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2024 DIGILAW 66 (JHR)

Md. Sabbir Ansari v. State of Jharkhand

2024-01-15

SANJAY PRASAD

body2024
JUDGMENT : SANJAY PRASAD, J. 1. Criminal Revision No. 1594 of 2017 and Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016 and Cr. M. P. No. 2257 of 2017 are being heard together and are being disposed of by this common order as the issue involved in all three cases are inter-linked to each other. 2. The instant Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner -Md. Shabbir Ansari (i.e. husband) challenging the judgment dated 26.07.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 77 of 2013 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur by which the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur has allowed the petition of the opposite party no. 2 filed under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. for maintenance and has directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 20000/-per month to the opp. Party no 2 as maintenance and Rs.15,000/-for her minor son for living medical expenses and educational expenses and Rs. 5000/- for the O.P. No 2 for her maintenance. The amount of maintenance shall be payable from the time of filing of the application for interim maintenance, which was filed on 30.5.2014 and therefore the order shall be effected from the month of June 2014. The arrears of maintenance from June 2014 to June 2016 i.e. for 25 months shall be paid by adding up Rs. 10,000/- per month towards arrears of maintenance in the current maintenance of Rs. 20,000/- per month, which shall be paid from July 2016 by the 15th of every succeeding month. The arrears of maintenance shall be paid till its complete realization under section 125 of the Cr.P.C. 3. The instant Criminal Revision No. 1594 of 2017 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner -Md. Shabbir Ansari (i.e. husband) challenging the judgment dated 28.08.2017 passed by Sri Manoj Prasad, learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Singhbhum East, Jamshedpur in Cr. App. No. 133 of 2016 and Cr. App. No. 66 of 2017 by which question of maintainability of appeal was rejected and also final order passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Singhbhum East, Jamshedpur, has been challenged by which prayer for granting interim maintenance directing the petitioner to pay maintenance and medical expenses of Rs. 15,000/-per month to the O.P. No. 2 under Section 20 (1) (d) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has been upheld. 4. 15,000/-per month to the O.P. No. 2 under Section 20 (1) (d) Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has been upheld. 4. The instant Cr. M. P. No. 2257 of 2017 has been filed on behalf of the petitioner- Sultana @ Afsana Begum (i.e. the wife) for quashing the order dated 21.07.2017 passed in Misc. Case No. 77 of 2013 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur by which the prayer for taking appropriate coercive steps against the opposite party no. 2 -Md. Shabbir Ansari (i.e. husband) for realization of Rs. 3,00,000/- to be paid as maintenance amount has been disposed of with a direction to issue D/W only for the amount which remains unpaid the amount for which the opposite party no. 2 was earlier sentenced. 5. So far as the Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016 is concerned, the same has been filed on behalf of the husband-petitioner challenging the judgment dated 26.07.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 77 of 2013 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur. 6. The case of the wife i.e. the opposite party no. -2, Sultana @ Afsana Begam is that the marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 was solemnized as per the muslim customs on 30.05.2011 at Dhatkidih, Bistupur, Jamshedpur and out of their matrimonial wedlock, parties have one son namely Md. Arhan Ahmed, who is specially challenged child. It is stated that after marriage, the wife-opposite party no. 2 was being tortured for giving additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/-, although at the time of marriage Rs. 2,00,000/- cash, ornaments worth of Rs. 1,50,000/- and cloth of Rs. 1,00,000/- and one motorcycle were also given. However, the wife was subjected to torture and even during her pregnancy, she had been not provided with medical attention and as a result of which, child, which was born on 01.03.2012, was specially challenged child, who was physically weak and needs treatment. It is stated that she has also filed a case under Sections 498-A/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which is still pending. Even after compromise in criminal application for bail, the husband-petitioner took his wife to a rented flat, but after getting bail, he has stopped living with her and the applicant i.e. wife-opposite party no. Even after compromise in criminal application for bail, the husband-petitioner took his wife to a rented flat, but after getting bail, he has stopped living with her and the applicant i.e. wife-opposite party no. 2 along with her son has been compelled to live along and even rent was paid by her father and brother. It has been stated that the husband-petitioner has got two shops at Sakchi market namely Beauty Centre, New Beauty Centre and he earns Rs. 45,000/- per month and therefore a sum of Rs. 20,000/- per month may be allowed as maintenance for the wife-opposite party no. 2 as well her son. 7. The husband-petitioner has appeared and contested the case by stating that the application under Section 125 of the CrPC is not maintainable as the husband–petitioner has divorced the opposite party no. 2 and divorced Muslim Women are not entitled for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C., rather she is entitled for maintenance till her Iddat period under Section 3 of Muslim Woman (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986. The husband-petitioner has also denied the allegation of cruelty and demand of dowry. It is also stated that i.e. first child was also born at the house of the father of the opposite party no. 2 where she is living without his permission and she has refused to come back even the petitioner agreed to live with the opposite party no. 2 in the rented house and the behaviour of the wife is not proper and his wife never cooked food and finally his wife i.e. opposite party no. 2 left the said rented house on 12.03.2012 after getting the husband-petitioner at stake and has also taken her all valuable with her. It is stated that husband-petitioner was doing business after taking loan from the bank and on account of loss in business, he was compelled to sale shop to return bank loan where the husband –petitioner is working as salesman in the shop of his father and is getting Rs. 250/- per day as allowance. Argument in Cr. Revision No. 1192 of 2016 and in Cr. Revision No. 1594 of 2017 by the petitioner:- 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned Judgement dated 26.07.2016 passed in Misc. 250/- per day as allowance. Argument in Cr. Revision No. 1192 of 2016 and in Cr. Revision No. 1594 of 2017 by the petitioner:- 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned Judgement dated 26.07.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 77/2013 by the learned Court below is illegal and arbitrary and not sustainable in the eye of law. It is submitted that the order passed by the learned Court below by directing the petitioner to pay Rs. 20,000/- per month to his wife and child as maintenance is arbitrary and exorbitant and is liable to be set aside. It is submitted that there is no shop in the name of the petitioner and the petitioner has already sold his shop and is working as a labour. It is further submitted that simultaneous proceeding under the provision of Domestic Violence Act and under the provision of Section 125 of the Cr. P. C is not maintainable. It is submitted that wife-opposite party no. 2 is a graduate and well educated lady and is able to maintain herself. It is submitted that presently the petitioner is working as the Salesman in the shop of his father and is getting Rs. 250/- per day. It is submitted that there is no documentary evidence of the income of the petitioner and there is no documentary evidence of shop of the petitioner and wife –opposite party no. 2 has failed to prove the monthly income of the petitioner @ Rs. 45,000/- per month in absence of any documentary evidence and as such, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below may be set aside and this Criminal Revision Application may be allowed. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur is fit and proper and no interference is required by this Court. It is submitted that the petitioner is husband of the opposite party no. 2 and plea of divorce is not correct. It is submitted that in order to escape his liability, the petitioner is pretending to be working as a Salesman in the shop of his father, which is incorrect because the petitioner has deliberately sold his shop to his father to escape his liability. It is submitted that the son of the petitioner and opposite party no. It is submitted that in order to escape his liability, the petitioner is pretending to be working as a Salesman in the shop of his father, which is incorrect because the petitioner has deliberately sold his shop to his father to escape his liability. It is submitted that the son of the petitioner and opposite party no. 2 is physically handicapped and special child and mentally retarded and blind. It is submitted that the petitioner is still running the shop in Shop No. 9, Block No. 5, Sakchi Market, in the name of Salamat Ali, great grand-father of the petitioner. It is submitted that even the electricity bill dated 16.01.2017 has been issued by the JUSCO in respect of shop no. 00006 in Block No. -VI in Sakchi Market in the name of the petitioner- Shabbir Ansari and thus, the sale of shop by the petitioner to his father is false and even the opposite party no. 2 has filed application before this Court to not sale the shop to any other person at the instance of the petitioner. It is submitted that opposite party no. 2 has also filed complaint case on 27.11.2012 which has led to institution of Mango P. S. Case No. 612 of 2012 dated 15.12.2012 under Section 498-A/420/406 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and learned Court below has taken cognizance under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act vide order dated 22.05.2013. It is submitted that the petitioner was in jail custody for about 42 days and was granted bail on the condition that he will live with the opposite party no. 2 and pursuant to which, the petitioner took the opposite party no. 2 i.e. the wife in a rented flat on monthly rental of Rs. 3,500/- per month, but after getting bail, he stopped to live with opposite party no. 2 and her son and rent has also not been paid by the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner has not paid any amount of maintenance in favour of the opposite party no. 2 and her son and entire expenses are being borne by her father and brother. It is submitted that so called Talaque has not been taken place in the Muslim Law and also in view of the fact that opposite party no. 2 and her son and entire expenses are being borne by her father and brother. It is submitted that so called Talaque has not been taken place in the Muslim Law and also in view of the fact that opposite party no. 2 was not signatory to the same. It is lastly submitted that even the divorcee Muslim Wife is entitled for maintenance till she re-marries and hence, the impugned judgment passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur is fit and proper and no interference is required by this Court and this Criminal Revision Application may be dismissed. 10. Perused the Lower Court Records and considered the submissions of both the sides. 11. It transpires that the petitioner is the husband of the opposite party no. 2, who is alleged to have divorced his wife. However, both i.e. the petitioner and opposite party no. 2 have got one son, who is also a special child, which has not been denied on behalf of the petitioner. 12. It transpires that the wife-opposite party no. 2 has examined four (04) witnesses in support of her case, who are as follows:- (i) P.W.-1 is Rukhsana i.e. the sister of the wife – O.P. No. 2, (ii) P.W.-2 is Sultana @ Afsana Begum i.e. the wife- O.P. No. 2, (iii) P.W.-3 is Sagir Ahmad i.e. brother of the wife- O.P. No. 2, (iv) P.W.-4 is Manoj Gupta. 13. The wife-opposite party no. 2 has got marked the following documents as the Exhibits:- (i) Ext.-1 is the Tenancy Agreement, (ii) Ext.-2 is the Pathology Report, (iii) Ext.-2/1 to 2/5 are the Discharge Bills and (iv) Ext.-3 is the Specimen Blood of Master Arhan Shabbir Karyogram (i.e. son of both i.e. the petitioner and the O.P. No. 2). 14. On the other hand, the petitioner –husband has got examined three (03) witnesses in support of his case, which are as follows:- (i) OPW-1 is Sabbir Ansari, i.e. the petitioner himself, (ii) OPW-2 is Arshad Ali and (iii) OPW-3 is Shamsher Ansari. 15. The husband-petitioner has got marked the following documents as the Exhibits:- (i) Ext.-A is the copy of Letter Diary No. 411 and (ii) Ext.-B is the copy of Letter Diary No. 81 dated 26.08.2014. 16. It transpires that the learned Court below, after considering the documents filed on behalf of the wife-opposite party no. 15. The husband-petitioner has got marked the following documents as the Exhibits:- (i) Ext.-A is the copy of Letter Diary No. 411 and (ii) Ext.-B is the copy of Letter Diary No. 81 dated 26.08.2014. 16. It transpires that the learned Court below, after considering the documents filed on behalf of the wife-opposite party no. 2 and the petitioner, has held that even the muslim woman is entitled for maintenance till she remarries. The learned Court below has further disbelieved the execution of sale deed by the petitioner in the favour of his father as the family is joint and has observed that if the money was available with father, he could have paid the loan as the family was joint and has also observed that loan dues were cleared must before the execution of sale deed on the ground that sale deed was executed by the petitioner in favour of his father in February, 2013 whereas the Bank loan was settled in May, 2012 and has noted certain discrepancy in the reconsideration amount. Thereafter the learned Court below has observed that OPW-3 is the cousin brother of the husband-petitioner and has admitted that in course of sale of joint family property, the husband of the opposite party no. 2 has received Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakh) in his share, which is four time more than the current value of the shop and therefore, the husband has sufficient means to maintain his wife. 17. From perusal of the evidence of witnesses examined before the learned Court below, it would appear that P.W.-1 is Rukhsana, who is the younger sister of the wife-opposite party no. 2 and has supported the case of the wife-opposite party no. 2. During her examination in-chief, she has stated that on filing of this application, her family has learnt about the Talaque for the first time through their counsel. Though she has admitted that she has not seen paper of the shop, but she has stated that one shop is running in the name of Shabbir and another shop is running in the name of Salamat Ali i.e. Great Grand-father of the petitioner. She has also stated that her brother in-law is not doing job, rather sits on the shop. She has also admitted that her sister is Graduate. However, she has learnt through her brother in-law at the time marriage that he is earning Rs. She has also stated that her brother in-law is not doing job, rather sits on the shop. She has also admitted that her sister is Graduate. However, she has learnt through her brother in-law at the time marriage that he is earning Rs. 45,000/- per month. Thus, P.W.-1 is Rukhsana has fully supported the case. 18. P.W.-2 is Sultana @ Afsana Begam i.e. the opposite party no. 2 herself and she has also supported her case as stated above and also discussed in the judgment passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur and hence the same is not being repeated here. During her cross- examination, she has admitted to have passed Graduation that her Husband and Dever are sitting and running the shop. She has further stated that her case was referred for mediation where husband has agreed to keep her on rent in the house, but the husband never gave any articles. She has denied for getting arrest of her husband and denied for writing an application to her husband regarding grant of divorce of her husband. She has further proved the Ext.-A and Ext.-B during her evidence and has stated that Ext.-A is the application sent by her to JUSCO for restraining her husband for not transferring the land/shop. She has agreed for DNA Test to prove the paternity of her child. She has emphatically denied for earing Rs. 250/- per day by her husband. Thus, P.W.-2 is Sultana @ Afsana Begam has fully supported her case. 19. P.W.-3 is Sagir Ahmad, who is own brother of the opposite party no. 2 and has supported the fact of demand of Dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/-, although Rs. 2,00,000/- cash and ornaments of Rs. 1,50,000/- and costly cloths worth Rs. 1,00,000/- and a Motor Cycle have been handed over to the petitioner. He has also supported the case of his sister that for keeping her in a rented house by the petitioner, but the maintenance was not paid. During cross-examination, he has denied for lodging of the false case against the husband of her sister. He has stated that rented house belongs to one Merazuddin, who lives in Saudi Arab and he used to go to the house of her sister, who is living in a rented to hand over the ration. He had denied for grant of divorce by the petitioner to the opposite party no. He has stated that rented house belongs to one Merazuddin, who lives in Saudi Arab and he used to go to the house of her sister, who is living in a rented to hand over the ration. He had denied for grant of divorce by the petitioner to the opposite party no. 2 and after filing of the case, he learnt about the paper of Talaque for the first time. Thus, this P.W.-3, Sagir Ahmad has also supported the case of the petitioner. 20. P.W.-4 is Manoj Gupta, who is a formal witness and has also supported the case of wife-opposite party no. 2 and has further proved the rental tenancy agreement marked as Ext.-I. 21. OPW-1 is Sabbir Ansari, i.e. the petitioner himself and has stated during his evidence that his wife wanted to live separately and to live costly life. He has admitted that his wife has given birth to a male child and however, he tried to bring back his wife alongwith her child, but she refused, rather she insisted upon him to live with her parents and his wife herself went to her maike and despite best efforts, she did not return to her matrimonial home. His wife has instituted a case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. It is stated that even as per the settlement before the Mediation Center, an offer was made to live separately in a rented house where she lived with his wife for few days, but then she has fled away from the flat with all valuable articles and she looked the flat in his absence on 12.03.2012. Thereafter he was arrested on 22.03.2013 at the instance of the wife-opposite party no. 2. He also alleged that the marriage was consummated only after one and half month of marriage and a child was born on 01.03.2012 and after calculation, the child was born premature after seven and half months after consummation of marriage and hence the legitimacy of child is doubtful. He further stated that he has taken loan from the Bank for running the shop, but due to non-clearance of amount, the bank has issued certificate case no. 163 (BL) 2011-12 in the Court of SDO, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur and then he has sold his shop namely Beauty Centre to Md. He further stated that he has taken loan from the Bank for running the shop, but due to non-clearance of amount, the bank has issued certificate case no. 163 (BL) 2011-12 in the Court of SDO, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur and then he has sold his shop namely Beauty Centre to Md. Alamgir and executed agreement of sale on 09.11.2010 and have taken Rs. 2,50,000/- and paid the entire amount to the Bank. However, after compromise with the Bank and after execution of sale deed on 19.02.2013, he paid the entire amount to the Bank and has become jobless and thereafter he started working as sale’s man in-charge on the basis of daily wages labourer in his father’s shop and getting Rs. 250/- per day in the shop of his father working as a labour. He claimed to have given divorce to his wife in the presence of two witnesses and Talaquenama was sent to the applicant/wife i.e. the opposite party no. 2 by registered post, which were received. He further denied to earning Rs. 45,000/- per month and has also denied for two shops in his name. During cross-examination, he has denied for torturing his wife and for which his wife has instituted a case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. He has further proved the Ext. 1 to 1/5 and Ext.-2 respectively, which are the discharge bills of TMH in seven pages and report of Lal Pathology. Thus, the OPW-1-husband has question on the chastity of the wife only to denying her claim of maintenance. 22. OPW-2 is Arshad Ali, who is salesman in the Beauty Centre and has stated during his evidence that O.P. No. 2 is not living in her matrimonial home, although her husband had requested her several times to go with him, but she has refused and a false case has been instituted by his wife against the petitioner and his family members and in which the petitioner was arrested. He has further state that the petitioner has sold his shop in the year 2010 to one Md. Alamgir, who is the father of the petitioner and the petitioner has compromised with the Bank to pay the entire amount after execution of the sale deed of the shop to one Md. Alamgir, who is the father of the petitioner and the petitioner has become jobless and is earning Rs. 250/- as salesman. Alamgir, who is the father of the petitioner and the petitioner has compromised with the Bank to pay the entire amount after execution of the sale deed of the shop to one Md. Alamgir, who is the father of the petitioner and the petitioner has become jobless and is earning Rs. 250/- as salesman. During cross-examination, has admitted to working in the shop as an employee where the petitioner-Shabbir is also working. He has shown ignorance about the bill submitted by the JUSCO of the shop. He has admitted that the petitioner has not given divorce to his wife in his presence. Thus, the evidence of OPW-2 is Arshad Ali clearly shows that he is an employee in the shop of the petitioner since last 12 years and thus, OPW-2, Arshad Ali is under influence of the petitioner and hence his evidence is rightly discarded by the learned Court below. 23. OPW-3 is Shamsher Ansari and has supported the case of the petitioner during his examination in-chief and as such, the same is not being repeated here. During cross-examination, he admitted that Md. Alamgir is the father of the petitioner and the petitioner is his cousin brother. He admitted that shop bearing Holding No. 929 was a joint family property, which were sold in Rupees One Crore Twenty Lakh (Rs. 1,20,000,00/-) and in which he obtained Rs. 20,000,00/-, but he is working in the shop of father of the petitioner for the last 12 years. Thus, evidence of OPW-3 is Shamsher Ansari has been rightly discarded by the learned Court below. However, his evidence also clearly shows that the petitioner and his family members have received Rs. 1.20 Crore. 24. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner has thoroughly neglected his wife and children. 25. Therefore, it is evident that the learned Court below has fully appreciated the evidence in detail. This Court also concurs with the finding of the learned Court below. 26. It is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that even the Divorce Muslim Woman is entitled to maintenance. 27. It is evident from the deposition of P.W.-1 is Rukhsana, P.W.-2 is Sultana @ Afsana Begum and P.W.-3 is Sagir Ahmad that just after birth of son of the parties i.e. the petitioner and the opposite party no. 27. It is evident from the deposition of P.W.-1 is Rukhsana, P.W.-2 is Sultana @ Afsana Begum and P.W.-3 is Sagir Ahmad that just after birth of son of the parties i.e. the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2, the dispute arose and in the meantime, the petitioner sold his share of shop to his father and has shown payment of around Rs. 3,40,000/- to the Bank only in order to deny and deprive the opposite party no. 2-wife for paying maintenance amount. It is clear that the husband-petitioner has sold his shop to his father and thus he must have received a good amount, but he has concealed this fact deliberately before the learned court below and even the petitioner has not examined his father as a witness to support the above fact and this fact remains unrebutted in absence of any documentary evidence on record of selling the shop/property by the petitioner to his father, is not a conclusive proof as there is no sale deed on record to show this fact and in absence of sale deed, the presumption can be drawn against the petitioner for concealing the true fact from the learned Court below and also before this Court. 28. It further transpires from the evidence of the petitioner, who has been examined as OPW-1 that the Bank had instituted Certificate Case No. 163 (BL) 2011-12 in the Court of SDO, Dhalbhum, Jamshedpur for the loan amount of Rs. 5,64,058/- against the petitioner then, he sold his shop for payment sent to Md. Alamgir i.e. his own father and got executed agreement of sale on 09.11.2010 and taken Rs. 2,50,000/- and paid the loan amount, but this story appears to be absurd as Certificate Proceeding was initiated in the year 2011-12, but the petitioner has allegedly made agreement with his father to sold the shop with the petitioner on 09.11.2010 i.e. more than one year ago before institution of the Certificate Proceeding, this story is put forward by the petitioner and not tenable. 29. It further transpires that the petitioner has further stated that after making compromise with the Bank and after executing sale deed no. 694 dated 19.02.2013, he paid the entire amount to the bank and then he become jobless and then his father told him to work in that shop as salesman in-charge on payment of Rs. 250/- daily wages. 29. It further transpires that the petitioner has further stated that after making compromise with the Bank and after executing sale deed no. 694 dated 19.02.2013, he paid the entire amount to the bank and then he become jobless and then his father told him to work in that shop as salesman in-charge on payment of Rs. 250/- daily wages. This story appears to be put forward by the petitioner is not tenable even the petitioner has not filed copy of the sale deed no. 694 dated 19.02.2013 and has not shown any paper for working in the said shop of his father as salesman in-charge on payment of Rs. 250/- daily wages. 30. It further appears that the petitioner has claimed to have given divorce to his wife on 18.08.2014 and Talaquenanama was sent to the wife-opposite party no. 2 through post and thereafter he has called “fatwa” for Bharat Saria Jamshedpur Talaqui. Thus conduct of the petitioner clearly shows that he has claimed to have pronounced Talaque in absence of his wife-O. P. No. 2 and has sent the said Talaquenama through registered post to the opposite party no. 2, but even the document has not been marked as Exhibits on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Court below and thus the story appears to be put forward by the petitioner, is not believable. He further admitted that he was not paying the expenses incurred by his wife towards clothes and marketing and also admitted for not going anywhere with his wife after marriage. Thus the evidence of OPW.-1 i.e. the petitioner is not credible and cannot be relied upon. 31. It has been held in Chaturbhuj Vs Sita Bai, (2008) SCC 316 at paragraph 8, as follows: Para 8:- “In and illustrative case where the wife was surviving by begging, it would not amount to her ability to maintain herself. It can also be not said that he wife has been capable of earning but she was not making an effort to earn. Whether the deserted wife was unable to maintain herself, has to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record. It can also be not said that he wife has been capable of earning but she was not making an effort to earn. Whether the deserted wife was unable to maintain herself, has to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record. Where the personal income of the wife is insufficient she can claim maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. The test is whether the wife is in a position to maintain herself in the way she was used to in the place of her husband. In Bhagwan Dutt V. Kamla Devi it was observed that wife should be in a position to maintain a standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of a family. The expression “ unable to maintain herself” does not mean that the wife must be absolutely destitute before she can apply for maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C.” 32. It has been held in the case of Dr. Swapan Kumar Banerjee Vs. State of West Bengal and Another, 2020 (19) SCC 342 , that even a wife who has been divorced on ground of desertion is entitled to claimed maintenance and it has been held at para 5 and 7 are as follows:- “Para 5:- Thereafter, in Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri this Court took a similar view: (SCCP 184, para 11) 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that once a decree for divorce was passed against the respondent and marital relations between the petitioner and the respondent came to an end, the mutual rights. Duties and obligations should also come to an end. He pleaded that in this situation, the obligation of the petitioner to maintain a woman with whom all relations came to an end should also be treated to have come to an end. This plea, as we have already indicated above, cannot be accepted as a woman has two distinct rights for maintenance. As a wife, she is entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from any of the disabilities indicated in Section 125(4). In another capacity, namely, as a divorced woman, she is again entitled to claim maintenance from the person of whom she was once the wife. A woman after divorce becomes a destitute. As a wife, she is entitled to maintenance unless she suffers from any of the disabilities indicated in Section 125(4). In another capacity, namely, as a divorced woman, she is again entitled to claim maintenance from the person of whom she was once the wife. A woman after divorce becomes a destitute. If she cannot maintain herself or remains unmarried, the man who was once her husband continues to be under a statutory duty and obligation to provide maintenance to her." “Para 7:- No doubt, as urged by Mr Debal Banerjee. Explanation II to Section 125 CrPC by deeming fiction includes a divorced woman to be a wife and, therefore, a woman who has been divorced by her husband can still claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The question is how we should read the provisions of sub-section (4) in this regard, especially when we deal with those women, against whom a decree for divorce has been obtained on the ground that they have deserted their husband. Once the relationship of marriage comes to an end, the woman obviously is not under any obligation to live with her former husband. The deeming fiction of the divorced wife being treated as a wife can only be read for the limited purpose for grant of maintenance and the deeming fiction cannot be stretched to the illogical extent that the divorced wife is under a compulsion to live with the ex-husband. The husband cannot urge that he can divorce his wife on the ground that she has deserted him and then deny maintenance which should otherwise be payable to her on the ground that event after divorce she is not willing to live with him. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of Mr Debal Banerjee.” 33. It has been held in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another, 2021 (2) SCC 324 at Para-77, 78, 79, 80, 112 and 113, which are as follows:- “Para-77:- The objective of granting interim/permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There is no straitjacket formula for fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. There is no straitjacket formula for fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. Para-78:- The factors which would weigh with the court inter alia are the status of the parties; reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children; whether the applicant is educated and professionally qualified; whether the applicant has any independent source of income; whether the income is sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in her matrimonial home; whether the applicant was employed prior to her marriage; whether she was working during the subpsistence of the marriage; whether the wife was required to sacrifice her employment opportunities for nurturing the family, child rearing, and looking after adult members of the family; reasonable costs of litigation for a non-working wife. [Refer to Jasbir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge, Dehradun, (1997) 7 SCC 7 ; Vinny Parmvir Parmar v. Parmvir Parmar, (2011) 13 SCC 112 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 290] Para-79:- In Manish Jain v. Akanksha Jain, (2017) 15 SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 712 this Court held that the financial position of the parents of the applicant wife, would not be material while determining the quantum of maintenance. An order of interim maintenance is conditional on the circumstance that the wife or husband who makes a claim has no independent income, sufficient for her or his support. It is no answer to a claim of maintenance that the wife is educated and could support herself. The court must take into consideration the status of the parties and the capacity of the spouse to pay for her or his support. Maintenance is dependent upon factual situations; the court should mould the claim for maintenance based on various factors brought before it. Para-80:- On the other hand, the financial capacity of the husband, his actual income, reasonable expenses for his own maintenance, and dependent family members whom he is obliged to maintain under the law, liabilities if any, would be required to be taken into consideration, to arrive at the appropriate quantum of maintenance to be paid. The court must have due regard to the standard of living of the husband, as well as the spiralling inflation rates and high costs of living. The court must have due regard to the standard of living of the husband, as well as the spiralling inflation rates and high costs of living. The plea of the husband that he does not possess any source of income ipso facto does not absolve him of his moral duty to maintain his wife if he is able-bodied and has educational qualifications. [Reema Salkan v. Sumer Singh Salkan, (2019) 12 SCC 303 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 596 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 339] Para-112:- In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 51 , the Supreme Court was considering the interpretation of Section 125 CrPC. The Court held : (SCC p. 196, para 13) “13.3. … purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125 CrPC. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.” Para-113:- It has therefore become necessary to issue directions to bring about uniformity and consistency in the orders passed by all courts, by directing that maintenance be awarded from the date on which the application was made before the court concerned. The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing the application, since the period during which the maintenance proceedings remained pending is not within the control of the applicant.” 34. It has been held in the case of Abhilasha Versus Parkash and Ors. (2021) 13 SCC 99 , at para 27 to 31, which are as follows:- “Para-27:- Muslim Law also recognises the obligation of father to maintain his daughters until they are married. Referring to Mulla’s Principle of Mohammedan Law, this Court in State of Haryana and Others Vs. It has been held in the case of Abhilasha Versus Parkash and Ors. (2021) 13 SCC 99 , at para 27 to 31, which are as follows:- “Para-27:- Muslim Law also recognises the obligation of father to maintain his daughters until they are married. Referring to Mulla’s Principle of Mohammedan Law, this Court in State of Haryana and Others Vs. Santra (Smt.), (2000) 5 SCC 182 in paragraph 40 held: (SCC p. 196) “40. Similarly, under the Mohammedan Law, a father is bound to maintain his sons until they have attained the age of puberty. He is also bound to maintain his daughters until they are married. [See: Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law (19th Edn.) page 300]” Para-28:- Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is nothing but recognition of principles of Hindu Law regarding maintenance of children and aged parents. Section 20(3) now makes it statutory obligation of a Hindu to maintain his or her daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. Para-29:- Section 20 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cast a statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his daughter who is unmarried and unable to maintain herself out of her own earnings or other property. As noted above, Hindu Law prior to enactment of Act, 1956 always obliged a Hindu to maintain unmarried daughter, who is unable to maintain herself. The obligation, which is cast on the father to maintain his unmarried daughter, can be enforced by her against her father, if she is unable to maintain herself by enforcing her right under Section 20. Para-30:- We may also notice another judgment of this Court in Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Quasim, (1997) 6 SCC 233 , which was a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. A Muslim wife with her two daughters and a son filed an application claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The trial court allowed the maintenance to the wife and children from her husband. The husband after divorcing the wife filed application in the trial court seeking modification of the order in view of the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The trial court modified the order insofar as the grant of maintenance of wife was concerned but maintained the order of maintenance to each of the three minor children. The trial court modified the order insofar as the grant of maintenance of wife was concerned but maintained the order of maintenance to each of the three minor children. The husband challenged the order by means of revision, which was dismissed by the Revisional Court. An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed in the High Court. The High Court accepted the claim of husband and relying on provision of Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, 1986 held that a Muslim wife is entitled to claim maintenance from her previous husband for her children only for a period of two years from the date of birth of the child concerned. The High Court held that minor children were not entitled for maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. A special leave to appeal was filed questioning the judgment. This Court dealing with Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as Act, 1986 held that effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. This Court held that there is no conflict between the two provisions. Para-31:- This Court noticed the provisions of Section 3 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and Section 125 Cr.P.C. It is relevant to refer to the following observations made by this Court in paragraph 7 of the above judgment: (Noor Saba Khatoon Case, SCC pp. 238-39) “7. ...Under Section 125, CrPC the maintenance of the children is obligatory on the father (irrespective of his religion) and as long as he is in a position to do so and the children have no independent means of their own, it remains his absolute obligation to provide for them. Insofar as children born of Muslim parents are concerned there is nothing in Section 125 CrPC which exempts a Muslim father from his obligation to maintain the children. These provisions are not affected by Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the 1986 Act and indeed it would be unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even preposterous to deny the benefit of Section 125 CrPC to the children only on the ground that they are born of Muslim parents. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 CrPC, cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. The effect of a beneficial legislation like Section 125 CrPC, cannot be allowed to be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute. We do not find manifestation of any such intention in the 1986 Act to take away the independent rights of the children to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC where they are minor and are unable to maintain themselves. A Muslim father's obligation, like that of a Hindu father, to maintain his minor children as contained in Section 125 CrPC is absolute and is not at all affected by Section 3 (1)(b) of the 1986 Act.” (emphasis in original) 35. It is well settled from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that husband has to maintain his wife and child, which has been elaborated in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another, 2021 (2) SCC 324 . 36. In view of the discussion made above, it is evident that the judgment dated 26.07.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 77 of 2013 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur is well discussed and reasoned order and speaking one and as such, no interference is required from this Court and hence the judgment dated 26.07.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 77 of 2013 by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur is upheld. 37. Accordingly, Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016 is dismissed, but, without any costs. 38. The Criminal Revision No. 1594 of 2017:- Although two appeals i.e. Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 2016 and Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 2017 were filed on behalf of the petitioner challenging the maintainability of institution of the case under the provision of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and also against the final order passed by the learned Court below in the said case i.e. C/1 Case No. 472 of 2016, which was filed on behalf of the opposite party no. 2 for granting interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/-per month by the husband-petitioner to his wife i.e. opposite party no. 2. 39. It appears that the opposite party no. 2 had instituted a case under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is the case of the wife-opposite parties no. 2 for granting interim maintenance of Rs. 15,000/-per month by the husband-petitioner to his wife i.e. opposite party no. 2. 39. It appears that the opposite party no. 2 had instituted a case under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It is the case of the wife-opposite parties no. 2 that after living her matrimonial home, she resided with her husband for couples of month in a separate accommodation, but due to difficulty, she has to live with her parental home, but even due to difficulty in accommodation, she is said to have resided in a rented premises with her child, who is suffering from physical and mental illness. The petitioner has filed Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 2017 on the ground that C/1 Case No. 472 of 2016 is barred by limitation as both the parties were living separately for more than one year on the date of institution of case. 40. It is also contended on behalf of the petitioner that a proceeding for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. is pending before the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur and despite pendency of the said proceeding, the present case has been filed for interim maintenance. Learned Court below has rejected the plea of maintainability of the appeal on the ground that protection order passed under Section 18, residence order under Section 17 and 19, monetary relief under Section 20 and compensation order under Section 22 of the Domestic Violence Act will not be covered by the provisions of Section 468 of Cr. P. C. The learned Court below has observed that provisions for Domestic Violence Act are the legislations of welfare and empowers the Court to grant interim and final relief to an aggrieved person, who is subjected to domestic violence. 41. It is clear from the provision of Section 20 (1) (d) of the Domestic Violence Act that the Court can allow maintenance to the aggrieved person as well her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. 42. 41. It is clear from the provision of Section 20 (1) (d) of the Domestic Violence Act that the Court can allow maintenance to the aggrieved person as well her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. 42. Thus, the learned Court below has correctly observed that passing an order under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. does not exclude the jurisdiction of the Court under the provision of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and has dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 2016. 43. On the merit of the Criminal Appeal No. 66 of 2017, the learned Court below has upheld the grant of Rs. 15,000/- per month as maintenance and medical expenses of the opposite party no. 2 and her child as monetary relief under Section 20 (1) (d) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 from the date of order of the disposal of the case. Even, learned Court below has also observed that the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur is not in derogation of the order passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur, rather in adherence to the said order and it was only an interim relief that the said order was passed. 44. It reveals from the evidence of wife-opposite party no. 2 in the learned Court below that she has also stated that her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner as per the customary muslim rituals on 30.05.2011 at Dhatkidih, Bistupur, Jamshedpur, although at the time of marriage Rs. 2,00,000/- cash, ornaments worth of Rs. 1,50,000/- and clothes of Rs. 1,00,000/- and one motorcycle were also given. However, she was subjected to assault and humiliation for non-payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- additional demand of dowry and even her hand was burnt and rubbed on hot ‘tawa’. She had also suffered high B.P. due to the act of her husband and by her in-laws members and a month before the delivery of her child, her husband and her father-in-law took her to her parental home where she has given birth of a child. She had also suffered high B.P. due to the act of her husband and by her in-laws members and a month before the delivery of her child, her husband and her father-in-law took her to her parental home where she has given birth of a child. Thereafter she had returned to her sasural i.e matrimonial home, but they refused to keep her and hence she has filed G. R. Case No. 3695 of 2012 pending in the Court of Shri Vishal Gaurav, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur for the offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. It is stated that her child is mentally special child and suffered from various ailments. Although her husband has kept her on the rental accommodation of Rs. 3,500/-, but he had fled away and she has been forced to live in another accommodation of Rs. 2,500/- per months, which was not paid to her and hence, she requires a sum of Rs. 11,000/- per month for Physiotherapy of her child and Rs. 2,500/- per month for her rental accommodation and Rs. 20,000/- per month for her maintenance total Rs. 33,500/- per month. 45. During her cross-examination, she admitted that all other three persons except her husband have been discharged from the case. She admitted that the case under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is still pending for evidence and she has not been examined as a witness. During cross-examination, she has stated that she is living separately since 2012. She has also stated that bill of jewellery issued by Chagan Lal Dayal has been kept on record of this case. She has also stated that her husband has kept one Bharti Monani as Concubine. Thus, the wife- opposite party no. 2 has fully supported her case. 46. It has been held in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another, 2021 (2) SCC 324 at Para-56, 59, 60 and 61 which are as follows:- “Para-56:-Similarly, in Tanushree & Ors. v A.S. Moorthy, the Delhi High Court was considering a case where the Magistrate’s Court had sine die adjourned the proceedings u/S. 125 Cr.P.C. on the ground that parallel proceedings for maintenance under the D.V. Act were pending. Neha and Another, 2021 (2) SCC 324 at Para-56, 59, 60 and 61 which are as follows:- “Para-56:-Similarly, in Tanushree & Ors. v A.S. Moorthy, the Delhi High Court was considering a case where the Magistrate’s Court had sine die adjourned the proceedings u/S. 125 Cr.P.C. on the ground that parallel proceedings for maintenance under the D.V. Act were pending. In an appeal filed by the wife before the High Court, it was held that a reading of Section 20(1)(d) of the D.V. Act indicates that while considering an application u/S. 12 of the D.V. Act, the Court would take into account an order of maintenance passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C., or any other law for the time being in force. The mere fact that two proceedings were initiated by a party, would not imply that one would have to be adjourned sine die. There is a distinction in the scope and power exercised by the Magistrate under Section 125, Cr.P.C. and the D.V. Act. With respect to the overlap in both statutes, the Court held : (SCC Online Del para 5) “5. Reading of Section 20(1)(d) of the D.V. Act further shows that the two proceedings are independent of each other and have different scope, though there is an overlap. Insofar as the overlap is concerned, law has catered for that eventuality and laid down that at the time of consideration of an application for grant of maintenance under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the maintenance fixed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. shall be taken into account.” (Emphasis supplied) Para-59:- In Sudeep Chaudhary v Radha Chaudhary the Supreme Court directed adjustment in a case where the wife had filed an application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., and under HMA. In the Section 125 proceedings, she had obtained an order of maintenance. Subsequently, in proceedings under the HMA, the wife sought alimony. Since the husband failed to pay maintenance awarded, the wife initiated recovery proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the maintenance awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C. must be adjusted against the amount awarded in the matrimonial proceedings under HMA, and was not to be given over and above the same. Directions on overlapping jurisdictions Para-60:- It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. The Supreme Court held that the maintenance awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C. must be adjusted against the amount awarded in the matrimonial proceedings under HMA, and was not to be given over and above the same. Directions on overlapping jurisdictions Para-60:- It is well settled that a wife can make a claim for maintenance under different statutes. For instance, there is no bar to seek maintenance both under the D.V. Act and Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., or under H.M.A. It would, however, be inequitable to direct the husband to pay maintenance under each of the proceedings, independent of the relief granted in a previous proceeding. If maintenance is awarded to the wife in a previously instituted proceeding, she is under a legal obligation to disclose the same in a subsequent proceeding for maintenance, which may be filed under another enactment. While deciding the quantum of maintenance in the subsequent proceeding, the civil court/family court shall take into account the maintenance awarded in any previously instituted proceeding, and determine the maintenance payable to the claimant. Para-61:- To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders being passed in different proceedings, we direct that in a subsequent maintenance proceeding, the applicant shall disclose the previous maintenance proceeding, and the orders passed therein, so that the Court would take into consideration the maintenance already awarded in the previous proceeding, and grant an adjustment or set-off of the said amount. If the order passed in the previous proceeding requires any modification or variation, the party would be required to move the concerned court in the previous proceeding.” 47. It has been held in the case of Prabha Tyagi Versus Kamesh Devi, 2022 (8) SCC 90 at Para-50, 54, 55, 57.2, 58, 65, 70, 71, 75, 75.1, 75.2 and 75.3 which are as follows:- “Para-50:- In our view, the D.V. Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ cannot mean as understood in Hindu Law. Thus, the expression “family members living together as a joint family”, means the members living jointly as a family. Therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ cannot mean as understood in Hindu Law. Thus, the expression “family members living together as a joint family”, means the members living jointly as a family. In such an interpretation, even a girl child/children who is/are cared for as foster children also have a right to live in a shared household and are conferred with the right under Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 of the D.V. Act. When such a girl child or woman becomes an aggrieved person, the protection of Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 comes into play. Para-54:- Bearing in mind the aforesaid discussion, question no. 2, namely, “whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled”is accordingly answered. It is held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person to have actually lived or resided with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of seeking relief. If a woman has the right to reside in a shared household, she can accordingly enforce her right under Section 17(1) of the D.V. Act. If a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek relief under the provisions of the D.V. Act including her right to live or reside in the shared household under Section 17 read with Section 19 of the D.V. Act. Para-55:- Hence, the appellant herein had the right to live in a shared household i.e., her matrimonial home and being a victim of domestic violence could enforce her right to live or reside in the shared household under the provisions of the D.V. Act and to seek any other appropriate relief provided under the D.V. Act. This is irrespective of whether she actually lived in the shared household. Para-57:-It would be useful to refer to the following judgments of this Court which have been taken into consideration relationship in the nature of marriage : Para-57.1:- In D. Velu Samy v. D. Patchaiammal, this Court discussed the concept of “relationship in the nature of marriage” in the context of the DV Act, and it was held to be akin to a common law marriage. It was held that the parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the DV Act. It was held that the parties must have lived together in a ‘shared household’ as defined in Section 2(s) of the DV Act. It was opined that not all live-in relationships would amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage to get the benefit of D.V. Act, but only to such relationships, which qualify as common law marriages. The requirements prescribed under law in order for a relationship to be recognized as a common law marriage were adumbrated as follows: (i) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses; (ii) They must be of legal age to marry; (iii) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage; (iv) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time. Para-57.2:- In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, the question as to whether disruption of a live-in relationship by failure to maintain a woman involved in such a relationship amounted to “domestic violence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the D.V. Act, was considered. It was held that entering into a marriage either under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act or any other personal law applicable to the parties, is entering into a relationship of public significance, since marriage, being a social institution, many rights and liabilities flow out of that relationship. Thus, the concept of marriage gives rise to civil rights. This Court referred to the following guidelines, which would determine whether a relationship between persons was in the nature of marriage, to ultimately hold that the DV Act had been enacted to cover a couple who had a relationship in the nature of marriage, so as to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of women in relationships, which are in the nature of marriage as per paragraph 56 which is extracted as under: (SCC pp 785-86) “56. We may, on the basis of above discussion cull out some guidelines for testing under what circumstances, a live-in relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationship : 56.1. Duration of period of relationship. The guidelines, of course, are not exhaustive, but will definitely give some insight to such relationship : 56.1. Duration of period of relationship. – Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act has used the expression “at any point of time”, which means a reasonable period of time to maintain and continue a relationship which may vary from case to case, depending upon the fact situation. 56.2. Shared household.- The expression has been defined under Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act and, hence, needs no further elaboration. 56.3. Pooling of resources and financial arrangements.-Supporting each other, or any one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties in joint names or in the name of the woman, long-term investments in business, shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, may be a guiding factor. 56.4. Domestic arrangements.- Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or upkeeping the house, etc., is an indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. 56.5. Sexual relationship.- Marriage-like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring, etc. 56.6. Children.- Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of marriage. The parties, therefore, intend to have a long-standing relationship. Sharing the responsibility for bringing up and supporting them is also a strong indication. 56.7. Socialisation in public.- Holding out to the public and socialising with friends, relations and others, as if they are husband and wife is a strong circumstance to hold the relationship is in the nature of marriage. 56.8. Intention and conduct of the parties.- Common intention of the parties as to what their relationship is to be and to involve, and as to their respective roles and responsibilities, primarily determines the nature of that relationship.” Para-58:- Further, the expression ‘family members living together as a joint family’ is not relatable only to relationship through consanguinity, marriage or adoption. As observed above, the expression ‘joint family’ does not mean a joint family as understood in Hindu Law. It would mean persons living together jointly as a family. As observed above, the expression ‘joint family’ does not mean a joint family as understood in Hindu Law. It would mean persons living together jointly as a family. It would include not only family members living together when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or adoption but also those persons who are living together or jointly as a joint family such as foster children who live with other members who are related by consanguinity, marriage or by adoption. Therefore, when any woman is in a domestic relationship as discussed above, is subjected to any act of aggrieved person, she is the D.V. Act domestic violence and becomes an entitled to avail the remedies under: Para-65:- On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that an aggrieved person on her own or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the D.V. Act but the proviso states that when a Domestic Incident Reported is received by the Magistrate from the Protection Officer or the service provider, in such a case, the same shall be taken into consideration. Therefore, when an aggrieved person files an application by herself or with the assistance of an advocate and not with the assistance of the Protection Officer or a service provider, in such a case, the role of the Protection Officer or a service provider is not envisaged. Obviously, there would be no Domestic Incident Report received by a Magistrate from the Protection Officer or a service provider. Para-70:-On an analysis of the aforesaid judgments from various High Courts, we find that the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Delhi, Gauhati, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh, are right in holding that if Domestic Incident Report has been received by the Magistrate either from the Protection Officer or the service provider then it becomes obligatory on the part of the Magistrate to take note of the said report before passing an order on the application filed by the aggrieved party, but if no complaint or application of domestic violence is received by the Magistrate from the Protection Officer or the service provider, the question of considering such a report does not arise at all. As already discussed, the D.V. Act does not make it mandatory for an aggrieved person to make an application before a Magistrate only through the Protection Officer or a service provider. An aggrieved person can directly make an application to the jurisdictional Magistrate by herself or by engaging the services of an Advocate. In such a case, the filing of a Domestic Incident Report by a Protection Officer or service provider does not arise. Para-71:-In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the Magistrate is not empowered to make any order interim or final, under the provisions of the D.V. Act, granting reliefs to the aggrieved persons. The Magistrate can take cognizance of the complaint or application filed by the aggrieved person and issue notice to the respondent under Section 12 of the D.V. Act even in the absence of Domestic Incident Report under Rule 5. Thus, the Magistrate has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint under Section 12 of the D.V. Act in the absence of a Domestic Incident Report under Rule 5 when the complaint is not filed on behalf of the aggrieved person through a Protection Officer or service provider. Such a purposeful interpretation has to be given bearing in mind the fact that the immediate relief would have to be given to an aggrieved person and hence the proviso cannot be interpreted in a manner which would be contrary to the object of the D.V. Act which renders Section 12 bereft of its object and purpose. Para-75:- In view of the above discussion, the three questions raised in this appeal are answered as under: Para-75.1:-“(i) Whether the consideration of Domestic Incidence Report is mandatory before initiating the proceedings under Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in order to invoke substantive provisions of Sections 18 to 20 and 22 of the said Act?” It is held that Section 12 does not make it mandatory for a Magistrate to consider a Domestic Incident Report filed by a Protection Officer or service provider before passing any order under the D.V. Act. It is clarified that even in the absence of a Domestic Incident Report, a Magistrate is empowered to pass both ex parte or interim as well as a final order under the provisions of the D.V. Act. It is clarified that even in the absence of a Domestic Incident Report, a Magistrate is empowered to pass both ex parte or interim as well as a final order under the provisions of the D.V. Act. Para-75.2: “(ii) Whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levied at the point of commission of violence?” It is held that it is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when she is related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family, to actually reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of commission of domestic violence. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household under Section 17 of the D.V. Act and such a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek reliefs under the provisions of D.V. Act including enforcement of her right to live in a shared household. Para-75.3:-“(iii) Whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed?” It is held that there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed vis-à-vis allegation of domestic violence. However, it is not necessary that at the time of filing of an application by an aggrieved person, the domestic relationship should be subsisting. In other words, even if an aggrieved person is not in a domestic relationship with the respondent in a shared household at the time of filing of an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act but has at any point of time lived so or had the right to live and has been subjected to domestic violence or is later subjected to domestic violence on account of the domestic relationship, is entitled to file an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.” 48. In view of the discussion made above, the judgment dated 28.08.2017 passed by Sri Manoj Prasad, learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Singhbhum East, Jamshedpur in Cr. App. No. 133 of 2016 and Cr. App. In view of the discussion made above, the judgment dated 28.08.2017 passed by Sri Manoj Prasad, learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Singhbhum East, Jamshedpur in Cr. App. No. 133 of 2016 and Cr. App. No. 66 of 2017 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned Court below to pass afresh order in light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajneesh Vs. Neha and Another, 2021 (2) SCC 324 and in the case of Prabha Tyagi Versus Kamesh Devi, 2022 (8) SCC 90 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. 49. In Cr. M. P. No. 2257 of 2017:- it transpires from the impugned order that the learned Court below has issued Distress Warrant only for realisation of the amount, which remains unpaid for which the opposite party-Md. Sabbir Ansari was earlier sentenced. Although, the petitioner has prayed that the learned Court below has not proceed further in accordance with law laid down in 1989 Eastern Criminal Cases (183) SC and the learned Court below could have directed for recovery of arrears payment of maintenance amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-. However, learned Court below has only passed orders for issuance of Distress Warrant while issuing the notice to the opposite party no. 2 i.e. the husband. 50. It appears that vide order dated 24.01.2018, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had directed for listing the case along with Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016 and as such this case being made analogues with the said Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016, has remained pending for a long period. Thus, the matter remained pending before this High Court for a long period. In the meantime, the above Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016, and Criminal Revision No. 1594 of 2017 and this present Cr. M. P has been placed before this Court in the year 2022. 51. This Court finds that grave error has been committed by the learned Court below by passing the order dated 21.07.2017 passed in Misc. In the meantime, the above Criminal Revision No. 1192 of 2016, and Criminal Revision No. 1594 of 2017 and this present Cr. M. P has been placed before this Court in the year 2022. 51. This Court finds that grave error has been committed by the learned Court below by passing the order dated 21.07.2017 passed in Misc. Case No. 77 of 2013 at the relevant time by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Jamshedpur as by way of first instance as the learned Court below is empowered to issue Distress Warrant but more than six (06) years have lapsed even after the passing of the impugned order for realisation of the amount of around Rs. 3,00,000/- and the learned court below could have proceeded further under Section 421 & 427 of the Cr. P. C. or/and the Learned Court below could have passed the direction also for attachment of the properties of the petitioner and the learned Court below should have taken efforts for realisation of the said amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- at the relevant time as having not been paid by the opposite party no. 2 –husband to the wife i.e. the petitioner. The petitioner cannot be denied the benefit of the order of maintenance passed in her favour as the petitioner is an able bodied person. 52. Accordingly, the Cr.M.P. No. 2257 of 2017 is disposed of by remitting back the matter to learned Court below to pass afresh order in the light of provision of Section 421 & 427 of the Cr.P.C. and the learned Court below may also consider to proceed further in light of the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manmohan Gopal Versus the State of Chhattisgarh and Another, 2023 SCC Online SC 1384 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 53. Thus, this Cr. M. P. No. 2257 of 2017 is allowed and remitted back to the learned Court below with the observation mentioned above.