JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 1.5.2003 passed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No.227 of 2001, whereby the Appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code Rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and fine of Rs.200 each in default of payment thereof additional rigorous imprisonment for 3 months 2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that Saraswati, wife of Amrikan/Appellant No.1, was beaten and abused by the Appellants with the allegation that she did not know cooking food and this torture led her to commit suicide by hanging herself at Village Kerakachhar between 24th and 25th April, 2001. Her marriage was solemnised with Appellant No.1 Amrikan 5-6 years before the incident. Appellants No.2 and 3 are mother-in-law and elder sister-in-law of the deceased, respectively. Gauna (a post marriage farewell ceremony) of the deceased was performed one year prior to the incident during Dussehra festival and she had come to her matrimonial house at Village Kerakachhar. On 24.4.2001, Ramnaresh (PW1), uncle of the deceased visited her at her matrimonial house at Village Kerakachhar. At that time, she told him that her husband Amrikan used to beat her without any reason. Later, he came to know that the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself. He reported the matter in Police Station Shankargarh. Morgue (Ex.P1) was registered. Dead body was sent for post mortem examination. Post mortem report is Ex.P5. During investigation, evidence were collected and statements of witnesses were recorded. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the Appellants. The Trial Court framed charge against them. 3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses. In examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Appellants pleaded false implication. No witness was examined in their defence. 4. On completion of the trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellants as mentioned in first paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the instant appeal. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants submitted that the Trial Court failed to consider that there was hardly any reliable evidence on record to warrant the conviction of the Appellants. 4. On completion of the trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellants as mentioned in first paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the instant appeal. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants submitted that the Trial Court failed to consider that there was hardly any reliable evidence on record to warrant the conviction of the Appellants. The prosecution has not been able to establish a case against the Appellants under Section 306 IPC. The Trial Court ought to have considered that most of the prosecution witnesses, being relatives of the deceased, are interested witnesses. There are material discrepancies in their statements. The allegations levelled relating to abetment are, in fact, common disputes which almost occur in every family and it would not be correct to say that due to such disputes the deceased hanged herself. The prosecution has not been able to establish any abetment against the Appellants. Hence, the Appellants deserve acquittal. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the State opposed the arguments raised on behalf of the Appellants. It was submitted that the Trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the Appellants. 7. I have heard the rival contentions put-forth on behalf of the parties and perused the entire material available with due care. 8. Post mortem examination over dead body of Saraswati was conducted by Dr. Joseph Lakra (PW4). Post mortem report is Ex.P5 in which he found that cause of the death was asphyxia due to hanging and nature of the death was suicidal. 9. It is quite clear from the prosecution evidence that deceased Saraswati was married to Appellant No.1 Amrikan alias Ambika Prasad about 6 years before the year 2001. Her mother-in-law is Appellant No.2 Samajhnibai and elder sister-in-law is Appellant No.3 Jasoda alias Jaswa. The Gauna ceremony took place about a year before 25.4.2001, which is the date of the alleged incident. It is also clear that the deceased was married to Appellant Amrikan according to the Golavat tradition, i.e., the elder sister of Appellant Amrikan, namely, Appellant Jasoda alias Jaswa was married to the deceased's brother Ramsunder. It is also clear that due to bad relations between Ramsunder and Appellant Jasoda alias Jaswa, they had mutually separated in a panchayat meeting. It is also clear that the deceased was married to Appellant Amrikan according to the Golavat tradition, i.e., the elder sister of Appellant Amrikan, namely, Appellant Jasoda alias Jaswa was married to the deceased's brother Ramsunder. It is also clear that due to bad relations between Ramsunder and Appellant Jasoda alias Jaswa, they had mutually separated in a panchayat meeting. The statements of deceased Saraswati's closest relatives, namely, mother Gangajali (PW2), uncle Ramnaresh (PW1) and neighbour Lal Bahadur (PW3) have also proved that after the Gauna ceremony, deceased Saraswati went to her in-laws' house and stayed there for a few days, after which she came back to her maternal house and after staying there for about a year, she again went to her in-laws' house about 3-4 days before the incident. It is also clear that both the parties are residents of the same Village Asanpani and live in different mohallas of that village. The Appellants party lived in Kerakachhar mohalla. It is also clear that the body of deceased Saraswati was found hanging in a tree near the village, i.e., her body was not found in any house. 10. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605 has defined ‘abetment’ as under: “11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under: “306. Abetment of suicide - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” From a bare reading of the provision, it is clear that to constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the prosecution has to establish: (i) that a person committed suicide, and (ii) that such suicide was abetted by the accused. In other words, an offence under Section 306 would stand only if there is an "abetment" for the commission of the crime. The parameters of "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the IPC, which defines abetment of a thing as follows: "107. In other words, an offence under Section 306 would stand only if there is an "abetment" for the commission of the crime. The parameters of "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the IPC, which defines abetment of a thing as follows: "107. Abetment of a thing - A person abets the doing of a thing, who - First- Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly-Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1- A person who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing." 12. As per the Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 of the IPC. 13. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the allegations levelled against the appellant in the FIR and the material collected during the course of investigations, would attract any one of the ingredients of Section 107 IPC? 14. As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in the IPC. 14. As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in the IPC. The meaning of the said word was considered by this Court in Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be (2001) 9 SCC 618 capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation. 15. Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action: provoke to action or reaction" (See: Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (See: Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary - 7th Edition). Similarly, "urge" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, especially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. As observed in Ramesh Kumar's case (supra), where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an "instigation" may be inferred. As observed in Ramesh Kumar's case (supra), where the accused by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an "instigation" may be inferred. In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established that: (i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and (ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary concomitant of instigation. 16. In the background of this legal position, we may advert to the case at hand. The question as to what is the cause of a suicide has no easy answers because suicidal ideation and behaviours in human beings are complex and multifaceted. Different individuals in the same situation react and behave differently because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide. Each individual's suicidability pattern depends on his inner subjective experience of mental pain, fear and loss of self-respect. Each of these factors are crucial and exacerbating contributor to an individual's vulnerability to end his own life, which may either be an attempt for self-protection or an escapism from intolerable self. 17. In the present case, the charge against the appellant is that he along with other two accused "in furtherance of common intention", mentally tortured Jitendra Sharma (the deceased) and abetted him to commit suicide by the said act of mental torture. It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring an end to his life. It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring an end to his life. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was left with no other option except to end his life and, therefore, clause firstly of Section 107 of the IPC was attracted. Briefly dealing with the material available on record, in the order directing framing of charge against the appellant, the learned trial court has observed as under: "In the present case the evidence shows threatening given to the deceased. One witness called Kartar Singh says that CK Chopra was heard saying to the deceased that the deceased had become dishonest because he was refusing to sign a paper in which the share in some joint property was shown to be 10%. On another occasion Chopra was heard by this witness to say that Chopra would ruin the deceased if he did not give up his claim for 25% and did not agree to accept 10%. Witness Padam Bahadur has stated inter alia that he overheard Jahoor and Mahavir telling the deceased that Chopra had asked them to say that this was the last opportunity to sign the document and that if he wanted to live in the society he should sign the agreement or should die by taking poison. Soon thereafter the deceased committed suicide. Thus the evidence is not of a mere quarrel in which one person told the other go and die without actually suggesting that the opponent should commit suicide. In the present case the evidence collected by the investigation suggest that the deceased had been actually pushed to the wall and the escape by committing suicide was suggested by the accused persons." 18. In the present case the evidence collected by the investigation suggest that the deceased had been actually pushed to the wall and the escape by committing suicide was suggested by the accused persons." 18. In the light of the material on record, in our judgment, it cannot be said that the trial court was in error in drawing an inference that the appellant had "instigated" the deceased to commit suicide and, therefore, there was ground for presuming that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (See: Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi & Ors. Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja & Ors). 19. In Som Nath Thapa & Ors. (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word "presume". Referring to dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus: "...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has commuted the offence. It is apparent that at (1990) 4 SCC 76 the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage". 11. It is apparent that at (1990) 4 SCC 76 the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage". 11. In Mahendra Singh and another Gayatribai v. State of M.P., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 731, on the point of abetment, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “2. …...Abetment has been defined in Section 107 IPC to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly instigates any person to do a thing, or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing, or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Neither of the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the statement of the deceased.” 12. Similarly, in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has observed thus: “20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 21. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal reported in (1994) 1 SCC 73 , this Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.” 13. Likewise, in Sudhakar and another v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 6 SCC 671 , Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under: “The conviction of the persons accused of offences cannot be based upon conjectures and suspicions.” 14. Considering the above view taken by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in the instant case it is evident that the prosecution witnesses have stated that sometime before the incident, deceased Saraswati's brother Janaklal had gone to her in-laws' house to bring her back, but the Appellants had locked the deceased in a room and did not allow him to meet her. However, in this matter, deceased's brother Janaklal has not been examined by the prosecution. 15. The prosecution witnesses have made omnibus allegations against the Appellants that they used to beat and abuse deceased Saraswati. But, no clear statement has been made about who beat her, when, how, with what object and where deceased Saraswati was injured. A clear description has also not been given about who from the Appellants party abused, when, how and what? In this matter, the allegations of beating and abuse are of general nature for which no specific details have been given, hence it cannot be believed beyond doubt. It has also come into evidence that Saraswati did not want to go to her matrimonial house. Gangajali (PW2), mother of deceased Saraswati has stated in her cross-examination at paragraph 6 that Saraswati did not want to go to her matrimonial house, but, they had sent her there due to public shame. Ramnaresh (PW1), uncle of deceased Saraswati has also stated in his cross-examination at paragraph 9 that Saraswati did not want to go to her matrimonial house. 16. Ramnaresh (PW1), uncle of deceased Saraswati has also stated in his cross-examination at paragraph 9 that Saraswati did not want to go to her matrimonial house. 16. On consideration of effect of abetment, it is found that uncle Ramnaresh (PW1) has stated that the deceased was beaten in the night soon before the incident, but, in cross-examination of this witness, it has emerged that this fact is not mentioned in his police statement. 17. From appreciation of the above evidence available on record, I find that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case. Hence, the conviction imposed upon the Appellants is not sustainable. 18. In the result, the criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The Appellants are acquitted. 19. The Appellants are reported to be on bail. Their bail bonds shall continue for a further period of 6 months under Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the said bonds shall stand discharged. 20. Record of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for necessary compliance.