JUDGMENT : (K. Surender, J.) The appellant/accused who was mother of the three children was convicted for murdering her own children. The appeal is filed against the conviction recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. 2. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is that on 30.09.2014 around 1:00 p.m., complaint was filed by PW.1 who is the VRO of Ghangadharpally. In the complaint it was mentioned stated that the appellant had killed her three children, which was informed by the appellant. When enquired with PW.2 (mother-in-law of appellant) regarding the incident, she stated that on the previous day i.e. on 29.09.2014, PW.2 warned and admonished the appellant for beating her four year old son. On the said night, she slept in her house with the children, since the husband of the appellant had gone to Hyderabad for begging and he did not return. The next day when PW.2 and her other son went to collect mango leaves, meanwhile it was informed to them that the appellant was running towards the pond. They rushed towards the pond and found that the appellant was in the middle of the pond and when she was asked to come out, she did not heed to their shouting as such PW.2 and others went inside the pond and brought appellant out with help of some people who entered into the pond and brought back the appellant out of the pond. On enquiry, the appellant revealed that she had killed all her children and the bodies were in the house. Immediately, on hearing what the appellant said, all of them went to the house and found the three children dead. Thereafter, it was informed to PW.1 who in turn lodged the complaint. 3. On the basis of the complaint filed, scene of offence ‘panchanama’ was conducted near the house and thereafter inquest was also conducted. The dead bodies of the three children were sent for post-mortem examination. According to the Postmortem, the three children were killed by strangulation. Having concluded investigation, police filed charge sheet for the offence under Sections 302 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant. 4. The learned Sessions Judge having framed charges under the said offences, examined PWs.1 to 12 on behalf the prosecution. According to the Postmortem, the three children were killed by strangulation. Having concluded investigation, police filed charge sheet for the offence under Sections 302 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant. 4. The learned Sessions Judge having framed charges under the said offences, examined PWs.1 to 12 on behalf the prosecution. PWs.2 and 3 supported the case of the prosecution regarding the appellant being present in the house along with her three children on the night i.e. previous day of the appellant trying to commit suicide. Accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge believing the version of PWs.2 and 3 and other circumstances, convicted the appellant. 5. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that even according to the prosecution case, the appellant was a beggar and also her husband. They used to go to Hyderabad for the purpose of begging and at times they could not return to the village. In fact, whenever, she goes to Hyderabad, the children were under the care and custody of PW.2. In fact, even in the complaint given by PW.1, it is stated that she wanted to take her life for the reason of the children not being alive. It is not mentioned in the complaint that appellant had committed the murder of three children, but, stated that since the children were not alive, she intended to commit suicide. 6. Counsel further argued that the circumstances made out by the prosecution are not sufficient to point towards the guilt of the appellant. It was not proved that when the children died, the appellant was in the house. In the said circumstances, on the basis of suspicion, conviction cannot be recorded. 7. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor would submit that in the complaint filed at the earliest point of time vide Ex.P1 the sequence was clearly narrated. PW.2 had admonished the appellant for beating her children on 29.09.2014. On the next day i.e. on 30.09.2014, appellant tried to commit suicide and PW.2 and others brought her out of the pond. Then the appellant had informed about the death of her three children. When the children were under the care and custody of the appellant, the appellant has to explain as to how the children died. On the next day i.e. on 30.09.2014, appellant tried to commit suicide and PW.2 and others brought her out of the pond. Then the appellant had informed about the death of her three children. When the children were under the care and custody of the appellant, the appellant has to explain as to how the children died. Since the children died when they were in the custody and care of the appellant and there is no explanation as to how they died, the logical conclusion that can be drawn is that the appellant caused death of the three children. 8. The case is one of causing death of one year, three year and four year old children. All the three children died. The death of the children was known only at the instance of the appellant while she was rescued from committing suicide in the pond. When questioned about the reason for her suicide, she stated that her children were dead. According to the witnesses, she informed PWs.2 and 3 that she has throttled her children. 9. It is not in dispute that the mother-in-law-PW.2 and her other son were living in one room and the appellant along with her husband and children were living in the other room in the same compound. Husband of the deceased was not present on the date of the incident and admittedly, he went to Hyderabad for begging. It was the appellant and the three children who alone were present in the house. In fact, PW.2 stated that on the previous day, when the appellant was beating her children, she admonished her not to do so. 10. When the prosecution has come up with evidence regarding the appellant being present in the house along with three children and thereafter at her instance, the dead bodies were found, the burden shifts on to the appellant to prove under what circumstances the children died. The knowledge about the death and discovering the dead bodies was at the instance of the appellant. Under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden shifts on to her, since she has the exclusive knowledge about the deaths of her three children. It is not the case of the appellant that some third person entered the house and caused the death of the children nor any insanity plea was taken during the course of trial. 11. It is not the case of the appellant that some third person entered the house and caused the death of the children nor any insanity plea was taken during the course of trial. 11. The Honourable Supreme Court in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 681 held as follows; “14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944 AC 315 : (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [ (2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135].) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. 16. A somewhat similar question was examined by this Court in connection with Sections 167 and 178-A of the Sea Customs Act in Collector of Customs v. D. Bhoormall [ (1974) 2 SCC 544 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 784 : AIR 1974 SC 859 ] and it will be apt to reproduce paras 30 to 32 of the reports which are as under: (SCC pp. 553-54) “30. It cannot be disputed that in proceedings for imposing penalties under clause (8) of Section 167, to which Section 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Department. This is a fundamental rule relating to proof in all criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, where there is no statutory provision to the contrary. But, in appreciating its scope and the nature of the onus cast by it, we must pay due regard to other kindred principles, no less fundamental, of universal application. One of them is that the prosecution or the Department is not required to prove its case with mathematical precision to a demonstrable degree; for, in all human affairs absolute certainty is a myth, and — as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it—‘all exactness is a fake’. El Dorado of absolute proof being unattainable, the law accepts for it probability as a working substitute in this work-a-day world. The law does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible. Brett felicitously puts it—‘all exactness is a fake’. El Dorado of absolute proof being unattainable, the law accepts for it probability as a working substitute in this work-a-day world. The law does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible. All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. 31. The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered—to use the words of Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archer [(1774) 1 Cowp 63 : 98 ER 969], Cowp at p. 65—‘according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’. Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. 32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar knowledge of the persons concerned in it. On the principle underlying Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to establish those facts is cast on the person concerned; and if he fails to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of fact may arise against him, which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in the result, prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best (in Law of Evidence, 12th Edn., Article 320, p. 291), the ‘presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumptio juris; but every day's practice shows that it may be successfully encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property’, though the latter is only a presumption of fact. As pointed out by Best (in Law of Evidence, 12th Edn., Article 320, p. 291), the ‘presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumptio juris; but every day's practice shows that it may be successfully encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property’, though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the burden on the prosecution or the Department may be considerably lightened even by such presumptions of fact arising in their favour. However, this does not mean that the special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the prosecution or the Department altogether of the burden of producing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only alleviate that burden, to discharge which, very slight evidence may suffice.” 12. The prosecution has proved that the appellant was alone along with the children and at her instance and information the three children were found dead in the house by PW.2 and others. The initial burden of proving that the children and the appellant were present in the house has been discharged by the prosecution. Except stating that she has not caused the death of the three children, nothing is elicited during the evidence of witnesses that she was not present in the house nor any suggestion is made to the effect that any third person had committed murder of the three children. 13. In the said circumstances, I do not find any infirmity with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge in convicting the appellant. 14. Accordingly, the appeal fails and dismissed. Since the appellant is on bail, in view of her confirmation of the conviction, the bail stands cancelled. The trial Court is directed to send the appellant to prison to serve out the remaining part of the sentence.