ORDER : (T. Mallikarjuna Rao, J.) 1. The petitioners/A. 1 to A. 4 have filed the Criminal Petition, as per Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Cr.P.C.’) seeking anticipatory bail concerning Crime No.219 of 2023 registered at the Rajahmundry II Town Police Station of East Godavari District. 2. A case has been registered against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 417, 420, 465, 467, 471 and 120-B, read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("I.P.C."). 3. Heard the arguments presented by the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners/A.1 to A.4, as well as the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing respondent No.1/State and the learned counsel on behalf of respondent No.2/defacto complainant. Additionally, respondent No.2/defacto complainant has been included as party respondent by the order dated 14.12.2023 in I.A. No.02 of 2023. 4. In brief, the prosecution case is that the defacto complainant lodged a report stating that A.1, A.2 and A.4 have approached one Vemuri Indira Devi, who is the mother-in-law of the defacto complainant and borrowed Rs.1.50 Crores by mortgaging plot admeasuring 977 Sq. Yards in Sy. No.385, situated at Rajahmundry. The plot was owned by A.1, and the loan amount was transferred to his account on 06.12.2017. The plot was purchased by A.1 from his father-in-law (A.2) by a registered Sale Deed dated 15.04.2017. A.1 paid interest up to February 2020. After that, he could not pay the interest or the principal. Then, A.1 wanted to sell the plot to discharge the loan, but he could not sell it immediately. After that, the defacto complainant and his wife decided to buy the plot and made a payment of Rs.2,05,17,000/- through a cheque bearing No.011492 dated 09.02.2022 to A.1. After receiving the payment from them, A.1 and A.4 repaid the loan principal and interest to the defacto complainant's mother-in-law and requested her for the re-conveyance of the mortgaged property, this led to execution of the re-conveyance of the mortgaged property on 25.02.2022. Immediately, A.1 transferred the said property in the name of the defacto complainant's wife on 25.02.2022. (a) Furthermore, it is asserted that when the defacto complainant and his wife tried to sell the said property in February 2023, they found that they were cheated by the accused as one of the potential buyers had obtained the Encumbrance Certificate and alerted them. (a) Furthermore, it is asserted that when the defacto complainant and his wife tried to sell the said property in February 2023, they found that they were cheated by the accused as one of the potential buyers had obtained the Encumbrance Certificate and alerted them. The defacto complainant came to know through the Encumbrance Certificate that A.2 had cancelled the earlier Sale Deed in favour of A.1 during the subsistence of the Mortgage, and having the knowledge that he has no right over the said property and sold the same to defacto complainant's wife. (b) It is further asserted that all the accused conspired together and executed a Cancellation Deed regarding Sale Deed standing in the name of A.1 vide Cancellation Deed dated 07.07.2018, and the said documents are fabricated by forgery and mischief. 5. The learned counsel for the Petitioners/accused contends that all the documents referred in the complaint are Registered Sale Deeds executed by the concerned persons only, and the question of forgery does not arise; A.2 to A.4 have no transactions either with the complainant or other persons; A.3 has nowhere figured in the complaint except that he is a witness to the Cancellation Deed, as such, witness cannot be made arrayed as an accused; the loan taken by A.1 was discharged before the execution of the Reconveyance deed by the mother-in-law of the defacto complainant. 6. The learned counsel for the Respondent No.2/Defacto complainant filed written submissions wherein it is contended that the offences alleged against the petitioners/accused are various in nature and the mode and manner employed by the accused in the commission of crime depicts a classic case of cheating and committing forgery of documents. It is further contended that A.1 to A.4 had entered into a criminal conspiracy and have cheated and committed forgery of various documents and the sequence of events would reveal the modus-operandi adopted by the accused; if the conduct of the accused is minutely scrutinized, it would be manifestly clear that there is something more than that meets the eye and a method in the madness on the part of the petitioners and by a process of elimination it would be apparent that the accused had played fraud on the victims by deceiving and cheating them and by a creating forged and fabricated documents to have wrongful gain for themselves. (a) It is further contended that a sum of Rs.2.05 Crores of hard-earned money was swindled by the accused, and this sort of white-collar crime is particularly harmful to society as they are committed by not just literate but well-educated and influenced persons, who are expected to set a moral example to the society; the prosecution in this case on hand has come out with a prima-facie material against all the accused about their role in the offences mentioned above and the offences committed by the accused had deep-rooted conspiracies involving huge loss of funds and such offences have to be viewed very seriously and to be considered as grave offences affecting the society; the investigation, in this case, is not yet completed, there is every likelihood of the petitioners tampering with the investigation, if the request of the accused is considered. 7. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the grant of anticipatory bail to the Petitioners on the ground that investigation is not completed. 8. Both learned counsel reiterated their arguments in alignment with the contentions outlined in the petition and the counter. As a result, there is no need to reiterate the contentions raised by the learned counsel. 9. The learned counsel for the Petitioners relied on the decision in Dilip Singh v. State of M.P., (2021) 2 SCC 779 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his absconding; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and more significant interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial. 10. The learned counsel for the Petitioners further relied on the decision in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 111. 10. The learned counsel for the Petitioners further relied on the decision in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 111. No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. We are clearly of the view that no attempt should be made to provide rigid and inflexible guidelines in this respect because all circumstances and situations of the future cannot be clearly visualised for the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with the legislative intention the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. As aptly observed in the Constitution Bench decision in the Sibbia case [ (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 S.C.C. (Cri) 465], the High Court or the Court of Session has to exercise their jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC by a wise and careful use of their discretion which by their long training and experience they are ideally suited to do. In any event, this is the legislative mandate that we are bound to respect and honour. 112. The following factors and parameters can be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail: (i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made; (ii) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence; (iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; (iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other offences; (v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her; (vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large magnitude affecting a very large number of people; (vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the accused very carefully. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860, the Court should consider with even more excellent care and caution because overimplication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge and concern; (viii) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation, and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused; (ix) The Court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; (x) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered, and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail. 113. Arrest should be the last option and it should be restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused is imperative in the facts and circumstances of that case. The Court must carefully examine the entire available record and particularly the allegations which have been directly attributed to the accused and these allegations are corroborated by other material and circumstances on record. 11. In light of the above settled legal principles, the rival contentions raised on behalf of both sides will be appreciated in deciding the Petitioners' entitlement to anticipatory bail relief. 12. The 2nd Petitioner is the 1st Petitioner’s father-in-law and father of Petitioners 3 and 4; the 4th Petitioner is the legally wedded wife of the 1st Petitioner. 13. Upon receipt of a written report dated 06.11.2023 lodged by the 2nd respondent, S. Yalamanchali, on behalf of the victims, Smt. Vemuri Indiradevi and Dr Nirupama Yalamanchali, who are his mother-in-law and legally wedded wife, respectively, the crime in question was registered against the accused persons under sections 417, 420, 465, 467, 471, and 120B read with 34 of I.P.C. 14. The learned counsel representing the Petitioners contends that the inclusion of sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. is solely to circumvent and overcome the Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 ; regarding the applicability of section 41A of Cr. P.C., which deals with notice of appearance before a Police officer and which was brought on the Statute book by way of amendment under Cr.P.C., (Amendment) Act No.5 of 2009 with effect on and from 01.11.2010. Furthermore, it is emphasized that in the absence of prima facie material regarding documents purported to be forged, no detention should be authorized. 15. For better appreciation, the provisions which are punishable with imprisonment of more than seven years are reproduced hereunder: 467. Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.— Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record.— Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record. 16. As seen from the record, the 2nd Petitioner acquired a plot measuring 977 square yards situated in Survey No. 385, adjacent to Door No. 85-51-53 in Rajahmundry, East Godavari District, through a registered sale deed dated 21.04.2011. Subsequently, the 2nd Petitioner transferred the plot, as mentioned earlier, comprising 977 square yards, to the 1st Petitioner through a registered sale deed dated 15.04.2017. Subsequently, the 2nd Petitioner transferred the plot, as mentioned earlier, comprising 977 square yards, to the 1st Petitioner through a registered sale deed dated 15.04.2017. Petitioners 1 and 4, who are a married couple, availed a loan from Smt. Vemuri Indira Devi by offering the same plot of 977 square yards as security through a registered mortgage deed dated 07.12.2017 at the Sub-Registrar's office in Rajahmundry. On 07.07.2018, the 1st Petitioner, along with the 2nd Petitioner, executed and registered a deed of cancellation, cancelling the sale deed dated 15.04.2017 (registered as Document No. 3192 of 2017) to confer absolute ownership rights back to the second Petitioner. The 3rd petitioner signed as one of the attesting witnesses to the deed of cancellation dated 07.07.2018. 17. The Prosecution asserts that the registered sale deed dated 15.04.2017 was conceived as part of a calculated conspiracy between Petitioners 1 and 2 to create an illusionary impression that the 1st Petitioner held sole and absolute ownership of the property. Moreover, the Prosecution argues that the deed of cancellation dated 07.07.2018 was executed and registered while the deed of mortgage dated 07.12.2017, wherein the 1st Petitioner mortgaged the property to Smt. Vemuri Indira Devi was still in effect. This occurred within a timeframe of eight months from the date the loan was obtained from Smt. Vemuri Indira Devi. 18. The Prosecution further alleges that following the execution and registration of the deed of cancellation dated 07.07.2018, the 1st Petitioner, despite being divested of all rights regarding the plot measuring 977 sq. yds, deceitfully continued to represent himself as the absolute owner and beneficiary of the said property. Subsequently, an agreement was reached between the Petitioners and Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali, wherein Rs.2,05,17,000/- was transferred from Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali's bank account to the 1st Petitioner's account through cheque No.011492 dated 09.02.2022, issued by Axis Bank, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad. Upon receipt of the amount as mentioned above, the 1st Petitioner, while still maintaining the pretence of ownership of the said plot of 977 square yards, executed a deed of sale on 25.02.2022 in favour of Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali, which was subsequently registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar in Rajahmundry. In the said document, it was recited that the 1st Petitioner is the absolute owner of the property conveyed by sale deed dated 25.02.2022 and had conveyed his right, title and interest to Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali, which was subsequently registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar in Rajahmundry. In the said document, it was recited that the 1st Petitioner is the absolute owner of the property conveyed by sale deed dated 25.02.2022 and had conveyed his right, title and interest to Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali. 19. The Prosecution further contends that before the execution and registration of the deed of sale dated 25.02.2022 in favour of Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali by the 1st Petitioner, a reconveyance deed of mortgage was executed on the same date, i.e., 25.02.2022, to cancel the mortgage deed dated 07.12.2017 executed in favour of Smt. Vemuri Indira Devi and was subsequently registered as document No.2149/2022. 20. It is the Prosecution's case that Dr Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali had parted with a considerable sum of Rs.2,05,17,000/-. When Petitioners 1 to 4 knew that the 1st Petitioner had no legitimate claim or right in the property measuring 977 sq. yds, they proceeded to mislead the purchaser that they would sell the property and that they should not have made a false representation that the 1st Petitioner is the owner, even by the date of sale deed on 25.02.2022. 21. The 2nd Respondent contends that he and the 1st Petitioner were business associates and that they have had acquaintance spanning over a decade; the 2nd Petitioner instituted a civil suit in O.S. No.17 of 2023 against 1st Petitioner and mother-in-law and wife of the 2nd Respondent in the Court of learned VIII Additional District Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District, seeking relief of declaration that the 2nd Petitioner is the owner of the suit property i.e., an extent of 977 sq. yds of the vacant site, and the F.I.R. in Cr. No.219 of 2023 was registered on 06.11.2022, and the suit was filed on 14.03.2023 to create a cloak of civil dispute. 22. It is further contended that Petitioners 1 and 2, along with Petitioners 3 and 4, brought forth this Criminal Petition before this Court, which indicates that the aforementioned civil suit in O.S. No.17 of 2023 was initiated solely to veil the underlying issue as a civil dispute. There existed no necessity to initiate the aforementioned suit since the 1st Petitioner could have obtained absolute rights to the property through the execution and registration of the deed of cancellation. There existed no necessity to initiate the aforementioned suit since the 1st Petitioner could have obtained absolute rights to the property through the execution and registration of the deed of cancellation. The conduct exhibited by the Petitioners strongly suggests the presence of a criminal conspiracy among them. O.S. No.17 of 2023 was not only fictitious and collusive but also fraudulent in nature. 23. Despite taking several grounds in the bail application, the 1st Petitioner still needs to explain his stand, particularly regarding the execution of the sale deed dated 25.02.2022, knowing the execution of registration of the deed of cancellation dated 07.07.2018. It appears that Dr Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali, who purchased the property under the sale deed dated 25.02.2022, failed to verify the encumbrance certificate. Had she done so, she would have been aware of the registered cancellation deed executed by the 1st Petitioner on 07.07.2018. 24. The Petitioners contend that the documents referenced in the complaint are registered sale deeds executed by the concerned person, and therefore, the question of forgery does not arise in this case. 25. Reference has been made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 547, wherein it has been stated as follows: "16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner to execute the deed on the owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his, even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under the first category of "false documents", it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 26. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 26. It will also be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sheila Sebastian Vs. R.Jawaharaj and another, (2018) 3 MLJ (Crl) 39 (SC) LNIND 2018 SC 265. The relevant portions are extracted hereunder: 19. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that Section 463 defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464 substantiates the same by providing an answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463, I.P.C. Therefore, we can safely deduce that Section 464 defines one of the ingredients of forgery, i.e., making a false document. Further, Section 465 provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463, implying that ingredients under Section 464 should also be satisfied. Therefore, unless and until ingredients under Section 463 are satisfied, a person cannot be convicted under Section 465 by solely relying on the ingredients of Section 464, as the offence of forgery would remain incomplete. 27. Thus, it is clear that when a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else, nor is he claiming that he is authorized by someone else, such a document is not the execution of a false document as defined under section 464 of I.P.C. The 1st Petitioner has not disputed his execution of the registered sale deed in favour of Dr. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali. There is no contention from the Defacto Complainant or the Victim that the sale deed lacks the genuine signature of the 1st Petitioner. Their grievance is that the 1st Petitioner lacked the rightful authority to execute such a document. Smt. Nirupama Yalamanchali. There is no contention from the Defacto Complainant or the Victim that the sale deed lacks the genuine signature of the 1st Petitioner. Their grievance is that the 1st Petitioner lacked the rightful authority to execute such a document. As rightly argued by the learned counsel representing the Defacto Complainant, the 1st Petitioner was fully aware of his lack of entitlement to the property yet proceeded to execute the document under the false pretence of having rightful ownership, thereby receiving Rs.2,05,17,000/-. Even if it is held that the 1st Petitioner has no right to execute the sale deed, the sale deed cannot be termed as a false document in light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 28. Given the prevailing circumstances, it is prima facie evident that the Petitioners cannot be deemed to have created a false document. If the document executed by the 1st Petitioner is not deemed false, then the offence of forgery cannot be established. No offence under sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. can be substantiated without establishing forgery. 29. Upon perusal of the material on record, this Court prima facie finds that even based on the uncontroverted allegations, there exists a doubt whether the ingredients of sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. align with the facts of the case. The Petitioners’ counsel contends that sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C. were included merely to deprive the Petitioners to have the benefit of notice under section 41A of Cr.P.C. However, such a possibility cannot be ruled out. Besides sections 467 and 471 of I.P.C., other sections mentioned in the First Information Report (F.I.R.) may carry punishments of less than seven years, thereby warranting the applicability of section 41A of C.r.P.C. in the present scenario. 30. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor asserts that the procedure outlined in Section 41A of Cr.P.C. cannot be mandated to be enforced. He contends that it is within the purview of the police authorities to decide whether to adhere to Section 41A or Section 41(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. He further argues that issuing a directive to follow a specific course of action is unwarranted, as it would essentially amount to instructing the police on how to conduct their investigation. He points out that the Court may refrain from intervening in the investigative process, and discretion should be left to the concerned police officers. 31. He points out that the Court may refrain from intervening in the investigative process, and discretion should be left to the concerned police officers. 31. While considering the similar submissions in W.P. No.3848 of 2020, this Court passed an order dated 28.04.2020, observing that even in the case of Arnesh Kumar (3 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has spelt out the manner in which the power under Section 41 (1) (b) and 41-A of Cr.P.C. are to be exercised. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, after considering Section 41 (1) Cr.P.C., noted that in all cases where the arrest of a person is not actually required, the Police Officer should issue a notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place and time. This Court concurs with the submission of the learned Government Pleader that the discretion to arrest or not to arrest a person and thereafter to follow Section 41-A of Cr.P.C. is solely vested in the Investigating Officer. This Court cannot compel the police to act based on 41-A Cr.P.C. as a matter of right. In this Court's opinion, the discretion should be left to the officer concerned to arrest or not to arrest. 32. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioners that A.2 to A.4, namely Petitioners 2 to 4, have had no dealings with the Defacto Complainant or other individuals mentioned in the complaint. Neither the Defacto Complainant nor the Victim have presented evidence to demonstrate their transactions with Petitioners 2 to 4. The 3rd Petitioner served merely as an attestor to the cancellation deed. It is not alleged by the Defacto Complainant and the Victim that the 3rd Petitioner acted as an attesting witness to the registered sale deed dated 25.02.2022. As for the allegation against A.4, she was party to a mortgage agreement already discharged through a registered reconveyance deed. After thoroughly considering the aforementioned submissions, this Court finds that Petitioners 2 to 4 have sufficiently established grounds to warrant the grant of anticipatory bail. 33. Upon scrutiny of the conduct of the 1st Petitioner, this Court finds force in the submission of the Petitioners' counsel that it is apparent that the 1st Petitioner/accused orchestrated a fraudulent scheme, deceiving and defrauding the Victim by executing a registered sale deed, fully aware of his lack of title over the property in question. 33. Upon scrutiny of the conduct of the 1st Petitioner, this Court finds force in the submission of the Petitioners' counsel that it is apparent that the 1st Petitioner/accused orchestrated a fraudulent scheme, deceiving and defrauding the Victim by executing a registered sale deed, fully aware of his lack of title over the property in question. In doing so, he knowingly received Rs.2,05,17,000/-, thereby unjustly enriching himself through deceitful and dishonest means. 34. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contends that, based on the stance adopted by the 1st Petitioner, it becomes evident that he engaged in the sale of property without legal entitlement, receiving consideration totalling Rs.2,05,17,000/-. The Petitioners assert that the purported sale deed executed on 25.02.2022 in favour of the Complainant's wife was to facilitate account adjustments, given that both the Complainant and his wife are citizens of the United States and faced restrictions in transferring money without a designated purpose. The Petitioners specifically argue that the amount transferred under the registered sale deed, along with the accompanying reconveyance deed, was promptly returned to the complainant on the same day; moreover, the fact that the Complainant's wife did not deduct T.D.S. from the alleged sale proceeds underscores the transaction's business and tax-related nature. Given the Petitioners' assertions, it appears that neither the Defacto Complainant nor the Victim has provided clarification regarding their position. Consequently, this Court deems it necessary to delve into the matter as a question of fact during the investigation. The 1st Petitioner still needs to place a document showing the return of the sale consideration amount as contended. He has not explained his stand as to whether he obtained a receipt or acknowledgement concerning said payment. Had he paid the amount, he is expected to have obtained a receipt from the Victim. The stance articulated by the 1st petitioner in the bail application warrants investigation by the investigating officer. In the event of non-payment of the sale consideration amount as contended by the 1st Petitioner, it is incumbent upon the investigating officer to take requisite measures to seize the proceeds of the crime. 35. In light of the preceding discussion and settled case law, simply because the offences prima facie made out against the 1st Petitioner/A.1 are punishable with seven years or less than seven years, it cannot be held that the 1st Petitioner is entitled to section 41A Cr. P.C. notice. 35. In light of the preceding discussion and settled case law, simply because the offences prima facie made out against the 1st Petitioner/A.1 are punishable with seven years or less than seven years, it cannot be held that the 1st Petitioner is entitled to section 41A Cr. P.C. notice. The discretion should be left to the investigating officer concerned to arrest or not to arrest and, therefore, to follow under section 41A of Cr.P.C., is solely vested in the investigating officer. 36. The learned counsel for the 1st Petitioner contends that even according to the Prosecution’s case, the Defacto Complainant is not the Victim, his wife is shown to be the Victim, and the Defacto Complainant/2nd Respondent has no locus standi to file the complaint. It seems that during the investigation, the statement of the Victim is recorded, and there is no conflict of interest between the Victim and the 2nd Respondent/Defacto Complainant, and it is not the Petitioner's case also. 37. Learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent relied on the decision in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 , wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court held that: 6. a well recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence is that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication, the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions can be referred to in support of this legal position, such as (i) Section 187-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947 (iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant must fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the CrPC. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence, i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [See Section 2(n) CrPC], is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people, which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of society is one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for the larger good of society; the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown, to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception. …………………. 7. The scheme underlying the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information about an offence may either approach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a police station. If the offence complained of is a non-cognizable one, the police officer can either direct the complainant to approach the Magistrate or he may obtain permission of the Magistrate and investigate the offence. If the offence complained of is a non-cognizable one, the police officer can either direct the complainant to approach the Magistrate or he may obtain permission of the Magistrate and investigate the offence. Similarly, anyone can approach the Magistrate with a complaint, and even if the offence disclosed is serious, the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offence and initiate proceedings. It is open to the Magistrate but not obligatory upon him to direct investigation by police. Thus, two agencies have been set up for taking offences to Court. One would, therefore, require a cogent and explicit provision to hold that Section 5-A displaces this scheme. 38. As per Section 154 of Cr.P.C., every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. 39. Thus, Section 154 of Cr.P.C., notably refrains from delineating any precise qualifications or prerequisites requisite for an individual to initiate a report concerning a cognizable offence. This Court finds force in the submissions of the counsel for the 2nd Respondent that any individual who possesses knowledge of the commission of the crime can set the law in motion; there is no mandatory requirement in the law laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code that the complaint has to be given to police only by the Victim; any person knowing the commission of a cognizable offence can give the complaint to the police, whereupon police can register F.I.R. 40. Learned counsel for the 1st Petitioner contends that a mere breach of contract by one of the parties would not attract prosecution for a criminal offence in every case. He placed reliance on Naresh Kumar and Anr. V. The State of Karnataka and Anr, 2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 268. Learned counsel for the 1st Petitioner contends that a mere breach of contract by one of the parties would not attract prosecution for a criminal offence in every case. He placed reliance on Naresh Kumar and Anr. V. The State of Karnataka and Anr, 2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 268. After careful perusal of the material on record, this Court views that the principle laid down in the said decision, prima facie, cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case, as the dispute between the parties was not of a civil nature. At this stage, it cannot be said that there is no criminal element, and the dispute is civil. 41. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further relied on the decision in Ashok Kumar V. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 274, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that: 12. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. 42. In a case containing severe allegations, the Investigating Officer deserves a free hand to take the investigation to its logical conclusion. The investigation officer who has been prevented from subjecting the Petitioner to custodial interrogation can hardly be fruitful in finding prima facie substance in the extremely serious allegations. The possibility of the investigation being effected once the Petitioner is released on bail is very much foreseen. Custodial interrogation can be one of the relevant aspects to be considered along with other grounds while deciding an application seeking anticipatory bail. 43. As previously noted, the Prosecution asserts that the custodial interrogation of the 1st Petitioner is imperative. The 1st Petitioner acknowledges receipt of Rs.2,05,17,000/- but has failed to furnish evidence substantiating the alleged return of said amount. Given these circumstances, the contention put forth by the 1st Petitioner's counsel is challenging to endorse. 43. As previously noted, the Prosecution asserts that the custodial interrogation of the 1st Petitioner is imperative. The 1st Petitioner acknowledges receipt of Rs.2,05,17,000/- but has failed to furnish evidence substantiating the alleged return of said amount. Given these circumstances, the contention put forth by the 1st Petitioner's counsel is challenging to endorse. Based on the rationales expounded in the foregoing paragraphs, this Court maintains that the 1st Petitioner/A.1 is ineligible to provide anticipatory bail. 44. Upon considering the nature of the accusations against the Petitioners and in light of settled legal principles, this Court finds that reasonable grounds exist to grant anticipatory bail to Petitioners 2 to 4. However, this Court does not find sufficient grounds to grant the relief of anticipatory bail to the 1st Petitioner/A.1. 45. As a result, the Criminal Petition is partly allowed by granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioners 2 to 4/Accused Nos.2 to 4 subject to their surrender before the Station House Officer, Rajahmundry II Town Police Station, East Godavari District, within two (2) weeks from today. On such surrender, the Petitioners shall be released on bail on their furnishing a personal bond for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand Only) each with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of the concerned Investigating Officer. Upon their release, the Petitioners are mandated to adhere to the following conditions: i. On such release, Petitioners 2 to 4/Accused No.2 to 4 are directed to appear before the concerned Investigating Officer as and when they are directed. ii. The Petitioners/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or any Investigating or Police Officer and shall cooperate with the investigating officer. iii. Petitioners are further directed not to tamper with the prosecution evidence and not to influence the prosecution witnesses. 46. The relief claimed for anticipatory bail to the 1st Petitioner is dismissed. 47. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without indicating a stance on the case's merits. The Investigating Agency is affirmed to have the freedom to investigate without being influenced by the observations in this Order. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.