JUDGMENT : Per Rajani Dubey, J Challenge in this appeal is to the legality and validity of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27-02-2020 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, Distt. Surajpur in ST No.15/2019, whereby the appellant stands convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 450 of IPC. RI for 10 years, pay a of Rs.5,000/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for 06 months. Under Section 376(1) of IPC. Life imprisonment, pay a of Rs.25,000/- and in default thereof to suffer additional RI for 01 year. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 17.10.2019 husband of the prosecutrix (PW-7) had gone to Ambikapur in connection with his work and while she along with her two minor children was asleep at her home, at around 10.30 pm she woke up hearing the sound of knock at the door. When she opened the door, she saw the appellant, who was resident of her maternal village-Podi, standing there and he forcibly entered her home and committed rape upon her. However, hearing the hue and cry raised by the prosecutrix, the villages came to her rescue and caught the appellant but it being too late, the appellant was not taken to police station at that time and after return of husband of the prosecutrix, she along with her husband and the villagers went to the police station with the appellant and lodged report to the above effect. 3. During the course of investigation, spot map Ex.P/10 was prepared, statement under Section 164 of CrPC of the prosecutrix was recorded, she was got medically examined, vaginal slides of the prosecutrix and undergarments of the appellant were seized; seized articles were sent to FSL for chemical examination; statements of the witnesses were recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet under Sections 376 and 450 of IPC was filed against the accused/appellant followed by framing of charges accordingly by the learned trial Court which were abjured by the appellant and he prayed for trial. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses in all. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses in all. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. However, no witness was examined by him in defence. 5. Learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective parties and considering the material available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant would submits that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. Learned trial Court ought to have seen that the prosecutrix and the appellant were well acquainted to each other as they belong to the same village and she has admitted in her deposition that there were friendly relations between them. In fact, on the date of incident she herself had called the appellant to her home and had physical relation with him of her own free will but as she was caught red handed by the villagers, a false report was lodged against the appellant. She also admits that she did not receive any external or internal injury during the alleged offence. Medical evidence lends no support to the prosecution case. Even otherwise, looking to the conduct of the prosecutrix during the alleged offence as is reflected from her deposition, it is clear that she was a consenting party to the act of the appellant. The other important prosecution witnesses have not supported the prosecution case and have turned hostile. Learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in its true perspective and therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Dola alias Dolagobinda Pradhan and another Vs. State of Odisha, (2018) 18 SCC 695 and Santosh Prasad alias Santosh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar, (2020) 3 SCC 443 . 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment submits that the trial Court considering all the relevant aspects of the matter in light of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution has rightly convicted and sentenced the present appellant by the impugned judgment which calls for no interference by this Court. 8. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment submits that the trial Court considering all the relevant aspects of the matter in light of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution has rightly convicted and sentenced the present appellant by the impugned judgment which calls for no interference by this Court. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the appellant was charged under Sections 450 and 376 of IPC. The prosecution examined in all 12 witnesses to substantiate its case and the learned trial Court upon appreciation of the evidence on record convicted the appellant under Sections 450 and 376(1) of IPC by the impugned judgment. 10. PW-7 prosecutrix states that on the date of incident at around 10.30 pm she heard the sound of knock at the door, when she opened the door under the impression that her husband would have come, the appellant entered her home and bolted the door from inside and thereafter committed rape on her. However, hearing her cries, her neighbour Ramgulab, Mahendra and Baldev came to her rescue. At that time, the appellant was trying to flee from there, however, he was caught by them, he was confined in the home and they informed her husband telephonically. Her husband came at around 2-3 am and then she narrated the whole incident to him. She admits that she made a written complaint Ex.P/9 to the police which was got written by an advocate and thereafter the police registered FIR (Ex.P/7). In cross-examination, she admits in para 7 that the appellant is of her Village-Podi and she knew the appellant since childhood as he used to visit her home and she had a good friendship with him. However, she denies the fact that she had a love affair with the appellant. In para 13 she admits that after marriage she was in contact with the appellant. In para 19 she admits that when she opened the door, she recognized the appellant that he is of her Village-Podi. She admits that when the appellant was closing the main gate, at that time her hand, leg and mouth were open. In para 13 she admits that after marriage she was in contact with the appellant. In para 19 she admits that when she opened the door, she recognized the appellant that he is of her Village-Podi. She admits that when the appellant was closing the main gate, at that time her hand, leg and mouth were open. She volunteers that the appellant entered inside her home suddenly and bolted the main door of the verandah from inside which was totally empty. She admits that there is house of Mahendra adjacent to the wall of the verandah. In para 24 she admits that her clothes were not torn during the incident and the same were intact. In para 28 she admits that both of her children had no knowledge about the incident as there was no hue and cry during the incident. She volunteers that as her mouth was gagged, therefore, she could not raise any alarm. It was also suggested that motorcycle of the appellant was parked inside her home but she denied this suggestion. However, she admits that when Mahendra was trying to catch the appellant, he climbed on the roof. It was suggested to the prosecutrix that since the neighbours came to know about the incident, therefore, she lodged a report next day but she denied this suggestion. However, she also admits that she did not bite any part of the appellant's body during the incident. 11. PW-10 husband of the prosecutrix states that when at around 1.30 am on the date of incident he reached his home, he found that the villagers Mahendra, Ramgulab and Baldev had confined the appellant in his home and on being asked, his wife informed that the appellant having forcibly entered her home committed rape on her by gagging her mouth. He states that the appellant was kept confined in his home throughout the night by the villagers and on the next day, he along with the prosecutrix and the villagers took the appellant to police station and lodged a report against him. In para 9 of his cross-examination he admits that Mahendra informed him telephonically at night that somebody has entered his home and he has bolted the door from outside. Mahendra also informed that they are keeping watch on his home and asked him (PW-10) to come home immediately. In para 9 of his cross-examination he admits that Mahendra informed him telephonically at night that somebody has entered his home and he has bolted the door from outside. Mahendra also informed that they are keeping watch on his home and asked him (PW-10) to come home immediately. Thereupon, he asked Mahendra to go inside the home and catch the accused. He admits that Mahendra then told him that the door is bolted from inside and it is not being opened by the prosecutrix. He admits that he asked Mahendra to catch the accused anyhow, on which he replied that the prosecutrix is not opening the door. Thereafter, he asked Mahendra to enter the home through roof and catch the accused. He admits that thereafter only Mahendra and the villagers caught the accused. 12. PW-1 Gameshwar Rajwade and PW-2 Mahendra Kumar did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile. In further cross-examination by the prosecution, they denied all the suggestions of the prosecution. 13. PW-5 Dr. Suchita Nirmala Kindo examined the prosecutrix on 18.10.2019 and did not notice any internal or external injury or any sign of struggle on her body. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dola alias Dolagobinda Pradhan (supra) observed in paras 6, 7 and 9 of its judgment as under: "6. It is well-settled law that if the version of the prosecutrix is believed, basic truth in her evidence is ascertainable and if it is found to be credible and consistent, the same would form the basis of conviction. Corroboration is not a sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. If the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration, except from medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. When a grown up and married woman gives evidence on oath in court that she was raped, it is not the proper judicial approach to disbelieve her outright. 7. When a grown up and married woman gives evidence on oath in court that she was raped, it is not the proper judicial approach to disbelieve her outright. 7. In this regard it would be useful to quote certain observations of this Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217 wherein it is observed that: (SCC pp. 225-27, paras 10-11) "10. By and large these factors are not relevant to India, and the Indian conditions. Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault on account of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is generally true in the context of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because: (1) A girl or a woman in the tradition-bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracised by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. (6) It would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (8) She would feel extremely embarrassed in relating the incident to others being overpowered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition-bound society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family name and family honour is brought into controversy. (10) The parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's family of a married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face the cross-examination by counsel for the culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. 11. In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to books. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle, the evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on a par with evidence of an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self-inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eyewitness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the courts in the western world (obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hangover). It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the courts in the western world (obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hangover). We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the "probabilities factor" does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following qualification: Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the "probabilities factor" is found to be out of tune." (emphasis supplied) 9. However, as is also evident from the observations above, such reliance may be placed only if the testimony of the prosecutrix appears to be worthy of credence. In this regard, it is also relevant to note the following observations of this Court in Raju v. State of M.P. (2008) 15 SCC 133 , which read thus: (SCC p. 141, paras 10-11) "10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court. 11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration." Having due regard in our mind to the abovementioned settled position in law, we have assessed the entire material on record meticulously. 15. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Santosh Prasad (supra) observed in para 5.4.3, 5.5 and 6 of its judgment as under: "5.4.3. In Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 it is observed and held by this Court that no doubt, it is true that to hold an accused guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling quality. 5.5. With the aforesaid decisions in mind, it is required to be considered. whether is it safe to convict the accused solely on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix? Whether the evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely trustworthy, unblemished and is of sterling quality? 6. Having gone through and considered the deposition of the prosecutrix, we find that there are material contradictions. Not only there are material contradictions, but even the manner in which the alleged incident has taken place as per the version of the prosecutrix is not believable. In the examination- in-chief, the prosecutrix has stated that after jumping the fallen compound wall the accused came inside and thereafter the accused committed rape. She has stated that she identified the accused from the light of the mobile. However, no mobile is recovered. Even nothing is on record that there was a broken compound wall. In the examination- in-chief, the prosecutrix has stated that after jumping the fallen compound wall the accused came inside and thereafter the accused committed rape. She has stated that she identified the accused from the light of the mobile. However, no mobile is recovered. Even nothing is on record that there was a broken compound wall. She has further stated that in the morning at 10 o'clock she went to the police station and gave oral complaint. However, according to the investigating officer a written complaint was given. It is also required to be noted that even the FIR is registered at 4:00 p.m. In her deposition, the prosecutrix has referred to the name of Shanti Devi, PW 1 and others. However. Shanti Devi has not-supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, when we tested the version of PW 5. prosecutrix, it is unfortunate that the said witness has failed to pass any of the tests of "sterling witness". There is a variation in her version about giving the complaint. There is a delay in the FIR. The medical report does not support the case of the prosecution. FSL report also does not support the case of the prosecution. As admitted, there was an enmity/dispute between both the parties with respect to land. The manner in which the occurrence is stated to have occurred is not believable. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the solitary version of the prosecutrix, PW 5 cannot be taken as a gospel truth at face value and in the absence of any other supporting evidence, there is no scope to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant and the accused is to be given the benefit of doubt." 16. In light of the above observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if we examine the facts and evidence of the present case, it is clear that the prosecutrix admitted her previous friendship with the appellant and also admitted that he is from her village, she knew him since childhood as he used to visit her house. It is also admitted by husband of the prosecutrix that his neighbour Mahendra informed him telephonically that somebody has entered his home and that the villagers bolted the door from outside and thereafter, caught the appellant. It is also admitted by husband of the prosecutrix that his neighbour Mahendra informed him telephonically that somebody has entered his home and that the villagers bolted the door from outside and thereafter, caught the appellant. The prosecutrix has also admitted that she made a complaint to the police which was written by an advocate. Though the prosecutrix states that she was subjected to forcible intercourse by the appellant, however, medical evidence shows that there was no internal or external injury or any sign of struggle on her body. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case; manner in which the incident is said to have taken place; the version of the prosecutrix cannot be taken as a gospel truth at the face value and it appears to be suspicious. Hence there is no scope to sustain the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant. He deserves to be acquitted of the said charges by giving him benefit of doubt. 17. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges under Sections 450 and 376(1) of IPC. He is still in jail, therefore, he be set free forthwith if not required in any other case. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437A of CrPC, the appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond in terms of form No.45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for a sum of Rs.25,000/-with two sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 18. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action.