ORDER : (Krishna S. Dixit, J.) Petitioner, a civil servant facing Crime No.12/2024 registered under Section 7(a) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is grieving before the Writ Court against the State Administrative Tribunal’s order dated 25.11.2024 whereby his Application No.4596/2024 has been negatived. In the said Application, he had called in question the order of suspension dated 06.09.2024. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner vehemently argues the following points for invalidation of the Tribunal’s order: i) The power to suspend is delegated to CEO of Zilla Panchayath concerned in the light of Note 2(a) of Rule 10 (8) of Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957; however, w.e.f 13.03.2024, the Karnataka General Services (Development Branch and Local Administration Branch) Cadre and Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2024 has been amended designating the Commissioner – RDPR as the appointing authority and because of this change in law, the power to suspend has to be exercised only by the appointing authority and not the CEO. ii) An employee after being suspended and detained for a period beyond 48 hours, stands automatically suspended by operation of law namely the Rule 10(2)(a) of 1957 Rules; however, once he is enlarged on bail or otherwise, the suspension stands automatically revoked unless the competent authority decides to continue such suspension in terms of Paragraph No.7 of the Government Circular dated 13.01.2015. iii) The order of suspension is not a reasoned decision and therefore, the same is liable to be struck down, requirement of giving germane reasons for the decision being imperative of good governance. 3. Learned AGA appearing for the official Respondents vehemently opposes the Petition making submission in justification of the impugned order contenting that the power to suspend granted to the CEO of Zilla Panchayat under the subject Rule remains intact, notwithstanding the amendment of 2024 Rules whereby power to appoint is vested in the Commissioner – RDPR; the Rule by virtue of which automatic suspension of a public servant happens, does not say that the same is coterminous with period of detention. He further adds that the Circular dated 13.01.2015 which Petitioner’s counsel has heavily banked upon, does not come to the aid of Petitioner since Paragraph No.7 of the said Circular empowers the competent authority to rescind or not, the suspension. 4. He further adds that the Circular dated 13.01.2015 which Petitioner’s counsel has heavily banked upon, does not come to the aid of Petitioner since Paragraph No.7 of the said Circular empowers the competent authority to rescind or not, the suspension. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the Petition papers, we are broadly in agreement with the submission made by learned AGA. The power to suspend ordinarily lies with the appointing authority. However, law may provide such power to some other official. Note below Rule 10 (8)(2)(a) of CCA Rules reads as under: “The Chief Executive Officers of the Zilla Panchayaths are delegated the power to place under suspension a Member of the State Civil Services belonging to Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’ of any Department (other than Karnataka Judicial Department) working in the jurisdiction of the Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and grama Panchayat of the District.)” It hardly needs to be stated that Note below Rule is also a part of the Rule and therefore, the same needs to be construed accordingly. The power to suspend includes power to rescind it unless the law otherwise says. The Karnataka General Services (Development Branch and Local Administration Branch) Cadre and Recruitment (Amendment) Rules, 2024 have vested power of appointment in the Commissioner – RDPR. That has not altered the power of CEO of Zilla Panchayat to suspend employees of the kind. In both the cases, these Rules are promulgated by the Government, which if wanted to alter would have amended 1957 Rules to accord with the submission of learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner. 5. The next submission that deemed suspension of a detained civil servant would be coterminous with the detention period, is not supported the provisions of Rule 10 of 1957 Rules. They only provide for the suspension of a civil servant when his arrest & detention exceeds 48 hours. Admittedly, the Petitioner was in detention during the period between 03.09.2024 & 13.09.2024 i.e., one lunar month. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has not cited any Rule or Ruling in support of his submission. If the Government intended that the suspension should stand automatically rescinded, once detention comes to an end, it would have structured the text of the provisions of Rule 10 in that way. However, it has chosen in its wisdom not to provide for that. If the Government intended that the suspension should stand automatically rescinded, once detention comes to an end, it would have structured the text of the provisions of Rule 10 in that way. However, it has chosen in its wisdom not to provide for that. On the other hand, 2015 Circular provides for continuing or rescinding the suspension vide Paragraph No.7 which reads as under: The text of the Circular supports the contention of learned AGA. The deemed suspension of an employee would continue even after his detention comes to an end by virtue of enlargement on bail or otherwise till after the competent authority issues a formal order revoking the suspension. The decision of Coordinate Bench of Tribunal vide Application No. 3917/2024 between SMT. SHOBHA RANI v THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, decided on 04.10.2024 arguably holding to the contra therefore, pales into insignificance. 6. The vehement submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the CEO of Zilla Panchayat in the impugned order of suspension has not given a germane reason, does not come to his aid even if it is assumed to be true. The reason is simple: suspension happened in the instant case not because of this order but by virtue of legal fiction created under Rule 10 of 1957 Rules. The subject suspension order, whatever be the reason on which it is founded, only gave expression to the deemed suspension because of detention of the Petitioner beyond 48 hours. Therefore, even if the suspension order is quashed, that would not liquidate deemed suspension. 7. It hardly needs to be stated that the Petitioner is facing a criminal case for the offence punishable under Section 7(a) of P.C. Act, 1988. Public confidence in the due discharge of duties by officials of the kind is shaken if such officials are not put under suspension pending disposal of the criminal case, subject to all just exceptions. We are not told at the Bar that any disciplinary proceedings against the Petitioner have begun. In view of that, liberty is reserved to the Petitioner to seek rescinding of suspension if grounds do exist therefor. However, we do not express our opinion on the merits of that matter, which essentially lies within the domain of Executive. In the above circumstances, this Petition is dismissed, costs having been made easy.