JUDGMENT : Moushumi Bhattacharya, J. The Appeal arises out of the Common Order dated 03.03.2017 passed by the Chairman, Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal-cum-II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar. The impugned order was passed in 4 Arbitration Original Petitions (A.O.Ps) filed by the parties before the Trial Court. The appellant before this Court was the petitioner in 2 of the 4 A.O.Ps before the Trial Court and respondent No.1 in the remaining 2. 2. The A.O.Ps. filed were as follows: A.O.P.No.782 of 2010 was filed by the appellant challenging the interim Award passed by the learned Arbitrator on 02.06.2010. A.O.P.No.1039 of 2010 was filed by the appellant against the final Award passed by the Arbitrator on 27.08.2010. A.O.P.No.979 of 2010 was filed by the respondent No.1 against the interim Award passed by the Arbitrator on 02.06.2010. A.O.P.No.1137 of 2010 was filed by the respondent No.1 against the final Award passed by the Arbitrator on 27.08.2010. 3. By the impugned Common Order, the interim Award dated 02.06.2010 and the final Award dated 27.08.2010 were confirmed and all the 4 A.O.Ps were dismissed. Facts: 4. A brief background to the Appeal should first be stated. The dispute involves a Cinema Theatre “Sri Laxmi Kala Mandir” at Alwal, Hyderabad, Telangana. Dhananjaya (appellant), K. Kumar (respondent No.1), Nagabhushanam (respondent No.2), Shyam Rao (respondent No.3) and one Srinivasulu own 20% shares each in the partnership firm- M/s.Sri Laxmi Enterprises which was formed on 23.12.1982. Srinivasulu died and his heirs Lokesh (respondent No.4) and Sailesh (respondent No.5) own 10% shares each in the partnership firm. 5. The appellant filed O.P.No.80 of 1992 for appointment of an Arbitrator in October, 1992 before the Principal Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District, under Section 8 of The Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellant also filed I.A.No.1284 of 1992 seeking appointment of a Receiver pending disposal of the said O.P. The said I.A. was dismissed on 19.01.1993. Challenging the said order of dismissal, the appellant filed A.A.O.No.123 of 1993 before the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which passed a judgment on 08.11.1994 setting out the modalities for the management of the theatre. The modalities included entrusting the management to the deceased respondent No.3 and for the appellant, respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 to receive Rs.30,000/- each per month. The respondent Nos.4 and 5 were to receive Rs.15,000/- each every month. The modalities included entrusting the management to the deceased respondent No.3 and for the appellant, respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 to receive Rs.30,000/- each per month. The respondent Nos.4 and 5 were to receive Rs.15,000/- each every month. The appellant, respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 as well as respondent Nos.4 and 5 were each entitled to withdraw the amounts specified in the judgment. 6. The O.P. filed by the appellant for appointment of Arbitrator was allowed on 03.05.1997 and Sri V.V. Ramanatham, Retired District Judge was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator. Sri V.V.Ramanatham was succeeded by Justice Vaman Rao, Retired High Court Judge, who was subsequently succeeded by Justice A.Gopal Rao, Retired High Court Judge, and thereafter by Sri P.V. Vidyasagar, Retired District Judge. The parties filed a Memo before Justice A. Gopal Rao on 25.09.2003 for converting the proceedings from The Arbitration Act, 1940 to the new Act i.e., The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which came into force w.e.f. 22.08.1996. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 filed I.A.No.2778 of 2008 in O.P.No.80 of 1992 for appointment of a new Arbitrator which was allowed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar, on 27.01.2009 appointing Justice G.Bikshapathy, Retired Judge of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, as the Arbitrator. 7. The newly-appointed Arbitrator passed the interim Award on 02.06.2010. 8. The appellant and the respondent No.1 filed applications for setting aside of the interim Award which became the subject matter of challenge before the Trial Court culminating in the impugned Common Order. The Arbitrator made the final Award on 27.08.2010 which was also challenged by the appellant and the respondent No.1. This also forms a part of the impugned Common Order. 9. The appellant also filed an Application questioning the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator under Section 16 of the 1996 Act on 12.08.2010 which was dismissed on 27.08.2010. Submissions made on behalf of the Parties: 10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant has filed a petition before the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh for appointment of an Arbitrator under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and also made an Application for appointment of a Receiver for managing the cinema theatre. Submissions made on behalf of the Parties: 10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant has filed a petition before the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh for appointment of an Arbitrator under the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and also made an Application for appointment of a Receiver for managing the cinema theatre. Counsel submits that although the Application was initially dismissed by the Trial Court on 19.01.1993, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh allowed the A.A.O. filed against the said order, by appointing a Receiver on 05.04.1993. Counsel submits that the said Receiver managed the affairs of the theatre until he was removed by the High Court. Counsel submits that 4 Arbitrators were thereafter appointed and that the parties filed a Joint Memo before the 3rd Arbitrator – Justice A. Gopal Rao to convert the proceedings under the new Act i.e., 1996 Act which was recorded by the sole Arbitrator on 25.09.2003. Counsel places strong objection to the appointment of Justice G. Bikshapathy aswell as the interim and the final Awards. Counsel submits that once the new Act came into force, the parties could only have approached the High Court under section 11 of the 1996 Act for appointment of Arbitrator. 11. Counsel further submits that the appellant had also questioned the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator on that basis under Section 16 of the 1996 Act but the said Application was dismissed by the Arbitrator on 27.08.2010. It is submitted that the final Award was also passed on the same day i.e., on 27.08.2010. Counsel submits that the final Award suffers from perversity and is in violation of the principles of natural justice. Counsel further submits that the Sole Arbitrator misdirected the proceedings by describing himself as “Receiver-cum-Arbitrator”. Counsel submits that the interim Award was also liable to be set aside as the Arbitrator showed bias against the appellant by requesting the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar to initiate necessary action against the appellant, the respondent No.1 and the respondent No.3 (now deceased). Counsel goes to the extent of submitting that the Arbitrator misappropriated an amount of Rs.9,57,000/- and that the appellant filed an Application before the Trial Court for recovery of this amount. 12. Counsel goes to the extent of submitting that the Arbitrator misappropriated an amount of Rs.9,57,000/- and that the appellant filed an Application before the Trial Court for recovery of this amount. 12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 submits that the proceedings before the Arbitrator were deemed to be under the old Act i.e., The Arbitration Act, 1940 and that the Arbitrator dismissed the Application under section 16 of the 1996 Act, without giving any opportunity of hearing to the parties. Counsel supports the case sought to be made out by the appellant namely the appointment of the Arbitrator could only have been made under section 11 of the 1996 Act. Counsel submits that the Arbitrator failed to provide any particulars with regard to the period relevant to the final Award and relied on the Report of a Chartered Accountant without putting the same for the scrutiny/objections of the parties before him. 13. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.4 disputes the contentions made on behalf of the appellant and the respondent No.1 on all points including with regard to the appointment of the Arbitrator as well as the interim and the final Awards. Counsel submits that the Arbitrator, namely, Justice G. Bikshapathy, conducted the proceedings as per the procedure contemplated under the 1996 Act. Counsel submits that the objections of the appellant and the respondent No.1 to the interim Award were in view of the order passed by the Arbitrator directing the appellant to pay Rs.62,02,940/- and the respondent No.1 an amount of Rs.14,71,084/-. Counsel submits that the Arbitrator acted as per the directions of the High Court and hence there was no occasion for the Arbitrator to act beyond the jurisdiction. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 supports the case of the respondent No.4 and submits that the appellant and the respondent No.1 having consented for the appointment of a new Arbitrator and for regulation of the affairs of the theatre till passing of the Award, cannot now question the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator or the manner in which the arbitration was conducted. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.5 submits that the Arbitration was initially conducted under the provisions of the 1940 Act but that the parties subsequently filed a Joint Memo for converting the said proceedings under the 1996 Act. 15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.5 submits that the Arbitration was initially conducted under the provisions of the 1940 Act but that the parties subsequently filed a Joint Memo for converting the said proceedings under the 1996 Act. Counsel submits that the Chartered Accountant, Sri M. Murali Jagan Mohan, called upon all the parties to submit their claims and objections along with supporting vouchers for the purpose of audit of the accounts of the theatre and that the Audit Report was submitted to the Arbitrator which formed the basis of the interim Award dated 02.06.2010 and final Award dated 27.08.2010. Counsel submits that the appellant participated in the Arbitration and has also received the proceeds of the auction process as directed by the Court and as such is estopped from objecting either to the appointment of the Arbitrator or the Arbitration proceedings. Decision: 16. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and have also perused the impugned Common Order dated 03.03.2017 as well as the interim and the final Awards passed by the Arbitrator on 02.06.2010 and 27.08.2010 respectively. 17. This is a case where the facts would be relevant for adjudication of the issue of whether the appellant can be permitted to challenge the interim and the final Awards by way of an Application for setting aside of the same under section 34 of the 1996 Act. The relevance of the facts with regard to the points of law adjudicated by the parties would be clear from the paragraphs below. 18. The Trial Court, by way of the impugned Common Order dated 03.03.2017, dismissed the Applications filed by the appellant and the respondent No.1 on the ground of the limited scope of interference under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The Trial Court was also of the view that the procedure adopted by the Arbitrator cannot be questioned since the parties themselves opted to convert the proceedings from The Arbitration Act, 1940 to the new Act of 1996 and further that the appellant has resisted in complying with his liability as fixed by the Arbitrator and has also protracted the litigation by approaching a different forum on flimsy grounds. The Trial Court accordingly declined to interfere with the interim and the final Awards passed by the Arbitrator and rejected the 4 Applications filed by the appellant and the respondent No.1. 19. The Trial Court accordingly declined to interfere with the interim and the final Awards passed by the Arbitrator and rejected the 4 Applications filed by the appellant and the respondent No.1. 19. The related issues which have been argued by the appellant and the respondent No.1 are as follows: (a) Whether the appointment of the Arbitrator was under the relevant statutory provisions? (b) Whether the impugned Common Order refusing to set aside the Interim and Final Awards should be interfered with? (c) Whether the application filed by respondent No.1 for transposition as the appellant No.2 can be allowed in the attending facts and circumstances? 20. The issues are answered as follows: Point No.1 - Whether the appointment of the Arbitrator was under the relevant statutory provisions? 21. The admitted facts would show that the appellant filed an Application (O.P.No.80 of 1992) for appointment of an Arbitrator before the Principal Sub-ordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District under section 8 of The Arbitration Act, 1940. This Application was made in October, 1992. The Arbitrator was subsequently appointed with the consent of all the parties which would be evident from an order dated 03.05.1997 passed in an Application filed by the respondent No.1 herein. The order dated 03.05.1997 allowed the petition filed by respondent No.1 for appointment of an Arbitrator and the Court appointed Sri V.V. Ramanadham, a Retired District Judge as the Sole Arbitrator to settle the disputes of the firm, M/s. Sri Lakshmi Enterprises. The Arbitrator was authorized to maintain the cinema theatre with the assistance of any persons nominated by him till making of the Award. The Arbitrator was also authorized to take the assistance of a qualified accountant of his choice for the aforesaid purpose. 22. Sri V.V. Ramanadham was replaced by Justice Vaman Rao and thereafter Justice A.Gopal Rao. Significantly, the parties to the Arbitration filed a Memo on 29.05.2003 to the effect that the parties wish to continue the proceedings under new Act - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and not under the old Act of 1940. 22. Sri V.V. Ramanadham was replaced by Justice Vaman Rao and thereafter Justice A.Gopal Rao. Significantly, the parties to the Arbitration filed a Memo on 29.05.2003 to the effect that the parties wish to continue the proceedings under new Act - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and not under the old Act of 1940. The Memo is a part of the proceedings dated 29.05.2003 before Justice A.Gopal Rao (Arbitrator) which records as follows: “All the parties have filed a joint memo requesting the Arbitrator to continue the proceedings hereafter under the new Arbitrator of and conciliation Act of 1996 and nor under the old Act, 1990.” (The mistakes are admitted typographical errors in the document) 23. The present Arbitrator, Justice G. Bikshapathy was subsequently appointed pursuant to an Application made by the respondent No.1 (I.A.No.2778 of 2008 in OP.No.80 of 1992) for appointment of a fresh Arbitrator. The order dated 27.01.2009 is on record. The Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B. Nagar appointed Justice G. Bikshapathy, a Retired Judge of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, for running the theatre in terms of the earlier orders passed by the High Court in C.R.P.Nos.4021 and 4165 of 1997. Justice G. Bikshapathy thereafter proceeded with the arbitration as per the procedure contemplated under the new Act but primarily on the Joint Memo filed by the parties herein to the arbitration. 24. Section 85(2) of the 1996 Act provides an exception to the repeal of The Arbitration Act, 1940. Under section 85(2)(a), the provisions of the old Act i.e., The Arbitration Act, 1940, have been made applicable to arbitral proceedings which commenced before the 1996 Act came into force, unless the parties agree otherwise. The statutory position is hence clear. The parties have an option to continue under the provisions of the 1940 Act provided the arbitral proceedings commenced before 22.08.1996 when the new Act of 1996 came into force. 25. Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act will however not apply to the present case since the parties filed a Joint Memo before the presiding Arbitrator at that point of time i.e., on 25.09.2003 for conversion of the proceedings under the new Act. Further, the Arbitrator had already been appointed by the time the new Act came into force. 26. 25. Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act will however not apply to the present case since the parties filed a Joint Memo before the presiding Arbitrator at that point of time i.e., on 25.09.2003 for conversion of the proceedings under the new Act. Further, the Arbitrator had already been appointed by the time the new Act came into force. 26. Section 11 of the 1996 Act, which deals with appointment of Arbitrators, would only be applicable if the arbitral proceedings had not commenced and the parties were at the stage of agreeing on a procedure for appointment of the Arbitrator or failed to appoint an Arbitrator under sub-section (4), (5) and (6) of Section 11 the 1996 Act. 27. Significantly, both the appellant as well as the respondent No.1 applied for setting aside of the Award before the Trial Court under section 34 of the 1996 Act and before this Court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act. Hence, the question of the parties either following the old 1940 Act or questioning the appointment of the Arbitrator after passing of the interim and final Awards on the ground that the appointment should have been made under section 11 of the 1996 Act does not arise. The argument is self-serving and has been made for the purpose of unsettling the effect of the interim and final Awards after both have gone against the appellant and the respondent No.1. 28. For the sake of emphasis, once the parties agreed to be governed by the law, which was in force at the relevant point of time, and the arbitrator proceeded on that understanding and made a final Award under the 1996 Act, the parties are estopped by conduct from reversing their stand: Thyssen Stahlunion Gmbh Etc vs. Steel Authority Of India Ltd, AIR 1999 SC 3923 , Delhi Transport Corporation Ltd. vs. Rose Advertising, (2003) 6 SCC 36 and Hyderabad Stock Exchange Limited Vs. Kaveri Projects Ltd. 2010 (1) ALD 763 DB . The conduct of the appellant and the respondent No.1 would also attract section 4 of the 1993 Act which contemplates waiver of a party’s right to object. Point No.2 - Whether the impugned Common Order refusing to set aside the Interim and Final Awards should be interfered with? 29. Kaveri Projects Ltd. 2010 (1) ALD 763 DB . The conduct of the appellant and the respondent No.1 would also attract section 4 of the 1993 Act which contemplates waiver of a party’s right to object. Point No.2 - Whether the impugned Common Order refusing to set aside the Interim and Final Awards should be interfered with? 29. As stated above, the Trial Court dismissed all 4 Applications filed by the appellant and the respondent No.1 for setting aside the interim Award dated 02.06.2010 and the final Award dated 27.08.2010. 30. With regard to the legality of the primary dispute i.e., whether the impugned Common Order dated 03.03.2017 should be set aside or sustained, we rely on the admitted facts which have already been stated above. 31. The applicants sought for setting aside of the interim Award dated 02.06.2010 and the final Award dated 27.08.2010 on the ground that the Awards were passed in excess/beyond the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and are against the public policy of India. The appellant and the respondent No.1 also challenged the quantum of the liability fixed by the Arbitrator on the said parties. The appellant and the respondent No.1 had argued that the figures given by the Chartered Accountant was without any basis. 32. The Trial Court noted that the grounds raised by the appellant and the respondent No.1 for setting aside the interim Award were similar to those raised in the Applications for setting aside the final Award. The Trial Court also found that the appointment of the Arbitrator was within the mandate of the 1996 Act and that the parties had also participated in the arbitration. The Trial Court also found that the appellant and the respondent No.1 resorted to every possible means to avoid the liability imposed upon them and also failed to cooperate with the Arbitrator for concluding the proceedings at the earliest. The Trial Court further found that during the course of the arguments, the appellant and the respondent No.1 gave up the argument on the appointment of Arbitrator and focused only on the point of liability. 33. There are several findings in the impugned Common Order of the appellant not co-operating with the Arbitrator including on the apportionment of liabilities by the Chartered Accountant, who was appointed to audit the accounts of the theatre therefor. 33. There are several findings in the impugned Common Order of the appellant not co-operating with the Arbitrator including on the apportionment of liabilities by the Chartered Accountant, who was appointed to audit the accounts of the theatre therefor. The Trial Court concluded that the scope of interference under section 34 of the 1996 Act is limited and the Court cannot reappreciate the evidence or substitute the findings given by the Arbitrator. The Trial Court also found that the appellant and the respondent No.1 were trying to protract the litigation so as to avoid their respective monetary liabilities. The Trial Court accordingly dismissed all the 4 Applications questioning the interim and final Awards. 34. We have carefully perused the interim Award and the final Award passed by the Arbitrator which are necessary for deciding on the legality of the impugned Common Order. 35. In the interim Award, the Arbitrator recorded that the litigation was kept alive for 20 years due to the non-co-operation of the parties and that the Arbitrator was hence faced with the herculean task of arbitrating on the dispute and also ensure the smooth running of the theatre. The Arbitrator also noted that the parties did not maintain or produce any records which were required for the Arbitrator to work out the liabilities of each of the partners to the partnership firm. We find that the Arbitrator meticulously recorded the proceedings of each of the 16 sittings and the fact that the parties were given sufficient opportunity to file their respective written submissions which they failed to do. 36. The interim Award notes that the appellant admitted that he managed the records from 17.06.2005 to 31.08.2006 and had also filed returns as well as made payments through cheques from his bank account. The Arbitrator hence found that the appellant was liable for rendition of accounts. Significantly, the Arbitrator also recorded that the appellant sent several letters in March and April, 2010 to the Arbitrator for returning the warrant of appointment. 37. It is further recorded that the respondent No.1 filed a Memo in May, 2010 for payment of Rs.4,00,000/-. The Arbitrator recorded that the Chartered Accountant was appointed on the request of the parties and the auditor conducted the audit according to the prescribed norms and sufficient opportunity was given to the parties to place the accounts. 37. It is further recorded that the respondent No.1 filed a Memo in May, 2010 for payment of Rs.4,00,000/-. The Arbitrator recorded that the Chartered Accountant was appointed on the request of the parties and the auditor conducted the audit according to the prescribed norms and sufficient opportunity was given to the parties to place the accounts. The Arbitrator accordingly relied on the Reports submitted by the Chartered Accountant and held the appellant liable for a sum payment of Rs.62,02,940/- and the respondent No.1 for a sum of Rs.14,71,084/-. The appellant and the respondent No.1 were directed to deposit the said amounts to the credit of the original proceedings – O.P.No.80 of 1992 within 2 months failing which they would be liable to make the payment along with interest @ 18% p.a. The Arbitrator also held that the respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 were eligible to receive the amounts of Rs.28,16,833/-, Rs.26,30,974/-, Rs.16,04,741/- and Rs.6,21,476/- respectively. 38. The final Award records that the Arbitrator tried his best to resolve the dispute between the parties and that the appellant and the respondent No.1 filed one Memo after another to stall the proceedings. The final Award further records that the appellant has filed an Application under section 16 of the 1996 Act to question the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator proceeded to assess the final liability of each partner which was decided as follows: 39. The appellant was to pay a total of Rs.74,69,470/- and the respondent No.1 Rs.27,05,079/-. The respondent Nos.2, 3,4 and 5were entitled to receive Rs.28,70,263/-, Rs.28,37,722/-, Rs.17,67,530/- and Rs.7,85,384/- respectively. The appellant and the respondent No.1 were given 2 months from the date of the Award to deposit the amount to the credit of O.P.No.80 of 1992 failing which they would be liable to pay interest @ 18% p.a. simple interest. The interim Award was made part and parcel of the final Award. 40. The objections raised by the appellant and the respondent No.1 to the Award must be seen within the statutory framework of section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Section 34 provides for recourse to a Court against an arbitral Award only on an application for setting aside the Award under the grounds available to the parties under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 34. Section 34 provides for recourse to a Court against an arbitral Award only on an application for setting aside the Award under the grounds available to the parties under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 34. Section 34 (2) is further divided into (a) and (b) where Clauses (iii) and (iv) deals more with the procedure including where a party was not given proper notice or was unable to present his/her case or where the arbitral Award deals with the dispute not contemplated within the terms or matters beyond the scope of the submission to Arbitration. Section 34 (b)(ii) envisages setting aside of the Award where the Award is in conflict to the publicpolicy of India. Section 34(2A) contemplates setting aside of an Award which is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the Award. 41. There are several caveats built in section 34 with regard to interference with the decision of the Arbitrator. These are found in Explanation 2 to section 34(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act which bars the Court from dealing with the merits of the dispute as well as in the proviso to section 34(2A) which mandates that an Award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by re-appreciation of evidence. The underlying statutory message is clear: i.e., the Arbitral Award shall not be interfered with unless the Award is in conflict with the public policy of India, is patently illegal, perverse or the Arbitration Agreement itself is invalid or the Award deals with a dispute which falls beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. 42. It is now judicially settled that the Court will also refuse to set aside an Award if the Arbitrator has taken a plausible view as opposed to an impossible view on the merits of the dispute. 43. In the present case, the Arbitrator has apportioned liabilities between the 6 partners by holding that the appellant and the respondent No.1 are to pay certain amounts and the respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 are entitled to receive certain amounts. The Arbitrator has taken the assistance of a Chartered Accountant to arrive at audited figures of the liabilities of the partnership firm on the basis of the period of management by each of the partners. The Arbitrator has taken the assistance of a Chartered Accountant to arrive at audited figures of the liabilities of the partnership firm on the basis of the period of management by each of the partners. The liabilities include statutory liabilities in respect of Employee State Insurance (ESI) and Entertainment Tax (ET). The Arbitrator adjudicated on the issue of the liability of the partners including of the appellant during the period in which the appellant was in management. The statutory liabilities include Entertaining Tax returns from the Commercial Tax Officer for the relevant period. The Arbitrator recorded a finding that the appellant had filed returns for the relevant period which showed that the appellant had solely managed the theatre during that time frame and was hence liable for rendering of accounts. 44. The appointment of the Chartered Accountant for the Arbitrator’s assistance cannot be called into question or said to be perverse as the Chartered Accountant was appointed as per the request of the parties. Moreover, the order dated 03.05.1997 passed by the Principal Sub-ordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District, in O.P.No.80 of 1992, permitted the Arbitrator to take the assistance of any person including a qualified Accountant of his choice for maintaining the cinema theatre till making of the Award. 45. The objection with regard to the Arbitrator managing the theatre and acting as the “Arbitrator-cum-Receiver” is unwarranted, to say the least. The order dated 27.01.2009 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, in I.A.No.2778 of 2008 in O.P.No.80 of 1992, which was filed by the respondent No.1 for appointment of a fresh Arbitrator, shows that the Court directed the Arbitrator to run the theatre and to follow the guidelines of the High Court in this respect. It is also significant that the respondent No.1 also sought for a direction to run the theatre by conducting an open auction amongst all the partners in the said I.A. 46. It is relevant to mention in this context that a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh had passed an order on 08.11.1994 in an Appeal (Appeal Against Order No.123 of 1993) filed by the appellant against an order passed by the Trial Court refusing appointment of a Receiver. The Division Bench appointed a Receiver and set out various modalities for running the theatre including distribution of amounts to the 6 partners. 47. The Division Bench appointed a Receiver and set out various modalities for running the theatre including distribution of amounts to the 6 partners. 47. From the above, it is clear that the Arbitrator was under a specific mandate to run the theatre by following the guidelines and conditions passed in the previous orders including for appointment of a Chartered Accountant for the purposes of audit and assistance. The Arbitrator duly complied with this mandate and apportioned the liability between the 6 partners. There is no evidence on record to indicate that the Arbitrator went beyond his mandate or travelled outside the contours of the dispute for fixing the liability of the appellant and the respondent No.1 and the amounts receivable by the respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5. The Arbitrator arrived at specific figures which are backed by the findings including that of the appellant solely running the theatre for a specific time frame. The Arbitrator has also individually dealt with the statutory liabilities under individual heads. 48. On the other hand, the Arbitrator’s findings of the continuous road blocks placed by the appellant and the respondent No.1 to the quick resolution of the proceedings is significant. It is evident that both the appellant and the respondentNo.1 sought for setting aside of the interim and final Awards only after the findings went against them with regard to the liability. 49. The appellant’s objection with regard to dismissal of his Application under section 16 of the 1996 Act questioning the competence of the Arbitral Tribunal is equally specious. The Application was filed on 12.08.2010 which was almost 2 months after passing of the interim Award and that too on the ground that the Arbitrator was not appointed under section 11 of the 1996 Act. It would be evident from the conduct of the appellant that the appellant chose to participate in the proceedings from 27.01.2009 and questioned the appointment of the Arbitrator only after the appellant and the respondent No.1 were made liable for payment of amounts to the credit of the O.P. 50. The Arbitrator records that the respondent No.1 filed a petition seeking appointment of an Arbitrator with a direction to take possession of the theatre and that the said I.A. clearly mentions that all the partners had consented for appointment of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator records that the respondent No.1 filed a petition seeking appointment of an Arbitrator with a direction to take possession of the theatre and that the said I.A. clearly mentions that all the partners had consented for appointment of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator also records that the appellant participated in the arbitration without any objection and had also received various amounts towards his share in the rental income. The Arbitrator accordingly dismissed the application filed under Section 16 of the 1996 Act. The fact of the Arbitrator dismissing the application on the same date of passing of the final Award cannot be accepted as a ground to upend the final Award. The final Award was substantially similar to the interim Award. Hence, the question of the Arbitrator accelerating the final Award with an ulterior motive is wholly without any basis. 51. Section 37(1)(c) of the 1996 Act envisages an Appeal from an order refusing to set aside an arbitral Award under section 34 of the 1996 Act. 52. It is judicially settled that the scope of an Appeal under section 37 of the 1996 Act from an order refusing to setting aside of an Award under Section 34 also operates within the restricted boundaries of an application under section 34. Hence, as per the statutory mandate, we are not inclined to undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the Award. The only scope of our adjudication is whether the Trial Court has exercised its power within the boundaries of section 34 of the 1996 Act and not exceeded the scope of the provision: MMTC Limited v. VedantaLimited (2019) 4 SCC 163 and UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2022) 4 SCC 114. 53. This Court disagrees with the objection taken by the appellant to the Award on the ground of public policy. Section 34 (2)(b)(ii) of the 1996 Act provides for the ground of an arbitral Award being liable to be set aside if it is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation 1 delineates this ground to include contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law (Section 34(2)(b)(ii) (Explanation I (ii))). The appellant has failed to show how the Award contravenes the Fundamental Policy of Indian law. Explanation 1 delineates this ground to include contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law (Section 34(2)(b)(ii) (Explanation I (ii))). The appellant has failed to show how the Award contravenes the Fundamental Policy of Indian law. We do not find evidence of absence of a “Judicial Approach” on the part of the Arbitrator in arriving at the findings of the interim and final Awards: Sangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) (2019 ) 15 SCC 131 and Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd v. Western Geco International Ltd ONGC (2014) 9 SCC 263 and PSA SICAL Terminals (P) Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin 2021 SCC OnLine SC 508. The discussion of the public policy of India inthe context of section 34 in Unibros v. All India Radio 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366 would not apply in the facts of the present case since the Supreme Court in that case dwelt on the aspect of an Arbitrator overreaching a binding judicial decision. 54. The appellant’s objection with regard to the appointment of the Arbitrator, as already been discussed above, is without basis. Hence, the superstructure falling on the foundation being removed would not arise in the facts of the present case: Chairman-cumManaging Director, Coal India Limited v. Ananta Saha (2011) 5 SCC 142 . 55. This Court fails to see any basis for interfering with the impugned Common Order dated 03.03.2017 dismissing the appellant’s and the respondent No.1’s challenge to the interim and final Awards. The Court has carefully perused the orders passed by the High Court and the District Courts in multifarious proceedings initiated by the appellant and the respondent No.1. These orders and the facts stated above would indicate that the appellant and the respondent No.1 resisted each and every direction passed by the Courts and the Arbitral Tribunal insofar as the directions/orders were against them. The appellant and therespondent No.1 have tried every rule in the book to assail these directions on trivial and flimsy pretexts only to prolong the proceedings. Hence, equity also demands that the appellant is not given any protection by an order of Court. Even otherwise, the appellant has no case on merits. The Trial Court correctly invoked its discretionary powers to dismiss the A.O.Ps questioning the interim and final Awards passed by the Arbitrator. Hence, equity also demands that the appellant is not given any protection by an order of Court. Even otherwise, the appellant has no case on merits. The Trial Court correctly invoked its discretionary powers to dismiss the A.O.Ps questioning the interim and final Awards passed by the Arbitrator. This Court finds no ground to interfere with those findings or substitute its views for those taken by the Trial Court and least of all by the learned Arbitrator. Point No.3 - Whether the application filed by respondent No.1 for transposition as the appellant No.2 can be allowed in the attending facts and circumstances? 56. The orders passed by this Court on 13.06.2024 and 08.07.2024 become material for I.A.No.1 of 2024 which is an Application filed by the respondent No.1 to transpose the said respondent as the appellant No.2 in C.M.A.No.420 of 2017. 57. The orders reflect the admitted facts in the present Appeal to the extent that the respondent No.1 has supported the case sought to be made out by the appellant for setting aside the CommonOrder impugned in the present Appeal by which the Applications filed by the appellant and the respondent No.1 for setting aside the interim and the final Awards, were dismissed. Moreover, the appellant filed an Application for appointment of an Arbitrator under section 8 of The Arbitration Act, 1940, wherein all the parties, including the respondent No.1, subsequently filed a Joint Memo before the Arbitrator agreeing that the proceedings would be conducted under the new Act i.e., The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 58. The respondent No.1/applicant has not filed any counter to any of the I.As. in the Appeal but more importantly, has not filed any Appeal from the impugned Common Order by which both the applications filed by the respondent No.1 were dismissed. 59. Section 37 of the 1996 Act contemplates Appeals from the orders enumerated under section 37(1) and section 37(2). While the first set Clauses (a) and (b) of section 37(1) pertain to the orders refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8 or the orders granting/refusing to grant any measure under section 9, section 37(2) provides for Appeals from the orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. It is to be noted that clause (c) of section 37(1) pertains to the orders setting aside/refusing to set aside an Arbitral Award under section 34. It is to be noted that clause (c) of section 37(1) pertains to the orders setting aside/refusing to set aside an Arbitral Award under section 34. Hence, section 37 does not permit the party to assail an order refusing to set aside the Award without invoking the provisions of section 37(1) or (2) i.e., without filing an Appeal under section 37(1)(c). 60. Therefore, the arguments made on behalf of the respondent No.1 in support of the appellant does not fall under any statutory provision as contemplated under the 1996 Act. 61. The present Interlocutory Application i.e., I.A.No.1 of 2024 was filed on 11.07.2024 which is pursuant to the order dated 08.07.2024. 62. It is evident that the respondent No.1 seeks to transpose himself as the appellant No.2 having supported the case of the appellant. This change of stand is however contrary to the law under the 1996 Act wherein a party can only assail an order of dismissal of a section 34 application under section 37(1)(c) by filing an Appeal under the said provision. Not having done that, the respondent No.1 cannot take up cudgels on behalf of the appellant. In any event, the Appeal has been argued at length from 11.06.2024 on at least 6 occasions and the application was made just before the arguments were closed in the matter. 63. Hence, we do not find any reason to allow I.A.No.1 of 2024 which is accordingly dismissed. 64. C.M.A.No.420 of 2017, along with all connected applications, is dismissed for the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs. The appellant shall pay costs of Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees Four Lakhs only) to the respondent Nos.2, 4, 5, and the Legal Representatives of the respondent No.3 for needlessly prolonging the proceedings and taking one specious plea after another with the sole motive of circumventing the orders of the Court and the directions given by the Arbitrator. The conduct of the appellant as well as the respondent No.1 is to be strongly deprecated. Such conduct warrants costs which the appellant shall pay as directed within a period of 2 weeks from today.