05.2003. The said LPA came to be dismissed on 22.04.2010, in the meantime on 30.11.2009, the respondent attained the age of superannuation i.e., during the time, when the operation of the order of Single Bench was stayed. 13. Thus, the order of Single Bench setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Appointing Authority having been stayed by the Division Bench, the respondent could not be deemed to have continued in service, and also when he had attained the age of superannuation on 30.11.2009. Thereafter, the order of Division Bench dated 22.04.2010 passed in the LPA 378 of 2003 having been set aside by this Court while allowing the appeal filed by the Appellant-Bank vide the order dated 25.11.2013, again it could not be said that the respondent was continued in service, till he attained the age of superannuation. 14. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on Rule 19(3) of the Rules is also thoroughly misplaced in as much as Rule 19(3) contemplates a situation, when the disciplinary proceedings against a bank officer, have already been initiated, and are pending when the officer ceases to be in the Bank’s service, and in that case the Managing Director in his discretion may continue and conclude the disciplinary proceedings against the officer as if the officer continues to be in service. However, in the instant case, there was no question of Managing Director exercising such discretion under Rule 19(3) as the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent had already culminated into his dismissal as per the order dated 11.08.1999 passed by the Appointing Authority. However, in the instant case, there was no question of Managing Director exercising such discretion under Rule 19(3) as the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent had already culminated into his dismissal as per the order dated 11.08.1999 passed by the Appointing Authority. Though the said order of dismissal was set aside by the Single Bench, the order of Single Bench had remained stayed pending the LPA filed by the Bank; and though the LPA was dismissed by the Division Bench, the said order in LPA was set aside by this Court, observing that the person who hears the matter has to decide it. 15. It was only pursuant to the direction given by this Court vide the order dated 25.11.2013, the Appointing Authority was expected to hear the respondent and pass appropriate order. This Court had kept all the contentions of all the parties open. Hence the Appointing Authority after issuing show-cause notice and granting opportunity of hearing to the respondent had passed the order imposing the penalty of “Dismissal from Service” w.e.f. 11.08.1999, i.e., from the date when the first order of dismissal was passed by the Appointing Authority. Since all the contentions were kept open by this Court while allowing the appeal filed by the Appellant-Bank, as such no affirmative action was expected from the Appellant- Bank, as sought to be submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent. 16. The said order of Appointing Authority dismissing the respondent from service after granting opportunity of hearing to the respondent was in consonance with the direction given by this Court and could not be said to be arbitrary illegal or in violation of Rule 19(3) of the said Rules. The impugned order of the High Court setting aside the said order of dismissal being under misconception of facts and law deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 18. Careful perusal of aforesaid exposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly reveals that back wages need not to be granted automatically on the basis of judgment of acquittal recorded in a criminal case, but if an employee succeeds in inquiry and directed to be reinstated, period during which he remained absent on account of pendency of the trial or inquiry is certainly required to be counted for the purpose of seniority. 19. At this stage, Ms. 19. At this stage, Ms. Seema Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General placed reliance upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Others v. K. Sathaiah (2019) 15 Supreme Court Cases 801, to contend that since services of the petitioner were dismissed for charges of mis-conduct, he cannot be granted seniority for a period he remained in jail on account of pendency of the criminal trial. 20. Before ascertaining the applicability of afore judgment pressed into service by the learned Deputy Advocate General, it may be relevant to take note of the facts of the aforesaid case decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, writ petitioner was appointed as a driver on contract basis, but on account of unauthorized absence, departmental inquiry was initiated against him. Following the report of the Enquiry Officer, his services came to be terminated. After the dismissal of the departmental appeal and in the course of the departmental review, the Divisional Manager issued an order for re-engagement of the petitioner on contract on 06.07.2012. After re-engagement, the writ petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prayed for continuity of service together with consequential service benefits. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition, holding that the matter was not res-integra and was covered by an earlier judgment of a learned Single Judge dated 29.02.2012 in Writ Petition No.2786 of 2012, titled S. Kumar v. A.P.SRTC. In nutshell, learned Single Judge held that once the Corporation had granted a largesse in the form of a fresh employment, the workman should not be deprived of the benefit of continuity of service for the limited purpose of regularization. Finding returned by the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench in a Writ Appeal. However, judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench was further laid challenge in the superior court of law, wherein it came to be contended on behalf of the appellant that there was a manifest error on the part of both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench because a disciplinary enquiry was held against the workman after which an initial decision was taken to terminate him from service. Hon’ble Apex Court observed that though charge of mis-conduct was proved against the original writ petitioner, but yet in departmental review, he was offered fresh appointment and as such, services rendered prior to fresh appointment could not have been ordered to be counted for the purpose of seniority. Hon’ble Apex Court having taken note of the fact that on the basis of report of the Enquiry Officer, services of the original petitioner in that case were terminated, but subsequently, in departmental review, he was granted fresh appointment, held original petitioner in that case not entitled for back wages as well as counting of service during which he remained absent for the purpose of seniority. 21. Bare narration of facts, as noted herein above, itself suggests that facts of the case supra are altogether different from the facts of the present case and as such, ratio of law laid down therein, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. In case before Hon’ble Apex Court, service of the original petitioner stood terminated pursuant to enquiry report and thereafter, in departmental review, he was offered fresh appointment and as such, Hon’ble Apex Court rightly held original petitioner in that case not entitled for benefit of the service rendered by him before his re-engagement for the purpose of seniority, however, in the case at hand, there is nothing on record that after registration of FIR, inquiry, if any, was conducted by the department, as a result thereof, service of the petitioner was terminated, rather on account of registration of FIR and thereafter, filing of the charge sheet, appellant/petitioner was lodged in jail. There is nothing on record that during incarceration of petitioner, his name was ever removed from the rolls of the department, may be in the capacity of the daily wage Beldar. There is nothing on record that during incarceration of petitioner, his name was ever removed from the rolls of the department, may be in the capacity of the daily wage Beldar. Though learned Deputy Advocate General vehemently argued that since petitioner was a daily wage employee, there was no occasion for the department to conduct disciplinary proceedings, rather on account of his having named in the FIR detailed herein above, he automatically came to be terminated from service on account of his mis-conduct, however we are not impressed with the aforesaid submission of learned Deputy Advocate General for the reason that immediately after registration of FIR and lodging of the petitioner in jail, department was not estopped from passing appropriate orders, thereby terminating the service of the petitioner on account of his misconduct. Similarly, there is nothing on record that at the time of reengagement of the petitioner after 11 days of judgment of acquittal recorded on 30.11.2002, vacancy of daily wage Beldar was available with the department and he was given fresh appointment, rather respondents after having received judgment of acquittal recorded in favour of the petitioner reengaged him w.e.f. 11.12.2002. If it is so, the petitioner is right in claiming the benefit of service for a period during which he remained absent on account of incarceration for the purpose of seniority. Learned Single Judge while deciding the controversy sidetracked the main issue and has gone astray by invoking the provision of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which otherwise could not have been attracted in the present case. 22. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, we find merit in the present appeal and accordingly same is allowed, as a result thereof, impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is quashed and set-aside with further direction to the respondents to count the services of the petitioner for a period he remained absent on account of criminal case for the purpose of continuity and seniority and thereafter, same may be also counted for computing the qualifying service for the purpose of the pension as well as other consequential reliefs. In the aforesaid terms, present appeal is disposed of alongwith pending applications, if any.